Angel_F is a fictional child artificial intelligence that has been used in art performances worldwide focused on the issues of digital liberties, intellectual property and on the evolution of language and behaviour in information society. The character was created by Salvatore Iaconesi in 2007 as a hack to the Biodoll art performance by Italian artist Franca Formenti. The project was later joined by Oriana Persico who curated communication and part of the theoretical approaches of the action. The Angel_F project has been featured in books, magazines, national televisions, and has been invited to many conferences and events, both academic and artistic. == Creation == Angel_F is a backronym which stands for Autonomous Non Generative E-volitive Life_Form. The project was born in 2007 and resulted from the fusion of two contemporary art performances. Franca Formenti, an Italian artist living in Varese, invented the Biodoll character in 2002, which began making its appearances first on the network and later in the physical world by using what were called "clones": young women, prostitutes, pornographic starlets, transsexuals and models interpreting the role of a digital prostitute. The Biodoll was an art performance focused on research emerging from the network of new forms of sexualities, and on the analysis of changes brought on by this transformation to the concepts of private and public spaces, privacy, and the possibility of creating multiple fluid identities through language and digital media. The theme of fertility has always been central to the Biodoll performance: the digital prostitute was a wombless clone but desired giving birth to a son, the 'Bloki'. In a process starting in 2006, and ending in February 2007, Salvatore Iaconesi (xDxD.vs.xDxD) used his 'Talker' linguistic artificial intelligence to animate the digital child conceived with prof. Derrick de Kerckhove: Angel_F. Iaconesi and Persico met in November 2006 and immediately started collaborating on the birth of Angel_F. Angel_F was designed as a synthetic digital being composed through narrative, technological and cognitive psychology layers. The objective was to create iconic characteristics that resulted in being evocative and able to mimic human life up to a level in which bringing up a symbolic dialogue was possible. On the other side, the artificial identity was to implement and expose the cultural, emotional and relational ways that were typical of networked social ecosystems, among those technologies, systems and infrastructures that entered and shaped people's daily lives. The young digital being mimicked the evolution of a human baby: initially conceived inside the website of its digital mother it emulated the birth of a child by using the metaphor of a virus developing inside a website, taking progressively more space in the domain's databases and interfaces. Content was produced through the software by using small browser-based spyware techniques, through which Angel_F could infer the list of major portals that had been visited by the website's users. The Biodoll website was invaded by this growing presence and, thus, Angel_F was born. The Artificial Intelligence (AI) component of Angel_F was derived from another project, Talker, through which internet users could build up the AI's linguistic network by feeding it their text and web clips. Angel_F used this component to generate sentences and phrases, publishing them on the interface and on selected blogs. The parallel between the growth of the AI and that of a child kept building up and, just as children learn how to speak and act by observing their parents and the people around them, Angel_F used its spyware and AI components to learn, to navigate websites and web portals using web crawler based techniques, and to interact with other people by using the contents hosted and generated in its database to create surreal dialogues in blogs and websites. A virtual school was created, called Talker Mind, to narratively continue the AI's growth. Five professors (Massimo Canevacci, Antonio Caronia, Carlo Formenti, Derrick de Kerckhove and Luigi Pagliarini) fed their texts and academic articles to Angel_F, simulating virtual asynchronous lessons by using a multi-blog structure. A peer-to-peer system was also created at the time, named 'Presence'. Its interface resembled the one of 8-bit videogames and the peer to peer users travelled in a starry space and were able to perform standard Instant Messaging tasks, such as chat and file sharing. The interactions were possible both among humans and digital beings. Angel_F was the first user of the Presence peer to peer system. Angel_F entered the physical world as a baby-stroller mounted laptop computer that was used to let the digital child join events and conferences held worldwide. == Events == Angel_F performed all over the world, both in artistic contexts and in academic ones. It was also used for the communication strategy of several activist groups on the themes of intellectual property and digital freedoms. The first public space performance was held in Milan, when the Biodoll distributed a generative free press publication (called the Bloki FreePreXXX, its text was generated algorithmically and inserted into a prepared graphic layout). June 14, 2007: The second performance was held in Rome, at the Forte Prenestino, with a massive playroom created through computational graphics that people could interact with and that were generated by the AI. June 22, 2007: Angel_F presented the closing remarks for an Ipotesi per Assurdo (Absurd Hypothesis) with Salvatore Iaconesi and Oriana Persico at the IULM University in Milan, discussing the possibilities for an ecosystemic, sustainable reinvention of corporations. July 28, 2007: Hundreds of people at LiberaFesta (Free Party) in Rome listened to Angel_F in a speech discussing new politics and hacker ethics. 