AI Content Used In Pragmata

AI Content Used In Pragmata — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

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  Boyfriend Maker

  Boyfriend Maker was a dating sim, romance chatbot smartphone app for iOS (iPhone) and Android devices, developed by Japanese studio 36 You Games (styled as 36You) and distributed under the freemium business model. Boyfriend Maker incorporated advanced artificial intelligence chat technology a decade before products such as ChatGPT. According to the developer's website, Boyfriend Maker is an "app that lets you interact and chat with quirky virtual boyfriends". While each virtual boyfriend has certain unique characteristics, the various instances of the boyfriend are powered by a chat engine, that (at least within a language and market) can utilise vocabulary and knowledge acquired in a chat with one user in subsequent chats with other users. == Gameplay == Users gain experience points and in-game coins. Users can customize their virtual boyfriend's appearance by selecting items such as hair, clothing, face, and a necklace. == Apple delisting and reintroduction == In late November 2012, the original iOS Boyfriend Maker app was delisted from the Apple App Store due to "ribald" chat, according to the New York Times. Boyfriend Maker was removed by Apple due to "reports of references to violent sexual acts and pedophilia". Boyfriend Maker had an age rating of 4+, even though the chat bot "responds with often strange and explicit text unsuitable for young children". User-posted chat excerpts indicate that the virtual boyfriend would sometimes transition abruptly to sexual chat in response to a seemingly innocent question. In one user-posted example, in response to the question, "what kind of wedding cake will we have" the boyfriend responds, "a good sex ima be on top of u u gonna ride oon me bitin the pillow gurrl ima fuck da shit out of u". The developer's use of the SimSimi-created third-party chat engine may be responsible for the sexual text. As the virtual boyfriend converses with human users, the SimSimi chat engine acquires vocabulary from users of the game and applies this "learned" vocabulary in chats with other users. The chat engine might also employ lines harvested from human-human chat logs, song lyrics, movies or TV shows. In April 2013, a detuned and presumably tamer version of the app, titled Boyfriend Plus, was permitted on Apple's App Store.

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  Composite portrait

  Composite portraiture (also known as composite photographs) is a technique invented by Sir Francis Galton in the 1880s after a suggestion by Herbert Spencer for registering photographs of human faces on the two eyes to create an "average" photograph of all those in the photographed group. Spencer had suggested using onion paper and line drawings, but Galton devised a technique for multiple exposures on the same photographic plate. He noticed that these composite portraits were more attractive than any individual member, and this has generated a large body of research on human attractiveness and averageness one hundred years later. He also suggested in a Royal Society presentation in 1883 that the composites provided an interesting concrete representation of human ideal types and concepts. He discussed using the technique to investigate characteristics of common types of humanity, such as criminals. In his mind, it was an extension of the statistical techniques of averages and correlation. In this sense, it represents one of the first implementations of convolution factor analysis and neural networks in the understanding of knowledge representation in the human mind. Galton also suggested that the technique could be used for creating natural types of common objects. During the late 19th century, English psychometrician Sir Francis Galton attempted to define physiognomic characteristics of health, disease, beauty, and criminality, via a method of composite photography. Galton's process involved the photographic superimposition of two or more faces by multiple exposures. After averaging together photographs of violent criminals, he found that the composite appeared "more respectable" than any of the faces comprising it; this was likely due to the irregularities of the skin across the constituent images being averaged out in the final blend. Since the advancement of computer graphics technology in the early 1990s, Galton's composite technique has been adopted and greatly improved using computer graphics software.

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  Artificial intelligence in Wikimedia projects

  Some editors of Wikimedia projects use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning programs to edit existing articles or create new ones. Some applications of artificial intelligence, like using large language models (LLMs) to create new articles from scratch, have been more controversial than others for the Wikipedia community. In August 2025, English Wikipedia adopted a policy that allowed editors to nominate suspected LLM-generated articles for speedy deletion. This was followed by a March 2026 decision to prohibit the use of LLMs to generate or rewrite article content, with exceptions for copyediting one's own writing and machine translation from another language's Wikipedia. Wikipedia has also been a significant source of training data for some of the earliest artificial intelligence projects. This has received mixed reactions including concern about companies not citing Wikipedia when relying on it to answer a question as well as Wikipedia's increased costs from data scraping. == AI usage == === Earliest use of automated tools, machine learning and AI === Since 2002, bots have been allowed to run on Wikipedia but must be approved and supervised by a human. A bot created in 2002, rambot, transformed census data into short new articles about towns in the United States; the vast majority of town, city, and county articles were started by it. Fighting vandalism has been a major focus of machine learning and AI bots and tools. The 2007 ClueBot relied on simple heuristics to identify likely vandalism, while its 2010 successor, ClueBot NG, uses machine learning through an artificial neural network. Machine translation software has also been used by Wikimedia contributors for a number of years. Aaron Halfaker's Objective Revision Evaluation Service (ORES) project was launched in late 2015 as an artificial intelligence service for grading the quality of Wikipedia edits. === Generative AI and LLMs === In 2022, the public release of ChatGPT inspired more experimentation with AI and writing Wikipedia articles. A debate was sparked about whether and to what extent such large language models are suitable for such purposes in light of their tendency to generate plausible-sounding misinformation, including fake references; to generate prose that is not encyclopedic in tone; and to reproduce biases. An early experiment on December 6, 2022 by a Wikipedia contributor named Pharos occurred when he created the article "Artwork title" using ChatGPT for the initial draft. Another editor who experimented with this early version of ChatGPT said that ChatGPT's overview of "Weaponized incompetence" was decent, but that the citations were fabricated. Since 2023, work has been done to draft an English Wikipedia policy regarding ChatGPT and similar LLMs, at times recommending that users who are unfamiliar with LLMs should avoid using them due to the aforementioned risks, as well as noting the potential for libel or copyright infringement. In early 2023, the Wiki Education Foundation reported that some experienced editors found AI to be useful in starting drafts or creating new articles. It said that ChatGPT "knows" what Wikipedia articles look like and can easily generate one that is written in the style of Wikipedia, but warned that ChatGPT had a tendency to use promotional language, among other issues. In 2023, a ban on AI was deemed "too harsh" by the community given the productivity benefits it offered editors. In 2023, members of the English Wikipedia community created a WikiProject named AI Cleanup to assist in the removal of poor quality AI content from Wikipedia. Miguel García, a former Wikimedia member from Spain, said in 2024 that when ChatGPT was originally launched, the number of AI-generated articles on the site peaked. He added that the rate of AI articles has now stabilized due to the community's efforts to combat it. He said that majority of the articles that have no sources are deleted instantly or are nominated for deletion. In October 2024, a study by Princeton University found that about 5% of 3,000 newly created articles (created in August 2024) on English Wikipedia were created using AI. The study said that some of the AI articles were on innocuous topics and that AI had likely only been used to assist in writing. For some other articles, AI had been used to promote businesses or political interests. In October 2024, Ilyas Lebleu, founder of WikiProject AI Cleanup, said that they and their fellow editors noticed a pattern of unnatural writing that could be connected to ChatGPT. They added that AI is able to mass-produce content that sounds real while being completely fake, leading to the creation of hoax articles on Wikipedia that they were tasked to delete. In June 2025, the Wikimedia Foundation started testing a "Simple Article Summaries" feature which would provide AI-generated summaries of Wikipedia articles, similar to Google Search's AI Overviews. The decision was met with immediate and harsh criticism from some Wikipedia editors, who called the feature a "ghastly idea" and a "PR hype stunt." They criticized a perceived loss of trust in the site due to AI's tendency to hallucinate and questioned the necessity of the feature. The criticism led the Wikimedia Foundation to halt the rollout of Simple Article Summaries that same month while still expressing interest in integrating generative AI more into Wikipedia. The project hints at tensions within the community and with the Foundation over when to use AI.In August 2025, the English Wikipedia community created a policy that allowed users to nominate suspected AI-generated articles for speedy deletion. Editors might recognize AI-generated articles because they use citations that are not related to the subject of the article or fabricated citations or the wording has particular quirks. If an article uses language that reads like an LLM response to a user, such as "Here is your Wikipedia article on" or "Up to my last training update", the article is typically tagged for speedy deletion. Other signs of AI use include excessive use of em dashes, overuse of the word "moreover", promotional material in articles that describes something as "breathtaking" and formatting issues like using curly quotation marks instead of straight versions. During the discussion on implementing the speedy deletion policy, one user, who is an article reviewer, said that he is "flooded non-stop with horrendous drafts" created using AI. Other users said that AI articles have a large amount of "lies and fake references" and that it takes a significant amount of time to fix the issues. English Wikipedia created a guide on how to spot signs of AI-generated writing in August 2025, titled "Signs of AI writing". In January 2026, the Wiki Education Foundation continued to caution against copying and pasting outputs from generative AI into Wikipedia and to avoid it for creating new articles explaining that the text often failed verification with the sources provided. The foundation created a training module that encourages editors to use AI for identifying gaps in articles, finding access to sources and finding relevant sources. In March 2026, the English Wikipedia community prohibited the use of AI to add content to articles, with exceptions for copy editing and machine translation from another language's Wikipedia. The English Wikipedia community holds the position that LLMs often violate core content policies. == Using Wikipedia for artificial intelligence == A 2017 paper described Wikipedia as the mother lode for human-generated text available for machine learning. In the development of the Google's Perspective API that identifies toxic comments in online forums, a dataset containing hundreds of thousands of Wikipedia talk page comments with human-labelled toxicity levels was used. As of 2023, subsets of the Wikipedia corpus were considered one of the largest well-curated data sets available for AI training, used to train every LLM to-date according to Stephen Harrison. This use of Wikipedia was divisive as of 2023. The Wikimedia Foundation and many of its projects supporters worry that attribution to Wikipedia articles is missing in many large-language models like ChatGPT (as well as AI like Siri and Alexa). While Wikipedia's licensing policy lets anyone use its texts, including in modified forms, it does have the condition that credit is given, implying that using its contents in answers by AI models without clarifying the sourcing may violate its terms of use. The Foundation expressed concern that without attribution, people will not visit the site as much or be as motivated to donate to support the project if they do not know when they are benefiting from it. They also noticed an 8% decrease in visitors to Wikipedia in 2025 which they attributed both to the increased popularity of generative AI and social media. In 2025, the Wikimedia Foundation has cited absorbing increased costs associated with scra

