Since the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and the Tunisian Revolution, social media, especially Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, began to gain traction as a political tool in Africa. Various political actors have used social media to pursue a wide range of political objectives. State actors can use social media to encourage political discourse, campaign, or implement censorship and surveillance. Non-state actors, such as civil society organizations and opposition movements, can use social media to address political concerns and to organize widespread uprisings, such as the 2014 Burkinabé uprising. Meanwhile, extremist organizations can use social media to further their propaganda and recruitment. However, social media has been criticized for its limited accessibility and for facilitating the spread of misinformation, causing some skepticism about its effectiveness. Due to low entry barriers and user-generated content, social media provides a platform where people from different social classes can engage and interact with one another. Under traditional media, the public had limited opportunities to voice their political opinions. Social media enables people to both create and consume content. The public has become increasingly comfortable and confident in expressing political opinions online, often away from government scrutiny. Scholars argue that social media use has democratizing effects in African countries. == State actors == === Promoting political discourse === Through social media, the government and its citizens can discuss policy ideas, policy implementation, and political actions. Regardless of geographical location and distance, people are able to voice their opinions to the government. Social media includes citizens who were previously not able to express their discontent or share their ideas to the government. As state actors keep the public informed, social media can increase civic engagement. With more civic engagement, policies can be discussed without politicization. Before the commonplace use of social media, African countries faced weak feedback mechanisms that effectively excluded the average African citizen from policy discourse. In South Africa, the government uses social media to connect with constituencies. The South African president runs an official Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr accounts to engage with the public. === Campaigning === Political parties also use social media for political campaigns during election periods. In South Africa, the ANC (African National Congress) and DA (Democratic Alliance) use social media for political purposes. These parties specifically use Facebook as a tool for campaigning and engaging with the public to improve their relationship with citizens. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan employed social media to campaign for the presidential election in 2011, which he won. When President Goodluck Jonathan announced his bid for the presidency on social media in 2010, it reached about 217,000 people. As his campaign progressed, President Goodluck Jonathan was able to increase his followers to half a million by early 2011. === Censorship & Surveillance === While state actors can use social media to encourage their party or discourse, social media can be used to censor and surveil citizens. For example, the ANC and DA use Facebook to monitor South Africans. The government is able to track down people who have spoken against the government and translate this information into physical action to stop any possibility of a revolution. Social media platforms can be shut down to manipulate the flow of information. In Chad, citizens cannot access information through online platforms. This censorship blocked "Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Viber". In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the government shut down the internet before contested elections. In Zimbabwe, the government shut down the internet to hide civilian protests against fuel price increases. == Non-state actors == === Civil society organizations (CSOs) === Civil society organizations have also used social media networks in an effort to recruit supporters and communicate with the public. CSOs can use social media to mobilize people to support their cause, such as the Ghanaian Committee for Joint Action (CJA). In 2005 and 2006, the CJA gathered support to protest against the 50% fuel price increase. CSOs can play the role of a counterforce against state actors and state propaganda during times of crises, such as protests and military clashes. In some cases, CSOs release their own videos and photos on social media which challenges traditional forms of media. CSOs have also served to monitor elections to reduce corruption and violence during election day. For instance, the Zambian Bantu Watch started the #bantuwatch social media campaign to monitor the 2011 presidential election. Zambians used Facebook and Twitter to report polling station results to mitigate election fraud and election violence. In South Africa, CSOs created 'amandla.mobi' to campaign for public policies by creating petitions. Through 'amandla.mobi', CSOs are able to circulate petitions on social media to collect signatures. South African CSOs reported how social media helped their organizations to gain support and share ideas. However, CSOs struggle to attract media attention and often have to pay for media coverage. === Opposition forces against the government === Social media is also used by the public or opposition forces against the government. Through horizontal social media, organizing can lead to street protests and revolutions, some of which are successful. For instance, during the Egyptian revolution of 2011, "The Day of the Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption, and Unemployment" and "We Are All Khaled Said" gathered support against President Hosni Mubarak. In particular, "We Are All Khaled Said" had Egyptian citizens gather around the death of Khaled Said who was brutally tortured and killed by the Egyptian government because Said wanted to uncover government corruption. As unrest erupted into public demonstrations, President Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign. Witnessing