AI Chatbot Interface

AI Chatbot Interface — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

• 

  Availability zone

  In cloud computing, an availability region is a group of data centres that are located in the same geographical region. Availability regions comprise multiple availability zones, which are groups of data centres that are located far enough from each other to prevent large-scale outages in the event of failure of a single zone, whilst still being close enough to each other to enable low-latency connections. Distributed systems spanning multiple availability zones allow for high availability, even in the event of catastrophic failure, such as natural disasters. Services offering distinct availability zones include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud.

  Read more →
• 

  Transparency in the software supply chain

  Transparency in the software supply chain is a condition in which participants involved in the development, procurement, operation, auditing, or regulation of software can determine which components, dependencies, build stages, identifiers, and relationships within the supply chain make up the delivered product. The disclosure of information about software components, their interrelationships, origins, and development methods—for the purposes of risk management, vulnerability detection, and compliance—takes place throughout the software lifecycle. Transparency is one of the key security attributes of the software supply chain, as a deeper understanding of the chain enables participants to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate threats. Problems in the software supply chain can cause billions in losses and create operational challenges for government and commercial entities, as demonstrated by incidents involving SolarWinds, Bybit, 3CX, Jaguar Land Rover, GitHub, and NotPetya. Modern software is often assembled from third-party libraries and open-source components. According to research by the Linux Foundation and Synopsys, 96% of the commercial codebases analyzed contained open-source software, and 70–90% of a typical codebase may consist of open-source components. Without transparency, any software component can become a threat. As a result, companies may spend billions of dollars building robust external defenses, but this will not protect against vulnerabilities in legitimate software inside the perimeter. At the same time, supply chain attacks also erode trust between customers and their IT providers, as malicious code is often embedded in official updates with certificates and digital signatures. One of the primary ways to ensure transparency is through a software bill of materials, which documents the components used to create the software and the relationships within the supply chain. == Concept == The software supply chain is the collection of systems, devices, people, artifacts, and processes involved in the creation of the final software product. Attacks on the software supply chain differ from conventional attacks in that they follow a four-stage pattern: compromise, modification, distribution, and subsequent exploitation of the compromised or modified component. A defining feature of a supply chain attack is the introduction or manipulation of a change at an upstream stage, which is subsequently exploited at a downstream stage. Transparency refers to the availability of knowledge about the chain, while validity concerns the integrity of operations and artifacts and the authentication of participants, and separation involves reducing unnecessary trust relationships and the radius of impact through compartmentalization. In this framework, transparency primarily helps during the pre-compromise and detection phases, as a clearer understanding of participants, operations, and artifacts makes it easier to identify weak links before attackers exploit them. Current major attack vectors include dependencies and containers, build infrastructure, and human participants, such as maintainers or developers. == History == Software supply-chain transparency developed from earlier efforts to document software components, long before the term came into widespread use in the cybersecurity field. Early component-documentation formats included SPDX, first published in 2011, and CycloneDX, first published in 2017. Initially, these formats were created to support license compliance, package identification, and tool compatibility. Their development helped shape a broader concept of software supply chain transparency, encompassing component documentation, disclosure practices, risk management, security analysis, and regulatory compliance. In 2018, the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administration launched a multistakeholder process on promoting software component transparency. This process helped move work on SBOMs from a specialized technical practice into the realm of policy and procurement to identify components used in software products. The 2020 compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform made software supply chain security a central issue in government cybersecurity policy. An analysis of the “Sunburst” campaign prepared by the Atlantic Council noted that the vulnerability of the software supply chain had become a realized risk for national-security agencies. In May 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden issued Executive Order 14028, which directed federal agencies to improve cybersecurity and increase transparency in the software supply chain, including requirements related to SBOMs. Reuters reported that the executive order required software developers selling their products to the federal government to provide greater visibility into their software and make security data available. In July 2021, the NTIA published the document “The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)”, defining the basic data fields and practices for creating SBOMs. Between 2021 and 2025, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency updated its guidance on “Framing Software Component Transparency”, expanding the set of SBOM attributes, metadata requirements, and operational recommendations for the creation, exchange, and use of SBOMs. Major incidents that occurred following the SolarWinds attack have underscored the importance of transparency in vulnerability management and supply chain security. The Log4Shell vulnerability in the Log4j library, disclosed in December 2021, demonstrated how difficult it can be for organizations to identify a vulnerable component deeply embedded within applications and services. In 2024, an attempt to plant a backdoor in XZ Utils showed how attackers could exploit trust in open-source maintenance processes to introduce malicious code into widely used infrastructure software. By the mid-2020s, software supply chain transparency had become part of international cybersecurity coordination and regulation. On September 3, 2025, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the National Cybersecurity Office, in collaboration with cybersecurity agencies from 15 countries, released the document “A Shared Vision of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for Cybersecurity.” In the European Union, the Cyber Resilience Act required manufacturers of products with digital elements to create, maintain, and retain SBOMs as part of the technical documentation for software placed on the EU market. == Transparency mechanisms == The primary mechanism for ensuring transparency is the software bill of materials (SBOM). An SBOM is a structured list of components, libraries, and tools used to build and distribute a software product, and it records dependencies in a way that helps organizations understand and assess their software supply chains. It can also be described as a formal record of components and their interdependencies, which gives users insight into their actual exposure to risks and threats. Five key areas of SBOM application in software supply chain security have been identified: vulnerability management, ensuring transparency, component evaluation, risk assessment, and ensuring supply chain integrity. In software supply chains, an SBOM documents all components, both open-source and proprietary. Under Executive Order 14028, U.S. federal agencies require software suppliers to provide SBOMs for government-procured software. The list of minimum required SBOM elements defined by NTIA includes three main categories: required data fields for describing each component (name, version, identifiers), automation support (machine-readable format, generation tools), and recommendations for creating SBOMs during development and purchasing. The post-2021 push for SBOMs was intended to provide visibility into the components used within software and to expose parts of an application that would otherwise remain hidden. This information can be used to prioritize patches, manage vulnerabilities, and support compliance work. Transparency also supports software traceability, which is becoming a standard feature of developer platforms. Traceability has become important because organizations are increasingly required to demonstrate how software was created, rather than simply listing its components. Higher levels of assurance require signed, tamper-proof traceability and more isolated, verifiable build environments. A related mechanism is build reproducibility. Reproducible builds are defined as build processes that make the compilation process deterministic, ensuring that the same source code always produces the same binary file. These builds are considered a foundational element for distributed verification, transparency-log maintenance, supply-chain workflow integration, and the creation of keyless signatures based on verifiable logs. Although reproducibility does not replace inventory or attestation, it gives external par

