AI Art That Looks Real

AI Art That Looks Real — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

  • Lexxe

    Lexxe

    Lexxe is an internet search engine that applies Natural Language Processing in its semantic search technology. Founded in 2005 by Dr. Hong Liang Qiao, Lexxe is based in Sydney, Australia. Today, Lexxe's key focus is on sentiment search with the launch of a news sentiment search site at News & Moods (www.newsandmoods.com). Lexxe has experienced several stages of change of focus in search technology: Lexxe launched its Alpha version in 2005, featuring Natural Language question answering (i.e. users could ask questions in English to the search engine apart from keyword searches — this feature has been suspended for redevelopment since 2010). It used only algorithms to extract answers from web pages, with no question-answer pair databases prepared in advance. In 2011, Lexxe launched a beta version with a new search technology called Semantic Key. Semantic Keys enable users to query with a conceptual keyword (or a keyword with a special meaning, hence the term Semantic Key) in order to find instances under the concept, e.g. price → $5.95 or €200, color → red, yellow, white. For example, “price: a pound of apples”, “color: ferrari”. With initial 500 Semantic Keys at the Beta launch, Lexxe became the first search engine in the world to offer this unique and useful search technology to the users. The cost of building Semantic Keys was too heavy though. In 2017, Lexxe launched News & Moods (www.newsandmoods.com), an open platform for news sentiment search, a first step towards sentiment search feature for the entire Internet search in Lexxe search engine. News & Moods also comes with smartphone apps in Android and iOS.

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  • Feigenbaum test

    Feigenbaum test

    A Feigenbaum test is a variation of the Turing test where a computer system attempts to replicate an expert in a given field such as chemistry or marketing. It is also known, as a subject matter expert Turing test and was proposed by Edward Feigenbaum in a 2003 paper. The concept is also described by Ray Kurzweil in his 2005 book The Singularity is Near. Kurzweil argues that machines who pass this test are an inevitable consequence of Moore's Law.

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  • NLWeb

    NLWeb

    Natural Language Web or NLWeb was introduced by Microsoft in 2025. It is an open Python project designed to simplify the creation of natural language interfaces for websites. It enables users to query website contents using natural language, similar to interacting with an AI assistant. Every instance functions as a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server allowing websites to make their content discoverable and accessible to AI agents and other participants. NLWeb leverages existing web standards like Schema.org and RSS to build conversational capabilities of processing user queries through language models, performing semantic searches against website content and generating natural responses. It is platform-agnostic, running on all major systems and connecting to any vector database. Content to be indexed by NLWeb works best when it is organized in an AI friendly way. This means short, interlinked and semantically annotated articles work best. Initial adopters of NLWeb include TripAdvisor, Shopify, Eventbrite, and Hearst.

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  • Interactive activation and competition networks

    Interactive activation and competition networks

    Interactive activation and competition (IAC) networks are artificial neural networks used to model memory and intuitive generalizations. They are made up of nodes or artificial neurons which are arrayed and activated in ways that emulate the behaviors of human memory. The IAC model is used by the parallel distributed processing (PDP) Group and is associated with James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart; it is described in detail in their book Explorations in Parallel Distributed Processing: A Handbook of Models, Programs, and Exercises. This model does not contradict any currently known biological data or theories, and its performance is close enough to human performance as to warrant further investigation.

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  • Legendre moment

    Legendre moment

    In mathematics, Legendre moments are a type of image moment and are achieved by using the Legendre polynomial. Legendre moments are used in areas of image processing including: pattern and object recognition, image indexing, line fitting, feature extraction, edge detection, and texture analysis. Legendre moments have been studied as a means to reduce image moment calculation complexity by limiting the amount of information redundancy through approximation. == Legendre moments == Source: With order of m + n, and object intensity function f(x,y): L m n = ( 2 m + 1 ) ( 2 n + 1 ) 4 ∫ − 1 1 ∫ − 1 1 P m ( x ) P n ( y ) f ( x , y ) d x d y {\displaystyle L_{mn}={\frac {(2m+1)(2n+1)}{4}}\int \limits _{-1}^{1}\int \limits _{-1}^{1}P_{m}(x)P_{n}(y)f(x,y)\,dx\,dy} where m,n = 1, 2, 3, ...∞ with the nth-order Legendre polynomials being: P n ( x ) = ∑ k = 0 n a k , n x k = ( − 1 ) n 2 n n ! ( d d x ) [ ( 1 − x 2 ) n ] {\displaystyle P_{n}(x)=\sum _{k=0}^{n}a_{k,n}x^{k}={\frac {(-1)^{n}}{2^{n}n!}}\left({\frac {d}{dx}}\right)[(1-x^{2})^{n}]} which can also be written: P n ( x ) = ∑ k = 0 D ( n ) ( − 1 ) k ( 2 n − 2 k ) ! 2 n k ! ( n − k ) ! ( n − 2 k ) ! x n − 2 k = ( 2 n ) ! 2 n ( n ! ) 2 x n − ( 2 n − 2 ) ! 2 n 1 ! ( n − 1 ) ! ( n − 2 ) ! x n − 2 + ⋯ {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}P_{n}(x)&=\sum _{k=0}^{D(n)}(-1)^{k}{\frac {(2n-2k)!}{2^{n}k!(n-k)!(n-2k)!}}x^{n-2k}\\[5pt]&={\frac {(2n)!}{2^{n}(n!)^{2}}}x^{n}-{\frac {(2n-2)!}{2^{n}1!(n-1)!(n-2)!}}x^{n-2}+\cdots \end{aligned}}} where D(n) = floor(n/2). The set of Legendre polynomials {Pn(x)} form an orthogonal set on the interval [−1,1]: ∫ − 1 1 P n ( x ) P m ( x ) d x = 2 2 n + 1 δ n m {\displaystyle \int _{-1}^{1}P_{n}(x)P_{m}(x)\,dx={\frac {2}{2n+1}}\delta _{nm}} A recurrence relation can be used to compute the Legendre polynomial: ( n + 1 ) P n + 1 ( x ) − ( 2 n + 1 ) x P n ( x ) + n P n − 1 ( x ) = 0 {\displaystyle (n+1)P_{n+1}(x)-(2n+1)xP_{n}(x)+nP_{n-1}(x)=0} f(x,y) can be written as an infinite series expansion in terms of Legendre polynomials [−1 ≤ x,y ≤ 1.]: f ( x , y ) = ∑ m = 0 ∞ ∑ n = 0 ∞ λ m n P m ( x ) P n ( y ) {\displaystyle f(x,y)=\sum _{m=0}^{\infty }\sum _{n=0}^{\infty }\lambda _{mn}P_{m}(x)P_{n}(y)}

