Data Science Africa (DSA) is a non-profit knowledge sharing professional group that aims at bringing together leading researchers and practitioners working on data science methods or applications relevant to Africa, and providing training on state of the art data science methods to students and others interested in developing practical skills. Since 2013, DSA has been organizing conference, workshops and summer schools on machine learning and data science across East Africa. Facilitators of Summer School and workshops are researchers and practitioners from the academia, private and public institutions across the world. == Summer schools and workshops == The first summer school which started as Gaussian Process Summer School was held at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda from 6th to 9 August 2013. The First Data Science Summer School and Workshop was held at Dedan Kimathi University of Technology in Nyeri, Kenya from 15th to 19 June 2015. The Second Data Science Summer School was held at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda from 27th to 29 July 2016, and the workshop was held at Pulse Lab, Kampala, Uganda from 30 July to 1 August 2016. The Third Data Science Summer School and Workshop was held at Nelson Mandela African Institute of Science and Technology, Tanzania from 19th to 21 July 2017. Among the sponsors of the event was ARM
Anderson's rule (computer science)
In the field of computer security, Anderson's rule refers to a principle formulated by Ross J. Anderson: systems that handle sensitive personal information involve a trilemma of security, functionality, and scale, of which you can choose any two. A system that has information on many data subjects and to which many people require access is hard to secure unless its functionality is severely restricted. If it has rich functionality, you may have to restrict the number of people with access, or accept that some information will leak.
Blockhead (thought experiment)
Blockhead is a theoretical computer system invented as part of a thought experiment by philosopher Ned Block, which appeared in a paper titled "Psychologism and Behaviorism". Block did not personally name the computer in the paper. == Overview == In "Psychologism and Behaviorism", Block argues that the internal mechanism of a system is important in determining whether that system is intelligent and claims to show that a non-intelligent system could pass the Turing test. Block asks the reader to imagine a conversation lasting any given amount of time. He states that given the nature of language, there are a finite number of syntactically and grammatically correct sentences that can be used to start a conversation. Consequently, there is a limit to how many "sensible" responses can be made to the first sentence, then to the second sentence, and so on until the conversation ends. Block then asks the reader to imagine a computer which had been programmed with all the sentences in theory, if not in practice. Block argues that such a machine could continue a conversation with a person on any topic because the computer would be programmed with every sentence that it was possible to use so the computer would be able to pass the Turing test despite the fact that—according to Block—it was not intelligent. Block says that this does not show that there is only one correct internal structure for generating intelligence but simply that some internal structures do not generate intelligence. The argument is related to John Searle's Chinese room.
Imageability
Imageability is a measure of how easily a physical object, word or environment will evoke a clear mental image in the mind of any person observing it. It is used in architecture and city planning, in psycholinguistics, and in automated computer vision research. In automated image recognition, training models to connect images with concepts that have low imageability can lead to biased and harmful results. == History and components == Kevin A. Lynch first introduced the term, "imageability" in his 1960 book, The Image of the City. In the book, Lynch argues cities contain a key set of physical elements that people use to understand the environment, orient themselves inside of it, and assign it meaning. Lynch argues the five key elements that impact the imageability of a city are Paths, Edges, Districts, Nodes, and Landmarks. Paths: channels in which people travel. Examples: streets, sidewalks, trails, canals, railroads. Edges: objects that form boundaries around space. Examples: walls, buildings, shoreline, curbstone, streets, and overpasses. Districts: medium to large areas people can enter into and out of that have a common set of identifiable characteristics. Nodes: large areas people can enter, that serve as the foci of the city, neighborhood, district, etc. Landmarks: memorable points of reference people cannot enter into. Examples: signs, mountains and public art. In 1914, half a century before The Image of the City was published, Paul Stern discussed a concept similar to imageability in the context of art. Stern, in Susan Langer's Reflections on Art, names the attribute that describes how vividly and intensely an artistic object could be experienced apparency. == In computer vision == Automated image recognition was developed by using machine learning to find patterns in large, annotated datasets of photographs, like ImageNet. Images in ImageNet are labelled using concepts in WordNet. Concepts that are easily expressed verbally, like "early", are seen as less "imageable" than nouns referring to physical objects like "leaf". Training AI models to associate concepts with low imageability with specific images can lead to problematic bias in image recognition algorithms. This has particularly been critiqued as it relates to the "person" category of WordNet and therefore also ImageNet. Trevor Pagan and Kate Crawford demonstrated in their essay "Excavating AI" and their art project ImageNet Roulette how this leads to photos of ordinary people being labelled by AI systems as "terrorists" or "sex offenders". Images in datasets are often labelled as having a certain level of imageability. As described by Kaiyu Yang, Fei-Fei Li and co-authors, this is often done following criteria from Allan Paivio and collaborators' 1968 psycholinguistic study of nouns. Yang el.al. write that dataset annotators tasked with labelling imageability "see a list of words and rate each word on a 1-7 scale from 'low imagery' to 'high imagery'. To avoid biased or harmful image recognition and image generation, Yang et.al. recommend not training vision recognition models on concepts with low imageability, especially when the concepts are offensive (such as sexual or racial slurs) or sensitive (their examples for this category include "orphan", "separatist", "Anglo-Saxon" and "crossover voter"). Even "safe" concepts with low imageability, like "great-niece" or "vegetarian" can lead to misleading results and should be avoided.