  Read more →
• 

  Computer security

  Computer security (also cybersecurity, digital security, or information technology (IT) security) is a subdiscipline within the field of information security. It focuses on protecting computer software, systems, and networks from threats that can lead to unauthorized information disclosure, theft, or damage to hardware, software, or data, as well as to the disruption or misdirection of the services they provide. The growing significance of computer security reflects the increasing dependence on computer systems, the Internet, and evolving wireless network standards. This reliance has expanded with the proliferation of smart devices, including smartphones, televisions, and other components of the Internet of things (IoT). As digital infrastructure becomes more embedded in everyday life, cybersecurity has emerged as a critical concern. The complexity of modern information systems—and the societal functions they underpin—has introduced new vulnerabilities. Systems that manage essential services, such as power grids, electoral processes, and finance, are particularly sensitive to security breaches. Although many aspects of computer security involve digital security, such as electronic passwords and encryption, physical security measures, such as metal locks, are still used to prevent unauthorized tampering. IT security is not a perfect subset of information security and therefore does not completely align with the security convergence schema. == Vulnerabilities and attacks == A vulnerability refers to a flaw in the structure, execution, functioning, or internal oversight of a computer or system that compromises its security. Most of the vulnerabilities that have been discovered are documented in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. An exploitable vulnerability is one for which at least one working exploit exists. Actors maliciously seeking vulnerabilities are known as threats. Vulnerabilities can be researched, reverse-engineered, hunted, or exploited using automated tools or customized scripts. Various people or parties are vulnerable to cyberattacks; however, different groups are likely to experience different types of attacks more than others. In April 2023, the United Kingdom Department for Science, Innovation & Technology released a report on cyberattacks over the previous 12 months. They surveyed 2,263 UK businesses, 1,174 UK registered charities, and 554 education institutions. The research found that "32% of businesses and 24% of charities overall recall any breaches or attacks from the last 12 months." These figures were much higher for "medium businesses (59%), large businesses (69%), and high-income charities with £500,000 or more in annual income (56%)." Yet, although medium or large businesses are more often the victims, since larger companies have generally improved their security over the last decade, small and midsize businesses (SMBs) have also become increasingly vulnerable as they often "do not have advanced tools to defend the business." SMBs are most likely to be affected by malware, ransomware, phishing, man-in-the-middle attacks, and Denial-of Service (DoS) Attacks. Normal internet users are most likely to be affected by untargeted cyberattacks. These are where attackers indiscriminately target as many devices, services, or users as possible. They do this using techniques that take advantage of the openness of the Internet. These strategies mostly include phishing, ransomware, water holing and scanning. To secure a computer system, it is important to understand the attacks that can be made against it, and these threats can typically be classified into one of the following categories: === Backdoor === A backdoor in a computer system, a cryptosystem or an algorithm, is any secret method of bypassing normal authentication or security controls. These weaknesses may exist for many reasons, including original design or poor configuration. Due to the nature of backdoors, they are of greater concern to companies and databases as opposed to individuals. Backdoors may be added by an authorized party to allow some legitimate access or by an attacker for malicious reasons. Criminals often use malware to install backdoors, giving them remote administrative access to a system. Once they have access, cybercriminals can "modify files, steal personal information, install unwanted software, and even take control of the entire computer." Backdoors can be difficult to detect, as they often remain hidden within source code or system firmware and may require intimate knowledge of the operating system to identify. === Denial-of-service attack === Denial-of-service attacks (DoS) are designed to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. Attackers can deny service to individual victims, such as by deliberately entering an incorrect password enough consecutive times to cause the victim's account to be locked, or they may overload the capabilities of a machine or network and block all users at once. While a network attack from a single IP address can be blocked by adding a new firewall rule, many forms of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are possible, where the attack comes from a large number of points. In this case, defending against these attacks is much more difficult. Such attacks can originate from the zombie computers of a botnet or from a range of other possible techniques, including distributed reflective denial-of-service (DRDoS), where innocent systems are fooled into sending traffic to the victim. With such attacks, the amplification factor makes the attack easier for the attacker because they have to use little bandwidth themselves. To understand why attackers may carry out these attacks, see the 'attacker motivation' section. === Physical access attacks === A direct-access attack is when an unauthorized user (an attacker) gains physical access to a computer, typically to copy data from it or steal information. Attackers may also compromise security by making operating system modifications, installing software worms, keyloggers, covert listening devices or using wireless microphones. Even when the system is protected by standard security measures, these may be bypassed by booting another operating system or tool from a CD-ROM or other bootable media. Disk encryption and the Trusted Platform Module standard are designed to prevent these attacks. Direct service attackers are related in concept to direct memory attacks which allow an attacker to gain direct access to a computer's memory. The attacks "take advantage of a feature of modern computers that allows certain devices, such as external hard drives, graphics cards, or network cards, to access the computer's memory directly." === Eavesdropping === Eavesdropping is the act of surreptitiously listening to a private computer conversation (communication), usually between hosts on a network. It typically occurs when a user connects to a network where traffic is not secured or encrypted and sends sensitive business data to a colleague, which, when listened to by an attacker, could be exploited. Data transmitted across an open network can be intercepted by an attacker using various methods. Unlike malware, direct-access attacks, or other forms of cyberattacks, eavesdropping attacks are unlikely to negatively affect the performance of networks or devices, making them difficult to notice. In fact, "the attacker does not need to have any ongoing connection to the software at all. The attacker can insert the software onto a compromised device, perhaps by direct insertion or perhaps by a virus or other malware, and then come back some time later to retrieve any data that is found or trigger the software to send the data at some determined time." Using a virtual private network (VPN), which encrypts data between two points, is one of the most common forms of protection against eavesdropping. Using the best form of encryption possible for wireless networks is best practice, as well as using HTTPS instead of an unencrypted HTTP. Programs such as Carnivore and NarusInSight have been used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the NSA to eavesdrop on the systems of internet service providers. Even machines that operate as a closed system (i.e., with no contact with the outside world) can be eavesdropped upon by monitoring the faint electromagnetic transmissions generated by the hardware. TEMPEST is a specification by the NSA referring to these attacks. === Malware === Malicious software (malware) is any software code or computer program "intentionally written to harm a computer system or its users." Once present on a computer, it can leak sensitive details such as personal information, business information and passwords, can give control of the system to the attacker, and can corrupt or delete data permanently. ==== Types of malware ==== Viruses are a specific type of malware, and are normally a malicious code that hijac