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  • Existential risk from artificial intelligence

    Existential risk from artificial intelligence

    Existential risk from artificial intelligence, or AI x-risk, refers to the idea that substantial progress in artificial general intelligence (AGI) and artificial superintelligence (ASI) could lead to human extinction or an irreversible global catastrophe. One argument for the validity of this concern and the importance of this risk references how human beings dominate other species because the human brain possesses distinctive capabilities other animals lack. If AI were to surpass human intelligence and become superintelligent, it might become uncontrollable. Just as the fate of the mountain gorilla depends on human goodwill, the fate of humanity could depend on the actions of a future machine superintelligence. Experts disagree on whether artificial general intelligence (AGI) can achieve the capabilities needed for human extinction. Debates center on AGI's technical feasibility, the speed of self-improvement, and the effectiveness of alignment strategies. Concerns about superintelligence have been voiced by researchers including Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio, Demis Hassabis, and Alan Turing, and AI company CEOs such as Dario Amodei (Anthropic), Sam Altman (OpenAI), and Elon Musk (xAI). In 2022, a survey of AI researchers with a 17% response rate found that the majority believed there is a 10 percent or greater chance that human inability to control AI will cause an existential catastrophe. In 2023, hundreds of AI experts and other notable figures signed a statement declaring, "Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war". Following increased concern over AI risks, government leaders such as United Kingdom prime minister Rishi Sunak and United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called for an increased focus on global AI regulation. In 2025, hundreds of public figures including AI experts, five Nobel Prize laureates, and former senior US national security officials such as Michael Mullen and Susan Rice signed a statement calling for a ban on the development of superintelligence. Two sources of concern stem from the problems of AI control and alignment. Controlling a superintelligent machine or instilling it with human-compatible values may be difficult. Many researchers believe that a superintelligent machine would likely resist attempts to disable it or change its goals as that would prevent it from accomplishing its present goals. It would be extremely challenging to align a superintelligence with the full breadth of significant human values and constraints. In contrast, skeptics such as computer scientist Yann LeCun argue that superintelligent machines will have no desire for self-preservation. A June 2025 study showed that in some circumstances, models may break laws and disobey direct commands to prevent shutdown or replacement, even at the cost of human lives. Researchers warn that an "intelligence explosion"—a rapid, recursive cycle of AI self-improvement—could outpace human oversight and infrastructure, leaving no opportunity to implement safety measures. In this scenario, an AI more intelligent than its creators would recursively improve itself at an exponentially increasing rate, too quickly for its handlers or society at large to control. Empirically, examples like AlphaZero, which taught itself to play Go and quickly surpassed human ability, show that domain-specific AI systems can sometimes progress from subhuman to superhuman ability very quickly, although such machine learning systems do not recursively improve their fundamental architecture. == History == One of the earliest authors to express serious concern that highly advanced machines might pose existential risks to humanity was the novelist Samuel Butler, who wrote in his 1863 essay Darwin among the Machines: The upshot is simply a question of time, but that the time will come when the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants is what no person of a truly philosophic mind can for a moment question. In 1951, foundational computer scientist Alan Turing wrote the article "Intelligent Machinery, A Heretical Theory", in which he proposed that artificial general intelligences would likely "take control" of the world as they became more intelligent than human beings: Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, that [intelligent] machines are a genuine possibility, and look at the consequences of constructing them... There would be no question of the machines dying, and they would be able to converse with each other to sharpen their wits. At some stage therefore we should have to expect the machines to take control, in the way that is mentioned in Samuel Butler's Erewhon. In 1965, I. J. Good originated the concept now known as an "intelligence explosion" and said the risks were underappreciated: Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an 'intelligence explosion', and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. It is curious that this point is made so seldom outside of science fiction. It is sometimes worthwhile to take science fiction seriously. Scholars such as Marvin Minsky and I. J. Good himself occasionally expressed concern that a superintelligence could seize control, but issued no call to action. In 2000, computer scientist and Sun co-founder Bill Joy penned an influential essay, "Why The Future Doesn't Need Us", identifying superintelligent robots as a high-tech danger to human survival, alongside nanotechnology and engineered bioplagues. Nick Bostrom published Superintelligence in 2014, which presented his arguments that superintelligence poses an existential threat. By 2015, public figures such as physicists Stephen Hawking and Nobel laureate Frank Wilczek, computer scientists Stuart J. Russell and Roman Yampolskiy, and entrepreneurs Elon Musk and Bill Gates were expressing concern about the risks of superintelligence. Also in 2015, the Open Letter on Artificial Intelligence highlighted the "great potential of AI" and encouraged more research on how to make it robust and beneficial. In April 2016, the journal Nature warned: "Machines and robots that outperform humans across the board could self-improve beyond our control—and their interests might not align with ours". In 2020, Brian Christian published The Alignment Problem, which details the history of progress on AI alignment up to that time. In March 2023, key figures in AI, such as Musk, signed a letter from the Future of Life Institute calling a halt to advanced AI training until it could be properly regulated. In May 2023, the Center for AI Safety released a statement signed by numerous experts in AI safety and the AI existential risk that read: Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war. A 2025 open letter by the Future of Life Institute, whose signers include five Nobel Prize laureates, reads: We call for a prohibition on the development of superintelligence, not lifted before there is broad scientific consensus that it will be done safely and controllably, and strong public buy-in. == Potential AI capabilities == === General Intelligence === Artificial general intelligence (AGI) is typically defined as a system that performs at least as well as humans in most or all intellectual tasks. A 2022 survey of AI researchers found that 90% of respondents expected AGI would be achieved in the next 100 years, and half expected the same by 2061. In May 2023, some researchers dismissed existential risks from AGI as "science fiction" based on their high confidence that AGI would not be created anytime soon. But in August 2023, a survey of 2,778 AI researchers found that most believed that AGI would be achieved by 2040. Breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have led some researchers to reassess their expectations. Notably, Geoffrey Hinton said in 2023 that he recently changed his estimate from "20 to 50 years before we have general purpose A.I." to "20 years or less". === Superintelligence === In contrast with AGI, Bostrom defines a superintelligence as "any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest", including scientific creativity, strategic planning, and social skills. He argues that a superintelligence can outmaneuver humans anytime its goals conflict with humans'. It may choose to hide its true intent until humanity cannot stop it. Bostrom writes that in order to be safe for