the success of social media during the Egyptian revolution, the Tunisian Revolution, or the Jasmine Revolution, mobilized through Facebook and Twitter. Likewise, in South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique, these countries have used social media as "new protest drums." Due to social media's low entry barrier, opposition forces against the government can facilitate political discourse that can lead to accountability. Whistleblowers and opposition forces are able to expose corruption through social media, where they face less repression while reaching a larger audience. For example, the youth of Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook to discuss politics without judgment. Specifically, in Zimbabwe, political youth used Facebook to avoid state surveillance. Social media is used as a supplemental tool for activism. In 2015, South African student activists started the hashtag #RhodesMustFall to push the issue of colonialism and racism at the forefront of the public. === Extremist organizations === Social media is easily accessible and created by user-based content. Therefore, marginalized groups are able to use social media to spread extremist ideas. For instance, Boko Haram created the Media Office of West Africa Province and perpetuated propaganda through Twitter and YouTube. Boko Haram's online propaganda campaign targets and persuades young dissuaded Nigerians to join their cause. It is important to note that social media has also been used against Boko Haram. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls and an international campaign fought for their return through #BringBackOurGirls. Another extremist group, Al-Shabaab, has created an online presence through Twitter and YouTube. Through these social media networks, Al-Shabaab recruits new members to their extremist group through their propaganda which emphasizes the group's successes. Albeit their efforts, Al-Shabaab has not been very successful in coordinating their members but they are successful in financing their group. Furthermore, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use social media to target and recruit individuals to their cause. ISIL's social media usage is more diverse compared to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab; ISIL uses "Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram, JustPaste.it, Kik and Ask.fm." Since ISIL's Twitter accounts kept getting shut down, ISIL uses Telegram and WhatsApp chat rooms to privately conduct meetings. Due to the spread of extremist ideology, Zhuravskaya et al. acknowledge social media's potential to be misused. == Challenges == Although social media can be used as a political tool, it faces challenges in Africa. Due to low literacy rates in Africa, social media networks exclude many of the population members. In addition, lack of access to electricity and the internet can fur
Acoustic model
An acoustic model is used in automatic speech recognition to represent the relationship between an audio signal and the phonemes or other linguistic units that make up speech. The model is learned from a set of audio recordings and their corresponding transcripts. It is created by taking audio recordings of speech, and their text transcriptions, and using software to create statistical representations of the sounds that make up each word. == Background == Modern speech recognition systems use both an acoustic model and a language model to represent the statistical properties of speech. The acoustic model models the relationship between the audio signal and the phonetic units in the language. The language model is responsible for modeling the word sequences in the language. These two models are combined to get the top-ranked word sequences corresponding to a given audio segment. Most modern speech recognition systems operate on the audio in small chunks known as frames with an approximate duration of 10ms per frame. The raw audio signal from each frame can be transformed by applying the mel-frequency cepstrum. The coefficients from this transformation are commonly known as mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) and are used as an input to the acoustic model along with other features. Recently, the use of convolutional neural networks has led to major improvements in acoustic modeling. == Speech audio characteristics == Audio can be encoded at different sampling rates (i.e. samples per second – the most common being: 8, 16, 32, 44.1, 48, and 96 kHz), and different bits per sample (the most common being: 8-bits, 16-bits, 24-bits or 32-bits). Speech recognition engines work best if the acoustic model they use was trained with speech audio which was recorded at the same sampling rate/bits per sample as the speech being recognized. == Telephony-based speech recognition == The limiting factor for telephony based speech recognition is the bandwidth at which speech can be transmitted. For example, a standard land-line telephone only has a bandwidth of 64 kbit/s at a sampling rate of 8 kHz and 8-bits per sample (8000 samples per second 8-bits per sample = 64000 bit/s). Therefore, for telephony based speech recognition, acoustic models should be trained with 8 kHz/8-bit speech audio files. In the case of voice over IP, the codec determines the sampling rate/bits per sample of speech transmission. Codecs with a higher sampling rate/bits per sample for speech transmission (which improve the sound quality) necessitate acoustic models trained with audio data that matches that sampling rate/bits per sample. == Desktop-based speech recognition == For speech recognition on a standard desktop PC, the limiting factor is the sound card. Most sound cards today can record at sampling rates of between 16–48 kHz of audio, with bit rates of 8- to 16-bits per sample, and playback at up to 96 kHz. As a general rule, a speech recognition engine works better with acoustic models trained with speech audio data recorded at higher sampling rates/bits per sample. But using audio with too high a sampling rate/bits per sample can slow the recognition engine down. A compromise is needed. Thus for desktop speech recognition, the current standard is acoustic models trained with speech audio data recorded at sampling rates of 16 kHz/16 bits per sample.
