In the philosophy of artificial intelligence, GOFAI (good old-fashioned artificial intelligence) is classical symbolic AI, as opposed to other approaches, such as neural networks, situated robotics, narrow symbolic AI or neuro-symbolic AI. The term was coined by philosopher John Haugeland in his 1985 book Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Haugeland coined the term to address two questions: Can GOFAI produce human-level artificial intelligence in a machine? Is GOFAI the primary method that brains use to display intelligence? AI founder Herbert A. Simon speculated in 1963 that the answers to both these questions was "yes". His evidence was the performance of programs he had co-written, such as Logic Theorist and the General Problem Solver, and his psychological research on human problem solving. AI research in the 1950s and 60s had an enormous influence on intellectual history: it inspired the cognitive revolution, led to the founding of the academic field of cognitive science, and was the essential example in the philosophical theories of computationalism, functionalism and cognitivism in ethics and the psychological theories of cognitivism and cognitive psychology. The specific aspect of AI research that led to this revolution was what Haugeland called "GOFAI". In AI development and technology, GOFAI is used to refer to programs that are built with deliberate, explicit instructions for a single task. This is in contrast to approaches that use machine learning. Examples of GOFAI applications include AlphaGo and Apple's initial Siri design. == Western rationalism == Haugeland places GOFAI within the rationalist tradition in western philosophy, which holds that abstract reason is the "highest" faculty, that it is what separates man from the animals, and that it is the most essential part of our intelligence. This assumption is present in Plato and Aristotle, in Shakespeare, Hobbes, Hume and Locke, it was central to the Enlightenment, to the logical positivists of the 1930s, and to the computationalists and cognitivists of the 1960s. As Shakespeare wrote: What a piece of work is a man, How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty ... In apprehension how like a god, The beauty of the world, The paragon of animals. Symbolic AI in the 1960s was able to successfully simulate the process of high-level reasoning, including logical deduction, algebra, geometry, spatial reasoning and means-ends analysis, all of them in precise English sentences, just like the ones humans used when they reasoned. Many observers, including philosophers, psychologists and the AI researchers themselves became convinced that they had captured the essential features of intelligence. This was not just hubris or speculation -- this was entailed by rationalism. If it was not true, then it brings into question a large part of the entire Western philosophical tradition. Continental philosophy, which included Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and others, rejected rationalism and argued that our high-level reasoning was limited and prone to error, and that most of our abilities come from our intuitions, culture, and instinctive feel for the situation. Philosophers who were familiar with this tradition were the first to criticize GOFAI and the assertion that it was sufficient for intelligence, such as Hubert Dreyfus and Haugeland. == Haugeland's GOFAI == Critics and supporters of Haugeland's position, from philosophy, psychology, or AI research have found it difficult to define "GOFAI" precisely, and thus the literature contains a variety of interpretations. Drew McDermott, for example, finds Haugeland's description of GOFAI "incoherent" and argues that GOFAI is a "myth". Haugeland coined the term GOFAI in order to examine the philosophical implications of “the claims essential to all GOFAI theories”, which he listed as: 1. our ability to deal with things intelligently is due to our capacity to think about them reasonably (including sub-conscious thinking); and 2. our capacity to think about things reasonably amounts to a faculty for internal “automatic” symbol manipulation This is very similar to the sufficient side of the physical symbol systems hypothesis proposed by Herbert A. Simon and Allen Newell in 1963: "A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action." It is also similar to Hubert Dreyfus' "psychological assumption": "The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules. " Haugeland's description of GOFAI refers to symbol manipulation governed by a set of instructions for manipulating the symbols. The "symbols" he refers to are discrete physical things that are assigned a definite semantics -- like
Semi-automation
Semi-automation is a process or procedure that is performed by the combined activities of man and machine with both human and machine steps typically orchestrated by a centralized computer controller. Within manufacturing, production processes may be fully manual, semi-automated, or fully automated. In this case, semi-automation may vary in its degree of manual and automated steps. Semi-automated manufacturing processes are typically orchestrated by a computer controller which sends messages to the worker at the time in which he/she should perform a step. The controller typically waits for feedback that the human performed step has been completed via either a human-machine interface or via electronic sensors distributed within the process. Controllers within semi-automated processes may either directly control machinery or send signals to machinery distributed within the process. Centralized computer controllers within semi-automated processes orchestrate processes by instructing the worker, providing electronic communication and control to process equipment, tools, or machines, as well as perform data management to record and ensure that the process meets established process criteria. Many manufacturers choose not to fully automate a process, and instead implement semi-automation due to the complexity of the task, or the number of products produced is too low to justify the investment in full automation. Other processes may not be fully automated because it may reduce the flexibility to easily adapt the processes to reflect production needs.