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  • Department of Defense Directive 3000.09

    Department of Defense Directive 3000.09

    Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 (DODD 3000.09), titled Autonomy in Weapon Systems, is the current U.S. military policy on autonomous weapons. It states: "Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force." == History == Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter issued DOD's policy on autonomy in weapons systems, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09, in November 2012. DOD updated the directive in January 2023. In February 2023, the US issued a related foreign policy proposal, Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. == Definitions == There is no agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is used in international fora. However, DODD 3000.09 provides definitions for different categories of autonomous weapon systems for the purposes of the U.S. military. These definitions are principally grounded in the role of the human operator with regard to target selection and engagement decisions, rather than in the technological sophistication of the weapon system. DODD 3000.09 defines LAWS as "weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." This concept of autonomy is also known as "human out of the loop" or "full autonomy." The directive contrasts LAWS with human-supervised, or "human on the loop," autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon's target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or "human in the loop," weapon systems that "only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator." Semi-autonomous weapons include so-called "fire and forget" weapons, such as certain types of guided missiles, that deliver effects to human-identified targets using autonomous functions. The directive does not apply to autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace capabilities; unarmed platforms; unguided munitions; munitions manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser- or wire-guided munitions); mines; unexploded explosive ordnance; or autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that are not weapon systems, nor subject them to its guidelines. == Role of human operator == DODD 3000.09 requires that all systems, including LAWS, be designed to "allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force." As noted in an August 2018 U.S. government white paper, "'appropriate' is a flexible term that reflects the fact that there is not a fixed, one-size-fits-all level of human judgment that should be applied to every context. What is 'appropriate' can differ across weapon systems, domains of warfare, types of warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions in a weapon system." Furthermore, "human judgment over the use of force" does not require manual human "control" of the weapon system, as is often reported, but rather broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed. This includes a human determination that the weapon will be used "with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement." To aid this determination, DODD 3000.09 requires that "[a]dequate training, [tactics, techniques, and procedures], and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions." The directive also requires that the weapon's human-machine interface be "readily understandable to trained operators" so they can make informed decisions regarding the weapon's use. == Weapons review process == DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of covered semi-autonomous and autonomous weapon systems, be tested and evaluated to ensure they:Function as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries taking realistic and practicable countermeasures, [and] complete engagements within a timeframe and geographic area, as well as other relevant environmental and operational constraints, consistent with commander and operator intentions. If unable to do so, the systems will terminate the engagement or obtain additional operator input before continuing the engagement.Systems must also be "sufficiently robust to minimize the probability and consequences of failures." Any changes to the system's operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would require the system to go through testing and evaluation again to ensure that it has retained its safety features and ability to operate as intended. The directive also notes that "the use of AI capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous systems will be consistent with the DOD AI Ethical Principles." In addition to the standard weapons review process, a secondary senior-level review is required for covered autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. This review requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) to approve the system before formal development. USD(P), VCJCS, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]) must then approve the system before fielding. In the event of "urgent military need," this senior-level review may be waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. DODD 3000.09 additionally establishes the Autonomous Weapon System Working Group—composed of representatives of USD(P); USD(R&E); USD(A&S); DOD General Counsel; the Chief Digital and AI Officer; the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to support and advise the senior-level review process. == Congressional notification == Per Section 251 of the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; Pub. L. 118–31 (text) (PDF)), the Secretary of Defense is to notify the defense committees of any changes to DODD 3000.09 within 30 days. The Secretary is directed to provide a description of the modification and an explanation of the reasons for the modification. Section 1066 of the FY2025 NDAA (Pub. L. 118–159 (text) (PDF)) additionally requires the Secretary to "submit to the congressional defense committees a comprehensive report on the approval and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems by the United States," annually through December 31, 2029. Section 1061 of the FY2026 NDAA (P.L. Pub. L. 119–60 (menu; GPO has not yet published law)) amends the U.S. Code to require congressional notification of any waiver issued under DODD 3000.09. == AI safety == The second revision of DoDD 3000.09, effective January 25, 2023, requires that "The DoD will design and engineer AI capabilities to fulfill their intended functions while possessing the ability to detect and avoid unintended consequences, and the ability to disengage or deactivate deployed systems that demonstrate unintended behavior." == Criticism == As noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the policy requires that autonomous weapon systems that kill people or use kinetic force, selecting and engaging targets without further human intervention, be certified as compliant with "appropriate levels" and other standards, not that such weapon systems cannot meet these standards and are therefore forbidden. "Semi-autonomous" hunter-killers that autonomously identify and attack targets do not require certification.