  Read more →
• 

  WebGPU Shading Language

  WebGPU Shading Language (WGSL, internet media type: text/wgsl) is a high-level shading language and the normative shader language for the WebGPU API on the web. WGSL's syntax is influenced by Rust and is designed with strong static validation, explicit resource binding, and portability in mind for secure execution in browsers. In web contexts, WebGPU implementations accept WGSL source and perform compilation to platform-specific intermediate forms (for example, to SPIR‑V, DXIL, or MSL via the user agent), but such backends are not exposed to web content. == History and background == Graphics on the web historically used WebGL, with shaders written in GLSL ES. As applications demanded more modern GPU features and finer control over compute and graphics pipelines, the W3C's GPU for the Web Community Group and Working Group created WebGPU and its companion shading language, WGSL, to provide a secure, portable model suitable for the web platform. WGSL was developed to be human-readable, avoid undefined behavior common in legacy shading languages, and align closely with WebGPU's resource and validation model. == Design goals == WGSL's design emphasizes: Safety and determinism suitable for web security constraints (extensive static validation and well-defined semantics). Portability across diverse GPU backends via an abstract resource model shared with WebGPU. Readability and explicitness (no preprocessor, minimal implicit conversions, explicit address spaces and bindings). Alignment with modern GPU features (compute, storage buffers, textures, atomics) while retaining a familiar C/Rust-like syntax. == Language overview == === Types and values === Core scalar types include bool, i32, u32, and f32. Vectors (e.g., vec2, vec3, vec4) and matrices (up to 4×4) are available for floating-point element types. Optional f16 (half precision) may be enabled via a WebGPU feature; availability is implementation-dependent. Atomic types (atomic, atomic) support limited atomic operations in qualified address spaces. === Variables and address spaces === Variables are declared with let (immutable), var (mutable), or const (compile-time constant). Storage classes (address spaces) include function, private, workgroup, uniform, and storage with read or read_write access as applicable. WGSL defines explicit layout and alignment rules; attributes such as @align, @size, and @stride control data layout for buffer interoperability. === Functions and control flow === Functions use explicit parameter and return types. Control flow includes if, switch, for, while, and loop constructs, with break/continue. Recursion is disallowed; entry-point call graphs must be acyclic. === Entry points and attributes === Shaders define stage entry points with @vertex, @fragment, or @compute. Attributes annotate bindings and interfaces, including @group, @binding (resource binding), @location (user-defined I/O), @builtin (stage built-ins such as position or global_invocation_id), @interpolate, and @workgroup_size. === Resources === WGSL exposes buffers (uniform, storage), textures (sampled, storage, and multisampled variants), and samplers (filtering/non-filtering/comparison). The binding model is explicit via descriptor sets called groups and bindings, matching WebGPU's pipeline layout model. == Compilation and validation == Browsers compile WGSL to platform-appropriate representations and native driver formats; the specific compilation pipeline is not observable by web content. WGSL source undergoes strict parsing and static validation, and WebGPU enforces robust resource access rules to avoid out-of-bounds memory hazards, contributing to predictable behavior across implementations. == Shader stages == WGSL supports three pipeline stages: vertex, fragment, and compute. === Vertex shaders === Vertex shaders transform per-vertex inputs and produce values for rasterization, including a clip-space position written to the position builtin. ==== Example ==== === Fragment shaders === Fragment shaders run per-fragment and compute color (and optionally depth) outputs written to color attachments. ==== Example ==== If half-precision (vec4h, shorthand for vec4) is desired, the code must be prefaced with a enable f16; statement. === Compute shaders === Compute shaders run in workgroups and are used for general-purpose GPU computations. ==== Example ==== == Differences from GLSL and HLSL == Compared with legacy shading languages, WGSL: Omits a preprocessor and requires explicit types and conversions. Uses explicit address spaces and binding annotations aligned with WebGPU's model. Enforces strict validation to avoid undefined behavior common in other shading languages. Defines a portable, web-focused feature set; 16-bit types and other features are opt-in and may depend on device capabilities.

