Gooch shading is a non-photorealistic rendering technique for shading objects. It is also known as "cool to warm" shading, and is widely used in technical illustration. == History == Gooch shading was developed by Amy Gooch et al. at the University of Utah School of Computing and first presented at the 1998 SIGGRAPH conference. It has since been implemented in shader libraries, software, and games released by Autodesk, Nvidia, and Valve. == Process == Gooch shading defines an additional two colors in conjunction with the original model color: a warm color (such as yellow) and a cool color (such as blue). The warm color indicates surfaces that are facing toward the light source while the cool color indicates surfaces facing away. This allows shading to occur only in mid-tones so that edge lines and highlights remain visually prominent. The Gooch shader is typically implemented in two passes: all objects in the scene are first drawn with the "cool to warm" shading, and in the second pass the object's edges are rendered in black.
Learning curve (machine learning)
In machine learning (ML), a learning curve (or training curve) is a graphical representation that shows how a model's performance on a training set (and usually a validation set) changes with the number of training iterations (epochs) or the amount of training data. Typically, the number of training epochs or training set size is plotted on the x-axis, and the value of the loss function (and possibly some other metric such as the cross-validation score) on the y-axis. Synonyms include error curve, experience curve, improvement curve and generalization curve. More abstractly, learning curves plot the difference between learning effort and predictive performance, where "learning effort" usually means the number of training samples, and "predictive performance" means accuracy on testing samples. Learning curves have many useful purposes in ML, including: choosing model parameters during design, adjusting optimization to improve convergence, and diagnosing problems such as overfitting (or underfitting). Learning curves can also be tools for determining how much a model benefits from adding more training data, and whether the model suffers more from a variance error or a bias error. If both the validation score and the training score converge to a certain value, then the model will no longer significantly benefit from more training data. == Formal definition == When creating a function to approximate the distribution of some data, it is necessary to define a loss function L ( f θ ( X ) , Y ) {\displaystyle L(f_{\theta }(X),Y)} to measure how good the model output is (e.g., accuracy for classification tasks or mean squared error for regression). We then define an optimization process which finds model parameters θ {\displaystyle \theta } such that L ( f θ ( X ) , Y ) {\displaystyle L(f_{\theta }(X),Y)} is minimized, referred to as θ ∗ {\displaystyle \theta ^{}} . === Training curve for amount of data === If the training data is { x 1 , x 2 , … , x n } , { y 1 , y 2 , … y n } {\displaystyle \{x_{1},x_{2},\dots ,x_{n}\},\{y_{1},y_{2},\dots y_{n}\}} and the validation data is { x 1 ′ , x 2 ′ , … x m ′ } , { y 1 ′ , y 2 ′ , … y m ′ } {\displaystyle \{x_{1}',x_{2}',\dots x_{m}'\},\{y_{1}',y_{2}',\dots y_{m}'\}} , a learning curve is the plot of the two curves i ↦ L ( f θ ∗ ( X i , Y i ) ( X i ) , Y i ) {\displaystyle i\mapsto L(f_{\theta ^{}(X_{i},Y_{i})}(X_{i}),Y_{i})} i ↦ L ( f θ ∗ ( X i , Y i ) ( X i ′ ) , Y i ′ ) {\displaystyle i\mapsto L(f_{\theta ^{}(X_{i},Y_{i})}(X_{i}'),Y_{i}')} where X i = { x 1 , x 2 , … x i } {\displaystyle X_{i}=\{x_{1},x_{2},\dots x_{i}\}} === Training curve for number of iterations === Many optimization algorithms are iterative, repeating the same step (such as backpropagation) until the process converges to an optimal value. Gradient descent is one such algorithm. If θ i ∗ {\displaystyle \theta _{i}^{}} is the approximation of the optimal θ {\displaystyle \theta } after i {\displaystyle i} steps, a learning curve is the plot of i ↦ L ( f θ i ∗ ( X , Y ) ( X ) , Y ) {\displaystyle i\mapsto L(f_{\theta _{i}^{}(X,Y)}(X),Y)} i ↦ L ( f θ i ∗ ( X , Y ) ( X ′ ) , Y ′ ) {\displaystyle i\mapsto L(f_{\theta _{i}^{}(X,Y)}(X'),Y')}
Redshift (theory)
Redshift is a techno-economic theory suggesting hypersegmentation of information technology markets based on whether individual computing needs are over or under-served by Moore's law, which predicts the doubling of computing transistors (and therefore roughly computing power) every two years. The theory, proposed and named by New Enterprise Associates partner and former Sun Microsystems CTO Greg Papadopoulos, categorized a series of high growth markets (redshifting) while predicting slower GDP-driven growth in traditional computing markets (blueshifting). Papadopoulos predicted the result will be a fundamental redesign of components comprising computing systems. == Hypergrowth market segments (redshifting) == According to the Redshift theory, applications "redshift" when they grow dramatically faster than Moore's Law allows, growing quickly in their absolute number