Apache Hama is a distributed computing framework based on bulk synchronous parallel computing techniques for massive scientific computations e.g., matrix, graph and network algorithms. Originally a sub-project of Hadoop, it became an Apache Software Foundation top level project in 2012. It was created by Edward J. Yoon, who named it (short for "Hadoop Matrix Algebra"), and Hama also means hippopotamus in Yoon's native Korean language (하마), following the trend of naming Apache projects after animals and zoology (such as Apache Pig). Hama was inspired by Google's Pregel large-scale graph computing framework described in 2010. When executing graph algorithms, Hama showed a fifty-fold performance increase relative to Hadoop. Retired in April 2020, project resources are made available as part of the Apache Attic. Yoon cited issues of installation, scalability, and a difficult programming model for its lack of adoption. == Architecture == Hama consists of three major components: BSPMaster, GroomServers and Zookeeper. === BSPMaster === BSPMaster is responsible for: Maintaining groom server status Controlling super steps in a cluster Maintaining job progress information Scheduling jobs and assigning tasks to groom servers Disseminating execution class across groom servers Controlling fault Providing users with the cluster control interface. A BSP Master and multiple grooms are started by the script. Then, the bsp master starts up with a RPC server for groom servers. Groom servers starts up with a BSPPeer instance and a RPC proxy to contact the bsp master. After started, each groom periodically sends a heartbeat message that encloses its groom server status, including maximum task capacity, unused memory, and so on. Each time the BSP master receives a heartbeat message, it brings the groom server status up-to-date. The bsp master makes use of groom servers' status in order to assign tasks to idle groom servers - and returns a heartbeat response containing assigned tasks and others actions for a groom server to do. Currently BSP master has a FIFO job scheduler and simple task assignment algorithms. === GroomServer === A groom server (shortly referred to as groom) is a process that performs BSP tasks assigned by BSPMaster. Each groom contacts the BSPMaster, and it takes assigned tasks and reports its status by means of periodical piggybacks with BSPMaster. Each groom is designed to run with HDFS or other distributed storages. Basically, a groom server and a data node should be run on one physical node. === Zookeeper === A Zookeeper is used to manage the efficient barrier synchronisation of the BSPPeers.
Subvocal recognition
Subvocal recognition (SVR) is the process of taking subvocalization and converting the detected results to a digital output, aural or text-based. A silent speech interface is a device that allows speech communication without using the sound made when people vocalize their speech sounds. It works by the computer identifying the phonemes that an individual pronounces from nonauditory sources of information about their speech movements. These are then used to recreate the speech using speech synthesis. == Input methods == Silent speech interface systems have been created using ultrasound and optical camera input of tongue and lip movements. Electromagnetic devices are another technique for tracking tongue and lip movements. The detection of speech movements by electromyography of speech articulator muscles and the larynx is another technique. Another source of information is the vocal tract resonance signals that get transmitted through bone conduction called non-audible murmurs. They have also been created as a brain–computer interface using brain activity in the motor cortex obtained from intracortical microelectrodes. == Uses == Such devices are created as aids to those unable to create the sound phonation needed for audible speech such as after laryngectomies. Another use is for communication when speech is masked by background noise or distorted by self-contained breathing apparatus. A further practical use is where a need exists for silent communication, such as when privacy is required in a public place, or hands-free data silent transmission is needed during a military or security operation. In 2002, the Japanese company NTT DoCoMo announced it had created a silent mobile phone using electromyography and imaging of lip movement. The company stated that "the spur to developing such a phone was ridding public places of noise," adding that, "the technology is also expected to help people who have permanently lost their voice." The feasibility of using silent speech interfaces for practical communication has since then been shown. In 2019, Arnav Kapur, a researcher from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, conducted a study known as AlterEgo. Its implementation of the silent speech interface enables direct communication between the human brain and external devices through stimulation of the speech muscles. By leveraging neural signals associated with speech and language, the AlterEgo system deciphers the user's intended words and translates them into text or commands without the need for audible speech. == Research and patents == With a grant from the U.S. Army, research into synthetic telepathy using subvocalization is taking place at the University of California, Irvine under lead scientist Mike D'Zmura. NASA's Ames Research Laboratory in Mountain View, California, under the supervision of Charles Jorgensen is conducting subvocalization research. The Brain Computer Interface R&D program at Wadsworth Center under the New York State Department of Health has confirmed