  Read more →
• 

  Diagnostically acceptable irreversible compression

  Diagnostically acceptable irreversible compression (DAIC) is the amount of lossy compression which can be used on a medical image to produce a result that does not prevent the reader from using the image to make a medical diagnosis. The term was first introduced at a workshop on irreversible compression convened by the European Society of Radiology (ESR) in Palma de Mallorca October 13, 2010, the results of which were reported in a subsequent position paper. == Determination == The "amount of compression" in irreversible compression used to be determined by the compression ratio, where the acceptable minimum is determined by the algorithm (typically JPEG or J2K) and the data type (body part and imaging method). Such a definition is easy to follow, and has been used by medical bodies in 2010 around the world. However, its downside is obvious: the compression ratio tells nothing about the real quality of the image, as different compressors can produce vastly different qualities under the same file size. For example, the JPEG format of 1992 can perform as well as many modern formats given newer techniques exploited in mozjpeg and ISO libjpeg, yet they would be lumped together with the legacy encoders in such a scheme. The image compression community has long used objective quality metrics like SSIM to measure the effects of compression. In the absence of good data regarding SSIM, the ESR review of 2010 concluded that it is still difficult to establish a criterion for whether a particular irreversible compression scheme applied with particular parameters to a particular individual image, or category of images, avoids the introduction of some quantifiable risk of a diagnostic error for any particular diagnostic task. A 2017 study showed that a SSIM variant called 4-G-r (4-component, gradient, structural component of SSIM) best reflects changes in images that affect the decision of radiologists out of 16 SSIM variants. A 2020 study shows that visual information fidelity (VIF), feature similarity index (FSIM), and noise quality metric (NQM) best reflect radiologist preferences out of ten metrics. It also mentions that the original version of SSIM works as poorly as a basic root-mean-square distance (RMSD) for this purpose, a result echoed by the 2017 study. The 4-G-r modification is not tested in the study.

  Read more →
• 

  Lossless join decomposition

  In database design, a lossless join decomposition is a decomposition of a relation r {\displaystyle r} into relations r 1 , r 2 {\displaystyle r_{1},r_{2}} such that a natural join of the two smaller relations yields back the original relation. This is central in removing redundancy safely from databases while preserving the original data. Lossless join can also be called non-additive. == Definition == A relation r {\displaystyle r} on schema R {\displaystyle R} decomposes losslessly onto schemas R 1 {\displaystyle R_{1}} and R 2 {\displaystyle R_{2}} if π R 1 ( r ) ⋈ π R 2 ( r ) = r {\displaystyle \pi _{R_{1}}(r)\bowtie \pi _{R_{2}}(r)=r} , that is r {\displaystyle r} is the natural join of its projections onto the smaller schemas. A pair ( R 1 , R 2 ) {\displaystyle (R_{1},R_{2})} is a lossless-join decomposition of R {\displaystyle R} or said to have a lossless join with respect to a set of functional dependencies F {\displaystyle F} if any relation r ( R ) {\displaystyle r(R)} that satisfies F {\displaystyle F} decomposes losslessly onto R 1 {\displaystyle R_{1}} and R 2 {\displaystyle R_{2}} . Decompositions into more than two schemas can be defined in the same way. == Criteria == A decomposition R = R 1 ∪ R 2 {\displaystyle R=R_{1}\cup R_{2}} has a lossless join with respect to F {\displaystyle F} if and only if the closure of R 1 ∩ R 2 {\displaystyle R_{1}\cap R_{2}} includes R 1 ∖ R 2 {\displaystyle R_{1}\setminus R_{2}} or R 2 ∖ R 1 {\displaystyle R_{2}\setminus R_{1}} . In other words, one of the following must hold: ( R 1 ∩ R 2 ) → ( R 1 ∖ R 2 ) ∈ F + {\displaystyle (R_{1}\cap R_{2})\to (R_{1}\setminus R_{2})\in F^{+}} ( R 1 ∩ R 2 ) → ( R 2 ∖ R 1 ) ∈ F + {\displaystyle (R_{1}\cap R_{2})\to (R_{2}\setminus R_{1})\in F^{+}} === Criteria for multiple sub-schemas === Multiple sub-schemas R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n {\displaystyle R_{1},R_{2},...,R_{n}} have a lossless join if there is some way in which we can repeatedly perform lossless joins until all the schemas have been joined into a single schema. Once we have a new sub-schema made from a lossless join, we are not allowed to use any of its isolated sub-schema to join with any of the other schemas. For example, if we can do a lossless join on a pair of schemas R i , R j {\displaystyle R_{i},R_{j}} to form a new schema R i , j {\displaystyle R_{i,j}} , we use this new schema (rather than R i {\displaystyle R_{i}} or R j {\displaystyle R_{j}} ) to form a lossless join with another schema R k {\displaystyle R_{k}} (which may already be joined (e.g., R k , l {\displaystyle R_{k,l}} )). == Example == Let R = { A , B , C , D } {\displaystyle R=\{A,B,C,D\}} be the relation schema, with attributes A, B, C and D. Let F = { A → B C } {\displaystyle F=\{A\rightarrow BC\}} be the set of functional dependencies. Decomposition into R 1 = { A , B , C } {\displaystyle R_{1}=\{A,B,C\}} and R 2 = { A , D } {\displaystyle R_{2}=\{A,D\}} is lossless under F because R 1 ∩ R 2 = A {\displaystyle R_{1}\cap R_{2}=A} and we have a functional dependency A → B C {\displaystyle A\rightarrow BC} . In other words, we have proven that ( R 1 ∩ R 2 → R 1 ∖ R 2 ) ∈ F + {\displaystyle (R_{1}\cap R_{2}\rightarrow R_{1}\setminus R_{2})\in F^{+}} .