of systems. In these markets, customers are running out of datacenter real-estate, power and cooling infrastructure. According to Dell Senior Vice President Brad Anderson, “Businesses requiring hyperscale computing environments – where infrastructure deployments are measured by up to millions of servers, storage and networking equipment – are changing the way they approach IT.” While various Redshift proponents offer minor alterations on the original presentation, “Redshifting” generally includes: === ΣBW (Sum-of-Bandwidth) === These are companies that drive heavy Internet traffic. This includes popular web-portals like Google, Yahoo, AOL and MSN. It also includes telecoms, multimedia, television over IP, online games like World of Warcraft and others. This segment has been enabled by widespread availability of high-bandwidth Internet connections to consumers through a DSL or cable modem. A simple way to understand this market is that for every byte of content served to a PC, mobile phone or other device over a network, there must exist computing systems to send it over the network. === High performance computing (HPC) === These are companies that do complex simulations that involve (for example) weather, stock markets or drug-design simulations. This is a generally elastic market because businesses frequently spend every "available" dollar budgeted for IT. A common anecdote claims that cutting the cost of computing by half causes customers in this segment to buy at least twice as much, because each marginal IT dollar spent contributes to business advantage. === prise (or "Star-prise") === These are companies that aggregate traditional computing applications and offer them as services, typically in the form of Software as a Service (SaaS). For example, companies that deploy CRM are over-served by Moore's Law, but companies that aggregate CRM functions and offer them as a service, such as Salesforce.com, grow faster than Moore's Law. === The eBay crisis === A prime example of redshift was a crisis at eBay. In 1999 eBay suffered a database crisis when a single Oracle Database running on the fastest Sun machine available (these tracking Moore's law in this period) was not enough to cope with eBay's growth. The solution was to massively parallelise their system architecture. == Traditional computing markets (blueshifting) == Redshift theory suggests that traditional computing markets, such as those serving enterprise resource planning or customer relationship management applications, have reached relative saturation in industrialized nations. Thereafter, proponents argued further market growth will closely follow gross domestic product growth, which typically remains under 10% for most countries annually. Given that Moore's Law continues to predict accurately the rate of computing transistor growth, which roughly translates into computing power doubling every two years, the Redshift theory suggests that traditional computing markets will ultimately contract as a percentage of computing expenditures over time. Functionally, this means “Blueshifting” customers can satisfy computing requirement growth by swapping in faster processors without increasing the absolute number of computing systems. == Consequences and industry commentary == Papadopoulos argued that while traditional computing markets remain the dominant source of revenue through the late 2000s, a shift to hypergrowth markets will inevitably occur. When that shift occurs, he argued computing (but not computers) will become a utility, and differentiation in the IT market will be based upon a company's ability to deliver computing at massive scale, efficiently and with predictable service levels, much like electricity at that time. If computing is to be delivered as a utility, Nicholas Carr suggested Papadopoulos' vision compares with Microsoft researcher Jim Hamilton, who both agree that computing is most efficiently generated in shipping containers. Industry analysts are also beginning to quantify Redshifting and Blueshifting markets. According to International Data Corporation vice president Matthew Eastwood, "IDC believes that the IT market is in a period of hyper segmentation... This a class of customers that is Moore's law driven and as price performance gains continue, IDC believes that these organizations will accelerate their consumption of IT infrastructure.” == History and nomenclature == Key portions of Papadopoulos' theory were first presented by Sun Microsystems CEO Jonathan Schwartz in late 2006. Papadopoulos later gave a full presentation on Redshift to Sun's annual Analyst Summit in February 2007. The term Redshift refers to what happens when electromagnetic radiation, usually visible light, moves away from an observer. Papadopoulos chose this term to reflect growth markets because redshift helped cosmologists explain the expansion of the universe. Papadopoulos originally depicted traditional IT markets as green to represent their revenue base, but later changed them to “blueshift,” which occurs when a light source moves toward an observer, similar to what would happen during a contraction of the universe.