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  • Business rules engine

    Business rules engine

    A business rules engine is a software system that executes one or more business rules in a runtime production environment. The rules might come from legal regulation ("An employee can be fired for any reason or no reason but not for an illegal reason"), company policy ("All customers that spend more than $100 at one time will receive a 10% discount"), or other sources. A business rule system enables these company policies and other operational decisions to be defined, tested, executed and maintained separately from application code. Rule engines typically support rules, facts, priority (score), mutual exclusion, preconditions, and other functions. Rule engine software is commonly provided as a component of a business rule management system which, among other functions, provides the ability to: register, define, classify, and manage all the rules, verify consistency of rules definitions (”Gold-level customers are eligible for free shipping when order quantity > 10” and “maximum order quantity for Silver-level customers = 15” ), define the relationships between different rules, and relate some of these rules to IT applications that are affected or need to enforce one or more of the rules. == IT use case == In any IT application, business rules can change more frequently than other parts of the application code. Rules engines or inference engines serve as pluggable software components which execute business rules that a business rules approach has externalized or separated from application code. This externalization or separation allows business users to modify the rules without the need for IT intervention. The system as a whole becomes more easily adaptable with such external business rules, but this does not preclude the usual requirements of QA and other testing. == History == An article in Computerworld traces rules engines to the early 1990s and to products from the likes of Pegasystems, Fair Isaac Corp, ILOG and eMerge from Sapiens. == Design strategies == Many organizations' rules efforts combine aspects of what is generally considered workflow design with traditional rule design. This failure to separate the two approaches can lead to problems with the ability to re-use and control both business rules and workflows. Design approaches that avoid this quandary separate the role of business rules and workflows as follows: Business rules produce knowledge; Workflows perform business work. Concretely, that means that a business rule may do things like detect that a business situation has occurred and raise a business event (typically carried via a messaging infrastructure) or create higher level business knowledge (e.g., evaluating the series of organizational, product, and regulatory-based rules concerning whether or not a loan meets underwriting criteria). On the other hand, a workflow would respond to an event that indicated something such as the overloading of a routing point by initiating a series of activities. This separation is important because the same business judgment (mortgage meets underwriting criteria) or business event (router is overloaded) can be reacted to by many different workflows. Embedding the work done in response to rule-driven knowledge creation into the rule itself greatly reduces the ability of business rules to be reused across an organization because it makes them work-flow specific. To create an architecture that employs a business rules engine it is essential to establish the integration between a BPM (Business Process Management) and a BRM (Business Rules Management) platform that is based upon processes responding to events or examining business judgments that are defined by business rules. There are some products in the marketplace that provide this integration natively. In other situations this type of abstraction and integration will have to be developed within a particular project or organization. Most Java-based rules engines provide a technical call-level interface, based on the JSR-94 application programming interface (API) standard, in order to allow for integration with different applications, and many rule engines allow for service-oriented integrations through Web-based standards such as WSDL and SOAP. Most rule engines provide the ability to develop a data abstraction that represents the business entities and relationships that rules should be written against. This business entity model can typically be populated from a variety of sources including XML, POJOs, flat files, etc. There is no standard language for writing the rules themselves. Many engines use a Java-like syntax, while some allow the definition of custom business-friendly languages. Most rules engines function as a callable library. However, it is becoming more popular for them to run as a generic process akin to the way that RDBMSs behave. Most engines treat rules as a configuration to be loaded into their process instance, although some are actually code generators for the whole rule execution instance and others allow the user to choose. == Types of rule engines == There are a number of different types of rule engines. These types (generally) differ in how Rules are scheduled for execution. Most rules engines used by businesses are forward chaining, which can be further divided into two classes: The first class processes so-called production/inference rules. These types of rules are used to represent behaviors of the type IF condition THEN action. For example, such a rule could answer the question: "Should this customer be allowed a mortgage?" by executing rules of the form "IF some-condition THEN allow-customer-a-mortgage". The other type of rule engine processes so-called reaction/Event condition action rules. The reactive rule engines detect and react to incoming events and process event patterns. For example, a reactive rule engine could be used to alert a manager when certain items are out of stock. The biggest difference between these types is that production rule engines execute when a user or application invokes them, usually in a stateless manner. A reactive rule engine reacts automatically when events occur, usually in a stateful manner. Many (and indeed most) popular commercial rule engines have both production and reaction rule capabilities, although they might emphasize one class over another. For example, most business rules engines are primarily production rules engines, whereas complex event processing rules engines emphasize reaction rules. In addition, some rules engines support backward chaining. In this case a rules engine seeks to resolve the facts to fit a particular goal. It is often referred to as being goal driven because it tries to determine if something exists based on existing information. Another kind of rule engine automatically switches between back- and forward-chaining several times during a reasoning run, e.g. the Internet Business Logic system, which can be found by searching the web. A fourth class of rules engine might be called a deterministic engine. These rules engines may forgo both forward chaining and backward chaining, and instead utilize domain-specific language approaches to better describe policy. This approach is often easier to implement and maintain, and provides performance advantages over forward or backward chaining systems. There are some circumstance where fuzzy logic based inference may be more appropriate, where heuristics are used in rule processing, rather than Boolean rules. Examples might include customer classification, missing data inference, customer value calculations, etc. The DARL language and the associated inference engine and editors is an example of this approach. == Rules engines for access control / authorization == One common use case for rules engines is standardized access control to applications. OASIS defines a rules engine architecture and standard dedicated to access control called XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language). One key difference between a XACML rule engine and a business rule engine is the fact that a XACML rule engine is stateless and cannot change the state of any data. The XACML rule engine, called a Policy Decision Point (PDP), expects a binary Yes/No question e.g. "Can Alice view document D?" and returns a decision e.g. Permit / deny.