  Read more →
• 

  Blanking (video)

  In analog video, blanking occurs between horizontal lines and between frames. In raster scan equipment, an image is built up by scanning an electron beam from left to right across a screen to produce a visible trace of one scan line, reducing the brightness of the beam to zero (horizontal blanking), moving it back as fast as possible to the left of the screen at a slightly lower position (the next scan line), restoring the brightness, and continuing until all the lines have been displayed and the beam is at the bottom right of the screen. Its intensity is then reduced to zero again (vertical blanking), and it is rapidly moved to the top left to start again, creating the next frame. In television, in particular, the vertical blanking interval is long to accommodate the slow equipment available at the time the standard was set. Fast modern electronics allows digital information to be encoded into the signal during the vertical blanking interval; it is not displayed on screen as the beam is blanked, but can be processed by appropriate circuitry.

  Read more →
• 

  Screen space directional occlusion

  Screen space directional occlusion (SSDO) is a computer graphics technique enhancing screen space ambient occlusion (SSAO) by taking direction into account to sample the ambient light (both the light coming directly at an object, as well as the light reflected off of the object directly behind it), to better approximate global illumination. SSDO was introduced by Tobias Ritschel, Thorsten Grosch, and Hans-Peter Seidel in their 2009 ACM Symposium on Interactive 3D Graphics and Games paper Approximating dynamic global illumination in image space, which describes it as extending SSAO to directional occlusion with one diffuse indirect bounce of light; later literature notes that SSDO still suffers from common screen-space artifacts such as noise and banding. == Method == The original SSDO paper describes a two-pass screen-space approach, with one pass for direct lighting and a second pass for indirect bounces. Later literature describes SSDO as assuming a general shadowing direction that allows color bleeding and a single light bounce.

  Read more →
• 

  CloudMinds

  CloudMinds is an operator of cloud-based systems for cognitive robotics. == History == CloudMinds was founded in 2015 and is backed by SoftBank, Foxconn, Walden Venture Investments, and Keytone Ventures. CloudMinds has developed research in smart devices, robot control, high-speed security networks, and cloud intelligence integration. CloudMinds developed the Mobile Intranet Cloud Services (MCS) based on these technologies in order to increase the information security of the cloud robot remote control. The technology has been applied in the fields of finance, medicine, the military, public safety, and large-scale manufacturing. == U.S. sanctions == In May 2020, CloudMinds was added to the Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List due to U.S. national security concerns.