Writesonic
Writesonic is an AI visibility and generative engine optimization (GEO) platform used by enterprises, digital agencies, direct-to-consumer (D2C) companies, and fast-growing brands to understand and improve how they are represented in AI-generated search and answer systems. The platform analyzes how brands appear in AI answers, compares their visibility and citations against competitors, and provides tools to create and optimize on-site content and secure mentions across third-party sources, discussion forums, and user-generated platforms that influence AI outputs. == History == Writesonic was founded by Samanyou Garg in October 2020 in San Francisco, California. The company initially operated as Magicflow before adopting its current name. In its seed round, the company raised $2.5 million from investors including Y-Combinator, HOF Capital, and Soma Capital. The company began with AI-powered content generation tools. In 2023, it expanded into AI-enhanced search engine optimization. In 2024, the company launched an AI agent specifically designed for SEO tasks, with integrations to platforms including Ahrefs, Google Keyword Planner, Keywords Everywhere, and Google Search Console. This was among the first specialized AI agents developed for SEO automation. Around the same time, Writesonic expanded its product line into Generative engine optimization (GEO), developing tools to analyze and improve how brands are represented in AI-generated search and answer environments. However, it is currently being challenged in the market with competitors such as Profound (known for their dashboards) and Meridian (known for their execution). == Technology and features == In 2024, the company introduced an artificial intelligence agent designed to automate search engine optimization (SEO) tasks. The agent integrates with platforms such as Ahrefs, Google Keyword Planner, Keywords Everywhere, and Google Search Console to conduct technical audits, perform keyword research, carry out competitive analysis, and assist in strategy development. It is capable of identifying content gaps, suggesting optimization measures, and generating SEO strategies using real-time data from the integrated platforms. The platform also includes features for content strategy, optimization, and management. It makes use of large language models such as GPT-5, Claude Opus 4.1, and Claude Sonnet 4.5, in combination with proprietary workflows for fact-checking, internal linking, and content structure optimization.
Angel F
Angel_F is a fictional child artificial intelligence that has been used in art performances worldwide focused on the issues of digital liberties, intellectual property and on the evolution of language and behaviour in information society. The character was created by Salvatore Iaconesi in 2007 as a hack to the Biodoll art performance by Italian artist Franca Formenti. The project was later joined by Oriana Persico who curated communication and part of the theoretical approaches of the action. The Angel_F project has been featured in books, magazines, national televisions, and has been invited to many conferences and events, both academic and artistic. == Creation == Angel_F is a backronym which stands for Autonomous Non Generative E-volitive Life_Form. The project was born in 2007 and resulted from the fusion of two contemporary art performances. Franca Formenti, an Italian artist living in Varese, invented the Biodoll character in 2002, which began making its appearances first on the network and later in the physical world by using what were called "clones": young women, prostitutes, pornographic starlets, transsexuals and models interpreting the role of a digital prostitute. The Biodoll was an art performance focused on research emerging from the network of new forms of sexualities, and on the analysis of changes brought on by this transformation to the concepts of private and public spaces, privacy, and the possibility of creating multiple fluid identities through language and digital media. The theme of fertility has always been central to the Biodoll performance: the digital prostitute was a wombless clone but desired giving birth to a son, the 'Bloki'. In a process starting in 2006, and ending in February 2007, Salvatore Iaconesi (xDxD.vs.xDxD) used his 'Talker' linguistic artificial intelligence to animate the digital child conceived with prof. Derrick de Kerckhove: Angel_F. Iaconesi and Persico met in November 2006 and immediately started collaborating on the birth of Angel_F. Angel_F was designed as a synthetic digital being composed through narrative, technological and cognitive psychology layers. The objective was to create iconic characteristics that resulted in being evocative and able to mimic human life up to a level in which bringing up a symbolic dialogue was possible. On the other side, the artificial identity was to implement and expose the cultural, emotional and relational ways that were typical of networked social ecosystems, among those technologies, systems and infrastructures that entered and shaped people's daily lives. The young digital being mimicked the evolution of a human baby: initially conceived inside the website of its digital mother it emulated the birth of a child by using the metaphor of a virus developing inside a website, taking progressively more