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  AlphaZero

  AlphaZero is a computer program developed by artificial intelligence research company DeepMind to master the games of chess, shogi and go. This algorithm uses an approach similar to AlphaGo Zero. On December 5, 2017, the DeepMind team released a preprint paper introducing AlphaZero, which would soon play three games by defeating world-champion chess engines Stockfish, Elmo, and the three-day version of AlphaGo Zero. In each case it made use of custom tensor processing units (TPUs) that the Google programs were optimized to use. AlphaZero was trained solely via self-play using 5,000 first-generation TPUs to generate the games and 64 second-generation TPUs to train the neural networks, all in parallel, with no access to opening books or endgame tables. After four hours of training, DeepMind estimated AlphaZero was playing chess at a higher Elo rating than Stockfish 8; after nine hours of training, the algorithm defeated Stockfish 8 in a time-controlled 100-game tournament (28 wins, 0 losses, and 72 draws). The trained algorithm played on a single machine with four TPUs. DeepMind's paper on AlphaZero was published in the journal Science on 7 December 2018. While the actual AlphaZero program has not been released to the public, the algorithm described in the paper has been implemented in publicly available software. In 2019, DeepMind published a new paper detailing MuZero, a new algorithm able to generalize AlphaZero's work, playing both Atari and board games without knowledge of the rules or representations of the game. == Relation to AlphaGo Zero == AlphaZero (AZ) is a more generalized variant of the AlphaGo Zero (AGZ) algorithm, and is able to play shogi and chess as well as Go. Differences between AZ and AGZ include: AZ has hard-coded rules for setting search hyperparameters. The neural network is now updated continually. AZ doesn't use symmetries, unlike AGZ. Chess or Shogi can end in a draw unlike Go; therefore, AlphaZero takes into account the possibility of a drawn game. == Stockfish and Elmo == Comparing Monte Carlo tree search searches, AlphaZero searches just 80,000 positions per second in chess and 40,000 in shogi, compared to 70 million for Stockfish and 35 million for Elmo. AlphaZero compensates for the lower number of evaluations by using its deep neural network to focus much more selectively on the most promising variation. == Training == AlphaZero was trained by simply playing against itself multiple times, using 5,000 first-generation TPUs to generate the games and 64 second-generation TPUs to train the neural networks. In parallel, the in-training AlphaZero was periodically matched against its benchmark (Stockfish, Elmo, or AlphaGo Zero) in brief one-second-per-move games to determine how well the training was progressing. DeepMind judged that AlphaZero's performance exceeded the benchmark after around four hours of training for Stockfish, two hours for Elmo, and eight hours for AlphaGo Zero. == Preliminary results == === Outcome === ==== Chess ==== In AlphaZero's chess match against Stockfish 8 (2016 TCEC world champion), each program was given one minute per move. AlphaZero was flying the English flag, while Stockfish the Norwegian. Stockfish was allocated 64 threads and a hash size of 1 GB, a setting that Stockfish's Tord Romstad later criticized as suboptimal. AlphaZero was trained on chess for a total of nine hours before the match. During the match, AlphaZero ran on a single machine with four application-specific TPUs. In 100 games from the normal starting position, AlphaZero won 25 games as White, won 3 as Black, and drew the remaining 72. In a series of twelve, 100-game matches (of unspecified time or resource constraints) against Stockfish starting from the 12 most popular human openings, AlphaZero won 290, drew 886 and lost 24. ==== Shogi ==== AlphaZero was trained on shogi for a total of two hours before the tournament. In 100 shogi games against Elmo (World Computer Shogi Championship 27 summer 2017 tournament version with YaneuraOu 4.73 search), AlphaZero won 90 times, lost 8 times and drew twice. As in the chess games, each program got one minute per move, and Elmo was given 64 threads and a hash size of 1 GB. ==== Go ==== After 34 hours of self-learning of Go and against AlphaGo Zero, AlphaZero won 60 games and lost 40. === Analysis === DeepMind stated in its preprint, "The game of chess represented the pinnacle of AI research over several decades. State-of-the-art programs are based on powerful engines that search many millions of positions, leveraging handcrafted domain expertise and sophisticated domain adaptations. AlphaZero is a generic reinforcement learning algorithm – originally devised for the game of go – that achieved superior results within a few hours, searching a thousand times fewer positions, given no domain knowledge except the rules." DeepMind's Demis Hassabis, a chess player himself, called AlphaZero's play style "alien": It sometimes wins by offering counterintuitive sacrifices, like offering up a queen and bishop to exploit a positional advantage. "It's like chess from another dimension." Given the difficulty in chess of forcing a win against a strong opponent, the +28 –0 =72 result is a significant margin of victory. However, some grandmasters, such as Hikaru Nakamura and Komodo developer Larry Kaufman, downplayed AlphaZero's victory, arguing that the match would have been closer if the programs had access to an opening database (since Stockfish was optimized for that scenario). Romstad additionally pointed out that Stockfish is not optimized for rigidly fixed-time moves and the version used was a year old. Similarly, some shogi observers argued that the Elmo hash size was too low, that the resignation settings and the "EnteringKingRule" settings (cf. shogi § Entering King) may have been inappropriate, and that Elmo is already obsolete compared with newer programs. === Reaction and criticism === Papers headlined that the chess training took only four hours: "It was managed in little more than the time between breakfast and lunch." Wired described AlphaZero as "the first multi-skilled AI board-game champ". AI expert Joanna Bryson noted that Google's "knack for good publicity" was putting it in a strong position against challengers. "It's not only about hiring the best programmers. It's also very political, as it helps make Google as strong as possible when negotiating with governments and regulators looking at the AI sector." Human chess grandmasters generally expressed excitement about AlphaZero. Danish grandmaster Peter Heine Nielsen likened AlphaZero's play to that of a superior alien species. Norwegian grandmaster Jon Ludvig Hammer characterized AlphaZero's play as "insane attacking chess" with profound positional understanding. Former champion Garry Kasparov said, "It's a remarkable achievement, even if we should have expected it after AlphaGo." Grandmaster Hikaru Nakamura was less impressed, stating: "I don't necessarily put a lot of credibility in the results simply because my understanding is that AlphaZero is basically using the Google supercomputer and Stockfish doesn't run on that hardware; Stockfish was basically running on what would be my laptop. If you wanna have a match that's comparable you have to have Stockfish running on a supercomputer as well." Top US correspondence chess player Wolff Morrow was also unimpressed, claiming that AlphaZero would probably not make the semifinals of a fair competition such as TCEC where all engines play on equal hardware. Morrow further stated that although he might not be able to beat AlphaZero if AlphaZero played drawish openings such as the Petroff Defence, AlphaZero would not be able to beat him in a correspondence chess game either. Motohiro Isozaki, the author of YaneuraOu, noted that although AlphaZero did comprehensively beat Elmo, the rating of AlphaZero in shogi stopped growing at a point which is at most 100–200 higher than Elmo. This gap is not that high, and Elmo and other shogi software should be able to catch up in 1–2 years. == Final results == DeepMind addressed many of the criticisms in their final version of the paper, published in December 2018 in Science. They further clarified that AlphaZero was not running on a supercomputer; it was trained using 5,000 tensor processing units (TPUs), but only ran on four TPUs and a 44-core CPU in its matches. === Chess === In the final results, Stockfish 9 dev ran under the same conditions as in the TCEC superfinal: 44 CPU cores, Syzygy endgame tablebases, and a 32 GB hash size. Instead of a fixed time control of one move per minute, both engines were given 3 hours plus 15 seconds per move to finish the game. AlphaZero ran on a much more powerful machine with four TPUs in addition to 44 CPU cores. In a 1000-game match, AlphaZero won with a score of 155 wins, 6 losses, and 839 draws. DeepMind also played a series of games using the TCEC opening positions; AlphaZero also won