Linked timestamping
Linked timestamping is a type of trusted timestamping where issued time-stamps are related to each other. Each time-stamp would contain data that authenticates the time-stamp before it, the authentication would be authenticating the entire message, including the previous time-stamps authentication, making a chain. This makes it impossible to add a time-stamp in to the middle of the chain, as any time-stamps afterwards would be different. == Description == Linked timestamping creates time-stamp tokens which are dependent on each other, entangled in some authenticated data structure. Later modification of the issued time-stamps would invalidate this structure. The temporal order of issued time-stamps is also protected by this data structure, making backdating of the issued time-stamps impossible, even by the issuing server itself. The top of the authenticated data structure is generally published in some hard-to-modify and widely witnessed media, like printed newspaper or public blockchain. There are no (long-term) private keys in use, avoiding PKI-related risks. Suitable candidates for the authenticated data structure include: Linear hash chain Merkle tree (binary hash tree) Skip list The simplest linear hash chain-based time-stamping scheme is illustrated in the following diagram: The linking-based time-stamping authority (TSA) usually performs the following distinct functions: Aggregation For increased scalability the TSA might group time-stamping requests together which arrive within a short time-frame. These requests are aggregated together without retaining their temporal order and then assigned the same time value. Aggregation creates a cryptographic connection between all involved requests; the authenticating aggregate value will be used as input for the linking operation. Linking Linking creates a verifiable and ordered cryptographic link between the current and already issued time-stamp tokens. Publishing The TSA periodically publishes some links, so that all previously issued time-stamp tokens depend on the published link and that it is practically impossible to forge the published values. By publishing widely witnessed links, the TSA creates unforgeable verification points for validating all previously issued time-stamps. == Security == Linked timestamping is inherently more secure than the usual, public-key signature based time-stamping. All consequential time-stamps "seal" previously issued ones - hash chain (or other authenticated dictionary in use) could be built only in one way; modifying issued time-stamps is nearly as hard as finding a preimage for the used cryptographic hash function. Continuity of operation is observable by users; periodic publications in widely witnessed media provide extra transparency. Tampering with absolute time values could be detected by users, whose time-stamps are relatively comparable by system design. Absence of secret keys increases system trustworthiness. There are no keys to leak and hash algorithms are considered more future-proof than modular arithmetic based algorithms, e.g. RSA. Linked timestamping scales well - hashing is much faster than public key cryptography. There is no need for specific cryptographic hardware with its limitations. The common technology for guaranteeing long-term attestation value of the issued time-stamps (and digitally signed data) is periodic over-time-stamping of the time-stamp token. Because of missing key-related risks and of the plausible safety margin of the reasonably chosen hash function this over-time-stamping period of hash-linked token could be an order of magnitude longer than of public-key signed token. == Research == === Foundations === Stuart Haber and W. Scott Stornetta proposed in 1990 to link issued time-stamps together into linear hash-chain, using a collision-resistant hash function. The main rationale was to diminish TSA trust requirements. Tree-like schemes and operating in rounds were proposed by Benaloh and de Mare in 1991 and by Bayer, Haber and Stornetta in 1992. Benaloh and de Mare constructed a one-way accumulator in 1994 and proposed its use in time-stamping. When used for aggregation, one-way accumulator requires only one constant-time computation for round membership verification. Surety started the first commercial linked timestamping service in January 1995. Linking scheme is described and its security is analyzed in the following article by Haber and Sornetta. Buldas et al. continued with further optimization and formal analysis of binary tree and threaded tree based schemes. Skip-list based time-stamping system was implemented in 2005; related algorithms are quite efficient. === Provable security === Security proof for hash-function based time-stamping schemes was presented by Buldas, Saarepera in 2004. There is an explicit upper bound N {\displaystyle N} for the number of time stamps issued during the aggregation period; it is suggested that it is probably impossible to prove the security without this explicit bound - the so-called black-box reductions will fail in this task. Considering that all known practically relevant and efficient