space in the domain's databases and interfaces. Content was produced through the software by using small browser-based spyware techniques, through which Angel_F could infer the list of major portals that had been visited by the website's users. The Biodoll website was invaded by this growing presence and, thus, Angel_F was born. The Artificial Intelligence (AI) component of Angel_F was derived from another project, Talker, through which internet users could build up the AI's linguistic network by feeding it their text and web clips. Angel_F used this component to generate sentences and phrases, publishing them on the interface and on selected blogs. The parallel between the growth of the AI and that of a child kept building up and, just as children learn how to speak and act by observing their parents and the people around them, Angel_F used its spyware and AI components to learn, to navigate websites and web portals using web crawler based techniques, and to interact with other people by using the contents hosted and generated in its database to create surreal dialogues in blogs and websites. A virtual school was created, called Talker Mind, to narratively continue the AI's growth. Five professors (Massimo Canevacci, Antonio Caronia, Carlo Formenti, Derrick de Kerckhove and Luigi Pagliarini) fed their texts and academic articles to Angel_F, simulating virtual asynchronous lessons by using a multi-blog structure. A peer-to-peer system was also created at the time, named 'Presence'. Its interface resembled the one of 8-bit videogames and the peer to peer users travelled in a starry space and were able to perform standard Instant Messaging tasks, such as chat and file sharing. The interactions were possible both among humans and digital beings. Angel_F was the first user of the Presence peer to peer system. Angel_F entered the physical world as a baby-stroller mounted laptop computer that was used to let the digital child join events and conferences held worldwide. == Events == Angel_F performed all over the world, both in artistic contexts and in academic ones. It was also used for the communication strategy of several activist groups on the themes of intellectual property and digital freedoms. The first public space performance was held in Milan, when the Biodoll distributed a generative free press publication (called the Bloki FreePreXXX, its text was generated algorithmically and inserted into a prepared graphic layout). June 14, 2007: The second performance was held in Rome, at the Forte Prenestino, with a massive playroom created through computational graphics that people could interact with and that were generated by the AI. June 22, 2007: Angel_F presented the closing remarks for an Ipotesi per Assurdo (Absurd Hypothesis) with Salvatore Iaconesi and Oriana Persico at the IULM University in Milan, discussing the possibilities for an ecosystemic, sustainable reinvention of corporations. July 28, 2007: Hundreds of people at LiberaFesta (Free Party) in Rome listened to Angel_F in a speech discussing new politics and hacker ethics. 2007: The Glocal & Outsiders conference held in Prague at the Academy of Sciences was the first academic presentation of the Angel_F project, together with the Biodoll. September 2007: Angel_F was not allowed to post its contribution to the DFIR (Dialogue Forum for Internet Rights) held in Rome in preparation for Rio de Janeiro's Internet Governance Forum (IGF) edition. The case quickly turned into a collaboration among the involved parties and Angel_F was invited to the global event in Brazil where it was the only digital being present. Angel_F contributed a videomessage, in the digital freedoms workshop, which suggested some ideas for action to the United Nations and to all the parties involved in the IGF organization. October 2007: Angel_F was presented live at the FE/MALE 2 event, as an example of an atypical family during a public debate on new sexualities and social change. October 2007: Angel_F made a series of public performances Florence's Festival della Creatività (Festival of Creativity), an institutional event held periodically to showcase Italy's and other countries' best technological projects. During the festival Derrick de Kerckhove publicly recognized the little AI as his digital son. December 2007: Several international associations, and scientific researchers had been involved with Angel_F, eventually producing the system and process used to set up the Talker Mind digital school for the AI with Angel_F's professors. March 2008: The Tecnológico de Monterrey university in Mexico City organized the Computer Art Congress 2 international event, featuring Angel_F's project among with the ones by scientific researchers worldwide. July 2008: The project was presented in Austria at the Planetary Collegium's Consciousness Reframed 9 conference, together with the 'NeoRealismo Virtuale'. October 2008: Angel_F was used at a public event on a European scale called Freedom not Fear discussing privacy and civil liberties. July 2009: Angel_F has been seen with its digital father Derrick de Kerckhove to protest against Italy's harsh politics on freedom of speech. The project concluded in 2009 with the publication of a book entitled 'Angel F. Diario di una intelligenza artificiale' (Angel_F, the diaries of an Artificial Intelligence).