the existing ability to decipher consonants and vowels from imagined speech, which allows for brain-based communication using imagined speech, however using EEGs instead of subvocalization techniques. US Patents on silent communication technologies include: US Patent 6587729 "Apparatus for audibly communicating speech using the radio frequency hearing effect", US Patent 5159703 "Silent subliminal presentation system", US Patent 6011991 "Communication system and method including brain wave analysis and/or use of brain activity", US Patent 3951134 "Apparatus and method for remotely monitoring and altering brain waves". Latter two rely on brain wave analysis. == In fiction == The decoding of silent speech using a computer played an important role in Arthur C. Clarke's story and Stanley Kubrick's associated film A Space Odyssey. In this, HAL 9000, a computer controlling spaceship Discovery One, bound for Jupiter, discovers a plot to deactivate it by the mission astronauts Dave Bowman and Frank Poole through lip reading their conversations. In Orson Scott Card's series (including Ender's Game), the artificial intelligence can be spoken to while the protagonist wears a movement sensor in his jaw, enabling him to converse with the AI without making noise. He also wears an ear implant. In Speaker for the Dead and subsequent novels, author Orson Scott Card described an ear implant, called a "jewel", that allows subvocal communication with computer systems. Author Robert J. Sawyer made use of subvocal recognition to allow silent commands to the cybernetic 'companion implants' used by the advanced Neanderthal characters in his Neanderthal Parallax trilogy of science fiction novels. In Earth, David Brin depicts this technology and its uses as a normal gear in the near future. In Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, Cory Doctorow has cellphone technology become silent through a cochlear implant and miking the throat to pick up subvocalization. William Gibson's Sprawl Trilogy frequently uses sub-vocalization systems in various devices. In Kage Baker's Company novels, the immortal cyborgs communicate subvocally. In the Hugo Award-winning Hyperion Cantos by Dan Simmons, the characters often use subvocalization to communicate. In the Culture novels by Iain M. Banks, more highly advanced species often communicate subvocally through their technology. In Deus Ex: Human Revolution (2011), the protagonist is augmented with a subvocalization implant for sending covert communications (and a corresponding cochlear implant for receiving covert communications). In the tabletop RPG and video game series Shadowrun, player characters can communicate via subvocal microphones in some instances. In Paranoia, all citizens can speak to the computer via their "cerebral cortech" implants. Alistair Reynolds Revelation Space trilogy frequently uses sub-vocalization systems in various devices.
Computational creativity
Computational creativity (also known as artificial creativity, mechanical creativity, creative computing or creative computation) is a multidisciplinary endeavour that is located at the intersection of the fields of artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, philosophy, and the arts (e.g., computational art as part of computational culture). Is the application of computer systems to emulate human-like creative processes, facilitating the generation of artistic and design outputs that mimic innovation and originality. The goal of computational creativity is to model, simulate or replicate creativity using a computer, to achieve one of several ends: To construct a program or computer capable of human-level creativity. To better understand human creativity and to formulate an algorithmic perspective on creative behavior in humans. To design programs that can enhance human creativity without necessarily being creative themselves. The field of computational creativity concerns itself with theoretical and practical issues in the study of creativity. Theoretical work on the nature and proper definition of creativity is performed in parallel with practical work on the implementation of systems that exhibit creativity, with one strand of work informing the other. The applied form of computational creativity is known as media synthesis. == Theoretical issues == Theoretical approaches concern the essence of creativity. Especially, under what circumstances it is possible to call the model a "creative" if eminent creativity is about rule-breaking or the disavowal of convention. This is a variant of Ada Lovelace's objection to machine intelligence, as recapitulated by modern theorists such as Teresa Amabile. If a machine can do only what it was programmed to do, how can its behavior ever be called creative? Indeed, not all computer theorists would agree with the premise that computers can only do what they are programmed to do—a key point in favor of computational creativity. == Defining creativity in computational terms == Because no single perspective or definition seems to offer a complete picture of creativity, the AI researchers Newell, Shaw and Simon developed the combination of novelty and usefulness into the cornerstone of a multi-pronged view of creativity, one that uses the following four criteria to categorize a given answer or solution as creative: The answer is novel and useful (either for the individual or for society) The answer demands that we reject ideas we had previously accepted The answer results from intense motivation and persistence The answer comes from clarifying a problem that was originally vague Margaret Boden focused on the first two of these criteria, arguing instead that creativity (at least when asking whether computers could be creative) should be defined as "the ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are new, surprising, and valuable". Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi argued that creativity had to be considered instead in a social context, and his DIFI (Domain-Individual-Field Interaction) framework has since strongly influenced the field. In DIFI, an individual produces works whose novelty and value are assessed by the field—other people in society—providing feedback and ultimately adding the work, now deemed creative, to the domain of societal works from which an individual might be later influenced. Whereas the above reflects a top-down approach to computational creativity, an alternative thread has developed among bottom-up computational psychologists involved in artificial neural network research. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, such generative neural systems were driven by genetic algorithms. Experiments involving recurrent nets were successful in hybridizing simple musical melodies and predicting listener expectations. == Historical evolution of computational creativity == The use computational processes to generate creative artifacts has been present from early times in history. During the late 1800's, methods for composing music combinatorily were explored, involving prominent figures like Mozart, Bach, Haydn, and Kiernberger. This approach extended to analytical endeavors as early as 1934, where simple mechanical models were built to explore mathematical problem solving. Professional interest in the creative aspect of computation also was commonly addressed in early discussions of artificial intelligence. The 1956 Dartmouth Conference, listed creativity, invention, and discovery as key goals for artificial intelligence. As the development of computers allowed systems of greater complexity, the 1970's and 1980's saw invention of early systems that modelled creativity using symbolic or rule-based approaches. The field of creative storytelling investigated several such models. Meehan's TALE-SPIN (1977) generated narratives through simulation of character goals and decision trees. Dehn's AUTHOR (1981) approached generation by simulating an author's process for crafting a story. Beyond narrative generation, computational creativity expanded into artistic and scientific domains. Artistic image generation was one of the disciplines that saw early potential in generated artifacts through computational creativity. One of the most prominent examples was Harold Cohen's AARON, which produced art through composition and adaptation of figures based on a large set of symbolic rules and heuristics for visual composition. Some systems also tackled creativity in scientific endeavors. BACON was said to rediscover natural laws like Boyle's Law and Kepler's law through hypothesis testing in constrained spaces. By the 1990's the modeling techniques became more adaptive, attempting to implement cognitive creative rules for generation. Turner's MINSTREL (1993) introduced TRAMs (Transform Recall Adapt Methods) to simulate creative re-use of prior material for generative storytelling. Meanwhile, Pérez y Pérez's MEXICA (1999) modeled the creative writing process using cycles of engagement and reflection. As systems increasingly incorporated models of internal evaluation, another approach that emerged was that of combining symbolic generation with domain-specific evaluation metrics, modeling generative and selective steps to creativity In the field of generational humor, the JAPE system (1994) generated pun-based riddles using Prolog and WordNet, applying symbolic pattern-matching rules and a large lexical database (WordNet) to compose riddles involving wordplay. WordNet is a system developed by George Miller and his team at Princeton, its platform and inspired word-mapping structures have been used as the backbone of several syntactic and semantic AI programs. A notable system for music generation was David Cope's EMI (Experiments in Musical Intelligence) or Emmy, which was trained in the styles of artists like Bach, Beethoven, or Chopin and generated novel pieces in their style through pattern abstraction and recomposition. In the 2000s and beyond, machine learning began influencing creative system design. Researchers such as Mihalcea and Strapparava trained classifiers to distinguish humorous from non-humorous text, using stylistic and semantic features. Meanwhile custom computational approaches led to chess systems like Deep Blue generating quasi-creative gameplay strategies through search algorithms and parallel processing constrained by specific rules and patterns for evaluation. The institutional development of computational creativity grew along its technical advances. Dedicated workshops such as the IJWCC emerged in the 1990s, growing out of interdisciplinary conferences focused on AI and creativity. By the early 2000s, the field coalesced around annual conferences like the International Conference on Computational Creativity (ICCC). Recently, with the advent of Deep Learning, Transformers, and further refinement in Machine Learning structures, computational creativity's implementation space has new tools for development. == Machine learning for computational creativity == While traditional computational approaches to creativity rely on the explicit formulation of prescriptions by developers and a certain degree of randomness in computer programs, machine learning methods allow computer programs to learn on heuristics from input data enabling creative capacities within the computer programs. Especially, deep artificial neural networks allow to learn patterns from input data that allow for the non-linear generation of creative artefacts. Before 1989, artificial neural networks have been used to model certain aspects of creativity. Peter Todd (1989) first trained a neural network to reproduce musical melodies from a training set of musical pieces. Then he used a change algorithm to modify the network's input parameters. The network was able to randomly generate new music in a highly uncontrolled manner. In 1992, Todd extended this work, using the so-called distal teacher approach that had been d