security proofs are black-box, this negative result is quite strong. Next, in 2005 it was shown that bounded time-stamping schemes with a trusted audit party (who periodically reviews the list of all time-stamps issued during an aggregation period) can be made universally composable - they remain secure in arbitrary environments (compositions with other protocols and other instances of the time-stamping protocol itself). Buldas, Laur showed in 2007 that bounded time-stamping schemes are secure in a very strong sense - they satisfy the so-called "knowledge-binding" condition. The security guarantee offered by Buldas, Saarepera in 2004 is improved by diminishing the security loss coefficient from N {\displaystyle N} to N {\displaystyle {\sqrt {N}}} . The hash functions used in the secure time-stamping schemes do not necessarily have to be collision-resistant or even one-way; secure time-stamping schemes are probably possible even in the presence of a universal collision-finding algorithm (i.e. universal and attacking program that is able to find collisions for any hash function). This suggests that it is possible to find even stronger proofs based on some other properties of the hash functions. At the illustration above hash tree based time-stamping system works in rounds ( t {\displaystyle t} , t + 1 {\displaystyle t+1} , t + 2 {\displaystyle t+2} , ...), with one aggregation tree per round. Capacity of the system ( N {\displaystyle N} ) is determined by the tree size ( N = 2 l {\displaystyle N=2^{l}} , where l {\displaystyle l} denotes binary tree depth). Current security proofs work on the assumption that there is a hard limit of the aggregation tree size, possibly enforced by the subtree length restriction. == Standards == ISO 18014 part 3 covers 'Mechanisms producing linked tokens'. American National Standard for Financial Services, "Trusted Timestamp Management and Security" (ANSI ASC X9.95 Standard) from June 2005 covers linking-based and hybrid time-stamping schemes. There is no IETF RFC or standard draft about linking based time-stamping. RFC 4998 (Evidence Record Syntax) encompasses hash tree and time-stamp as an integrity guarantee for long-term archiving.
Security type system
In computer science, a type system can be described as a syntactic framework which contains a set of rules that are used to assign a type property (int, boolean, char etc.) to various components of a computer program, such as variables or functions. A security type system works in a similar way, only with a main focus on the security of the computer program, through information flow control. Thus, the various components of the program are assigned security types, or labels. The aim of a such system is to ultimately be able to verify that a given program conforms to the type system rules and satisfies non-interference. Security type systems is one of many security techniques used in the field of language-based security, and is tightly connected to information flow and information flow policies. In simple terms, a security type system can be used to detect if there exists any kind of violation of confidentiality or integrity in a program, i.e. the programmer wants to detect if the program is in line with the information flow policy or not. == A simple information flow policy == Suppose there are two users, A and B. In a program, the following security classes (SC) are introduced: SC = {∅, {A}, {B}, {A,B}}, where ∅ is the empty set. The information flow policy should define the direction that information is allowed to flow, which is dependent on whether the policy allows read or write operations. This example considers read operations (confidentiality). The following flows are allowed: → = {({A}, {A}), ({B}, {B}), ({A,B}, {A,B}), ({A,B}, {A}), ({A,B}, {B}), ({A}, ∅), ({B}, ∅), ({A,B}, ∅)} This can also be described as a superset (⊇). In words: information is allowed to flow towards stricter levels of confidentiality. The combination operator (⊕) can express how security classes can perform read operations with respect to other security classes. For example: {A} ⊕ {A,B} = {A} — the only security class that can read from both {A} and {A,B} is {A}. {A} ⊕ {B} = ∅ — neither {A} nor {B} are allowed to read from both {A} and {B}. This can also be described as an intersection (∩) between security classes. An information flow policy can be illustrated as a Hasse diagram. The policy should also be a lattice, that is, it has a greatest lower-bound and least upper-bound (there always exists a combination between security classes). In the case of integrity, information will flow in the opposite direction, thus the policy will be inverted. == Information flow policy in security type systems == Once the policy is in place, the software developer can apply the security classes to the program components. Use of a security type system is usually combined with a compiler that can perform the verification of the information flow according to the type system rules. For the sake of simplicity, a very simple computer program, together with the information flow policy as described in the previous section, can be used as a