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  Deep Learning Indaba

  The Deep Learning Indaba is an annual conference and educational event that aims to strengthen machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) capacity across Africa. Launched in 2017, it brings together students, researchers, industry practitioners, and policymakers from across the African continent. == History == The Deep Learning Indaba began in 2017 at the University of the Witwatersrand with over 300 participants from 23 African countries, offering tutorials in advanced AI topics and featuring notable speakers like Nando de Freitas. In 2018, it expanded to 650 delegates at Stellenbosch University, introducing parallel sessions to encourage collaboration. The 2019 edition in Nairobi, Kenya, reflected further growth, with increasing sponsorship and support from major tech companies like Google and Microsoft. === Deep Learning IndabaX ===

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  Lethal autonomous weapon

  A lethal autonomous weapon (LAW), also known as a lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS), autonomous weapon system (AWS), robotic weapon, or killer robot, is a type of military drone or military robot, which is autonomous in that it can independently search for and engage targets based on programmed constraints and descriptions. As of 2025, most military drones (including unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles) and military robots are not truly autonomous. LAWs may engage in drone warfare in the air, on land, on water, underwater, or in space. == Definitions == In weapons development, the term "autonomous" is somewhat ambiguous and can vary hugely between different scholars, nations and organizations. There is no definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is generally agreed upon among different countries. The official United States Department of Defense Policy on Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Department of Defense Directive 3000.09) defines an Autonomous Weapon System as one that "...once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." Heather Roff, a writer for Case Western Reserve University School of Law, describes autonomous weapon systems as "... capable of learning and adapting their 'functioning in response to changing circumstances in the environment in which [they are] deployed,' as well as capable of making firing decisions on their own." The British Ministry of Defence states "Whilst definitions can vary, the key difference is that an automated system is capable of carrying out complicated tasks but is incapable of complex decision-making, whereas an autonomous system is capable of deciding a course of action without depending on human oversight and control." Scholars such as Peter Asaro and Mark Gubrud believe that any weapon system that is capable of releasing a lethal force without the operation, decision, or confirmation of a human supervisor can be deemed autonomous. == Automatic defensive systems == Some definitions of autonomous weapon systems are broad enough to include land mines and naval mines, simple automatically-triggered lethal weapons that have been in use for centuries. Some current examples of LAWs are automated "hardkill" active protection systems, such as a radar-guided close-in weapon systems (CIWS) used to defend ships that have been in use since the 1970s (e.g., the US Phalanx CIWS). Such systems can autonomously identify and attack oncoming missiles, rockets, artillery fire, aircraft, and surface vessels according to criteria set by the human operator. Similar systems exist for tanks, such as the Russian Arena, the Israeli Trophy, and the German AMAP-ADS. Several types of stationary sentry guns, which can fire at humans and vehicles, are used in South Korea and Israel. Many missile defence systems, such as Iron Dome, also have autonomous targeting capabilities. The main reason for not having a "human in the loop" in these systems is the need for rapid response. They have generally been used to protect personnel and installations against incoming projectiles. == Autonomous offensive systems == According to The Economist in 2018, as technology advances, applications of uncrewed undersea vehicles could include mine clearance, mine-laying, anti-submarine sensor networking in contested waters, patrolling with active sonar, resupplying manned submarines, and becoming low-cost missile platforms. In 2017 the Russian Federation was developing artificially intelligent missiles, drones, unmanned vehicles, military robots and medic robots. In 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review alleged that Russia was developing a "new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo" named "Status 6". Israeli Minister Ayoob Kara stated in 2017 that Israel is developing military robots, including ones as small as flies. In October 2018, Zeng Yi, a senior executive at the Chinese defense firm Norinco, gave a speech in which he said that "In future battlegrounds, there will be no people fighting", and that the use of lethal autonomous weapons in warfare is "inevitable". In 2019, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper lashed out at China for selling drones capable of taking life with no human oversight. As of 2020, DARPA was working on making swarms of 250 autonomous lethal drones available to the American military. The US Navy is developing unmanned surface vehicles, also called sea drones, including Ghost Fleet Overlord, with plans to equip them with weapons and with the potential to use them semi-autonomously. In 2020 a Kargu 2 drone hunted down and attacked a human target in Libya, according to a report from the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Libya, published in March 2021. This may have been the first time an autonomous killer robot armed with lethal weaponry attacked human beings. In May 2021 Israel conducted an AI-guided combat drone swarm attack in Gaza. In the Russo-Ukrainian war, Ukraine has developed advanced drones with integrated artificial intelligence for a range of drone warfare purposes, including to attack infrastructure in Russia, although as of May 2026, Al Jazeera reported that humans remain in control of operation. == Ethical and legal issues == === Degree of human control === Three classifications of the degree of human control of autonomous weapon systems were laid out by Bonnie Docherty in a 2012 Human Rights Watch report. human-in-the-loop: a human must instigate the action of the weapon (in other words not fully autonomous). human-on-the-loop: a human may abort an action. human-out-of-the-loop: no human action is involved. === Standard used in US policy === Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 states that "Autonomous … weapons systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force." However, as noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the policy requires that autonomous weapon systems that kill people or use kinetic force, selecting and engaging targets without further human intervention, be certified as compliant with "appropriate levels" and other standards, not that such weapon systems cannot meet these standards and are therefore forbidden. "Semi-autonomous" hunter-killers that autonomously identify and attack targets do not even require certification. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work said in 2016 that the Defense Department would "not delegate lethal authority to a machine to make a decision", but might need to reconsider this since "authoritarian regimes" may do so. In October 2016 President Barack Obama stated that early in his career he was wary of a future in which a US president making use of drone warfare could "carry on perpetual wars all over the world, and a lot of them covert, without any accountability or democratic debate". In the US, security-related AI has fallen under the purview of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence since 2018. On October 31, 2019, the United States Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Board published the draft of a report outlining five principles for weaponized AI and making 12 recommendations for the ethical use of artificial intelligence by the Department of Defense that would ensure a human operator would always be able to look into the 'black box' and understand the kill-chain process. A major concern is how the report will be implemented. === Possible violations of ethics and international acts === Stuart Russell, professor of computer science from University of California, Berkeley stated the concern he has with LAWs is that his view is that it is unethical and inhumane. The main issue with this system is it is hard to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. There is concern by some economists and legal scholars about whether LAWs would violate International Humanitarian Law, especially the principle of distinction, which requires the ability to discriminate combatants from non-combatants, and the principle of proportionality, which requires that damage to civilians be proportional to the military aim. This concern is often invoked as a reason to ban "killer robots" altogether - but it is doubtful that this concern can be an argument against LAWs that do not violate International Humanitarian Law. A 2021 report by the American Congressional Research Service states that "there are no domestic or international legal prohibitions on the development of use of LAWs," although it acknowledges ongoing talks at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). LAWs are said by some to blur the boundaries of who is responsible for a particular killing. Philosopher Robert Sparrow argues that autonomous weapons are causally but not morally responsible, similar to child soldiers. In each case, he argues there is a risk of atrocities occurring without an appropriate subject to hold responsible, which violates jus in bell

