In information science, an upper ontology (also known as a top-level ontology, upper model, or foundation ontology) is an ontology (in the sense used in information science) that consists of very general terms (such as "object", "property", "relation") that are common across all domains. An important function of an upper ontology is to support broad semantic interoperability among a large number of domain-specific ontologies by providing a common starting point for the formulation of definitions. Terms in the domain ontology are ranked under the terms in the upper ontology, e.g., the upper ontology classes are superclasses or supersets of all the classes in the domain ontologies. A number of upper ontologies have been proposed, each with its own proponents. Library classification systems predate upper ontology systems. Though library classifications organize and categorize knowledge using general concepts that are the same across all knowledge domains, neither system is a replacement for the other. == Development == Any standard foundational ontology is likely to be contested among different groups, each with its own idea of "what exists". One factor exacerbating the failure to arrive at a common approach has been the lack of open-source applications that would permit the testing of different ontologies in the same computational environment. The differences have thus been debated largely on theoretical grounds, or are merely the result of personal preferences. Foundational ontologies can however be compared on the basis of adoption for the purposes of supporting interoperability across domain ontologies. No particular upper ontology has yet gained widespread acceptance as a de facto standard. Different organizations have attempted to define standards for specific domains. The 'Process Specification Language' (PSL) created by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is one example. Another important factor leading to the absence of wide adoption of any existing upper ontology is the complexity. Some upper ontologies—Cyc is often cited as an example in this regard—are very large, ranging up to thousands of elements (classes, relations), with complex interactions among them and with a complexity similar to that of a human natural language, and the learning process can be even longer than for a natural language because of the unfamiliar format and logical rules. The motivation to overcome this learning barrier is largely absent because of the paucity of publicly accessible examples of use. As a result, those building domain ontologies for local applications tend to create the simplest possible domain-specific ontology, not related to any upper ontology. Such domain ontologies may function adequately for the local purpose, but they are very time-consuming to relate accurately to other domain ontologies. To solve this problem, some genuinely top level ontologies have been developed, which are deliberately designed to have minimal overlap with any domain ontologies. Examples are Basic Formal Ontology and the DOLCE (see below). === Arguments for the infeasibility of an upper ontology === Historically, many attempts in many societies have been made to impose or define a single set of concepts as more primal, basic, foundational, authoritative, true or rational than all others. A common objection to such attempts points out that humans lack the sort of transcendent perspective — or God's eye view — that would be required to achieve this goal. Humans are bound by language or culture, and so lack the sort of objective perspective from which to observe the whole terrain of concepts and derive any one standard. Thomasson, under the headline "1.5 Skepticism about Category Systems", wrote: "category systems, at least as traditionally presented, seem to presuppose that there is a unique true answer to the question of what categories of entity there are – indeed the discovery of this answer is the goal of most such inquiries into ontological categories. [...] But actual category systems offered vary so much that even a short survey of past category systems like that above can undermine the belief that such a unique, true and complete system of categories may be found. Given such a diversity of answers to the question of what the ontological categories are, by what criteria could we possibly choose among them to determine which is uniquely correct?" Another objection is the problem of formulating definitions. Top level ontologies are designed to maximize support for interoperability across a large number of terms. Such ontologies must therefore consist of terms expressing very general concepts, but such concepts are so basic to our understanding that there is no way in which they can be defined, since the very process of definition implies that a less basic (and less well understood) concept is defined in terms of concepts that are more basic and so (ideally) more well understood. Very general concepts can often only be elucidated, for example by means of examples, or paraphrase. There is no self-evident way of dividing the world up into concepts, and certainly no non-controversial one There is no neutral ground that can serve as a means of translating between specialized (or "lower" or "application-specific") ontologies Human language itself is already an arbitrary approximation of just one among many possible conceptual maps. To draw any necessary correlation between English words and any number of intellectual concepts, that we might like to represent in our ontologies, is just asking for trouble. (WordNet, for instance, is successful and useful, precisely because it does not pretend to be a general-purpose upper ontology; rather, it is a tool for semantic / syntactic / linguistic disambiguation, which is richly embedded in the particulars and peculiarities of the English language.) Any hierarchical or topological representation of concepts must begin from some ontological, epistemological, linguistic, cultural, and ultimately pragmatic perspective. Such pragmatism does not allow for the exclusion of politics between persons or groups, indeed it requires they be considered as perhaps more basic primitives than any that are represented. Those who doubt the feasibility of general purpose ontologies are more inclined to ask "what specific purpose do we have in mind for this conceptual map of entities and what practical difference will this ontology make?" This pragmatic philosophical position surrenders all hope of devising the encoded ontology version of "The world is everything that is the case." (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). Finally, there are objections similar to those against artificial intelligence. Technically, the complex concept acquisition and the social / linguistic interactions of human beings suggest any axiomatic foundation of "most basic" concepts must be cognitive biological or otherwise difficult to characterize since we don't have axioms for such systems. Ethically, any general-purpose ontology could quickly become an actual tyranny by recruiting adherents into a political program designed to propagate it and its funding means, and possibly defend it by violence. Historically, inconsistent and irrational belief systems have proven capable of commanding obedience to the detriment or harm of persons both inside and outside a society that accepts them. How much more harmful would a consistent rational one be, were it to contain even one or two basic assumptions incompatible with human life? === Arguments for the feasibility of an upper ontology === Many of those who doubt the possibility of developing wide agreement on a common upper ontology fall into one of two traps: they assert that there is no possibility of universal agreement on any conceptual scheme; but they argue that a practical common ontology does not need to have universal agreement, it only needs a large enough user community (as is the case for human languages) to make it profitable for developers to use it as a means to general interoperability, and for third-party developer to develop utilities to make it easier to use; and they point out that developers of data schemes find different representations congenial for their local purposes; but they do not demonstrate that these different representations are in fact logically inconsistent. In fact, different representations of assertions about the real world (though not philosophical models), if they accurately reflect the world, must be logically consistent, even if they focus on different aspects of the same physical object or phenomenon. If any two assertions about the real world are logically inconsistent, one or both must be wrong, and that is a topic for experimental investigation, not for ontological representation. In practice, representations of the real world are created as and known to be approximations to the basic reality, and their use is circumscribed by the limits of e
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