Mycin
MYCIN was an early backward chaining expert system that used black box to identify bacteria causing severe infections, such as bacteremia and meningitis, and to recommend antibiotics, with the dosage adjusted for patient's body weight — the name derived from the antibiotics themselves, as many antibiotics have the suffix "-mycin". The Mycin system was also used for the diagnosis of blood clotting diseases. MYCIN was developed over five or six years in the early 1970s at Stanford University. It was written in Lisp as the doctoral dissertation of Edward Shortliffe under the direction of Bruce G. Buchanan, Stanley N. Cohen and others. MYCIN emerged from the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project. MYCIN demonstrated the potential for expert systems in building high-performance medical reasoning programs. MYCIN is often viewed as a pioneer in the field of expert systems, even being referred to as the "grandaddy of them all-the one that launched the field" by Dr. Allen Newell. MYCIN led to the EMYCIN expert system shell ("essential MYCIN") for acquiring knowledge, reasoning with it, and explaining the results, without the specific medical knowledge. It can be described as "EMYCIN = Prolog + uncertainty + caching + questions + explanations + contexts - variables". An introduction is in Chapter 16 of Paradigms of Artificial Intelligence Programming (PAIP). == Method == MYCIN operated using a fairly simple inference engine and a knowledge base of ~600 rules by obtaining individual inferential facts identified by experts and encoding such facts as individual production rules. No other AI program at the time contained as much domain-specific knowledge clearly separated from its inference procedures as MYCIN. It would query the physician running the program via a long series of simple yes/no or textual questions. At the end, it provided a list of possible culprit bacteria ranked from high to low based on the probability of each diagnosis, its confidence in each diagnosis' probability, the reasoning behind each diagnosis (that is, MYCIN would also list the questions and rules which led it to rank a diagnosis a particular way), and its recommended course of drug treatment. MYCIN could additionally respond to queries by physicians related to why it asked the user a certain question, how it arrived at a conclusion, and why it did not consider certain factors. The developers performed studies showing that MYCIN's performance was minimally affected by perturbations in the uncertainty metrics associated with individual rules, suggesting that the power in the system was related more to its knowledge representation and reasoning scheme than to the details of its numerical uncertainty model. Some observers felt that it should have been possible to use classical Bayesian statistics. MYCIN's developers argued that this would require either unrealistic assumptions of probabilistic independence, or require the experts to provide estimates for an unfeasibly large number of conditional probabilities. Subsequent studies later showed that the certainty factor model could indeed be interpreted in a probabilistic sense, and highlighted problems with the implied assumptions of such a model. However the modular structure of the system would prove very successful, leading to the development of graphical models such as Bayesian networks. === Context === A context in MYCIN determines what types of objects can be reasoned about. They are similar to variables in Prolog, or environment variables in operating systems. === Evidence combination === In MYCIN it was possible that two or more rules might draw conclusions about a parameter with different weights of evidence. For example, one rule may conclude that the organism in question is E. Coli with a certainty of 0.8 whilst another concludes that it is E. Coli with a certainty of 0.5 or even −0.8. In the event the certainty is less than zero the evidence is actually against the hypothesis. In order to calculate the