Lethal autonomous weapon
A lethal autonomous weapon (LAW), also known as a lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS), autonomous weapon system (AWS), robotic weapon, or killer robot, is a type of military drone or military robot, which is autonomous in that it can independently search for and engage targets based on programmed constraints and descriptions. As of 2025, most military drones (including unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles) and military robots are not truly autonomous. LAWs may engage in drone warfare in the air, on land, on water, underwater, or in space. == Definitions == In weapons development, the term "autonomous" is somewhat ambiguous and can vary hugely between different scholars, nations and organizations. There is no definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is generally agreed upon among different countries. The official United States Department of Defense Policy on Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Department of Defense Directive 3000.09) defines an Autonomous Weapon System as one that "...once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." Heather Roff, a writer for Case Western Reserve University School of Law, describes autonomous weapon systems as "... capable of learning and adapting their 'functioning in response to changing circumstances in the environment in which [they are] deployed,' as well as capable of making firing decisions on their own." The British Ministry of Defence states "Whilst definitions can vary, the key difference is that an automated system is capable of carrying out complicated tasks but is incapable of complex decision-making, whereas an autonomous system is capable of deciding a course of action without depending on human oversight and control." Scholars such as Peter Asaro and Mark Gubrud believe that any weapon system that is capable of releasing a lethal force without the operation, decision, or confirmation of a human supervisor can be deemed autonomous. == Automatic defensive systems == Some definitions of autonomous weapon systems are broad enough to include land mines and naval mines, simple automatically-triggered lethal weapons that have been in use for centuries. Some current examples of LAWs are automated "hardkill" active protection systems, such as a radar-guided close-in weapon systems (CIWS) used to defend ships that have been in use since the 1970s (e.g., the US Phalanx CIWS). Such systems can autonomously identify and attack oncoming missiles, rockets, artillery fire, aircraft, and surface vessels according to criteria set by the human operator. Similar systems exist for tanks, such as the Russian Arena, the Israeli Trophy, and the German AMAP-ADS. Several types of stationary sentry guns, which can fire at humans and vehicles, are used in South Korea and Israel. Many missile defence systems, such as Iron Dome, also have autonomous targeting capabilities. The main reason for not having a "human in the loop" in these systems is the need for rapid response. They have generally been used to protect personnel and installations against incoming projectiles. == Autonomous offensive systems == According to The Economist in 2018, as technology advances, applications of uncrewed undersea vehicles could include mine clearance, mine-laying, anti-submarine sensor networking in contested waters, patrolling with active sonar, resupplying manned submarines, and becoming low-cost missile platforms. In 2017 the Russian Federation was developing artificially intelligent missiles, drones, unmanned vehicles, military robots and medic robots. In 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review alleged that Russia was developing a "new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo" named "Status 6". Israeli Minister Ayoob Kara stated in 2017 that Israel is developing military robots, including ones as small as flies. In October 2018, Zeng Yi, a senior executive at the Chinese defense firm Norinco, gave a speech in which he said that "In future battlegrounds, there will be no people fighting", and that the use of lethal autonomous weapons in warfare is "inevitable". In 2019, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper lashed out at China for selling drones capable of taking life with no human oversight. As of 2020, DARPA was working on making swarms of 250 autonomous lethal drones available to the American military. The US Navy is developing unmanned surface vehicles, also called sea drones, including Ghost Fleet Overlord, with plans to equip them with weapons and with the potential to use them semi-autonomously. In 2020 a Kargu 2 drone hunted down and attacked a human target in Libya, according to a report from the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Libya, published in March 2021. This may have been the first time an autonomous killer robot armed with lethal weaponry attacked human beings. In May 2021 Israel conducted an AI-guided combat drone swarm attack in Gaza. In the Russo-Ukrainian war, Ukraine has developed advanced drones with integrated artificial intelligence for a range of drone warfare purposes, including to attack infrastructure in Russia, although as of May 2026, Al Jazeera reported that humans remain in control of operation. == Ethical and legal issues == === Degree of human control === Three classifications of the degree of human control of autonomous weapon systems were laid out by Bonnie Docherty in a 2012 Human Rights Watch report. human-in-the-loop: a human