demonstration. The simple program is given in the following pseudocode: if y{A} = 1 then x{A,B} := 0 else x{A,B} := 1 Here, an equality check is made on a variable y that is assigned the security class {A}. A variable x with a lower security class ({A,B}) is influenced by this check. This means that information is leaking from class {A} to class {A,B}, which is a violation of the confidentiality policy. This leak should be detected by the security type system. === Example === Designing a security type system requires a function (also known as a security environment) that creates a mapping from variables to security types, or classes. This function can be called Γ, such that Γ(x) = τ, where x is a variable and τ is the security class, or type. Security classes are assigned (also called "judgement") to program components, using the following notation: Types are assigned to read operations by: Γ ⊢ e : τ. Types are assigned to write operations by: Γ ⊢ S : τ cmd. Constants can be assigned any type. The following bottom-up notation can be used to decompose the program: assumption1 ... assumptionn/conclusion. Once the program is decomposed into trivial judgements, by which the type can easily be determined, the types for the less trivial parts of the program can be derived. Each "numerator" is considered in isolation, looking at the type of each statement to see if an allowed type can be derived for the "denominator", based on the defined type system "rules". ==== Rules ==== The main part of the security type system is the rules. They say how the program should be decomposed and how type verification should be performed. This toy program consists of a conditional test and two possible variable assignments. Rules for these two events are defined as follows: Applying this to the simple program introduced above yields: The type system detects the policy violation in line 2, where a read operation of security class {A} is performed, followed by two write operations of a less strict security class {A,B}. In more formalized terms, {A} ⋢ {A,B}, {A,B} (from the rule of the conditional test). Thus, the program is classified as "not typeable". === Soundness === The soundness of a security type system can be informally defined as: If program P is well typed, P satisfies non-interference. Volpano, Smith and Irvine were the first to prove soundness of a security type system for a deterministic imperative programming language with a standard (non-instrumented) semantics using the notion of non-interference.
Information schema
In relational databases, the information schema (information_schema) is an ANSI-standard set of read-only views that provide information about all of the tables, views, columns, and procedures in a database. It can be used as a source of the information that some databases make available through non-standard commands, such as: the SHOW command of MySQL the DESCRIBE command of Oracle's SQLPlus the \d command in psql (PostgreSQL's default command-line program). => SELECT count(table_name) FROM information_schema.tables; count ------- 99 (1 row) => SELECT column_name, data_type, column_default, is_nullable FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name='alpha'; column_name | data_type | column_default | is_nullable -------------+-----------+----------------+------------- foo | integer | | YES bar | character | | YES (2 rows) => SELECT FROM information_schema.information_schema_catalog_name; catalog_name -------------- johnd (1 row) == Implementation == As a notable exception among major database systems, Oracle does not as of 2015 implement the information schema. An open-source project exists to address this. RDBMSs that support information_schema include: Amazon Redshift Apache Hive Microsoft SQL Server MonetDB Snowflake MySQL PostgreSQL H2 Database HSQLDB InterSystems Caché MariaDB SingleStore (formerly MemSQL) Mimer SQL Snowflake Trino Presto CrateDB ClickHouse CockroachDB Kinetica DB TiDB RDBMSs that do not support information_schema include: Apache Derby Apache Ignite Firebird Microsoft Access IBM Informix Ingres IBM Db2 Oracle Database SAP HANA SQLite Sybase ASE Sybase SQL Anywhere Teradata Vertica
Infogram
Infogram is a web-based data visualization and infographics platform, created in Riga, Latvia. It allows people to make and share digital charts, infographics and maps. Infogram offers an intuitive WYSIWYG editor that converts users’ data into infographics that can be published, embedded or shared. Users do not need coding skills to use this tool; users include newsrooms, marketing teams, governments, educators and students. The company that created Infogram, also called Infogram, was founded in 2012 in Riga, Latvia and has another office in San Francisco. As of October 2017, Infogram says it has 3 million users who have created charts and infographics that have been viewed more than 1.5 billion times. Infogram was bought by Prezi, a web-based presentation software company, in May 2017. == History == Infogram was founded in February 2012 in Riga, Latvia by Uldis Leiterts, Raimonds Kaže and Alise Dīrika. In January 2013, Infogram won the international Hy