Norm (artificial intelligence)
Norms can be considered from different perspectives in artificial intelligence to create computers and computer software that are capable of intelligent behaviour. In artificial intelligence and law, legal norms are considered in computational tools to automatically reason upon them. In multi-agent systems (MAS), a branch of artificial intelligence (AI), a norm is a guide for the common conduct of agents, thereby easing their decision-making, coordination and organization. Since most problems concerning regulation of the interaction of autonomous agents are linked to issues traditionally addressed by legal studies, and since law is the most pervasive and developed normative system, efforts to account for norms in artificial intelligence and law and in normative multi-agent systems often overlap. == Artificial intelligence and law == With the arrival of computer applications into the legal domain, and especially artificial intelligence applied to it, logic has been used as the major tool to formalize legal reasoning and has been developed in many directions, ranging from deontic logics to formal systems of argumentation. The knowledge base of legal reasoning systems usually includes legal norms (such as governmental regulations and contracts), and as a consequence, legal rules are the focus of knowledge representation and reasoning approaches to automatize and solve complex legal tasks. Legal norms are typically represented into a logic-based formalism, such as deontic logic. Artificial intelligence and law applications using an explicit representation of norms range from checking the compliance of business processes and the automatic execution of smart contracts to legal expert systems advising people on legal matters. == Multi-agent systems == Norms in multi-agent systems may appear with different degrees of explicitness ranging from fully unambiguous written prescriptions to implicit unwritten norms or tacit emerging patterns. Computer scientists’ studies mirror this polarity. Explicit norms are typically investigated in formal logics (e.g. deontic logics and argumentation) to represent and reason upon them, leading eventually to architecture for cognitive agents, while implicit norms are accounted as patterns emerging from repeated interactions amongst agents (typically reinforced learning agents). Explicit and implicit norms can be used together to coordinate agents. Explicit norms are typically represented as a deontic statement that aims at regulating the life of software agents and the interactions among them. It can be an obligation, a permission or a prohibition, and is often represented with some dialect or extension of Deontic logic. At the opposite, implicit norms are social norms that are not written, and they usually emerge from the repetitive interactions of agents.
Johns Hopkins Beast
The Johns Hopkins Beast was a mobile automaton, an early pre-robot, built in the 1960s at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. The machine had a rudimentary intelligence and the ability to survive on its own. As it wandered through the white halls of the laboratory, it would seek black wall outlets. When it found one it would plug in and recharge. The robot was cybernetic. It did not use a computer. Its control circuitry consisted of dozens of transistors controlling analog voltages. It used photocell optics and sonar to navigate. The 2N404 transistors were used to create NOR logic gates that implemented the Boolean logic to tell it what to do when a specific sensor was activated. The 2N404 transistors were also used to create timing gates to tell it how long to do something. 2N1040 Power transistors were used to control the power to the motion treads, the boom, and the charging mechanism. The original sensors in Mod I were physical touch only. The wall socket was detected by physical switches on the arm that followed the wall. Once detected, two electrical prongs were extended until they entered the wall socket and made the electrical connection to charge the vehicle. The stairway, doors, and pipes on the hall wall were also detected by physical switches and recognized by appropriate logic. The sonar guidance system was developed for Mod I and improved for Mod II. It used two ultrasonic transducers to determine distance, location within the halls, and obstructions in its path. This provided "The Beast" with bat-like guidance. At this point, it could detect obstructions in the hallway, such as people. Once an obstruction was detected, the Beast would slow down and then decide whether to stop or divert around the obstruction. It could also ultrasonically recognize the stairway and doorways to take appropriate action. An optical guidance system was added to Mod II. This provided, among other capabilities, the ability to optically identify the black wall sockets that contrasted with the white wall. The Hopkins Beast Autonomous Robot Mod II link below was written by Dr. Ronald McConnell, at that time a co-op student and one of the designers for Mod II.