must instigate the action of the weapon (in other words not fully autonomous). human-on-the-loop: a human may abort an action. human-out-of-the-loop: no human action is involved. === Standard used in US policy === Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 states that "Autonomous … weapons systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force." However, as noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the policy requires that autonomous weapon systems that kill people or use kinetic force, selecting and engaging targets without further human intervention, be certified as compliant with "appropriate levels" and other standards, not that such weapon systems cannot meet these standards and are therefore forbidden. "Semi-autonomous" hunter-killers that autonomously identify and attack targets do not even require certification. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work said in 2016 that the Defense Department would "not delegate lethal authority to a machine to make a decision", but might need to reconsider this since "authoritarian regimes" may do so. In October 2016 President Barack Obama stated that early in his career he was wary of a future in which a US president making use of drone warfare could "carry on perpetual wars all over the world, and a lot of them covert, without any accountability or democratic debate". In the US, security-related AI has fallen under the purview of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence since 2018. On October 31, 2019, the United States Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Board published the draft of a report outlining five principles for weaponized AI and making 12 recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence by the Department of Defense that would ensure a human operator would always be able to look into the 'black box' and understand the kill-chain process. A major concern is how the report will be implemented. === Possible violations of ethics and international acts === Stuart Russell, professor of computer science from University of California, Berkeley stated the concern he has with LAWs is that his view is that it is unethical and inhumane. The main issue with this system is it is hard to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. There is concern by some economists and legal scholars about whether LAWs would violate International Humanitarian Law, especially the principle of distinction, which requires the ability to discriminate combatants from non-combatants, and the principle of proportionality, which requires that damage to civilians be proportional to the military aim. This concern is often invoked as a reason to ban "killer robots" altogether - but it is doubtful that this concern can be an argument against LAWs that do not violate International Humanitarian Law. A 2021 report by the American Congressional Research Service states that "there are no domestic or international legal prohibitions on the development of use of LAWs," although it acknowledges ongoing talks at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). LAWs are said by some to blur the boundaries of who is responsible for a particular killing. Philosopher Robert Sparrow argues that autonomous weapons are causally but not morally responsible, similar to child soldiers. In each case, he argues there is a risk of atrocities occurring without an appropriate subject to hold responsible, which violates jus in bell
Piranesi (software)
Piranesi is an interactive paint system that enables the user to create artistic images from 3D scenes created using conventional modeling applications. == Image format == Piranesi uses the proprietary EPix file format. For every pixel, additional information is stored, such as distance from the viewer and material settings. EPix files can be rendered from 3D scenes using a fixed viewpoint by Piranesi's companion software, Vedute.
Turing's Wager
Turing's Wager is a philosophical argument that claims it is impossible to infer or deduce a detailed mathematical model of the human brain within a reasonable timescale, and thus impossible in any practical sense. The argument was first given in 1950 by the computational theorist Alan Turing in his paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence, published in Mind (Turing 1950, p. 453). The argument asserts that determining any mathematical model of a computer (its source code or any isomorphic equivalent such as a Turing machine or virtual simulation) is not possible in a reasonable timeframe. As a consequence, determining a mathematical model of the human brain (which is, by its nature, more complicated) must also be impossible within that timeframe. == Effect of modern technology on the wager == It has been argued that modern neuroimaging techniques will allow researchers to create accurate simulations of the human mind within the 21st century (Kurzweil 2012; Markram 2012, Fildes 2009), thereby overcoming the wager. Others have argued that such claims are unjustified (Thwaites et al. 2017). == Relationship between Turing's Wager and the Turing Test == The Turing Test attempts to define when a machine might be said to possess human intelligence, while Turing's Wager is an argument aiming to demonstrate that characterising the brain mathematically will take over a thousand years. While building an artificial intelligence and mapping the human brain are both difficult endeavours, the former is actually a sub-problem of the latter (Thwaites et al. 2017).