2007: The Glocal & Outsiders conference held in Prague at the Academy of Sciences was the first academic presentation of the Angel_F project, together with the Biodoll. September 2007: Angel_F was not allowed to post its contribution to the DFIR (Dialogue Forum for Internet Rights) held in Rome in preparation for Rio de Janeiro's Internet Governance Forum (IGF) edition. The case quickly turned into a collaboration among the involved parties and Angel_F was invited to the global event in Brazil where it was the only digital being present. Angel_F contributed a videomessage, in the digital freedoms workshop, which suggested some ideas for action to the United Nations and to all the parties involved in the IGF organization. October 2007: Angel_F was presented live at the FE/MALE 2 event, as an example of an atypical family during a public debate on new sexualities and social change. October 2007: Angel_F made a series of public performances Florence's Festival della Creatività (Festival of Creativity), an institutional event held periodically to showcase Italy's and other countries' best technological projects. During the festival Derrick de Kerckhove publicly recognized the little AI as his digital son. December 2007: Several international associations, and scientific researchers had been involved with Angel_F, eventually producing the system and process used to set up the Talker Mind digital school for the AI with Angel_F's professors. March 2008: The Tecnológico de Monterrey university in Mexico City organized the Computer Art Congress 2 international event, featuring Angel_F's project among with the ones by scientific researchers worldwide. July 2008: The project was presented in Austria at the Planetary Collegium's Consciousness Reframed 9 conference, together with the 'NeoRealismo Virtuale'. October 2008: Angel_F was used at a public event on a European scale called Freedom not Fear discussing privacy and civil liberties. July 2009: Angel_F has been seen with its digital father Derrick de Kerckhove to protest against Italy's harsh politics on freedom of speech. The project concluded in 2009 with the publication of a book entitled 'Angel F. Diario di una intelligenza artificiale' (Angel_F, the diaries of an Artificial Intelligence).
Adversarial stylometry
Adversarial stylometry is the practice of altering writing style to reduce the potential for stylometry to discover the author's identity or their characteristics. This task is also known as authorship obfuscation or authorship anonymisation. Stylometry poses a significant privacy challenge in its ability to unmask anonymous authors or to link pseudonyms to an author's other identities, which, for example, creates difficulties for whistleblowers, activists, and hoaxers and fraudsters. The privacy risk is expected to grow as machine learning techniques and text corpora develop. All adversarial stylometry shares the core idea of faithfully paraphrasing the source text so that the meaning is unchanged but the stylistic signals are obscured. Such a faithful paraphrase is an adversarial example for a stylometric classifier. Several broad approaches to this exist, with some overlap: imitation, substituting the author's own style for another's; translation, applying machine translation with the hope that this eliminates characteristic style in the source text; and obfuscation, deliberately modifying a text's style to make it not resemble the author's own. Manually obscuring style is possible, but laborious; in some circumstances, it is preferable or necessary. Automated tooling, either semi- or fully-automatic, could assist an author. How best to perform the task and the design of such tools is an open research question. While some approaches have been shown to be able to defeat particular stylometric analyses, particularly those that do not account for the potential of adversariality, establishing safety in the face of unknown analyses is an issue. Ensuring the faithfulness of the paraphrase is a critical challenge for automated tools. It is uncertain if the practice of adversarial stylometry is detectable in itself. Some studies have found that particular methods produced signals in the output text, but a stylometrist who is uncertain of what methods may have been used may not be able to reliably detect them. == History == Rao & Rohatgi (2000), an early work in adversarial stylometry, identified machine translation as a possibility, but noted that the quality of translators available at the time presented severe challenges. Kacmarcik & Gamon (2006) is another early work. Brennan, Afroz & Greenstadt (2012) performed the first evaluation of adversarial stylometric methods on actual texts. Brennan & Greenstadt (2009) introduced the first corpus of adversarially authored texts specifically for evaluating stylometric methods; other corpora include the International Imitation Hemingway Competition, the Faux Faulkner contest, and the hoax blog A Gay Girl in Damascus. == Motivations == Rao & Rohatgi (2000) suggest that short, unattributed documents (i.e., anonymous posts) are not at risk of stylometric identification, but pseudonymous authors who have not practiced adversarial stylometry in producing corpuses of thousands of words may be vulnerable. Narayanan et al. (2012) attempted large-scale deanonymisation of 100,000 blog authors with mixed results: the identifications were significantly better than chance, but only accurately matched the blog and author a fifth of the time; identification improved with the number of posts written by the author in the corpus. Even if an author is not identified, some of their characteristics may still be deduced stylometrically, or stylometry may narrow the anonymity set of potential authors sufficiently for other information to complete the identification. Detecting author characteristics (e.g., gender or age) is often simpler than identifying an author from a large, possibly open, set of candidates. Modern machine learning techniques offer powerful tools for identification; further development of corpora and computational stylometric techniques are likely to raise further privacy issues. Gröndahl & Asokan (2020a) say that the general validity of the hypothesis underlying stylometry—that authors have invariant, content-independent 'style fingerprints'—is uncertain, but "the deanonymisation attack is a real privacy concern". Those interested in practicing adversarial stylometry and stylistic deception include whistleblowers avoiding retribution; journalists and activists; perpetrators of frauds and hoaxes; authors of fake reviews; literary forgers; criminals disguising their identity from investigators; and, generally, anyone with a desire for anonymity or pseudonymity. Authors, or agents acting on behalf of authors, may also attempt to remove stylistic clues to author characteristics (e.g., race or gender) so that knowledge of those characteristics cannot be used for discrimination (e.g., through algorithmic bias). Another possible use for adversarial stylometry is in disguising automatically generated text as human-authored. == Methods == With imitation, the author attempts to mislead stylometry by matching their style to another author's. An incomplete imitation, where some of the true author's unique characteristics appear alongside the imitated author's, can be a detectable