Czekanowski distance
The Czekanowski distance (sometimes shortened as CZD) is a per-pixel quality metric that estimates quality or similarity by measuring differences between pixels. Because it compares vectors with strictly non-negative elements, it is often used to compare colored images, as color values cannot be negative. This different approach has a better correlation with subjective quality assessment than PSNR. == Definition == Androutsos et al. give the Czekanowski coefficient as follows: d z ( i , j ) = 1 − 2 ∑ k = 1 p min ( x i k , x j k ) ∑ k = 1 p ( x i k + x j k ) {\displaystyle d_{z}(i,j)=1-{\frac {2\sum _{k=1}^{p}{\text{min}}(x_{ik},\ x_{jk})}{\sum _{k=1}^{p}(x_{ik}+x_{jk})}}} Where a pixel x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} is being compared to a pixel x j {\displaystyle x_{j}} on the k-th band of color – usually one for each of red, green and blue. For a pixel matrix of size M × N {\displaystyle M\times N} , the Czekanowski coefficient can be used in an arithmetic mean spanning all pixels to calculate the Czekanowski distance as follows: 1 M N ∑ i = 0 M − 1 ∑ j = 0 N − 1 ( 1 − 2 ∑ k = 1 3 min ( A k ( i , j ) , B k ( i , j ) ) ∑ k = 1 3 ( A k ( i , j ) + B k ( i , j ) ) ) {\displaystyle {\frac {1}{MN}}\sum _{i=0}^{M-1}\sum _{j=0}^{N-1}{\begin{pmatrix}1-{\frac {2\sum _{k=1}^{3}{\text{min}}(A_{k}(i,j),\ B_{k}(i,j))}{\sum _{k=1}^{3}(A_{k}(i,j)+B_{k}(i,j))}}\end{pmatrix}}} Where A k ( i , j ) {\displaystyle A_{k}(i,j)} is the (i, j)-th pixel of the k-th band of a color image and, similarly, B k ( i , j ) {\displaystyle B_{k}(i,j)} is the pixel that it is being compared to. == Uses == In the context of image forensics – for example, detecting if an image has been manipulated –, Rocha et al. report the Czekanowski distance is a popular choice for Color Filter Array (CFA) identification.
Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence
Hubert Dreyfus was a critic of artificial intelligence research. In a series of papers and books, including Alchemy and AI (1965), What Computers Can't Do (1972; 1979; 1992) and Mind over Machine (1986), he presented a skeptical and cautious assessment of AI's progress and a critique of the philosophical foundations of the field. Dreyfus' objections are discussed in most introductions to the philosophy of artificial intelligence, including Russell & Norvig (2021), a standard AI textbook, and in Fearn (2007), a survey of contemporary philosophy. Dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depend primarily on yet-to-be understood informal and unconscious processes rather than symbolic manipulation and that these essentially human skills cannot be fully captured in formal rules. His critique was based on the insights of modern continental philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and was directed at the first wave of AI research which tried to reduce intelligence to high level formal symbols. When Dreyfus' ideas were first introduced in the mid-1960s, they were met in the AI community with ridicule and outright hostility. By the 1980s, however, some of his perspectives were rediscovered by researchers working in robotics and the new field of connectionism—approaches that were called "sub-symbolic" at the time because they eschewed early AI research's emphasis on high level symbols. In the 21st century, "sub-symbolic" artificial neural networks and other statistics-based approaches to machine learning were highly successful. Historian and AI researcher Daniel Crevier wrote: "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments." Dreyfus said in 2007, "I figure I won and it's over—they've given up." == Dreyfus' critique == === The grandiose promises of artificial intelligence === In Alchemy and AI (1965) and What Computers Can't Do (1972), Dreyfus summarized the history of artificial intelligence and ridiculed the unbridled optimism that permeated the field. For example, Herbert A. Simon, following the success of his program General Problem Solver (1957), predicted that by 1967: A computer would be world champion in chess. A computer would discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem. Most theories in psychology will take the form of computer programs. The press dutifully reported these predictions of the imminent arrival of machine intelligence. Dreyfus felt that this optimism was unwarranted and, in 1965, argued forcefully that predictions like these would not come true. He would eventually be proven right. Pamela McCorduck explains Dreyfus' position: A great misunderstanding accounts for public confusion about thinking machines, a misunderstanding perpetrated by the unrealistic claims researchers in AI have been making, claims that thinking machines are already here, or at any rate, just around the corner. These predictions were based on the success of the cognitive revolution, which promoted an "information processing" model of the mind. It was articulated by Newell and Simon in their physical symbol systems hypothesis, and later expanded into a philosophical position known as computationalism by philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam. In AI, the approach is now called symbolic AI or "GOFAI". Dreyfus argued that "symbolic AI" was the latest version of the ancient program of rationalism in philosophy. Rationalism had come under heavy criticism in the 20th century from philosophers like Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. The