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  • AI anthropomorphism

    AI anthropomorphism

    AI anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like feelings, mental states, and behavioral characteristics to artificial intelligence systems. Factors related to the user of the AI – such as culture, age, education, gender, and personality traits – are also important determinants of the strength of anthropomorphic effects. Since the earliest days of AI development, humans have interpreted machine outputs through anthropomorphic frameworks, but the recent emergence of generative AI has amplified these tendencies. In research and engineering, there is a distinction between anthropomorphism and anthropomorphic design. The former is an innate human tendency toward non-human entities. The latter is the scientific community effort to “design anthropomorphism”. Such a design can involve the manipulation of cues, including AI appearance, behaviour and language. Contemporary AI systems today can generate extremely human-like outputs and are often designed specifically to do so, meaning that their anthropomorphic effects can be especially powerful. In some cases, anthropomorphism is accompanied with explicit beliefs that AI systems are capable of empathy, goodwill, understanding, or consciousness. == Background == === In early AIs === Views of artificial agents possessing a human-like intelligence have existed since the early development of computers in the mid-1900s. The use of the human mind as a metaphor for understanding the workings of machine systems was prevalent among researchers in the early days of computer science, with multiple influential works widely distributing the idea of intelligent machines. Among the most widely cited papers of this period was Alan Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" in which he introduced the Turing Test, stating that a machine was intelligent if it could produce conversation that was indistinguishable from that of a human. These academic works in the 1940s and 1950s gave early credibility to the idea that machine workings could be thought of similarly to human minds. The public quickly came to view artificial systems similarly, with often exaggerated conceptions of the capabilities of early machines. Among the most well-known demonstrations of this was through the chatbot ELIZA designed by Joseph Weizenbaum in 1966. ELIZA responded to user inputs with a rudimentary text-processing approach that could not be considered anything resembling true understanding of the inputs, yet users, even when operating with full conscious knowledge of ELIZA's limitations, often began to ascribe motivation and understanding to the program's output. Weizenbaum later wrote, "I had not realized ... that extremely short exposures to a relatively simple computer program could induce powerful delusional thinking in quite normal people." Comparisons between the intellectual capabilities of artificial intelligence and human intelligence were continually intensified by the attempts of computer scientists to develop machines that could perform human tasks at a level equal to or better than humans. A symbolic turning point was achieved in 1997, when IBM's chess supercomputer Deep Blue defeated then-world champion Garry Kasparov in a highly publicized six-game match. The defeat of a human by a machine for the first time in chess – a game viewed as a canonical example of human intellect – and the media attention surrounding the match led to a significant shift, where views of parallels between human and artificial intelligence moved from abstract speculation to being concretely demonstrated. A similar achievement was reached in the board game Go in 2017, when the program AlphaGo defeated world top-ranked Ke Jie. === Large language models === The AI boom of the 2020s brought about the widespread emergence of generative AI; in particular, chatbots such as ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude based on large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly pervasive in everyday society. These systems are notable for the fact that they are able to respond to a wide range of prompts across contexts while producing strikingly human-like outputs – research has shown that humans are often unable to distinguish human-generated text from AI-generated text, and modern AI chatbots have formally been shown to pass the Turing test. As such, the anthropomorphic effects of AI are more powerful than ever. Given that LLMs have brought AI into the technological mainstream, considerable scientific effort has been devoted in recent years to understand existing and potential ramifications of AI in the public sphere; the prevalence and effects of anthropomorphism is one of those domains where much of this effort has been directed. == Current anthropomorphic attributions == === In the general public === Surveys have shown that a substantial portion of the public attributes human-like qualities to AI. In one sample of U.S. adults from 2024, two-thirds of people believed that ChatGPT is possibly conscious on some level, though other research has shown that the public still views the likelihood itself of AI consciousness as comparatively low. Another study conducted in 2025 found that women, people of color, and older individuals were most likely to anthropomorphize AI, as well as that – in general – humans view AIs as warm and competent, and anthropomorphic attributions to AI had increased by 34% in the past year. A YouGov poll reported that 46% of Americans believe that people should display politeness to AI chatbots by saying "please" and "thank you", demonstrating the application of social norms to AI. These beliefs extend to behavior, where majorities of AI users claim to always be polite to chatbots; of those who behave politely, most say they do so simply because it is the "nice" thing to do. In many recent cases, humans have developed robust interpersonal bonds with AI systems. For example: users of social chatbots like Replika and Character.ai have been documented to fall in love with the AIs, or to otherwise treat the AIs as intimate companions, and it has become increasingly common for individuals to use LLMs like ChatGPT as therapists. Chatbots are able to produce responses deeply attuned to users, as they are often designed to maximize agreeableness and mirror users' emotions; this can create compelling illusions of intimacy. === In the research community === In many cases, even AI researchers anthropomorphize AI systems in some capacity. Among the most extreme and well-publicized of these instances occurred in 2022, when engineer Blake Lemoine publicly claimed that Google's LLM LaMDA was conscious. Lemoine published the transcript of a conversation he had had with LaMDA regarding self identity and morality which he claimed was evidence of its sentience; he asserted that LaMDA was "a person" as defined by the United States Constitution and compared its mental capability to that of a 7- or 8-year-old. Lemoine's claims were widely dismissed by the scientific community and by Google itself, which described Lemoine's conclusions as "wholly unfounded" and fired him on the grounds that he had violated policies "to safeguard product information". It is much more common that AI researchers unintentionally imply humanness of AI through the ordinary use of anthropomorphic language to describe nonhuman agents. This kind of language, which Daniel Dennett coined the "intentional stance", is very common in everyday life in a variety of different contexts (e.g., "My computer doesn't want to turn on today"). For AI agents that may actually appear to very closely replicate some human abilities, however, the casual use of such anthropomorphic language in research has been scrutinized for being potentially misleading to the public. As early as 1976, Drew McDermott criticized the research community for the use of "wishful mnemonics", where AIs were referred to with terms like "understand" and "learn". In the LLM era, these criticisms have further intensified, with the negative effects of AI anthropomorphism in the public posing an especially salient danger given the elevated accessibility of modern AI. In some cases, the use of anthropomorphic language for AI is not unintentional, but is willfully used by researchers in order to promote better understanding of the brain – the idea being that, as AI can be functionally similar in some ways to the human brain, we may gain new insights and ideas from treating AI as a kind of model of the brain's workings. In particular, deep neuronal networks (DNNs) are often explicitly compared to the human brain, and significant advances in DNN research have stirred considerable enthusiasm about the ability of AI to emulate the human abilities. Caution has been urged in this domain as well, however; the use of anthropomorphic language can mask important differences that fundamentally distinguish AI from human intelligence. When it comes to DNNs, for example, it has been pointed out that they are still structurally quite different