signal for the use of adversarial stylometry. Imitation can be performed automatically with style transfer systems, though this typically requires a large corpus in the target style for the system to learn from. Another approach is translation, which employs machine translation of a source text to eliminate characteristic style, often through multiple translators in sequence to produce a round-trip translation. Such chained translation can lead to texts being significantly altered, even to the point of incomprehensibility; improved translation tools reduce this risk. More simply-structured texts can be easier to machine translate without losing the original meaning. Machine translation blurs into direct stylistic imitation or obfuscation achieved through automated style transfer, which can be viewed as a "translation" with the same language as input and output. With low-quality translation tools, an author can be required to manually correct major translation errors while avoiding the hazard of re-introducing stylistic characteristics. Wang, Juola & Riddell (2022) found that gross errors introduced by Google Translate were rare, but more common with several intermediate translations—however, occasional simple or short sentences and misspellings in the source text appeared verbatim in the output, potentially providing an identifying signal. Chain translation can leave characteristic traces of its application in a document, which may allow reconstruction of the intermediate languages used and the number of translation steps performed. Obfuscation involves deliberately changing the style of a text to reduce its similarity to other texts by some metric; this may be performed at the time of writing by conscious modification, or as part of a revision process with feedback from the metric being targeted as an input to decide when the text has been sufficiently obfuscated. In contrast to translation, complex texts can offer more opportunities for effective obfuscation without altering meaning, and likewise genres with more permissible variation allow more obfuscation. However, longer texts are harder to thoroughly obfuscate. Obfuscation can blend into imitation if the author develops a novel target style, distinct from their original style. With respect to masking author characteristics, obfuscation may aim to achieve a union (adding signals for imitated characteristics) or an intersection (removing signals and normalising) of other authors' styles. Avoiding the author's own idiosyncrasies and producing a "normalised" text is a critical obfuscatory step: an author may have a unique tendency to misspell certain words, use particular variants, or to format a document in a characteristic way. Stylometric signals vary in how simply they can be adversarially masked; an author may easily change their vocabulary by conscious choice, but altering the pattern of grammar or the letter frequency in their text may be harder to achieve, though Juola & Vescovi (2011) report that imitation typically succeeds at masking more characteristics than obfuscation. Automated obfuscation may require large amounts of training data written by the author. Concerning automated implementations of adversarial stylometry, two possible implementations are rule-based systems for paraphrasing; and encoder–decoder architectures, where the text passes through an intermediate format that is (intended to be) style-neutral. Another division in automated methods is whether there is feedback from an identification system or not. With such feedback, finding paraphrases for author masking has been characterised as a heuristic search problem, exploring textual variants until the result is stylistically sufficiently far (in the case of obfuscation) or near (in the case of imitation), which then constitutes an adversarial example for that identification system. == Evaluation == How
Intelligent automation
Intelligent automation (IA), or intelligent process automation, is a software term that refers to a combination of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic process automation (RPA). Companies use intelligent automation to cut costs and streamline tasks by using artificial-intelligence-powered robotic software to mitigate repetitive tasks. As it accumulates data, the system learns in an effort to improve its efficiency. Intelligent automation applications consist of, but are not limited to, pattern analysis, data assembly, and classification. The term is similar to hyperautomation, a concept identified by research group Gartner as being one of the top technology trends of 2020. == Technology == Intelligent automation applies the assembly line concept of breaking tasks into repetitive steps to improve business processes. Rather than having humans perform each step, intelligent automation can replace steps with an intelligent software robot, improving efficiency. Intelligent automation integrates robotic process automation (RPA) with artificial intelligence techniques (such as machine learning, natural-language processing, and computer vision) enabling systems to interpret data, make decisions, and adapt to changing inputs. Modern platforms use a layered architecture combining workflow orchestration, low-code tools, integration middleware, and AI services to coordinate bots and data pipelines across organisational systems. == Applications == Intelligent automation is used to process unstructured content. Common real-world applications include self-driving cars, self-checkouts at grocery stores, smart home assistants, and appliances. Businesses can apply data and machine learning to build predictive analytics that react to consumer behavior changes, or to implement RPA to improve manufacturing floor operations. For example, the technology has also been used to automate the workflow behind distributing COVID-19 vaccines. Data provided by hospital systems’ electronic health records can be processed to identify and educate patients, and schedule vaccinations. Intelligent automation can provide real-time insights on profitability and efficiency. However, in an April 2022 survey by Alchemmy, despite three quarters of businesses acknowledging the importance of Artificial Intelligence to their future development, just a quarter of business leaders (25%) considered Intelligent Automation a “game changer” in understanding current performance. 