Berlin pitch contest. During his pitch, Infogram CEO Uldis Leiterts announced that the company had created more templates and was working with Microsoft to integrate its platform with the contemporaneous version of Microsoft Office. The company also won the 2013 Kantar Information Is Beautiful Award, which “celebrates excellence and beauty in data visualizations, infographics, interactives & information art.” In December 2014, Infogram acquired the Brazil-based data visualization blog, Visualoop. In an effort to expand sales and marketing in the U.S., Infogram secured $1.8 million in funding in February 2014. The announcement was made at TechChill, a startup conference for the Baltics in Riga, Latvia. At the time, the funding was believed to be the largest to date for the company. Infogram won the 2017 National Design Award of Latvia. == Acquisition by Prezi == Prezi, a web-based presentation software company, acquired Infogram in May 2017. Infogram is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Prezi. Infogram was rated #1 on Forbes’ list of “The Best Infographic Tools for 2017,” which was published in September 2017. In October 2017, Infogram announced a new version of its data visualization platform, including a drag-and-drop editor, over 40 new designer templates and social media support.
Concurrency control
In information technology and computer science, especially in the fields of computer programming, operating systems, multiprocessors, and databases, concurrency control ensures that correct results for concurrent operations are generated, while getting those results as quickly as possible. Computer systems, both software and hardware, consist of modules, or components. Each component is designed to operate correctly, i.e., to obey or to meet certain consistency rules. When components that operate concurrently interact by messaging or by sharing accessed data (in memory or storage), a certain component's consistency may be violated by another component. The general area of concurrency control provides rules, methods, design methodologies, and theories to maintain the consistency of components operating concurrently while interacting, and thus the consistency and correctness of the whole system. Introducing concurrency control into a system means applying operation constraints which typically result in some performance reduction. Operation consistency and correctness should be achieved with as good as possible efficiency, without reducing performance below reasonable levels. Concurrency control can require significant additional complexity and overhead in a concurrent algorithm compared to the simpler sequential algorithm. For example, a failure in concurrency control can result in data corruption from torn read or write operations. == Concurrency control in databases == Comments: This section is applicable to all transactional systems, i.e., to all systems that use database transactions (atomic transactions; e.g., transactional objects in Systems management and in networks of smartphones which typically implement private, dedicated database systems), not only general-purpose database management systems (DBMSs). DBMSs need to deal also with concurrency control issues not typical just to database transactions but rather to operating systems in general. These issues (e.g., see Concurrency control in operating systems below) are out of the scope of this section. Concurrency control in Database management systems (DBMS; e.g., Bernstein et al. 1987, Weikum and Vossen 2001), other transactional objects, and related distributed applications (e.g., Grid computing and Cloud computing) ensures that database transactions are performed concurrently without violating the data integrity of the respective databases. Thus concurrency control is an essential element for correctness in any system where two database transactions or more, executed with time overlap, can access the same data, e.g., virtually in any general-purpose database system. Consequently, a vast body of related research has been accumulated since database systems emerged in the early 1970s. A well established concurrency control theory for database systems is outlined in the references mentioned above: serializability theory, which allows to effectively design and analyze concurrency control methods and mechanisms. An alternative theory for concurrency control of atomic transactions over abstract data types is presented in (Lynch et al. 1993), and not utilized below. This theory is more refined, complex, with a wider scope, and has been less utilized in the Database literature than the classical theory above. Each theory has its pros and cons, emphasis and insight. To some extent they are complementary, and their merging may be useful. To ensure correctness, a DBMS usually guarantees that only serializable transaction schedules are generated, unless serializability is intentionally relaxed to increase performance, but only in cases where application correctness is not harmed. For maintaining correctness in cases of failed (aborted) transactions (which can always happen for many reasons) schedules also need to