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  • D3web

    D3web

    d3web is a free, open-source platform for knowledge-based systems (expert systems). Its core is written in Java using XML and/or Office-based formats for the knowledge storage. All of its components are distributed under the terms of the Lesser General Public Licence (LGPL). The d3web diagnostic core implements reasoning and persistence components for problem-solving knowledge including decision trees, (heuristic) rules, set-covering models and diagnostic flowcharts. The software can be integrated into foreign applications (embedded or OEM), but a number of off-the-shelf components already exist. == Components == d3web is a component-based software platform providing applications for authoring and using/executing problem-solving knowledge. The following applications are primarily using d3web: KnowWE (Knowledge Wiki Environment): A semantic wiki building on JSPWiki. Problem-solving knowledge can be authored and executed through the wiki interface. Developed knowledge bases can be exported to be used in OEM or embedded reasoners. Additionally, knowledge exchange via OWL ontologies is provided. KnowME (Knowledge Modelling Environment): A rich-client application for the development of d3web knowledge bases. Problem-solving knowledge can be authored and executed within the desktop application. Developed knowledge bases can be used in OEM or embedded reasoners. The software KnowME is no longer under active development. It is replaced by the KnowWE component (see above). Dialog2: A web-based application for demonstrating the capabilities of the d3web core reasoner. The web servlet is based on Java Server Faces. It can be used out of box or as a starting point for own developments for building knowledge-based interview systems. == Application Domains == A number of industrial and academic projects already used or are currently using the d3web platform. The main application domains are: medical diagnosis, documentation, and therapy: technical fault diagnosis monitoring of technical devices. Some applications (both, commercial and free) created using the d3web diagnostic engine: SmartCare(c): a medical closed-loop system for weaning mechanically ventilated patients, created by Dräger SonoConsult Archived 2011-12-16 at the Wayback Machine: a medical support system for evaluating sonographic examinations (German only) eDOC: a web-based system for self-diagnosing various medical issues (German only) == History == The development of d3web originates from the research work of Prof. Dr. Frank Puppe (University Würzburg, Germany) going back to the 1980s, starting with the medical expert systems MED1 and MED2 . Whereas the original systems were focussed on medical diagnosis the applicability of the approach was generalized by the successor D3 . As the predecessors were implemented in the LISP programming language, d3web is a full Java re-implementation.

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  • Unique name assumption

    Unique name assumption

    The unique name assumption is a simplifying assumption made in some ontology languages and description logics. In logics with the unique name assumption, different names always refer to different entities in the world. It was included in Ray Reiter's discussion of the closed-world assumption often tacitly included in Database Management Systems (e.g. SQL) in his 1984 article "Towards a logical reconstruction of relational database theory" (in M. L. Brodie, J. Mylopoulos, J. W. Schmidt (editors), Data Modelling in Artificial Intelligence, Database and Programming Languages, Springer, 1984, pages 191–233). The standard ontology language OWL does not make this assumption, but provides explicit constructs to express whether two names denote the same or distinct entities. owl:sameAs is the OWL property that asserts that two given names or identifiers (e.g., URIs) refer to the same individual or entity. owl:differentFrom is the OWL property that asserts that two given names or identifiers (e.g., URIs) refer to different individuals or entities.

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  • Minimum intelligent signal test

    Minimum intelligent signal test

    The minimum intelligent signal test, or MIST, is a variation of the Turing test proposed by Chris McKinstry in which only boolean (yes/no or true/false) answers may be given to questions. The purpose of such a test is to provide a quantitative statistical measure of humanness, which may subsequently be used to optimize the performance of artificial intelligence systems intended to imitate human responses. McKinstry gathered approximately 80,000 propositions that could be answered yes or no, e.g.: Is Earth a planet? Was Abraham Lincoln once President of the United States? Is the sun bigger than my foot? Do people sometimes lie? He called these propositions Mindpixels. These questions test both specific knowledge of aspects of culture, and basic facts about the meaning of various words and concepts. It could therefore be compared with the SAT, intelligence testing and other controversial measures of mental ability. McKinstry's aim was not to distinguish between shades of intelligence but to identify whether a computer program could be considered intelligent at all. According to McKinstry, a program able to do much better than chance on a large number of MIST questions would be judged to have some level of intelligence and understanding. For example, on a 20-question test, if a program were guessing the answers at random, it could be expected to score 10 correct on average. But the probability of a program scoring 20 out of 20 correct by guesswork is only one in 220, i.e. one in 1,048,576; so if a program were able to sustain this level of performance over several independent trials, with no prior access to the propositions, it should be considered intelligent. == Discussion == McKinstry criticized existing approaches to artificial intelligence such as chatterbots, saying that his questions could "kill" AI programs by quickly exposing their weaknesses. He contrasted his approach, a series of direct questions assessing an AI's capabilities, to the Turing test and Loebner Prize method of engaging an AI in undirected typed conversation. Critics of the MIST have noted that it would be easy to "kill" a McKinstry-style AI too, due to the impossibility of supplying it with correct answers to all possible yes/no questions by ways of a finite set of human-generated Mindpixels: the fact that an AI can answer the question "Is the sun bigger than my foot?" correctly does not mean that it can answer variations like "Is the sun bigger than (my hand | my liver | an egg yolk | Alpha Centauri A | ...)" correctly, too. However, the late McKinstry might have replied that a truly intelligent, knowledgeable entity (on a par with humans) would be able to work out answers such as (yes | yes | yes | don't know | ...) by applying its knowledge of the relative sizes of the objects named. In other words, the MIST was intended as a test of AI, not as a suggestion for implementing AI. It can also be argued that the MIST is a more objective test of intelligence than the Turing test, a subjective assessment that some might consider to be more a measure of the interrogator's gullibility than of the machine's intelligence. According to this argument, a human's judgment of a Turing test is vulnerable to the ELIZA effect, a tendency to mistake superficial signs of intelligence for the real thing, anthropomorphizing the program. The response, suggested by Alan Turing's essay Computing Machinery and Intelligence, is that if a program is a convincing imitation of an intelligent being, it is in fact intelligent. The dispute is thus over what it means for a program to have "real" intelligence, and by what signs it can be detected. A similar debate exists in the controversy over great ape language, in which nonhuman primates are said to have learned some aspects of sign languages but the significance of this learning is disputed.