  Read more →
• 

  NHS COVID-19

  NHS COVID-19 was a voluntary contact tracing app for monitoring the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in England and Wales, in use from 24 September 2020 until 27 April 2023. It was available for Android and iOS smartphones, and could be used by anyone aged 16 or over. Two versions of the app were created. The first was commissioned by NHSX and developed by the Pivotal division of American software company VMware. A pilot deployment began in May 2020, but on 18 June development of the app was abandoned in favour of a second design using the Apple/Google Exposure Notification system. Scotland and Northern Ireland had separate contact tracing apps. A 2023 study estimated that in its first year of use, the app's contact tracing function prevented an estimated 1 million cases, and 9,600 deaths. == Description == The app allowed users to: See the alert level of their local authority area (in Wales) or information about restrictions (in England); to enable this, the user must enter the first half of their postcode "Check in" at places displaying an NHS QR code poster (no longer required by legislation after 26 January 2022, removed from the app the next month) Be notified when they have been in close contact with someone who has tested positive for the virus Be notified when local health protection teams determine that people with the virus had attended a business or other venue around the same time as the user Check their symptoms, and book a coronavirus test if necessary If asked to self-isolate, receive information and a daily "countdown". At first, "close contact" was defined as being within 2 metres for 15 minutes, or within 4 metres for a longer time. These time durations were reduced from 29 October 2020, to as little as three minutes when the other person is at their most infectious, i.e. soon after they begin showing symptoms. === Implementation === The Android app was coded in Kotlin, and the iOS app in Swift. The backend used Java and is deployed to Amazon Web Services using Terraform. The code of the app and back-end is open-source and available on GitHub. == Context == The app was part of the UK's test and trace programme which was chaired by Dido Harding; from 12 May 2020 Tom Riordan, chief executive of Leeds City Council, led the tracing effort. == First phase and cancellation == === Description === In March 2020, NHSX commissioned a contact tracing app to monitor the spread in the United Kingdom of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the 2020 pandemic, developed by the Pivotal division of American software company VMware. The app used a centralised approach, in contrast to the Google / Apple contact tracing project. NHSX consulted ethicists and GCHQ's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) about the privacy aspects. The app recorded the make and model of the phone and asked the user for their postcode area. It generated a unique installation identification number and also a daily identification number. It then used Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to record the daily identification number of other users nearby. If a user was unwell, they could tell the app about symptoms which are characteristic of COVID-19, such as a fever and cough. These details were then passed to a central NHS server. This would assess the information and notify other users that have been in contact, giving them appropriate advice such as physical distancing. The NHS would also arrange for a swab test of the unwell user and the outcome would determine further notifications to contacts: if the test confirmed infection with COVID-19, the contacts would be asked to isolate. By June 2020, £11.8 million had been spent on the app; in 2020–21, £35 million was spent on the app. === Deployment === The first public trial of the app began on the Isle of Wight on 5 May 2020 and by 11 May it had been downloaded 55,000 times. When the first national contact tracing schemes were launched – Test, Trace, Protect in Wales on 13 May, then on 28 May NHS Test and Trace in England, and Test and Protect in Scotland – the app was not ready to be included. Replying to a question at the government's daily briefing on 8 June, Hancock was unable to give a date for rollout of the app in England, saying it would be brought in "when it's right to do so". On 17 June, Lord Bethell, junior minister for Innovation at the Department of Health and Social Care, said "we're seeking to get something going before the winter ... it isn't a priority for us at the moment". On 18 June, Health Secretary Matt Hancock announced development would switch to the Apple/Google system after admitting that Apple's restrictions on usage of Bluetooth prevented the app from working effectively. At the same press briefing Dido Harding, leader of the UK's test and trace programme, said "What we've done in really rigorously testing both our own Covid-19 app and the Google-Apple version is demonstrate that none of them are working sufficiently well enough to be actually reliable to determine whether any of us should self-isolate for two weeks [and] that's true across the world". === Concerns === The first, ultimately rejected, version of the app was subject to privacy concerns, the government backtracking on initial statements that the data collected from the app would not be shared outside the NHS. Matthew Gould, CEO of NHSX, the government department responsible for the app, said the data would be accessible to other organisations, but did not disclose which. Data collected would not necessarily be anonymised and would be held in a centralised repository. Over 150 of the UK's security and privacy experts warned the app's data could be used by 'a bad actor (state, private sector, or hacker)' to spy on citizens. Fears were discussed by the House of Commons' Human Rights Select Committee about plans for the app to record user location data. Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights said this version of the app should not be released without proper privacy protections. The second version of the app, released nationwide, addressed these concerns by employing a decentralised framework, the Apple/Google Exposure Notification system. Under this system, users remain pseudonymous: a person diagnosed with COVID-19 does not know which people are informed about an encounter, and contacted persons do not receive any information about the person diagnosed with COVID-19. The functionality of the app was also questioned in late April and early May 2020, as the software's use of Bluetooth required the app to be constantly running, meaning users could not use other apps or lock their device if the app was to function properly. The developers of the app were said to have found a way of working around this restriction. === Related contracts === Faculty – a company linked to Cambridge Analytica – provided research and modelling to NHSX in support of the response to the pandemic. Palantir, also linked to Cambridge Analytica, provided their data management platform. These contracts began in February and March respectively. == Second phase == As outlined on cancellation of the first app on 18 June 2020, the Department of Health and Social Care published on 30 July a brief description of the "next phase" app. Users would be able to scan a QR code at venues they visit, and later be notified if they had visited a place which was the source of a number of infections; the app would also assist with identifying symptoms and ordering a test. By using the Exposure Notification system from Apple and Google, personal data would be decentralised. Zuhlke Engineering Ltd, the UK branch of Swiss-based Zühlke Group, used 70 staff to complete the development of the app in 12 weeks. Zuhlke Engineering was awarded "Development Team of the Year" title at UK IT Industry awards in November 2021 for development of NHS COVID-19 application. === Timeline === Testing of the app by NHS volunteer responders, and selected residents of the Isle of Wight and the London Borough of Newham, began around 13 August. The app was made available to the public (aged 16 or over) in England and Wales on 24 September. An updated app released on 29 October, in part from collaboration with the Alan Turing Institute, improved the accuracy of measurements of the distance between the user's phone and other phones. At the same time, the duration threshold for determining exposure was reduced; this was expected to lead to an increase in the number of users told to self-isolate. An update to the app in April 2021, timed to coincide with easing of restrictions on hospitality businesses, was blocked by Apple and Google. It was intended that users who tested positive would be asked to share their history of visited venues, to assist in warning others, but this would have contravened assurances by Apple and Google that location data from devices would not be shared. === Statistics and effectiveness === The app was downloaded six million times on the first day it was generally availa