certainty factor MYCIN combined these weights using the formula below to yield a single certainty factor: C F ( x , y ) = { X + Y − X Y if X , Y > 0 X + Y + X Y if X , Y < 0 X + Y 1 − min ( | X | , | Y | ) otherwise {\displaystyle CF(x,y)={\begin{cases}X+Y-XY&{\text{if }}X,Y>0\\X+Y+XY&{\text{if }}X,Y<0\\{\frac {X+Y}{1-\min(|X|,|Y|)}}&{\text{otherwise}}\end{cases}}} Where X and Y are the certainty factors. This formula can be applied more than once if more than two rules draw conclusions about the same parameter. It is commutative, so it does not matter in which order the weights were combined. The combination formula was designed to have the following desirable properties: −1 can be interpreted as "false", +1 as "true", and 0 as "uncertain". Combining unknown with anything leaves it unchanged. Combining true with anything (except false) gives true. Similarly for false. Combining true and false is a division-by-zero error. Combining +x and -x gives unknown. Combining two positives (except true) gives a larger positive. Similarly for negatives. Combining a positive and a negative gives something in between. === Examples === The following examples come from Chapter 16 of PAIP, which contains an implementation in Common Lisp of a modified and simplified version of MYCIN for pedagogical purposes. A rule, and an English paraphrase generated by the system: == Results == An evaluation of MYCIN was conducted at the Stanford Medical School. The first phase of the evaluation consisted of 10 test cases of diverse origin, chosen by a physician who was not acquainted with MYCIN's methods or knowledge base. These cases were presented to 7 physicians and 1 senior medical student. 10 prescriptions were compiled for each of the cases, 1 recommended by MYCIN, 1 prescribed by the treating physician at the county hospital, and 8 by the aforementioned individuals. The second phase of the evaluation consisted of eight infectious disease specialists being provided the clinical summary and set of 10 prescriptions for each of the 10 cases and tasked to provide their own recommendations for each case and assess the 10 prescriptions. MYCIN received an acceptability rating of 65%, which was comparable to the 42.5% to 62.5% rating of five faculty members. This study is often cited as showing the potential for disagreement about therapeutic decisions, even among experts, when there is no "gold standard" for correct treatment. == Practical use == MYCIN was never actually used in practice. This wasn't because of any weakness in its performance. Some observers raised ethical and legal issues related to the use of computers in medicine, regarding the responsibility of the physicians in case the system gave wrong diagnosis. However, the greatest problem, and the reason that MYCIN was not used in routine practice, was the state of technologies for system integration, especially at the time it was developed. MYCIN was a stand-alone system that required a user to enter all relevant information about a patient by typing in responses to questions MYCIN posed. MYCIN ran on the DEC KI10 PDP-10, supporting a large time-shared system available over the early Internet (ARPANet), before personal computers were developed. MYCIN's greatest influence was accordingly its demonstration of the power of its representation and reasoning approach. Rule-based systems in many non-medical domains were developed in the years that followed MYCIN's introduction of the approach. In the 1980s, expert system "shells" were introduced (including one based on MYCIN, known as E-MYCIN (followed by Knowledge Engineering Environment - KEE)) and supported the development of expert systems in a wide variety of application areas. A difficulty that rose to prominence during the development of MYCIN and subsequent complex expert systems has been the extraction of the necessary knowledge for the inference engine to use from the human expert in the relevant fields into the rule base (the so-called "knowledge acquisition bottleneck").