42% of CTOs see “shortage of talent” as the main obstacle to implementing Intelligent Automation in their business, while 36% of CEOs see ‘upskilling and professional development of existing workforce’ as the most significant adoption barrier. IA is becoming increasingly accessible for firms of all sizes. With this in mind, it is expected to continue to grow rapidly in all industries. This technology has the potential to change the workforce. As it advances, it will be able to perform increasingly complex and difficult tasks. In addition, this may expose certain workforce issues as well as change how tasks are allocated. Tools such as Semrush's AI Visibility Toolkit and Enterprise AIO reflect these developments by analysing how entities are referenced and represented within responses produced by large-language-model-based systems. == Benefits == Streamline processes: Repetitive manual tasks can put a strain on the workforce. However, with AI agents, these tasks can be automated to allow teams to focus on more important matters that require human cognition. Intelligent automation can also be used to mitigate tasks with human error which in turn increases proficiency. This allows the opportunity for firms to scale production without the traditional negative consequences such as reduced quality or increased risk. Customer service improvement: Customer service can be significantly improved, providing the firm with a competitive advantage. IA utilizing chat features allows for instant curated responses to customers. In addition, it can give updates to customers, make appointments, manage calls, and personalize campaigns. Flexibility: Due to the wide range of applications, IA is useful across a variety of fields, technologies, projects and industries. In addition, IA can be integrated with current automated systems in place. This allows for optimized systems unique to each firm to best fit their individual needs. == Capabilities == Cognitive automation: Employs AI techniques to assist humans in decision-making and task completion Natural language processing: Allows computers to automate knowledge work Business process management: Enhances the consistency and agility of corporate operations Process mining: Applies data mining methods to discover, analyze, and improve business processes Intelligent document processing: Utilizes OCR and other advanced technologies to extract data from documents and convert it into structured, usable data Computer vision: Allows computers to extract information from digital images, videos, and other visual inputs Integration automation: Establishes a unified platform with automated workflows that integrate data, applications, and devices.
Hardware for artificial intelligence
Specialized computer hardware is often used to execute artificial intelligence (AI) programs faster, and with less energy, such as Lisp machines, neuromorphic engineering, event cameras, and physical neural networks. Since 2017, several consumer grade CPUs and SoCs have on-die NPUs. As of 2023, the market for AI hardware is dominated by GPUs. As of the 2020s, AI computation is dominated by graphics processing units (GPUs) and newer domain-specific accelerators such as Google's Tensor Processing Units (TPUs), AMD's Instinct MI300 series, and various on-device neural-processing units (NPUs) found in consumer hardware. == Scope == For the purposes of this article, AI hardware refers to computing components and systems specifically designed or optimized to accelerate artificial-intelligence workloads such as machine-learning training or inference. This includes general-purpose accelerators used for AI (for example, GPUs) and domain-specific accelerators (for example, TPUs, NPUs, and other AI ASICs). Event-based cameras are sometimes discussed in the context of neuromorphic computing, but they are input sensors rather than AI compute devices. Conversely, components such as memristors are basic circuit elements rather than specialized AI hardware when considered alone. == Lisp machines == Lisp machines were developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to make artificial intelligence programs written in the programming language Lisp run faster. == Dataflow architecture == Dataflow architecture processors used for AI serve various purposes with varied implementations like the polymorphic dataflow Convolution Engine by Kinara (formerly Deep Vision), structure-driven dataflow by Hailo, and dataflow scheduling by Cerebras. == Component hardware == === AI accelerators === Since the 2010s, advances in computer hardware have led to more efficient methods for training deep neural networks that contain many layers of non-linear hidden units and a very large output layer. By 2019, graphics processing units (GPUs), often with AI-specific enhancements, had displaced central processing units (CPUs) as the dominant means to train large-scale commercial cloud AI. OpenAI estimated the hardware compute used in the largest deep learning projects from Alex Net (2012) to Alpha Zero (2017), and found a 300,000-fold increase in the amount of compute needed, with a doubling-time trend of 3.4 months. === General-purpose GPUs for AI === Since the 2010s, graphics processing units (GPUs) have been widely used to train and deploy deep learning models because of their highly parallel architecture and high memory bandwidth. Modern data-center GPUs include dedicated tensor or matrix-math units that accelerate neural-network operations. In 2022, NVIDIA introduced the Hopper-generation H100 GPU, adding FP8 precision support and faster interconnects for large-scale model training. AMD and other vendors have also developed GPUs and accelerators aimed at AI and high-performance computing workloads. === Domain-specific accelerators (ASICs / NPUs) === Beyond general-purpose GPUs, several companies have developed application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and neural processing units (NPUs) tailored for AI workloads. Google introduced the Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) in 2016 for deep-learning inference, with later generations supporting large-scale training through dense systolic-array designs and optical interconnects. Other vendors have released similar devices—such as Apple's Neural Engine and various on-device NPUs—that emphasize energy-efficient inference in mobile or edge computing environments. === Memory and interconnects === AI accelerators rely on fast memory and inter-chip links to manage the large data volumes of training and inference. High-bandwidth memory (HBM) stacks, standardized as HBM3 in 2022, provide terabytes-per-second throughput on modern GPUs and ASICs. These accelerators are often connected through dedicated fabrics such as NVIDIA's NVLink and NVSwitch or optical interconnects used in TPU systems to scale performance across thousands of chips.