  Read more →
• 

  Olio (app)

  Olio is a mobile app for sharing by giving away, getting, borrowing or lending things in your community for free, aiming to reduce household and food waste. It does this by connecting neighbours with spare food or household items to others nearby who wish to pick up those items. The food must be edible; it can be raw or cooked, sealed or open. Non-food items often listed on Olio include books, clothes and furniture. Those donating surplus food can be individuals or companies such as food retailers, restaurants, corporate canteens, food photographers etc., and donations can take place on an ad-hoc or recurrent basis. For example, some supermarket chains in the UK, including Tesco, the Midcounties Co-operative, Morrisons, Sainsbury's and Iceland have piloted Olio as an 'online food bank' to donate food and to reduce their waste. In March 2022, Olio partnered with Pandamart in Singapore. First launched in early 2015 by Tessa Clarke and Saasha Celestial-One, by October 2017 the company had raised $2.2 million in funding. Olio subsequently performed a series A funding round of $6 million in 2018 and a Series B of $43 million. Notable investors include Accel, Octopus Ventures and VNV Global. The Olio app had around 7 million registered users as of May 2023.

  Read more →
• 

  ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24

  ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 Computer graphics, image processing and environmental data representation is a standardization subcommittee of the joint subcommittee ISO/IEC JTC 1 of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), which develops and facilitates standards within the field of computer graphics, image processing, and environmental data representation. The international secretariat of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 is the British Standards Institute (BSI) located in the United Kingdom. == History == ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 was formed in 1987 from ISO/TC 97 as a result of Resolution 21 at the ISO/IEC JTC 1 plenary. The group's origins began in computer graphics, the standardization of which was originally under ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 21/WG 2. However, when ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 was created, the standardization activity of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 21/WG 2 was carried over to the new subcommittee. The initial five working groups of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 were titled, “Architecture,” “Application programming interfaces,” “Metafiles and interfaces,” “Language bindings,” and “Validation, testing and registration.” The work of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 began with the Graphical Kernel System (GKS), which was adopted from ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 21/WG 2. However, since GKS only addressed 2D functionality, attention turned to the standardization of 3D functionality. This resulted in two standards being published: GKS-3D in 1988 and PHIGS in 1989, both of which addressed 3D functionality. Since 1991, ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 has held plenaries in a number of countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, United States, France, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Korea, United Kingdom, Australia, and Czech Republic. == Scope == The scope of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 is the “Standardization of interfaces for information technology based applications relating to”: Computer graphics Image processing Environmental data representation Support for the Mixed and Augmented Reality (MAR) Interaction with, and visual representation of, information Included are the following related areas: Modeling and simulation and related reference models Virtual reality with accompanying augmented reality/augmented virtuality aspects and related reference models Application program interfaces Functional specifications Representation models Interchange formats, encodings and their specifications, including metafiles Device interfaces Testing methods Registration procedures Presentation and support for creation of multimedia, hypermedia, and mixed reality documents Excluded are the following areas: Character and image coding Coding of multimedia, hypermedia, and mixed reality document interchange formats JTC 1 work in user system interfaces and document presentation ISO/TC 207 work on ISO 14000 environment management, ISO/TC 211 work on geographic information and geomatics Software environments as described by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 22 == Structure == ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 is made up of four active working groups, each of which carries out specific tasks in standards development within the field of computer graphics, image processing and environmental data representation, together with ITU-T Study Group 16. As a response to changing standardization needs, working groups of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 can be disbanded if their area of work is no longer applicable, or established if new working areas arise. The focus of each working group is described in the group's terms of reference. Active working groups of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 are: == Collaborations == ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 works in close collaboration with a number of other organizations or subcommittees, both internal and external to ISO or IEC, in order to avoid conflicting or duplicative work. Organizations internal to ISO or IEC that collaborate with or are in liaison to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 include: ISO/IEC JTC 1/WG 7, Sensor Networks ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 29, Coding of audio, picture, multimedia and hypermedia information ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 32, Data management and interchange ISO/TAG 14, Imagery and technology ISO/TC 130, Graphic Technology ISO/TC 184/SC 4, Industrial data ISO/TC 211, Geographic information/Geomatics ISO/TC 215, Health informatics IEC TC 100, Audio, video and multimedia system and equipment Some organizations external to ISO or IEC that collaborate with or are in liaison to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 include: Defence Geospatial Information Working Group (DGIWG) Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) The Khronos Group NATO - Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capability Group (JISRCG) OMG Robotics DTF Open CGM Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) SEDRIS Organization Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) US National Imagery Transmission Format Standard (NITFS) Technical Board (US NTB) Web3D Consortium World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) == Member countries == Countries pay a fee to ISO to be members of subcommittees. The 11 "P" (participating) members of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 are: Australia, China, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Portugal, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. The 22 "O" (observer) members of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 are: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czech Republic, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Thailand. == Published standards == ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 24 currently has 80 published standards under their direct responsibility within the field of computer graphics, image processing, and environmental data representation, including:

  Read more →
• 

  Sanad (government app)