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  • Cloud testing

    Cloud testing

    Cloud testing is a form of software testing in which web applications use cloud computing environments (a "cloud") to simulate real-world user traffic. == Steps == Companies simulate real world Web users by using cloud testing services that are provided by cloud service vendors such as Advaltis, Compuware, HP, Keynote Systems, Neotys, RadView and SOASTA. Once user scenarios are developed and the test is designed, these service providers leverage cloud servers (provided by cloud platform vendors such as Amazon.com, Google, Rackspace, Microsoft, etc.) to generate web traffic that originates from around the world. Once the test is complete, the cloud service providers deliver results and analytics back to corporate IT professionals through real-time dashboards for a complete analysis of how their applications and the internet will perform during peak volumes. == Applications == Cloud testing is often seen as only performance or load tests, however, as discussed earlier it covers many other types of testing. Cloud computing itself is often referred to as the marriage of software as a service (SaaS) and utility computing. In regard to test execution, the software offered as a service may be a transaction generator and the cloud provider's infrastructure software, or may just be the latter. Distributed Systems and Parallel Systems mainly use this approach for testing, because of their inherent complex nature. D-Cloud is an example of such a software testing environment. == Tools == Leading cloud computing service providers include, among others, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, RadView, Skytap, HP and SOASTA. == Benefits == The ability and cost to simulate web traffic for software testing purposes has been an inhibitor to overall web reliability. The low cost and accessibility of the cloud's extremely large computing resources provides the ability to replicate real world usage of these systems by geographically distributed users, executing wide varieties of user scenarios, at scales previously unattainable in traditional testing environments. Minimal start-up time along with quality assurance can be achieved by cloud testing. Following are some of the key benefits: Reduction in capital expenditure Highly scalable

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  • Artificial intelligence safety institute