AI literacy
AI literacy or artificial intelligence literacy is "a set of competencies that enables individuals to critically evaluate AI technologies; communicate and collaborate effectively with AI; and use AI as a tool online, at home, and in the workplace." AI is employed in a variety of applications, including self-driving automobiles, virtual assistants and text generation by generative AI models. Users of these tools should be able to make informed decisions. AI literacy may have an impact on students' future employment prospects. With the rise of generative AI platforms, AI literacy has become a topic of conversation in the field of education. Some think AI literacy is essential for school and college students, while others restrict or prohibit the use of AI in assignments, viewing it as a form of academic dishonesty. However, many researchers and educational institutions promote a more nuanced approach, encouraging critical engagement with AI while developing policies that balance academic integrity with opportunities for learning. == Definitions == Other definitions of AI literacy include the ability to understand, use, monitor, and critically reflect on AI applications. That use of the term usually refers to teaching skills and knowledge to the general public, particularly those who are not adept in AI and the ability to understand, use, evaluate, and ethically navigate AI. As research into AI literacy is still emerging and focused on developing context-specific skills, there is not yet a single, broadly agreed-upon definition. AI literacy is linked to other forms of literacy. AI literacy requires digital literacy, whereas scientific and computational literacy may inform it. Data literacy also significantly overlaps with it. == Categories == AI literacy encompasses multiple categories, including a theoretical understanding of how artificial intelligence works, the usage of artificial intelligence technologies, and the critical appraisal of artificial intelligence, and its ethics. === Know and understand AI === Knowledge and understanding of AI refers to a basic understanding of what artificial intelligence is and how it works. This includes familiarity with machine learning algorithms and the limitations and biases present in AI systems. Users who know and understand AI should be familiar with various technologies that use artificial intelligence, including cognitive systems, robotics and machine learning. This includes recognizing that large language models (LLMs) are machine learning models trained on extensive datasets which generate new text rather than retrieving pre-written responses. === Use and apply AI === Using and applying AI refers to the ability to use AI tools to solve problems and perform tasks such as programming and analyzing big data. Some consider prompt engineering, the practice of designing effective prompts to guide generative AI platforms more effectively, as another competency within AI literacy. === Evaluate and create AI === Evaluation and creation refers to the ability to critically evaluate the quality and reliability of AI systems. It also refers to designing and building fair and ethical AI systems. To evaluate correctly, users should also learn in which areas AI is strong, and in which areas it is weak. === AI ethics === AI ethics refers to understanding the moral implications of AI, and the making informed decisions regarding the use of AI tools. This area includes considerations such as: Accountability: Hold AI actors accountable for the operation of AI systems and adherence to ethical ideals. Accuracy: Identify and report sources of error and uncertainty in algorithms and data. Auditability: Enable other parties to audit and assess algorithm behavior via transparent information sharing. Explainability: Make sure that algorithmic judgments and the underlying data can be presented in simple language. Fairness: Prevent biases and consider varied viewpoints. To do so, increase the diversity of researchers in the field. Human Centricity and Well-being: Prioritize human well-being in AI development and deployment. Human rights Alignment: Ensure that technology do not infringe internationally recognized human rights. Inclusivity: Make AI accessible to everyone. Progress: Choose high value initiatives. Responsibility, accountability, and transparency: Foster trust via responsibility, accountability, and fairness. Robustness and Security: Make AI systems safe, secure, and resistant to manipulation or data breach. Sustainability: Choose implementations that generate long-term, useful benefits. Environmental Implications: How this tool impacts the environment, any restrictions or laws, if this impact is worth the effects or not. === Enabling AI === Support AI by developing associated knowledge and skills such as programming and statistics. == Promoting AI literacy == Several governments have recognized the need to promote AI literacy, including among adults. Such programs have been published in the United States, China, Germany and Finland. Programs intended for the general public usually consist of short and easy to understand online study units. Programs intended for children are usually project-based. Programs for students at colleges and universities often address the specific professional needs of the student, depending on their field of study. Beyond the education system, AI literacy can also be developed in the community, for example in museums. === Schools === Schools use diverse pedagogies to promote AI literacy. These include: Performing a Turing test with an intelligent agent Creating chatbots Building apps using Blockly-based programming Project-based learning Building robots Data visualization Training AI models Artificial intelligence curricula can improve students' understanding of topics such as machine learning, neural networks, and deep learning. === Higher education === Before the second decade of the 21st century, artificial intelligence was studied mainly in STEM courses. Later, projects emerged to increase artificial intelligence education, specifically to promote AI literacy. Most courses start with one or more study units that deal with basic questions such as what artificial intelligence is, where it comes from, what it can do and what it can't do. Most courses also refer to machine learning and deep