Deconfliction line
A deconfliction line is an official line of communications established between militaries who are or could be hostile, to avoid dangerous misunderstandings and miscalculations based on ignorance. The ultimate aim is to avoid accidents and conflict escalation. In the 2010s and 2020s, the US and Russia set up deconfliction lines during the Syrian civil war and Russo-Ukrainian War. They were regularly tested by military staff, and used by air traffic controllers and senior military officers. They were used to avoid midair collisions between aircraft in the same or adjacent airspace, and sometimes to give warning of airstrikes. In April 2017, Russia severed the Syrian line in retaliation for a called strike.
Fear of missing out
Fear of missing out (FOMO) is the feeling of apprehension that one is either not in the know about or missing out on information, events, experiences, or life decisions that could make one's life better. FOMO is also associated with a fear of regret, which may lead to concerns that one might miss an opportunity for social interaction, a novel experience, a memorable event, profitable investment, or the comfort of loved ones. It is characterized by a desire to stay continually connected with what others are doing, and can be described as the fear that deciding not to participate is the wrong choice. FOMO could result from not knowing about a conversation, missing a TV show, not attending a wedding or party, or hearing that others have discovered a new restaurant. In recent years, FOMO has been attributed to a number of negative psychological and behavioral symptoms. FOMO has increased in recent times due to advancements in technology. Social networking sites create many opportunities for FOMO. While it provides opportunities for social engagement, it offers a view into an endless stream of activities in which a person is not involved. Further, a common tendency is to post about positive experiences (such as a great restaurant) rather than negative ones (such as a bad first date). Psychological dependence on social media can lead to FOMO or even pathological Internet use. FOMO is also present in video games, investing, and business marketing. The increasing popularity of the phrase has led to related linguistic and cultural variants. FOMO is associated with worsening depression and anxiety, and a lowered quality of life. FOMO can also affect businesses. Hype and trends can lead business leaders to invest based on perceptions of what others are doing, rather than their own business strategy. This is also the idea of the bandwagon effect, where one individual may see another person or people do something and they begin to think it must be important because everyone is doing it. They might not even understand the meaning behind it, and they may not totally agree with it. Nevertheless, they are still going to participate because they don't want to be left out. == History == Patrick J. McGinnis coined the term FOMO and popularized it in a 2004 op-ed titled "Social Theory at HBS: McGinnis' Two FOs" in The Harbus, the magazine of Harvard Business School, where he was then a student. The article also referred to another related condition, Fear of a Better Option (FOBO), and the role of these two fears in the school's social life. Currently the term has been used as a hashtag on social media and has been mentioned in hundreds of news articles, from online sources like Salon.com to print papers like The New York Times. === Earlier forms === The phrase "fear of missing out" is a common English phrase, especially in the form "fear of missing out on (something)". The term "fear of missing out" (but not the term FOMO) was used earlier in the academic business literature by marketing strategist Dan Herman, who used it in presentations in the late 1990s, and included the phrase in a 2000 paper about "short-term brands", where a motivation for trying these brands is "ambition to exhaust all possibilities and the fear of missing out on something". Herman also believes the concept has evolved to become more wide spread through mobile phone usage, texting, and social media and has helped flesh out the concept of the fear of missing out to the masses. Before the Internet, a related phenomenon, "keeping up with the Joneses", was widely experienced. FOMO generalized and intensified this experience because so much more of people's lives became publicly documented and easily accessed. == Symptoms == === Psychological === Fear of missing out has been associated with a deficit in psychological needs. Self-determination