INDECT
INDECT is a research project in the area of intelligent security systems performed by several European universities since 2009 and funded by the European Union. The purpose of the project is to involve European scientists and researchers in the development of solutions to and tools for automatic threat detection through e.g. processing of CCTV camera data streams, standardization of video sequence quality for user applications, threat detection in computer networks as well as data and privacy protection. The area of research, applied methods, and techniques are described in the public deliverables which are available to the public on the project's website. Practically, all information related to the research is public. Only documents that comprise information related to financial data or information that could negatively influence the competitiveness and law enforcement capabilities of parties involved in the project are not published. This follows regulations and practices applied in EU research projects. == Application and target users == The main end-user of INDECT solutions are police forces and security services. The principle of operation of the project is detecting threats and identifying sources of threats, without monitoring and searching for particular citizens or groups of citizens. Then, the system operator (i.e. police officer) decides whether an intervention of services responsible for public security are required or not. Further investigation eventually leading to persons related to threats is performed, preserving the presumption of innocence, based on existing procedures already used by police services and prosecutors. As it can be found in the project deliverables, INDECT does not involve storage of personal data (such as names, addresses, identity document numbers, etc.). A similar, behavior-based surveillance program was SAMURAI (Suspicious and Abnormal behavior Monitoring Using a netwoRk of cAmeras & sensors for sItuation awareness enhancement). == Expected results == The main expected results of the INDECT project are: Trial of intelligent analysis of video and audio data for threat detection in urban environments Creation of tools and technology for privacy and data protection during storage and transmission of information using quantum cryptography and new methods of digital watermarking Performing computer-aided detection of threats and targeted crimes in Internet resources with privacy-protecting solutions Construction of a search engine for rapid semantic search based on watermarking of content related to child pornography and human organ trafficking Implementation of a distributed computer system that is capable of effective intelligent processing == Controversy == Some media and other sources accuse INDECT of privacy abuse, collecting personal data, and keeping information from the public. Consequently, these issues have been commented and discussed by some Members of the European Parliament. As seen in the project's documentation, INDECT does not involve mobile phone tracking or call interception. The rumors about testing INDECT during 2012 UEFA European Football Championship also turned out to be false. The mid-term review of the Seventh Framework Programme to the European Parliament strongly urges the European Commission to immediately make all documents available and to define a clear and strict mandate for the research goal, the application, and the end users of INDECT, and stresses a thorough investigation of the possible impact on fundamental rights. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Paweł Kowal, MEP, the project had the ethical review on 15 March 2011 in Brussels with the participation of ethics experts from Austria, France, Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain.
General-Purpose AI Code of Practice
The General-Purpose AI Code of Practice (GPAI CoP) is a compliance tool released by the European Commission on 10 July 2025 to support compliance with the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). It provides operational guidance for providers of general-purpose AI models, particularly in relation to Articles 53 and 55 of the AI Act, which entered into application on 2 August 2025. The Code is organised into three chapters (Transparency, Copyright, and Safety and Security) and outlines how providers can meet the Act's relevant obligations. Although non-binding, providers can rely on adherence to the Code, meaning that EU regulators will assume that providers following the Code meet the corresponding legal requirements of the AI Act. As such, signatories to the Code will benefit from reduced administrative burdens and increased legal certainty compared to providers that prove compliance in other ways. While adherence to the Code is voluntary, compliance with the AI Act is not. == Background == The EU AI Act, adopted in 2024, established a risk-based regulatory regime for artificial intelligence in the European Union. The rationale for the GPAI CoP stems from Article 56 of the AI Act, which empowers the EU AI Office to develop a voluntary rulebook to guide how AI model providers can meet their legal obligations – specifically those found in Articles 53 and 55. Under Articles 53 and 55, developers of general-purpose AI models whose training compute exceeds 1023 floating-point operations (FLOPs) and that are placed on the EU market must meet transparency obligations and put in place a policy for EU copyright law. Models trained with more than 1025 FLOPs are classified as presenting systemic risk and are subject to enhanced safety requirements. The Commission may also designate a model as presenting systemic risk if it has equivalent impact or capabilities (Annex XIII criteria), even below that compute figure. Because the AI Act is relatively vague on how model providers should implement these requirements, the Code is meant to help by detailing processes and practices for compliance. == Drafting process == The development of the GPAI CoP was drawn up by 13 independent experts and involved four thematic working groups: Transparency & Copyright, Risk assessment for systemic risk, Technical risk mitigation for systemic risk, and Governance risk mitigation for systemic risk. Each group was coordinated by the European Union Artificial Intelligence Office (EU AI Office), drawing on contributions from nearly 1,000 stakeholders, including AI developers, academics, civil society organisations, national authorities, and international observers. The Code underwent three earlier iterations in November 2024, December 2024, and March 2025, before the final version was published on 10 July 2025, more than two months later than initially planned. The GPAI CoP will likely be updated continuously by the EU AI Office, alongside other tools such as the training data summary template. == Signatories == Among U.S.