learning. Some of the courses deal with moral issues in artificial intelligence. In Ireland, the Higher Education Authority published Generative AI in Higher Education Teaching & Learning: Policy Framework in December 2025, which encouraged higher education institutions to embed AI literacy across programmes as a core graduate attribute. ==== Disciplinary policy ==== As a response to the increase of generative AI use in education, several disciplines formed committees or task forces to examine context-specific approaches toward AI literacy. In spring 2025, the Modern Language Association and Conference on College Composition and Communication Joint Task Force finished development of three working papers, a guide on AI literacy for students, and a collection of resources addressing AI use in writing. The task force emphasized the need for "a culture of critical AI literacy" and included guidelines not only for students but also educators and institutions, highlighting the need for modeling ethical AI use in planning processes. Similarly, a committee formed by the American Historical Association Council published "Guiding Principles for Artificial Intelligence in History Education" which encouraged "clear and transparent engagement with generative AI." The guidelines demonstrate the value of criticality when working with generative AI in thinking and research.
Zero-day vulnerability
A zero-day (also known as a 0-day) is a vulnerability or security hole in a computer system unknown to its developers or anyone capable of mitigating it. Until the vulnerability is remedied, threat actors can exploit it in a zero-day exploit, or zero-day attack. The term "zero-day" originally referred to the number of days since a new piece of software was released to the public, so "zero-day software" was obtained by hacking into a developer's computer before release. Eventually the term was applied to the vulnerabilities that allowed this hacking, and to the number of days that the vendor has had to fix them. Vendors who discover the vulnerability may create patches or advise workarounds to mitigate it, though users need to deploy that mitigation to eliminate the vulnerability in their systems. Zero-day attacks are severe threats. == Definition == Despite developers' goal of delivering a product that works entirely as intended, virtually all products contain software and hardware bugs. If a bug creates a security risk, it is called a vulnerability. Vulnerabilities vary in their ability to be exploited by malicious actors. Some are not usable at all, while others can be used to disrupt the device with a denial of service attack. The most dangerous allow the attacker to inject and run their own code, without the user being aware of it. Although the term "zero-day" initially referred to the time since the vendor had become aware of the vulnerability, zero-day vulnerabilities can also be defined as the subset of vulnerabilities for which no patch or other fix is available. A zero-day exploit is any exploit that takes advantage of such a vulnerability. == Exploits == An exploit is the delivery mechanism that takes advantage of the vulnerability to penetrate the target's systems, for such purposes as disrupting operations, installing malware, or exfiltrating data. Researchers Lillian Ablon and Andy Bogart write that "little is known about the true extent, use, benefit, and harm of zero-day exploits". Exploits based on zero-day vulnerabilities are considered more dangerous than those that take advantage of a known vulnerability. However, it is likely that most cyberattacks use known vulnerabilities, not zero-days. Governments of states are the primary users of zero-day exploits, not only because of the high cost of finding or buying vulnerabilities, but also the significant cost of writing the attack software. Nevertheless, anyone can use a vulnerability, and according to research by the RAND Corporation, "any serious attacker can always get an affordable zero-day for almost any target". Many targeted attacks and most advanced persistent threats rely on zero-day vulnerabilities. In 2017, the average time to develop an exploit from a zero-day vulnerability was estimated at 22 days. The difficulty of developing exploits has been increasing over time due to increased anti-exploitation features in popular software. === Window of vulnerability === Zero-day vulnerabilities are often classified as alive—meaning that there is no public knowledge of the vulnerability—and dead—the vulnerability has been disclosed, but not patched. If the software's maintainers are actively searching for vulnerabilities, it is a living vulnerability; such vulnerabilities in unmaintained software are called immortal. Zombie vulnerabilities can be exploited in older versions of the software but have been patched in newer versions. Even publicly known and zombie vulnerabilities are often exploitable for an extended period. Security patches can take months to develop, or may never be developed. A patch can have negative effects on the functionality of software and users may need to test the patch to confirm functionality and compatibility. Larger organizations may fail to identify and patch all dependencies, while smaller enterprises and personal users may not install patches. Research suggests that risk of cyberattack increases if the vulnerability is made publicly known or a patch is released. Cybercriminals can reverse engineer the patch to find the underlying vulnerability and develop exploits, often faster than users install the patch. According to research by RAND Corporation published in 2017, zero-day exploits remain usable for 6.9 years on average, although those purchased from a third party only remain usable for 1.4 years on average. The researchers were unable to determine if any particular platform or software (such as open-source software) had any relationship to the life expectancy of a zero-day vulnerability. Although the RAND researchers found that 5.7 percent of a stockpile of secret zero-day vulnerabilities will have been discovered by someone else within a year, another study found a higher overlap rate, as high as 10.8 percent to 21.9 percent per year. == Countermeasures == Because, by definition, there is no patch that can block a zero-day exploit, all systems employing the software or hardware