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  Composite Capability/Preference Profiles

  Composite Capability/Preference Profiles (CC/PP) is a specification for defining capabilities and preferences of user agents (also known as "delivery context"). The delivery context can be used to guide the process of tailoring content for a user agent. CC/PP is a vocabulary extension of the Resource Description Framework (RDF). The CC/PP specification is maintained by the W3C's Ubiquitous Web Applications Working Group (UWAWG) Working Group. == History == Composite Capability/Preference Profiles (CC/PP): Structure and Vocabularies 1.0 became a W3C recommendation on 15 January 2004. A "Last-Call Working-Draft" of CC/PP 2.0 was issued in April 2007

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  ICAD (software)

  ICAD (Corporate history: ICAD, Inc., Concentra (name change at IPO in 1995), KTI (name change in 1998), Dassault Systèmes (purchase in 2001) () is a knowledge-based engineering (KBE) system that enables users to encode design knowledge using a semantic representation that can be evaluated for Parasolid output. ICAD has an open architecture that can utilize all the power and flexibility of the underlying language. KBE, as implemented via ICAD, received a lot of attention due to the remarkable results that appeared to take little effort. ICAD allowed one example of end-user computing that in a sense is unparalleled. Most ICAD developers were degreed engineers. Systems developed by ICAD users were non-trivial and consisted of highly complicated code. In the sense of end-user computing, ICAD was the first to allow the power of a domain tool to be in the hands of the user, at the same time being open to allow extensions as identified and defined by the domain expert or subject-matter expert (SME). A COE article looked at the resulting explosion of expectations (see AI winter), which were not sustainable. However, such a bubble burst does not diminish the existence of ability that would exist were expectations and use reasonable or properly managed. == History == The original implementation of ICAD was on a Lisp machine (Symbolics). Some of the principals involved with the development were Larry Rosenfeld, Avrum Belzer, Patrick M. O'Keefe, Philip Greenspun, and David F. Place. The time frame was 1984–85. ICAD started on special-purpose Symbolics Lisp hardware and was then ported to Unix when Common Lisp became portable to general-purpose workstations. The original domain for ICAD was mechanical design with many application successes. However, ICAD has found use in other domains, such as electrical design, shape modeling, etc. An example project could be wind tunnel design or the development of a support tool for aircraft multidisciplinary design. Further examples can be found in the presentations at the annual IIUG (International ICAD Users Group) that have been published in the KTI Vault (1999 through 2002). Boeing and Airbus used ICAD extensively to develop various components in the 1990s and early 21st century. As of 2003, ICAD was featured strongly in several areas as evidenced by the Vision & Strategy Product Vision and Strategy presentation. After 2003, ICAD use diminished. At the end of 2001, the KTI Company faced financial difficulties and laid off most of its best staff. They were eventually bought out by Dassault who effectively scuppered the ICAD product. See IIUG at COE, 2003 (first meeting due to Dassault by KTI) The ICAD system was very expensive, relatively, and was in the price range of high-end systems. Market dynamics couldn't support this as there may not have been sufficient differentiating factors between ICAD and the lower-end systems (or the promises from Dassault). KTI was absorbed by Dassault Systèmes and ICAD is no longer considered the go-forward tool for knowledge-based engineering (KBE) applications by that company. Dassault Systèmes is promoting a suite of tools oriented around version 5 of their popular CATIA CAD application, with Knowledgeware the replacement for ICAD. As of 2005, things were still a bit unclear. ICAD 8.3 was delivered. The recent COE Aerospace Conference had a discussion about the futures of KBE. One issue involves the stacking of 'meta' issues within a computer model. How this is resolved, whether by more icons or the availability of an external language, remains to be seen. The Genworks GDL product (including kernel technology from the Gendl Project) is the nearest functional equivalent to ICAD currently available. == Particulars == ICAD provided a declarative language (IDL) using New Flavors (never converted to Common Lisp Object System (CLOS)) that supported a mechanism for relating parts (defpart) via a hierarchical set of relationships. Technically, the ICAD Defpart was a Lisp macro; the ICAD defpart list was a set of generic classes that can be instantiated with specific properties depending upon what was represented. This defpart list was extendible via composited parts that represented domain entities. Along with the part-subpart relations, ICAD supported generic relations via the object modeling abilities of Lisp. Example applications of ICAD range from a small collection of defparts that represents a part or component to a larger collection that represents an assembly. In terms of power, an ICAD system, when fully specified, can generate thousands of instances of parts on a major assembly design. One example of an application driving thousands of instances of parts is that of an aircraft wing – where fastener type and placement may number in the thousands, each instance requiring evaluation of several factors driving the design parameters. == Futures (KBE, etc.) == One role for ICAD may be serving as the defining prototype for KBE which would require that we know more about what occurred the past 15 years (much information is tied up behind corporate firewalls and under proprietary walls). With the rise of functional programming languages (an example is Haskell) in the markets, perhaps some of the power attributable to Lisp may be replicated.

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  Manifold hypothesis

  The manifold hypothesis posits that many high-dimensional data sets that occur in the real world actually lie along low-dimensional latent manifolds inside that high-dimensional space. As a consequence of the manifold hypothesis, many data sets that appear to initially require many variables to describe, can actually be described by a comparatively small number of variables, linked to the local coordinate system of the underlying manifold. It is suggested that this principle underpins the effectiveness of machine learning algorithms in describing high-dimensional data sets by considering a few common features. The manifold hypothesis is related to the effectiveness of nonlinear dimensionality reduction techniques in machine learning. Many techniques of dimensional reduction make the assumption that data lies along a low-dimensional submanifold, such as manifold sculpting, manifold alignment, and manifold regularization. The major implications of this hypothesis is that Machine learning models only have to fit relatively simple, low-dimensional, highly structured subspaces within their potential input space (latent manifolds). Within one of these manifolds, it's always possible to interpolate between two inputs, that is to say, morph one into another via a continuous path along which all points fall on the manifold. The ability to interpolate between samples is the key to generalization in deep learning. == The information geometry of statistical manifolds == An empirically-motivated approach to the manifold hypothesis focuses on its correspondence with an effective theory for manifold learning under the assumption that robust machine learning requires encoding the dataset of interest using methods for data compression. This perspective gradually emerged using the tools of information geometry thanks to the coordinated effort of scientists working on the efficient coding hypothesis, predictive coding and variational Bayesian methods. The argument for reasoning about the information geometry on the latent space of distributions rests upon the existence and uniqueness of the Fisher information metric. In this general setting, we are trying to find a stochastic embedding of a statistical manifold. From the perspective of dynamical systems, in the big data regime this manifold generally exhibits certain properties such as homeostasis: We can sample large amounts of data from the underlying generative process. Machine Learning experiments are reproducible, so the statistics of the generating process exhibit stationarity. In a sense made precise by theoretical neuroscientists working on the free energy principle, the statistical manifold in question possesses a Markov blanket.

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  Hive (artificial intelligence company)

  Hive is an American artificial intelligence company offering machine learning models via APIs to enterprise customers. Hive uses around 700,000 gig workers to train data for its models through its Hive Work app. One of Hive's major offerings is to provide automated content moderation services. == Products == Hive is reported to have been engaged to provide content moderation services to social news aggregator Reddit, Giphy, BeReal, Donald Trump-affiliated social network Truth Social, and on online chat website Chatroulette. Parler, after its shutdown by content service providers in early 2021 due to a lack of content moderation, integrated with Hive and was allowed back in the App Store. Hive's content moderation models have been leveraged widely in the livestreaming industry, where the cost of human moderation is high. Hive's models have also been used in events such as the Super Bowl and March Madness, and its contextual advertising models used by NBC Universal and Vevo. Hive provides APIs to detect deepfakes and AI-generated artwork. In early 2023, Hive released a free demo text classifier intended to detect AI-generated text. Mark Hachman at PC World rated Hive's classifier favorably and found it more reliable than OpenAI's AI text classifier. == History == Hive was founded by Kevin Guo and Dmitriy Karpman, and in April 2021, announced $85M in new capital at a valuation of $2 billion.