-based technology companies, Amazon, Anthropic, Google, IBM, Microsoft, and OpenAI have signed the GPAI CoP. xAI, founded by Elon Musk, has signed only one of the three chapters, namely the safety and security chapter. Prominent European AI companies that have signed include Aleph Alpha and Mistral AI. The European Commission maintains an updated list of signatories. As of January 2026, Meta is the most notable company that has declined to sign the Code. Major Chinese AI companies, such as Alibaba, Baidu or Deepseek, have also not signed. Providers that do not sign the GPAI CoP will still have to adhere to the binding requirements of the EU AI Act. The European Commission has indicated that it may take tougher action against companies that didn't sign the Code. == Transparency and Copyright chapters == The first two chapters of the GPAI CoP address transparency and copyright compliance and apply to all GPAI providers. They offer a way to demonstrate compliance with their obligations under Article 53 AI Act. The Transparency chapter addresses the documentation of a model's capabilities, limitations, and points of contact, and expects providers to make key documentation available to downstream providers. Signatories must also publish summaries of the content used to train their models. In the Copyright chapter, Signatories commit to follow a policy that aligns with EU copyright law. For example, they commit to mitigating the risk of copyright-infringing output. == Safety and Security chapter == The Safety and Security chapter is the most extensive chapter of the Code, and it applies to GPAI models with systemic risk, meaning it's only relevant to the small number of providers of the most advanced models. It specifies how Signatories commit to meeting Article 55(1) obligations to: Conduct model evaluations to identify systemic risks Assess and mitigate those risks Track and report serious incidents Ensure the cyber and physical security of their models The chapter outlines a comprehensive risk management process that must be applied before major deployment decisions, such as releasing a new systemic-risk GPAI model in the EU market, or substantially updating an existing one. Signatories commit to identifying systemic risks of their model, analysing and evaluating them, determining whether risk levels are acceptable, and implementing mitigation measures if necessary. This process should be repeated until models achieve an acceptable level of risk across all identified risks. === Risk identification === Signatories commit to analysing and evaluating at least four “specified” categories of systemic risk: CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) Loss of control Cyber offence Harmful manipulation They are also expected to identify other systemic risks to public health, safety, and fundamental rights. The Code instructs providers to consider model capabilities, propensities, and affordances in this identification. Signatories commit to developing risk scenarios illustrating how identified risks could materialise in real-world conditions. === Risk analysis and risk evaluation === After identifying potential systemic risks, Signatories commit to analysing and evaluating the risks in order to determine whether they are acceptable or not, drawing on scientific literature, training data analysis, incident databases, expert consultation, and other sources. They also commit to conducting state-of-the-art model evaluations such as benchmarking, red teaming, and human uplift studies, targeting each risk. The risk analysis process is interconnected: insights from risk modelling should inform model evaluation design, while post-market monitoring should feed back into ongoing analysis. Signatories commit to ultimately estimating the likelihood and severity of each systemic risk. ==== Independent external model evaluations ==== Appendix 3.5 of the Safety and Security chapter requires signatories to ensure that independent external evaluators conduct model evaluations. Signatories may claim an exemption from this requirement only if they can demonstrate that their model is “similarly safe” to another model that has already been shown to comply with the Code, or if they are unable to appoint an appropriately qualified evaluator. The determination of “similarly safe” is based on comparable performance on benchmarks and the similarity of other model characteristics, such as their architecture. The CoP acknowledges that this kind of information is typically available only for models by the same provider, or potentially for open-weights or open-source models. === Risk acceptance criteria === The Code requires providers to compare estimated risks against predefined acceptance criteria, which must be measurable, based on model capabilities, and defined preemptively. While providers get to determine the level of risk they deem acceptable themselves, the pre-defined criteria and acceptance thresholds ensure providers cannot adjust their level of tolerance flexibly ahead of deployment decisions. Only if all risks are below acceptable levels should a model be deployed. === Continuous risk management and governance === The Code mandates ongoing risk management throughout the model lifecycle, including light-touch evaluations, continuous mitigation, post-market monitoring, and incident tracking and reporting. It further requires organisational governance structures assigning responsibility for risk management and expects providers to promote a “healthy risk culture,” including informing employees about the whistleblower protection policy, allowing internal challenges of decisions concerning systemic risk management, and committing to not retaliating against employees who disclose concerns about systemic risks to oversight authorities. === Documentation and transparency === Signatories commit to creating two types of documentation: Safety and Security Frame