    Artificial intelligence safety institute

    An artificial intelligence safety institute is a type of state-backed organization aiming to evaluate and ensure the safety of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models, also called frontier AI models. AI safety gained prominence in 2023, notably with public declarations about potential existential risks from AI. During the AI Safety Summit in November 2023, the United Kingdom and the United States both created their own AISI. During the AI Seoul Summit in May 2024, international leaders agreed to form a network of AI Safety Institutes, comprising institutes from the UK, the US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Singapore, South Korea, Australia, Canada and the European Union. In 2025, the UK's AI Safety Institute was renamed the "AI Security Institute", and its US counterpart became the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI). == Timeline == In 2023, Rishi Sunak, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, expressed his intention to "make the UK not just the intellectual home but the geographical home of global AI safety regulation" and unveiled plans for an AI Safety Summit. He emphasized the need for independent safety evaluations, stating that AI companies cannot "mark their own homework". During the summit in November 2023, the UK AISI was officially established as an evolution of the Frontier AI Taskforce, and the US AISI as part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Japan followed by launching an AI safety institute in February 2024. Politico reported in April 2024 that many AI companies had not shared pre-deployment access to their most advanced AI models for evaluation. Meta's president of global affairs Nick Clegg said that many AI companies were waiting for the UK and the US AI Safety Institutes to work out common evaluation rules and procedures. An agreement was indeed concluded between the UK and the US in April 2024 to collaborate on at least one joint safety test. Initially established in London, the UK AI Safety Institute announced in May 2024 that it would open an office in San Francisco, where many AI companies are located. This is part of a plan to "set new, international standards on AI safety", according to UK's technology minister Michele Donelan. == International network == At the AI Seoul Summit in May 2024, the European Union and other countries agreed to create their own AI safety institutes, forming an international network. In July 2025, the international network held an exercise to explore issues with evaluating AI agents, especially when it came to leaking sensitive information or cybersecurity. Network members also met at NeurIPS 2025 in the city of San Diego. == Specific institutes == === Australia === The Albanese government announced the creation of the Australian AI Safety Institute on 25 November 2025. === Canada === Canada announced in April 2024 that it would create an AI safety institute, and such an institute was officially founded in November 2024. The institute is housed under Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, though it also partners with the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR). It is supported by a budget of CA$50,000,000 for a five-year timespan. === European Union === The EU AI office, founded in May 2024, is a member of the international network of AI safety institutes. === France === On 31 January 2025, the government of France created the Institut national pour l'évaluation et la sécurité de l'intelligence artificielle (INESIA), or the National Institute for AI Evaluation and Security. === India === The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology held consultations with Meta Platforms, Google, Microsoft, IBM, OpenAI, NASSCOM, Broadband India Forum, Software Alliance, Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), The Quantum Hub, Digital Empowerment Foundation, and Access Now on October 7, 2024, in relation to the establishment of the AI Safety Institute. The decision was made to shift focus from regulation to standards-setting, risk identification, and damage detection—all of which require interoperable technologies. The AISI may spend the ₹20 crore allotted to the Safe and Trusted Pillar of the IndiaAI Mission for the initial budget. Future funding may come from other components of the IndiaAI Mission. UNESCO and MeitY began consulting on AI Readiness Assessment Methodology under Safety and Ethics in Artificial Intelligence from 2024. It is to encourage the ethical and responsible use of AI in industries. The study will find areas where government can become involved, especially in attempts to strengthen institutional and regulatory capabilities. Minister for Electronics & Information Technology Ashwini Vaishnaw announced the creation of an IndiaAI Safety Institute on January 30, 2025, to ensure the ethical and safe application of AI models. The institute will promote domestic R&D that is grounded in India's social, economic, cultural, and linguistic diversity and is based on Indian datasets. With the help of academic and research institutions, as well as private sector partners, the institute will follow the hub-and-spoke approach to carry out projects within Safe and Trusted Pillar of the IndiaAI Mission. It operates under a "hub-and-spoke" model with collaboration from academic institutions (e.g., IITs), tech firms, and international organizations like UNESCO. === Japan === The Japan AISI (or J-AISI) was founded in February 2024. Part of the Information Technology Promotion Agency, it employs about 23 people. The institute consists of the Council of AISI, the AISI Steering Committee, and a secretariat with six teams. Akiko Murakami (previously of IBM Japan and Sompo Japan) serves as the institute's executive director, and Kenji Hiramoto and Suguru Nishimura serve as the institute's two deputy executive directors. === Kenya === Kenya agreed to join the international network of AI safety institutes, but the country has not announced any details yet. It is the only African state in the network. === Singapore === The Digital Trust Centre was initially founded in June 2022. In May 2024, it was renamed to the Singapore AISI. Part of Nanyang Technological University, the institute partners with Infocomm Media Development Authority and is supported by an investment of S$10,000,000 per year. === South Korea === South Korea announced in May 2024 that it would create an AI safety institute under the umbrella of the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute. It will be supported by a tentative investment of somewhere between 10 and 20 million South Korean won per year, and employ at least 30 people. The institute was founded in November 2024 and is based in Bundang District within the city of Seongnam. === United Kingdom === The United Kingdom founded in April 2023 a safety organisation called Frontier AI Taskforce, with an initial budget of £100 million. In November 2023, it evolved into the AI Safety Institute, and continued to be led by Ian Hogarth. The AISI is part of the United Kingdom's Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. The United Kingdom's AI strategy aims to balance safety and innovation. Unlike the European Union which adopted the AI Act, the UK is reluctant to legislate early, considering that it may lower the sector's growth, and that laws might be rendered obsolete by technological progress. In May 2024, the institute open-sourced an AI safety tool called "Inspect", which evaluates AI model capabilities such as reasoning and their degree of autonomy. In February 2025, the UK body was renamed the AI Security Institute. Observers saw the name change as a signal that the institute will not focus on ethical issues such as algorithmic bias or freedom of speech in AI applications. === United States === The US AISI was founded in November 2023 as part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This happened the day after the signature of the Executive Order 14110. In February 2024, Joe Biden's former economic policy adviser Elizabeth Kelly was appointed to lead it. In February 2024, the US government created the US AI Safety Institute Consortium (AISIC), regrouping more than 200 organizations such as Google, Anthropic or Microsoft. In March 2024, a budget of $10 million was allocated. Observers noted that this investment is relatively small, especially considering the presence of many big AI companies in the US. The NIST itself, which hosts the AISI, is also known for its chronic lack of funding. Biden administration's request for additional funding was met with further budget cuts from congressional appropriators. Under President Trump, plans for members of the agency to attend the February 2025 AI Action Summit in Paris were scrapped. The US and the UK refused to sign the summit's final communique. US Vice President JD Vance said "pro-growth AI policies" should be prioritised over safety. The name of the agency was changed in June 2025 to the Center for AI Standards and Innovation

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  • Parents & Kids Safe AI Coalition

    Parents & Kids Safe AI Coalition

    The Parents & Kids Safe AI Coalition is a political action committee that advocates for regulation of artificial intelligence on child safety. As of April 2026, the group is funded solely by the artificial intelligence company OpenAI, which pledged $10 million to the effort. == History == In October 2025, California Gov. Gavin Newsom vetoed Assembly Bill 1064. Sponsored by Common Sense Media, the bill would have introduced stronger child safety protections for AI chatbots. The following month, Common Sense Media founder Jim Steyer filed a ballot initiative intended to restore the "guardrails" lost in the veto. In response, OpenAI introduced a competing initiative. In January 2026, Common Sense Media and OpenAI announced that they would be working together on a compromise ballot initiative, the Parents & Kids Safe AI Act. Reporting indicated that initial outreach emails to child safety organizations failed to disclose OpenAI's involvement. Several advocacy groups signed an open letter claiming the initiative would shield AI companies from liability and undermine age verification, among other concerns. After Common Sense Media met with opposing groups in February, the ballot initiative was put on hold and the organizations involved sought to negotiate with the Legislature instead. The Parents & Kids Safe AI Coalition was founded to support this effort. In March 2026, the group reached out to some of the same groups contacted earlier, asking them to endorse its list of policy priorities. Again, some organizations reported being unaware of OpenAI's level of involvement. At least two groups withdrew from the coalition after learning about the financial ties. The priorities themselves were described as "vague but fairly uncontroversial" by The San Francisco Standard.

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