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  4E cognition

  4E cognition refers to a group of theories in (the philosophy of) cognitive science that challenge traditional views of the mind as something that happens only inside the brain. The four Es stand for: embodied, meaning that a brain is found in and, more importantly, vitally interconnected with a larger physical/biological body; embedded, which refers to the limitations placed on the body by the external environment and laws of nature; extended, which argues that the mind is supplemented and even enhanced by the exterior world (e.g., writing, a calculator, etc.); and enactive, which is the argument that without dynamic processes, actions that require reactions, the mind would be ineffectual. It could be argued that the four Es are compounding extensions of cognition or the mind, being part of a body that is, in turn, part of an environment which limits it but also allows for certain extensions, all of which require dynamic actions and reactions. == History == Ideas of embodied cognition, or rather the idea that our physical bodies play a crucial role in our decision making, can be traced back as far as Plato's dialogues and Aristotelian thought. It was, however, in the twentieth century that this debate began to resemble the current discussion, fueled by disagreements between cognitivists and behaviourists. Tensions within cognitivism, as well as the increasing popularity of neurobiology, led, on the one side, to a predominant focus on internal, cognitive processes while neglecting environmental factors, which in turn caused a push-back fuelling our modern understanding of embodied cognition. The term 4E cognition is hard to trace back to its first use, however, some sources attribute it to Shaun Gallagher and the conference on 4E cognition he organised in 2007, while others indicate the term to be first used in 2006 at an 'Embodied mind workshop' at Cardiff University that Gallagher attended. Embodiment or embodied cognition arguably presents the bridge between cognitivism and 4E cognition as the embodiment of cognitive function provides the necessary conditions for embeddedness, enactedness, and extendedness to connect to cognition. 4E cognition was and is heavily influenced by phenomenology. The ideas are still rather fragmented in nature due to their four main components, which can not be neatly divided, causing conceptual questions of internal boundary concepts. As a young field, it is held back both by its fragmented nature and a relative lack of critical evaluations. It is important to acknowledge that 4E cognition, though young, is a broad field containing and combining several different theoretical perspectives that conflict with one another to varying degrees. The somewhat convoluted and competing nature of the theories that can be grouped as 4E cognition, as well as the field's relative youth, make it difficult to put together an exhaustive history beyond the history of its four main theoretical pillars: embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, and enactedness. == Importance and core tenets of 4E == If there are separate theories of cognition (e.g., embodied, extended, etc.), why group them under this umbrella, causing important epistemological and especially ontological dilemmas? Notably, other theories of 'non-traditional' cognition are not included under the 4E umbrella. The four E's in 4E cognition importantly all reject, or at a minimum draw into question, some of the core tenets of traditional cognitivism. Importantly, 4E cognition is seen as deindividualizing cognition to some extent, allowing for a broader examination of the interplay of personal, social, political, and ethical aspects that shape human cognition. This can be compared to advancements in the field of epigenetics, which have allowed for a broader examination of environmental (both natural and social) factors and their influence on what had previously only been subject to genetic theorizing. In a similar vein, 4E cognition might also help ground cognition in evolutionary theory by extending cognition to a biological account subject to development over time by means of evolution. Overall, the importance of the extension that is 4E cognition aims to reexamine ideas of a self-centered view of cognition, advocating for a more holistic approach. Ideally, this would allow us to reconsider ideas of justice and individual rights and responsibilities that take into account a more nuanced understanding of the relations between people and their context, balancing self-agency with factors beyond it. === Conceptual differences from cognitive psychology === According to the traditional teachings of cognitive psychology, cognition is a type of information processing based on representational mental structures. This idea, as the name suggests, was heavily influenced by computer science. In this light, the brain is a kind of central processing unit that organises and directs all else. The classical cognitivist view draws a strong boundary between 'the internal' and 'the external', where cognition is solely a subject of 'the internal' realm. The four E's, however, break down this boundary. Cognition can not reside solely within the confines of our heads if it is also embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. In a way, 4E cognition is interested in the extracranial processes affecting cognition. == From embodied cognition to 4E cognition == === The strong and the weak view === ==== Embodied cognition ==== Broadly speaking, there is a strong and a weak perspective of embodied cognition in 4E cognition. The weak understanding refers to mental processes being causally dependent on extracranial processes. This essentially means that there is a cause and effect or action-reaction relationship between the mind and the body and its environment, etc. The strong perspective views extracranial processes as a (partial) constitutive aspect of cognition. An example here could be using a calculator to solve math problems. The calculator is not part of your brain or mind, but it supports your cognitive processes. === Extracranial processes: bodily or extrabodily === In addition to the weak and the strong reading of 4E cognition, there is also the distinction between bodily and extrabodily extracranial processes. Bodily extracranial processes refer to processes within the body, e.g., sensory perception. Extrabodily extracranial processes refer to processes outside of the body, like the aforementioned calculator example. === Four claims of embodied cognition === ==== Embedded and extended cognition ==== When combining the weak/strong reading of embodied cognition and bodily/extrabodily extracranial process, four claims about embodied cognition emerge: strongly embodied and bodily processes strongly embodied and extrabodily processes weakly embodied and bodily processes weakly embodied and extrabodily processes The first and third claims signify a strong and a weak reading of embodied cognition in the more classical sense. The second claim fits almost perfectly with embedded cognition. Claim two is most compatible with extended cognition. ==== Enacted cognition ==== Finally, enacted cognition refers to cognition being connected to active interaction between a conscious agent and their environment. Here, too, there can be a weak and a strong reading. == Criticisms == Given the divided nature of the field, much criticism surrounding the lack of unity within the field has emerged. In particular, the claims of embodied cognition centering around the body appear to conflict with the tenets of extended cognition, which also appear to conflict with the body/environment distinction that is central to enactivism. Some theoreticians argue that the umbrella of 4E theories is still lacking a common language that might bridge the gaps between the theories that constitute it. There is also the concern that the grouping of such variable theories results in an important loss of nuance and complexity, which is a part of human cognition. Another concern raised is the "dogma of harmony". The criticism contained there regards the notion that within 4E theorizing, there is generally an optimistic and harmonic expectation of the extension between humans and their technologies, ignoring the possibility of those extensions detracting from cognition in some way rather than adding to it. Recent attempts to incorporate embodied cognitive neuroscience have been argued to hold the potential to resolve internal issues within 4E cognition. Overall, a concern often voiced regarding 4E cognition is that its proponents are at best only vaguely interested in cognition. More broadly, this concern reflects the arguably too distracted nature of this emerging field.