with the vulnerability are at risk. This includes secure systems such as banks and governments that have all patches up to date. Security systems are designed around known vulnerabilities, and repeated exploitations of a zero-day exploit could continue undetected for an extended period of time. Although there have been many proposals for a system that is effective at detecting zero-day exploits, this remains an active area of research in 2023. Many organizations have adopted defense-in-depth tactics so that attacks are likely to require breaching multiple levels of security, which makes it more difficult to achieve. Conventional cybersecurity measures such as training and access control — including multi-factor authentication, least-privilege access, and air-gapping makes it harder to compromise systems with a zero-day exploit. Since writing perfectly secure software is impossible, some researchers argue that driving up the cost of exploits is considered a good strategy to reduce the burden of cyberattacks. == Market == Zero-day exploits can fetch millions of dollars. There are three main types of buyers: White: the vendor, or to third parties such as the Zero Day Initiative that disclose to the vendor. Often such disclosure is in exchange for a bug bounty. Not all companies respond positively to disclosures, as they can cause legal liability and operational overhead. It is not uncommon to receive cease-and-desist letters from software vendors after disclosing a vulnerability for free. Gray: the largest and most lucrative. Government or intelligence agencies buy zero-days and may use it in an attack, stockpile the vulnerability, or notify the vendor. The United States federal government is one of the largest buyers. As of 2013, the Five Eyes (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) captured the plurality of the market and other significant purchasers included Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, and Iran. Middle Eastern countries were poised to become the biggest spenders. Black: organized crime, which typically prefers exploit software rather than just knowledge of a vulnerability. These users are more likely to employ "half-days" where a patch is already available. In 2015, the markets for government and crime were estimated at least ten times larger than the white market. Sellers are often hacker groups that seek out vulnerabilities in widely used software for financial reward. Some will only sell to certain buyers, while others will sell to anyone. White market sellers are more likely to be motivated by non pecuniary rewards such as recognition and intellectual challenge. Selling zero-day exploits is legal. Despite calls for more regulation, law professor Mailyn Fidler says there is little chance of an international agreement because key players such as Russia and Israel are not interested. The sellers and buyers that trade in zero-days tend to be secretive, relying on non-disclosure agreements and classified information laws to keep the exploits secret. If the vulnerability becomes known, it can be patched and its value consequently crashes. Because the market lacks transparency, it can be hard for parties to find a fair price. Sellers might not be paid if the vulnerability was disclosed before it was verified, or if the buyer declined to purchase it but used it anyway. With the proliferation of middlemen, sellers could never know to what use the exploits could be put. Buyers could not guarantee that the exploit was not sold to another party. Both buyers and sellers advertise on the dark web. Research published in 2022 based on maximum prices paid as quoted by a single exploit broker found a 44 percent annualized inflation rate in exploit pricing. Remote zero-click exploits could fetch the highest price, while those that require local access to the device are much cheaper. Vulnerabilities in widely used software are also more expensive. They estimated that around 400 to 1,500 people sold exploits to th
Right to explanation
In the regulation of algorithms, particularly artificial intelligence and its subfield of machine learning, a right to [an] explanation is a right to be given an explanation for an output of the algorithm. Such rights primarily refer to individual rights to be given an explanation for decisions that significantly affect an individual, particularly legally or financially. For example, a person who applies for a loan and is denied may ask for an explanation, which could be "Credit bureau X reports that you declared bankruptcy last year; this is the main factor in considering you too likely to default, and thus we will not give you the loan you applied for." Some such legal rights already exist, while the scope of a general "right to explanation" is a matter of ongoing debate. There have been arguments made that a "social right to explanation" is a crucial foundation for an information society, particularly as the institutions of that society will need to use digital technologies, artificial intelligence, machine learning. In other words, that the related automated decision making systems that use explainability would be more trustworthy and transparent. Without this right, which could be constituted both legally and through professional standards, the public will be left without much recourse to challenge the decisions of automated systems. == Examples == === Credit scoring in the United States === Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B of the Code of Federal Regulations), Title 12, Chapter X, Part 1002, §1002.9, creditors are required to notify applicants who are denied credit with specific reasons for the detail. As detailed in §1002.9(b)(2): (2) Statement of specific reasons. The statement of reasons for adverse action required by paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section must be specific and indicate the principal reason(s) for the adverse action. Statements that the adverse action was based on the creditor's internal standards or policies or that the applicant, joint applicant, or similar party failed to achieve a qualifying score on the creditor's credit scoring system are insufficient. The official interpretation of this section details what types of statements are acceptable. Creditors comply with this regulation by providing a list of reasons (generally at