  Sanad (Arabic: سند) is the official digital identity and e-government services application of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Developed and managed by the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship, the app provides a unified platform for accessing a range of public services and personal records digitally. == Overview == Launched in February 2020, Sanad is part of Jordan's broader digital transformation strategy aimed at improving public service delivery and enhancing administrative efficiency. The app allows users to authenticate their identity digitally and access over 550 services from more than 50 government and private sector entities. == Features == Sanad provides a wide array of services, including: Viewing and managing official digital documents Applying for government services (e.g., jordanian passport issuance or renewal, health insurance) Accessing personal records (e.g., pension, property ownership) Digitally signing documents Paying utility bills and traffic fines Receiving and tracking official notifications The app is available on iOS, Android, and HarmonyOS platforms and supports both Arabic and English languages. == Digital Identity == A core feature of Sanad is the digital identity system, which enables secure login and authentication for all integrated services. Users must activate their digital identity at designated Sanad stations across Jordan to access the full suite of services. == Adoption and Impact == As of 2025, more than 1.6 million Jordanians have activated their digital identities through Sanad. The app has played a significant role in streamlining government interactions and reducing the need for in-person visits, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. == Recent Developments == In 2025, the Ministry launched an updated version of the app with enhanced user experience and new services, including the e-passport issuance feature.

  Read more →
• 

  Geofence warrant

  A geofence warrant or a reverse location warrant is a search warrant issued by a court to allow law enforcement to search a database to find all active mobile devices within a particular geo-fence area. Courts have granted law enforcement geo-fence warrants to obtain information from databases such as Google's Sensorvault, which collects users' historical geolocation data. Geo-fence warrants are a part of a category of warrants known as reverse search warrants. == History == Geofence warrants were first used in 2016. Google reported that it had received 982 such warrants in 2018, 8,396 in 2019, and 11,554 in 2020. A 2021 transparency report showed that 25% of data requests from law enforcement to Google were geo-fence data requests. Google is the most common recipient of geo-fence warrants and the main provider of such data, although companies including Apple, Snapchat, Lyft, and Uber have also received such warrants. == Legality == === United States === Some lawyers and privacy experts believe reverse search warrants are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires any search warrants be specific to what and to whom they apply. The Fourth Amendment specifies that warrants may only be issued "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Some lawyers, legal scholars, and privacy experts have likened reverse search warrants to general warrants, which were made illegal by the Fourth Amendment. Groups including the Electronic Frontier Foundation have opposed geo-fence warrants in amicus briefs filed in motions to quash such orders to disclose geo-fence data. In 2024, a panel of the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered data acquired from Google’s Sensorvault not to be a search, but non-private business records when users opt-in to Google’s location history. However, upon a rehearing en banc, the Court vacated that decision. In April 2025, the full Court affirmed the judgment solely on the 'good faith' exception, leaving the underlying constitutional question of whether geofence warrants constitute a search unsettled in the Circuit. However, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that geofence warrants are "categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." The split in Circuits prompted the United States Supreme Court to agree to hear Chatrie v. United States in January 2026.

  Read more →
• 

  Spanish Network of Excellence on Cybersecurity Research

  The Spanish Network of Excellence on Cybersecurity Research (RENIC), is a research initiative to promote cybersecurity interests in Spain. == Members == === Board of Directors (2018) === President: Universidad de Málaga Vice president: CSIC Treasurer: Universidad Politécnica de Madrid Secretary: Universidad de Granada Vocals: Tecnalia, Universidad de La Laguna and Universidad de Modragón === Board of Directors (2016) === President: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Vice president: Universidad Politécnica de Madrid Treasurer: Universidad de Granada Secretary: Universidad de León Vocals: Gradiant, Tecnalia, Universidad de Málaga === Founding Members === Centro Andaluz de Innovación y Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones (CITIC). Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC). Centro Tecnolóxico de Telecomunicaciones de Galicia (Gradiant). Instituto Imdea Software. Instituto Nacional de Ciberseguridad (INCIBE). Mondragón Unibertsitatea. Tecnalia. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Universidad Castilla la Mancha. Universidad de Granada. Universidad de la Laguna. Universidad de León. Universidad de Málaga. Universidad de Murcia. Universidad de Vigo. Universidad Internacional de la Rioja. Universidad Politécnica de Madrid. Universidad Rey Juan Carlos. === Members === Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC). Centro Tecnolóxico de Telecomunicaciones de Galicia (Gradiant). Instituto Imdea Software. Instituto Nacional de Ciberseguridad (INCIBE). Mondragón Unibertsitatea. Tecnalia. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha. Universidad de Granada. Universidad de la Laguna. Universidad de León. Universidad de Málaga. Universidad de Murcia. Universidad de Vigo. Universidad Politécnica de Madrid. Universidad Rey Juan Carlos. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. IKERLAN. === Honorary Members === Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI). (2017) Instituto Nacional de Ciberseguridad (INCIBE). (2016) == Initiatives and Participations == RENIC is ECSO member, and is also a member of its board of directors. A collaboration agreement between RENIC and the Innovative Business Cluster on Cybersecurity (AEI Cybersecurity) has been signed. RENIC is pleased to sponsor the Cybersecurity Research National Conferences (JNIC) JNIC2017 edition, organized by Universidad Rey Juan Carlos. RENIC is pleased to announce the publication of the online version of the Catalog and knowledge map of cybersecurity research

  Read more →