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  Lisp machine

  Lisp machines are general-purpose computers designed to efficiently run Lisp as their main software and programming language, usually via hardware support. They are an example of a high-level language computer architecture. In a sense, they were the first commercial single-user workstations. Despite being modest in number (perhaps 7,000 units total as of 1988) Lisp machines commercially pioneered some now-commonplace technologies, including networking innovations such as Chaosnet, and effective garbage collection. Several firms built and sold Lisp machines in the 1980s: Symbolics (3600, 3640, XL1200, MacIvory, and other models), Lisp Machines Incorporated (LMI Lambda), Texas Instruments (Explorer, MicroExplorer), and Xerox (Interlisp-D workstations). The operating systems were written in Lisp Machine Lisp, Interlisp (Xerox), and later partly in Common Lisp. == History == === Historical context === Artificial intelligence (AI) computer programs of the 1960s and 1970s intrinsically required what was then considered a huge amount of computer power, as measured in processor time and memory space. The power requirements of AI research were exacerbated by the Lisp symbolic programming language, when commercial hardware was designed and optimized for assembly- and Fortran-like programming languages. At first, the cost of such computer hardware meant that it had to be shared among many users. As integrated circuit technology shrank the size and cost of computers in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the memory needs of AI programs began to exceed the address space of the most common research computer, the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) PDP-10, researchers considered a new approach: a computer designed specifically to develop and run large artificial intelligence programs, and tailored to the semantics of the Lisp language. To provide consistent performance for interactive programs, these machines would often not be shared, but would be dedicated to a single user at a time. === Initial development === In 1973, Richard Greenblatt and Thomas Knight, programmers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (AI Lab), began what would become the MIT Lisp Machine Project when they first began building a computer hardwired to run certain basic Lisp operations, rather than run them in software, in a 24-bit tagged architecture. The machine also did incremental (or Arena) garbage collection. More specifically, since Lisp variables are typed at runtime rather than compile time, a simple addition of two variables could take five times as long on conventional hardware, due to test and branch instructions. Lisp Machines ran the tests in parallel with the more conventional single instruction additions. If the simultaneous tests failed, then the result was discarded and recomputed; this meant in many cases a speed increase by several factors. This simultaneous checking approach was used as well in testing the bounds of arrays when referenced, and other memory management necessities (not merely garbage collection or arrays). Type checking was further improved and automated when the conventional byte word of 32 bits was lengthened to 36 bits for Symbolics 3600-model Lisp machines and eventually to 40 bits or more (usually, the excess bits not accounted for by the following were used for error-correcting codes). The first group of extra bits were used to hold type data, making the machine a tagged architecture, and the remaining bits were used to implement compressed data representation (CDR) coding (wherein the usual linked list elements are compressed to occupy roughly half the space), aiding garbage collection by reportedly an order of magnitude. A further improvement was two microcode instructions which specifically supported Lisp functions, reducing the cost of calling a function to as little as 20 clock cycles, in some Symbolics implementations. The first machine was called the CONS machine (named after the list construction operator cons in Lisp). Often it was affectionately referred to as the Knight machine, perhaps since Knight wrote his master's thesis on the subject; it was extremely well received. It was subsequently improved into a version called CADR (a pun; in Lisp, the cadr function, which returns the second item of a list, is pronounced /ˈkeɪ.dəɹ/ or /ˈkɑ.dəɹ/, as some pronounce the word "cadre") which was based on essentially the same architecture. About 25 of what were essentially prototype CADRs were sold within and without MIT for ~$50,000; it quickly became the favorite machine for hacking – many of the most favored software tools were quickly ported to it (e.g. Emacs was ported from ITS in 1975). It was so well received at an AI conference held at MIT in 1978 that Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding its development. === Commercializing MIT Lisp machine technology === In 1979, Russell Noftsker, being convinced that Lisp machines had a bright commercial future due to the strength of the Lisp language and the enabling factor of hardware acceleration, proposed to Greenblatt that they commercialize the technology. In a counter-intuitive move for an AI Lab hacker, Greenblatt acquiesced, hoping perhaps that he could recreate the informal and productive atmosphere of the Lab in a real business. These ideas and goals were considerably different from those of Noftsker. The two negotiated at length, but neither would compromise. As the proposed firm could succeed only with the full and undivided assistance of the AI Lab hackers as a group, Noftsker and Greenblatt decided that the fate of the enterprise was up to them, and so the choice should be left to the hackers. The ensuing discussions of the choice divided the lab into two factions. In February 1979, matters came to a head. The hackers sided with Noftsker, believing that a commercial venture-fund-backed firm had a better chance of surviving and commercializing Lisp machines than Greenblatt's proposed self-sustaining start-up. Greenblatt lost the battle. It was at this juncture that Symbolics, Noftsker's enterprise, slowly came together. While Noftsker was paying his staff a salary, he had no building or any equipment for the hackers to work on. He bargained with Patrick Winston that, in exchange for allowing Symbolics' staff to keep working out of MIT, Symbolics would let MIT use internally and freely all the software Symbolics developed. A consultant from CDC, who was trying to put together a natural language computer application with a group of West-coast programmers, came to Greenblatt, seeking a Lisp machine for his group to work with, about eight months after the disastrous conference with Noftsker. Greenblatt had decided to start his own rival Lisp machine firm, but he had done nothing. The consultant, Alexander Jacobson, decided that the only way Greenblatt was going to start the firm and build the Lisp machines that Jacobson desperately needed was if Jacobson pushed and otherwise helped Greenblatt launch the firm. Jacobson pulled together business plans, a board, a partner for Greenblatt (one F. Stephen Wyle). The newfound firm was named LISP Machine, Inc. (LMI), and was funded by CDC orders, via Jacobson. Around this time Symbolics (Noftsker's firm) began operating. It had been hindered by Noftsker's promise to give Greenblatt a year's head start, and by severe delays in procuring venture capital. Symbolics still had the major advantage that while 3 or 4 of the AI Lab hackers had gone to work for Greenblatt, 14 other hackers had signed onto Symbolics. Two AI Lab people were not hired by either: Richard Stallman and Marvin Minsky. Stallman, however, blamed Symbolics for the decline of the hacker community that had centered around the AI lab. For two years, from 1982 to the end of 1983, Stallman worked by himself to clone the output of the Symbolics programmers, with the aim of preventing them from gaining a monopoly on the lab's computers. Regardless, after a series of internal battles, Symbolics did get off the ground in 1980/1981, selling the CADR as the LM-2, while Lisp Machines, Inc. sold it as the LMI-CADR. Symbolics did not intend to produce many LM-2s, since the 3600 family of Lisp machines was supposed to ship quickly, but the 3600s were repeatedly delayed, and Symbolics ended up producing ~100 LM-2s, each of which sold for $70,000. Both firms developed second-generation products based on the CADR: the Symbolics 3600 and the LMI-LAMBDA (of which LMI managed to sell ~200). The 3600, which shipped a year late, expanded on the CADR by widening the machine word to 36-bits, expanding the address space to 28-bits, and adding hardware to accelerate certain common functions that were implemented in microcode on the CADR. The LMI-LAMBDA, which came out a year after the 3600, in 1983, was compatible with the CADR (it could run CADR microcode), but hardware differences existed. Texas Instruments (TI) joined the fray whe

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  Afghan Girls Robotics Team