most 4, per interpretation of regulations), consisting of a numeric reason code (as identifier) and an associated explanation, identifying the main factors affecting a credit score. An example might be: 32: Balances on bankcard or revolving accounts too high compared to credit limits === European Union === The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, enacted 2016, taking effect 2018) extends the automated decision-making rights in the 1995 Data Protection Directive to provide a legally disputed form of a right to an explanation, stated as such in Recital 71: "[the data subject should have] the right ... to obtain an explanation of the decision reached". In full: The data subject should have the right not to be subject to a decision, which may include a measure, evaluating personal aspects relating to him or her which is based solely on automated processing and which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her, such as automatic refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices without any human intervention. ... In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision. However, the extent to which the regulations themselves provide a "right to explanation" is heavily debated. There are two main strands of criticism. There are significant legal issues with the right as found in Article 22 — as recitals are not binding, and the right to an explanation is not mentioned in the binding articles of the text, having been removed during the legislative process. In addition, there are significant restrictions on the types of automated decisions that are covered — which must be both "solely" based on automated processing, and have legal or similarly significant effects — which significantly limits the range of automated systems and decisions to which the right would apply. In particular, the right is unlikely to apply in many of the cases of algorithmic controversy that have been picked up in the media. The UK has also recently amended its implementation of Article 22. A second potential source of such a right has been pointed to in Article 15, the "right of access by the data subject". This restates a similar provision from the 1995 Data Protection Directive, allowing the data subject access to "meaningful information about the logic involved" in the same significant, solely automated decision-making, found in Article 22. Yet this too suffers from alleged challenges that relate to the timing of when this right can be drawn upon, as well as practical challenges that mean it may not be binding in many cases of public concern. Other EU legislative instruments contain explanation rights. The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act provides in Article 86 a "[r]ight to explanation of individual decision-making" of certain high risk systems which produce significant, adverse effects to an individual's health, safety or fundamental rights. The right provides for "clear and meaningful explanations of the role of the AI system in the decision-making procedure and the main elements of the decision taken", although only applies to the extent other law does not provide such a right. The Digital Services Act in Article 27, and the Platform to Business Regulation in Article 5, both contain rights to have the main parameters of certain recommender systems to be made clear, although these provisions have been criticised as not matching the way that such systems work. The Platform Work Directive, which provides for regulation of automation in gig economy work as an extension of data protection law, further contains explanation provisions in Article 11, using the specific language of "explanation" in a binding article rather than a recital as is the case in the GDPR. Scholars note that remains uncertainty as to whether these provisions imply sufficiently tailored explanation in practice which will need to be resolved by courts. === France === In France the 2016 Loi pour une République numérique (Digital Republic Act or loi numérique) amends the country's administrative code to introduce a new provision for the explanation of decisions made by public sector bodies about individuals. It notes that where there is "a decision taken on the basis of an algorithmic treatment", the rules that define that treatment and its "principal characteristics" must be communicated to the citizen upon request, where there is not an exclusion (e.g. for national security or defence). These should include the following: the degree and the mode of contribution of the algorithmic processing to the decision- making; the data processed and its source; the treatment parameters, and where appropriate, their weighting, applied to the situation of the person concerned; the operations carried out by the treatment. Scholars have noted that this right, while limited to administrative decisions, goes beyond the GDPR right to explicitly apply to decision support rather than decisions "solely" based on automated processing, as well as provides a framework for explaining specific decisions. Indeed, the GDPR automated decision-making rights in the European Union, one of the places a "right to an explanation" has been sought within, find their origins in French law in the late 1970s. == Criticism == Some argue that a "right to explanation" is at best unnecessary, at worst harmful, and threatens to stifle innovation. Specific criticisms include: favoring human decisions over machine decisions, being redundant with existing laws, and focusing on process over outcome. Authors of study "Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For" Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale argue that a right to explanation is not the solution to harms caused to stakeholders by algorithmic decisions. They also state that the right of explanation in the GDPR is narrowly defined, and is not compatible with how modern machine learning technologies are being developed. With these limitations, defining transparency within the context of algorithmic accountability remains a problem. For example, providing the source code of algorithms may not be sufficient and may create other problems in terms of privacy disclosures and the gaming of technical systems. To mitigate this issue, Edwards and Veale argue that an auditing system could be more effective, to allow auditors to loo