mind, according to modern continental philosophy, is not "rationalist" and is nothing like a digital computer. Cognitivism led early AI researchers to believe that they had successfully simulated the essential process of human thought, thus it seemed a short step to producing fully intelligent machines. Dreyfus' last paper detailed the ongoing history of the "first step fallacy", where AI researchers tend to wildly extrapolate initial success as promising, perhaps even guaranteeing, wild future successes. === Dreyfus' four assumptions of artificial intelligence research === In Alchemy and AI and What Computers Can't Do, Dreyfus identified four philosophical assumptions, at least one of which he deems necessary for AI to succeed. "In each case," Dreyfus writes, "the assumption is taken by workers in AI as an axiom, guaranteeing results, whereas it is, in fact, one hypothesis among others, to be tested by the success of such work." Dreyfus argues that AI would be impossible without accepting at least one of these four assumptions: The biological assumption The brain processes information in discrete operations by way of some biological equivalent of on/off switches. In the early days of research into neurology, scientists found that neurons fire in all-or-nothing pulses. Several researchers, such as Walter Pitts and Warren McCulloch, speculated with great confidence that neurons functioned similarly to the way Boolean logic gates operate, and so could be imitated by electronic circuitry at the level of the neuron. When digital computers became widely used in the early 50s, this argument was extended to suggest that the brain was a vast physical symbol system, manipulating the binary symbols of zero and one. Dreyfus was able to refute the biological assumption by citing research in neurology that suggested that the action and timing of neuron firing had analog components. But Daniel Crevier observes that "few still held that belief in the early 1970s, and nobody argued against Dreyfus" about the biological assumption. The psychological assumption The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules. He refuted this assumption by showing that much of what we know about the world consists of complex attitudes or tendencies that make us lean towards one interpretation over another. He argued that, even when we use explicit symbols, we are using them against an unconscious and informal background including commonsense knowledge and that without this background our symbols cease to mean anything. This background, in Dreyfus' view, was not implemented in individual brains as explicit individual symbols with explicit individual meanings. The epistemological assumption All knowledge can be formalized. This concerns the philosophical issue of epistemology, or the study of knowledge. Even if we agree that the psychological assumption is false, AI researchers could still argue (as AI founder John McCarthy has) that it is possible for a symbol processing machine to represent all knowledge, regardless of whether human beings represent knowledge the same way. Dreyfus argued that there is no justification for this assumption, since so much of human knowledge is not symbolic or even expressible using formal constructs. The ontological assumption The world consists of independent facts that can be represented by independent symbols AI researchers (and futurists and science fiction writers) often assume that there is no limit to formal, scientific knowledge, because they assume that any phenomenon in the universe can be described by symbols or scientific theories. This assumes that everything that exists can be understood as objects, properties of objects, classes of objects, relations of objects, and so on: precisely those things that can be described by logic, language and mathematics. The study of being or existence is called ontology, and so Dreyfus calls this the ontological assumption. If this is false, then it raises doubts about what we can ultimately know and what intelligent machines will ultimately be able to help us to do. === Knowing-how vs. knowing-that: the primacy of intuition === In Mind Over Machine (1986), written (with his brother) during the heyday of expert systems, Dreyfus analyzed the difference between human expertise and the programs that claimed to capture it. This expanded on ideas from What Computers Can't Do, where he had made a similar argument criticizing the "cognitive simulation" school of AI research practiced by Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon in the 1960s. Dreyfus argued that human problem solving and expertise depend on our background sense of the context, of what is important and interesting given the situation, rather than on the process of searching through combinations of possibilities to find what we need. Dreyfus would describe it in 1986 as the difference between "knowing-that" and "knowing-how", based on Heidegger's distinction of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. Knowing-that is our conscious, step-by-step problem solving abilities. We use these skills when we encounter a difficult problem that requires us to stop, step back and search through ideas one at time. At moments like this, the ideas become very precise and simple: they become context free symbols, which we manipulate using logic and language. These are the skills that Newell and Simon had demonstrated with both psy