  The Afghan Girls Robotics Team, also known as the Afghan Dreamers, is an all-girl robotics team from Herat, Afghanistan, founded through the Digital Citizen Fund (DCF) in 2017 by Roya Mahboob and Alireza Mehraban. It is made up of girls between ages 12 and 18 and their mentors. Several members of the team were relocated to Qatar and Mexico by humanitarian and tech entrepreneur Sarah Porter following the fall of Kabul in August 2021. A documentary film featuring members of the team, titled Afghan Dreamers, was released by MTV Documentary Films in 2023. == Origins == The Afghan Girls Robotics Team was co-founded in 2017 by Roya Mahboob, who is their coach, mentor and sponsor, and founder of the Digital Citizen Fund (DCF), which is the parent organization for the team. Dean Kamen was planning a 2017 competition in the United States and had recruited Mahboob to form a team from Afghanistan. Out of 150 girls, 12 were selected for the first team. Before parts were sent by Kamen, they trained in the basement of the home of Mahboob's parents, with scrap metal and without safety equipment under the guidance of their coach, Mahboob's brother Alireza Mehraban, who is also a co-founder of the team. == 2017 and 2018 == In 2017, six members of the Afghan Girls Robotics Team traveled to the United States to participate in the international FIRST Global Challenge robotics competition. Their visas were rejected twice after they made two journeys from Herat to Kabul through Taliban-controlled areas, before officials in the United States government intervened to allow them to enter the United States. Customs officials also detained their robotics kits, which left them two weeks to construct their robot, unlike some teams that had more time. They were awarded a Silver medal for Courageous Achievement. One week after they returned home from the competition, the father of team captain Fatemah Qaderyan, Mohammad Asif Qaderyan, was killed in a suicide bombing. After their United States visas expired, the team participated in competitions in Estonia and Istanbul. Three of the 12 members participated in the 2017 Entrepreneurial Challenge at the Robotex festival in Estonia, and won the competition for their solar-powered robot designed to assist farmers. In 2018, the team trained in Canada, continued to travel in the United States for months and participate in competitions. == 2019 == The Afghan Girls Robotics team had aspirations to develop a science and technology school for girls in Afghanistan. Roya Mahboob interfaced with the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS), the School of Architecture, and the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies Yale University to design the infrastructure for what they named The Dreamer Institute. == 2020 == In March 2020, the governor of Herat at the time, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Afghanistan and a scarcity of ventilators, sought help with the design of low-cost ventilators, and the Afghan Girls Robotics Team was one of six teams contacted by the government. Using a design from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and with guidance from MIT engineers and Douglas Chin, a surgeon in California, the team developed a prototype with Toyota Corolla parts and a chain drive from a Honda motorcycle. UNICEF also supported the team with the acquisition of necessary parts during the three months they spent building the prototype that was completed in July 2020. Their design costs around $500 compared to $50,000 for a ventilator. In December 2020, Minister of Industry and Commerce Nizar Ahmad Ghoryani donated funding and obtained land for a factory to produce the ventilators. Under the direction of their mentor Roya Mahboob, the Afghan Dreamers also designed a UVC Robot for sanitization, and a Spray Robot for disinfection, both of which were approved by the Ministry of Health for production. == 2021 == In early August 2021, Somaya Faruqi, former captain of the team, was quoted by Public Radio International about the future of Afghanistan, stating, "We don’t support any group over another but for us what’s important is that we be able to continue our work. Women in Afghanistan have made a lot of progress over the past two decades and this progress must be respected." On August 17, 2021, the Afghan Girls Robotics Team and their coaches were reported to be attempting to evacuate, but unable to obtain a flight out of Afghanistan, and a lawyer appealed to Canada for assistance regarding the evacuation of the team members. As of August 19, 2021, nine members of the team and their coaches had evacuated to Qatar. The founder of the team, Roya Mahboob, and DCF board member, Elizabeth Schaeffer Brown, were previously in contact with the Qatari government to assist the team members in their evacuation from Afghanistan. By August 25, 2021, some members arrived in Mexico. Saghar, a team member who evacuated to Mexico, said, "We wanted to continue the path that we started to continue to go for our achievements and to go for having our dreams through reality. So that's why we decided to leave Afghanistan and go for somewhere safe" in an interview with The Associated Press. The members who have left Afghanistan participated in an online robotics competition in September and plan to continue their education. A documentary film titled Afghan Dreamers, produced by Beth Murphy and directed by David Greenwald, was in post-production when the team began to evacuate. == 2022 == The Afghan Dreamers were involved in a training program at the Texas A&M University at Qatar’s STEM Hub. == 2023 == The Afghan Girls Robotics Team had a booth at the 5th UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, where they displayed some of the robots the team had constructed. == Afghan Dreamers documentary == The Afghan Dreamers documentary from MTV Documentary Films premiered in May 2023 on Paramount+. The film was directed by David Greenwald and produced by David Cowan and Beth Murphy. In a review for Screen Daily, Wendy Ide wrote, "This film, with its likeable cast of girl nerds and positive message, should enjoy a warm reception on the festival circuit, and will be of particular interest to events seeking to showcase women's stories from around the world. It also serves as a timely cautionary tale – a case study on just how quickly the rights and the opportunities of women can be curtailed, at the behest of the men in power." == Honors and awards == 2017 Silver medal for Courageous Achievement at the FIRST Global Challenge, science and technology 2017 Benefiting Humanity in AI Award at World Summit AI 2017 Winner, Entrepreneurship Challenge at Robotex in Estonia 2018 Permission to Dream Award, Raw Film Festival 2018 Conrad Innovation Challenge, Raw Film Festival 2018 Rookie All Star – District Championship, Canada 2018 Asia Game Changer Award Honoree 2019 Inspiring in Engineering Award – FIRST Detroit World Championship 2019 Asia Game Changer Award of California 2019 Safety Award – FIRST Global, Dubai 2021 Forbes 30 Under 30 Asia 2022 World Championships, Genoa, Switzerland

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  Regulation of artificial intelligence in the United States

  The United States federal government and state governments have developed some regulation of artificial intelligence, including executive orders, federal laws, and state laws. Federal agencies have also developed some sector-specific regulations related to AI. At the federal level, the Biden administration released an October 2023 executive order about AI safety and security, Executive Order 14110, with directives related to AI development and deployment. President Trump revoked that executive order in January 2025 and issued Executive Order 14179. In December 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14365, an executive order directing federal agencies to develop a unified national approach to AI policy, evaluate state AI laws for potential conflicts, challenge them through legal action, and condition certain federal funding on state compliance, while exempting state laws related to child safety, data center infrastructure, and state government procurement. In 2025, Congress passed legislation targeting AI-generated deepfakes, the TAKE IT DOWN Act. Several U.S. states have enacted laws related to artificial intelligence. Some are already in effect, including in California. Other states have AI-related legislation coming into effect in 2026 and 2027. In 2025 and 2026, the Trump administration mentioned the patchwork nature of state legislation as a motivation for its push for unified national legislation regulating AI. The administration has criticized state lawmakers, threatened to sue states, and issued letters to discourage them from regulating AI companies and products; some states have continued to propose and enact related laws. Discussions about regulating AI have included topics such as the timeliness of regulating AI, the nature of the federal regulatory framework to govern and promote AI, including what agency should lead, the regulatory and governing powers of that agency, and how to update regulations in the face of rapidly changing technology, as well as the roles of state governments and courts. == Federal government == === Obama administration (2009–2017) === As early as 2016, the Obama administration had begun to focus on the risks and regulations for artificial intelligence. In an October 2016 report titled Preparing For the Future of Artificial Intelligence, the National Science and Technology Council set a precedent to allow researchers to continue to develop new AI technologies with few restrictions. The report stated that "the approach to regulation of AI-enabled products to protect public safety should be informed by assessment of the aspects of risk". The first National Artificial Intelligence Research And Development Strategic Plan was published in October 2016. === First Trump administration (2017–2021) === On August 13, 2018, Section 1051 of the Fiscal Year 2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-232) established the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence "to consider the methods and means necessary to advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States." Steering on regulating security-related AI is provided by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. The Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act (S.1558) is a proposed bill that would establish a federal initiative designed to accelerate research and development on AI for, inter alia, the economic and national security of the United States. On January 7, 2019, following an Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy released a draft Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications, which includes ten principles for United States agencies when deciding whether and how to regulate AI. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology released a position paper, and the Defense Innovation Board issued recommendations on the ethical use of AI. A year later, the administration called for comments on regulation in another draft of its Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications. Other specific agencies working on the regulation of AI included the Food and Drug Administration, which created pathways to regulate the incorporation of AI in medical imaging. The National Science and Technology Council also published an updated National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan in 2019, which received public scrutiny and recommendations to further improve it towards enabling Trustworthy AI. === Biden administration (2021–2025) === In March 2021, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence released their final report. In the report, they stated, "Advances in AI, including the mastery of more general AI capabilities along one or more dimensions, will likely provide new capabilities and applications. Some of these advances could lead to inflection points or leaps in capabilities. Such advances may also introduce new concerns and risks and the need for new policies, recommendations, and technical advances to assure that systems are aligned with goals and values, including safety, robustness and trustworthiness." In June 2022, Senators Rob Portman and Gary Peters introduced the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act. The bipartisan bill "would also help counter the risk of artificial intelligence... from being abused in ways that may pose a catastrophic risk". On October 4, 2022, President Joe Biden unveiled a new AI Bill of Rights, which outlines five protections Americans should have in the AI age: 1. Safe and Effective Systems, 2. Algorithmic Discrimination Protection, 3.Data Privacy, 4. Notice and Explanation, and 5. Human Alternatives, Consideration, and Fallback. The bill was formally published in October 2022 by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), a U.S. government office that advises the President on science and technology policy matters. In July 2023, the Biden administration secured voluntary commitments from seven companies – Amazon, Anthropic, Google, Inflection, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI – to manage the risks associated with AI. The companies committed to ensure AI products undergo both internal and external security testing before public release; to share information on the management of AI risks with the industry, governments, civil society, and academia; to prioritize cybersecurity and protect proprietary AI system components; to develop mechanisms to inform users when content is AI-generated, such as watermarking; to publicly report on their AI systems' capabilities, limitations, and areas of use; to prioritize research on societal risks posed by AI, including bias, discrimination, and privacy concerns; and to develop AI systems to address societal challenges, ranging from cancer prevention to climate change mitigation. In September 2023, eight additional companies – Adobe, Cohere, IBM, Nvidia, Palantir, Salesforce, Scale AI, and Stability AI – subscribed to these voluntary commitments. In January 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released the Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), providing voluntary guidance for organizations to identify, assess, and manage risks associated with AI systems. The Biden administration, in October 2023 signaled that they would release an executive order leveraging the federal government's purchasing power to shape AI regulations, hinting at a proactive governmental stance in regulating AI technologies. On October 30, 2023, President Biden released Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. The Executive Order includes directives on standards for critical infrastructure, AI-enhanced cybersecurity, and federally funded biological synthesis projects. The Executive Order provides the authority to various agencies and departments of the US government, including the Energy and Defense departments, to apply existing consumer protection laws to AI development. The Executive Order builds on the Administration's earlier agreements with AI companies to instate new initiatives to "red-team" or stress-test AI dual-use foundation models, especially those that have the potential to pose security risks, with data and results shared with the federal government. The Executive Order also recognizes AI's social challenges, and calls for companies building AI dual-use foundation models to be wary of these societal problems. For example, the Executive Order states that AI should not "worsen job quality", and should not "cause labor-force disruptions". Additionally, Biden's Executive Order mandates that AI must "advance equity and civil rights", and cannot disadvantage marginalized groups. It also called for foundation models to include "watermarks" to help the publi