have the recoverability (from abort) property. A DBMS also guarantees that no effect of committed transactions is lost, and no effect of aborted (rolled back) transactions remains in the related database. Overall transaction characterization is usually summarized by the ACID rules below. As databases have become distributed, or needed to cooperate in distributed environments (e.g., Federated databases in the early 1990, and Cloud computing currently), the effective distribution of concurrency control mechanisms has received special attention. === Database transaction and the ACID rules === The concept of a database transaction (or atomic transaction) has evolved in order to enable both a well understood database system behavior in a faulty environment where crashes can happen any time, and recovery from a crash to a well understood database state. A database transaction is a unit of work, typically encapsulating a number of operations over a database (e.g., reading a database object, writing, acquiring lock, etc.), an abstraction supported in database and also other systems. Each transaction has well defined boundaries in terms of which program/code executions are included in that transaction (determined by the transaction's programmer via special transaction commands). Every database transaction obeys the following rules (by support in the database system; i.e., a database system is designed to guarantee them for the transactions it runs): Atomicity - Either the effects of all or none of its operations remain ("all or nothing" semantics) when a transaction is completed (committed or aborted respectively). In other words, to the outside world a committed transaction appears (by its effects on the database) to be indivisible (atomic), and an aborted transaction does not affect the database at all. Either all the operations are done or none of them are. Consistency - Every transaction must leave the database in a consistent (correct) state, i.e., maintain the predetermined integrity rules of the database (constraints upon and among the database's objects). A transaction must transform a database from one consistent state to another consistent state (however, it is the responsibility of the transaction's programmer to make sure that the transaction itself is correct, i.e., performs correctly what it intends to perform (from the application's point of view) while the predefined integrity rules are enforced by the DBMS). Thus since a database can be normally changed only by transactions, all the database's states are consistent. Isolation - Transactions cannot interfere with each other (as an end result of their executions). Moreover, usually (depending on concurrency control method) the effects of an incomplete transaction are not even visible to another transaction. Providing isolation is the main goal of concurrency control. Durability - Effects of successful (committed) transactions must persist through crashes (typically by recording the transaction's effects and its commit event in a non-volatile memory). The concept of atomic transaction has been extended during the years to what has become Business transactions which actually implement types of Workflow and are not atomic. However also such enhanced transactions typically utilize atomic transactions as components. === Why is concurrency control needed? === If transactions are executed serially, i.e., sequentially with no overlap in time, no transaction concurrency exists. However, if concurrent transactions with interleaving operations are allowed in an uncontrolled manner, some unexpected, undesirable results may occur, such as: The lost update problem: A second transaction writes a second value of a data-item (datum) on top of a first value written by a first concurrent transaction, and the first value is lost to other transactions running concurrently which need, by their precedence, to read the first value. The transactions that have read the wrong value end with incorrect results. The dirty read problem: Transactions read a value written by a transaction that has been later aborted. This value disappears from the database upon abort, and should not have been read by any transaction ("dirty read"). The reading transactions end with incorrect results. The incorrect summary problem: While one transaction takes a summary over the values of all the instances of a repeated data-item, a second transaction updates some instances of that data-item. The resulting summary does not reflect a correct result for any (usually needed for correctness) precedence order between the two transactions (if one is executed before the other), but rather some random result, depending on the timing of the updates, and whether certain update results have been included in the summary or not. Most high-performance transactional systems need to run transactions concurrently to meet their performance requirements. Thus, without concurrency control such systems can neither provide correct results nor maintain their databases consistently. === Concurrency control mechanisms === ==== Categories ==== The main categories of concurrency control mechanis