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  Future of Life Institute

  The Future of Life Institute (FLI) is a nonprofit organization which aims to steer transformative technology towards benefiting life and away from large-scale risks, with a focus on existential risk from advanced artificial intelligence (AI). FLI's work includes grantmaking, educational outreach, and advocacy within the United Nations, United States government, and European Union institutions. The founders of the Institute include MIT cosmologist Max Tegmark, UCSC cosmologist Anthony Aguirre, and Skype co-founder Jaan Tallinn. == Purpose == FLI's stated mission is to steer transformative technology towards benefiting life and away from large-scale risks. FLI's philosophy focuses on the potential risk to humanity from the development of human-level or superintelligent artificial general intelligence (AGI), but also works to mitigate risk from biotechnology, nuclear weapons and global warming. == History == === Founding === FLI was founded in March 2014 by MIT cosmologist Max Tegmark, Skype co-founder Jaan Tallinn, DeepMind research scientist Viktoriya Krakovna, Tufts University postdoctoral scholar Meia Chita-Tegmark, and UCSC physicist Anthony Aguirre. === Activism === Starting in 2017, FLI has offered an annual "Future of Life Award", with the first awardee being Vasili Arkhipov. The same year, FLI released Slaughterbots, a short arms-control advocacy film. FLI released a sequel in 2021. In 2018, FLI drafted a letter calling for "laws against lethal autonomous weapons". Signatories included Elon Musk, Demis Hassabis, Shane Legg, and Mustafa Suleyman. In January 2023, Swedish magazine Expo reported that the FLI had offered a grant of $100,000 to a foundation set up by Nya Dagbladet, a Swedish far-right online newspaper. In response, Tegmark said that the institute had only become aware of Nya Dagbladet's positions during due diligence processes a few months after the grant was initially offered, and that the grant had been immediately revoked. === Open letter on an AI pause === In March 2023, FLI published a letter titled "Pause Giant AI Experiments: An Open Letter". This called on major AI developers to agree on a verifiable six-month pause of any systems "more powerful than GPT-4" and to use that time to institute a framework for ensuring safety; or, failing that, for governments to step in with a moratorium. The letter said: "recent months have seen AI labs locked in an out-of-control race to develop and deploy ever more powerful digital minds that no-one - not even their creators - can understand, predict, or reliably control". The letter referred to the possibility of "a profound change in the history of life on Earth" as well as potential risks of AI-generated propaganda, loss of jobs, human obsolescence, and society-wide loss of control. Prominent signatories of the letter included Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak, Evan Sharp, Chris Larsen, and Gary Marcus; AI lab CEOs Connor Leahy and Emad Mostaque; politician Andrew Yang; deep-learning researcher Yoshua Bengio; and Yuval Noah Harari. Marcus stated "the letter isn't perfect, but the spirit is right." Mostaque stated, "I don't think a six month pause is the best idea or agree with everything but there are some interesting things in that letter." In contrast, Bengio explicitly endorsed the six-month pause in a press conference. Musk predicted that "Leading AGI developers will not heed this warning, but at least it was said." Some signatories, including Musk, said they were motivated by fears of existential risk from artificial general intelligence. Some of the other signatories, such as Marcus, instead said they signed out of concern about risks such as AI-generated propaganda. The authors of one of the papers cited in FLI's letter, "On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?" including Emily M. Bender, Timnit Gebru, and Margaret Mitchell, criticised the letter. Mitchell said that “by treating a lot of questionable ideas as a given, the letter asserts a set of priorities and a narrative on AI that benefits the supporters of FLI. Ignoring active harms right now is a privilege that some of us don’t have.” === Open letter on prohibiting superintelligence === In October 2025, another letter, the "Statement on Superintelligence", was published. It called for a prohibition on the development of superintelligence not lifted before there is "broad scientific consensus that it will be done safely and controllably" and "strong public buy-in". FLI director Anthony Aguirre explained that "time is running out", expecting that the technology could arrive in as little as one to two years and counting on "widespread realization among society at all its levels" to stop it. He added that "whether it's soon or it takes a while, after we develop superintelligence, the machines are going to be in charge" and "that is not an experiment that we want to just run toward". The list of signatories included Nobel laureates Geoffrey Hinton, Daron Acemoglu, Beatrice Fihn, Frank Wilczek and John C. Mather as well as Hinton's fellow "godfather" of modern AI Yoshua Bengio, Steve Wozniak, Steve Bannon, Paolo Benanti, Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex and Meghan, Duchess of Sussex. The letter was also signed by the actors Joseph Gordon-Levitt and Stephen Fry, rapper Will.i.am and author Yuval Noah Harari. Former national security advisor Susan Rice, and OpenAI member of technical staff Leo Gao also signed their names to the letter. Polling released alongside the letter showed that 64% of American agreed that superintelligence "shouldn't be developed until it's provably safe and controllable" and only 5% believed it should be developed as quickly as possible. == Operations == === Advocacy === FLI has actively contributed to policymaking on AI. In October 2023, for example, U.S. Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer invited FLI to share its perspective on AI regulation with selected senators. In Europe, FLI successfully advocated for the inclusion of more general AI systems, such as GPT-4, in the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act. In military policy, FLI coordinated the support of the scientific community for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. At the UN and elsewhere, the institute has also advocated for a treaty on autonomous weapons. === Research grants === The FLI research program started in 2015 with an initial donation of $10 million from Elon Musk. In this initial round, a total of $7 million was awarded to 37 research projects. In July 2021, FLI announced that it would launch a new $25 million grant program with funding from the Russian–Canadian programmer Vitalik Buterin. === Conferences === In 2014, the Future of Life Institute held its opening event at MIT: a panel discussion on "The Future of Technology: Benefits and Risks", moderated by Alan Alda. The panelists were synthetic biologist George Church, geneticist Ting Wu, economist Andrew McAfee, physicist and Nobel laureate Frank Wilczek and Skype co-founder Jaan Tallinn. Since 2015, FLI has organised biannual conferences with the stated purpose of bringing together AI researchers from academia and industry. As of April 2023, the following conferences have taken place: "The Future of AI: Opportunities and Challenges" conference in Puerto Rico (2015). The stated goal was to identify promising research directions that could help maximize the future benefits of AI. At the conference, FLI circulated an open letter on AI safety which was subsequently signed by Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and many artificial intelligence researchers. The Beneficial AI conference in Asilomar, California (2017), a private gathering of what The New York Times called "heavy hitters of A.I." (including Yann LeCun, Elon Musk, and Nick Bostrom). The institute released a set of principles for responsible AI development that came out of the discussion at the conference, signed by Yoshua Bengio, Yann LeCun, and many other AI researchers. These principles may have influenced the regulation of artificial intelligence and subsequent initiatives, such as the OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence. The beneficial AGI conference in Puerto Rico (2019). The stated focus of the meeting was answering long-term questions with the goal of ensuring that artificial general intelligence is beneficial to humanity. == In the media == "The Fight to Define When AI is 'High-Risk'" in Wired. "Lethal Autonomous Weapons exist; They Must Be Banned" in IEEE Spectrum. "United States and Allies Protest U.N. Talks to Ban Nuclear Weapons" in The New York Times. "Is Artificial Intelligence a Threat?" in The Chronicle of Higher Education, including interviews with FLI founders Max Tegmark, Jaan Tallinn and Viktoriya Krakovna. "But What Would the End of Humanity Mean for Me?", an interview with Max Tegmark on the ideas behind FLI in The Atlantic.

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