theory contends that an individual's psychological satisfaction in their competence, autonomy, and relatedness consists of three basic psychological needs for human beings. Test subjects with lower levels of basic psychological satisfaction reported a higher level of FOMO. FOMO has also been linked to negative psychological effects in overall mood and general life satisfaction. A study performed on college campuses found that experiencing FOMO on a certain day led to a higher fatigue on that day specifically. Experiencing FOMO continuously throughout the semester also can lead to higher stress levels among students. An individual with an expectation to experience the fear of missing out can also develop a lower level of self-esteem. A study by JWTIntelligence suggests that FOMO can influence the formation of long-term goals and self-perceptions. In this study, around half of the respondents stated that they are overwhelmed by the amount of information needed to stay up-to-date, and that it is impossible to not miss out on something. The process of relative deprivation creates FOMO and dissatisfaction. It reduces psychological well-being. FOMO led to negative social and emotional experiences, such as boredom and loneliness. A 2013 study found that it negatively impacts mood and life satisfaction, reduces self-esteem, and affects mindfulness. Four in ten young people reported FOMO sometimes or often. FOMO was found to be negatively correlated with age, and men were more likely than women to report it. People who experience higher levels of FOMO tend to have a stronger desire for high social status, are more competitive with others of the same gender, and are more interested in short-term relationships. Studies have found that experiencing fear of missing out has been linked to anxiety or depression. === Behavioral === The fear of missing out stems from a feeling of missing social connections or information. This absent feeling is then followed by a need or drive to interact socially to boost connections. The fear of missing out not only leads to negative psychological effects but also has been shown to increase negative behavioral patterns. In aims of maintaining social connections, negative habits are formed or heightened. A 2019 University of Glasgow study surveyed 467 adolescents, and found that the respondents felt societal pressure to always be available. According to John M. Grohol, founder and Editor-in-Chief of Psych Central, FOMO may lead to a constant search for new connections with others, abandoning current connections to do so. The fear of missing out derived from digital connection has been positively correlated with bad technology habits especially in youth. These negative habits included increased screen time, checking social media during school, or texting while driving. Social media use in the presence of others can be referred to as phubbing, the habit of snubbing a physically present person in favour of a mobile phone. Multiple studies have also identified a negative correlation between the hours of sleep and the scale at which individuals experience fear of missing out. A lack of sleep in college students experiencing FOMO can be attributed to the number of social interactions that occur late at night on campuses. == Settings == === Social media === Fear of missing out has a positive correlation with higher levels of social media usage. Social media connects individuals and showcases the lives of others at their peak. This gives people the fear of missing out when they feel like others on social media are taking part in positive life experiences that they personally are not also experiencing. This fear of missing out related to social media has symptoms including anxiety, loneliness, and a feeling of inadequacy compared to others. Self-esteem plays a key role in the levels a person feels when experiencing the fear of missing out, as their self worth is influenced by people they observe on social media. There are two types of anxiety; one related to genetics that is permanent, and one that is temporary. The temporary state of anxiety is the one that is more relevant to the fear of missing out, and is directly related to the individual looking at social media sites for a short period of time. This anxiety is caused by a loss of feeling of belonging through the concept of social exclusion. FOMO-sufferers may increasingly seek access to others' social lives, and consume an escalating amount of real-time information. A survey in 2012 indicated that 83% of respondents said that there is information overload in regards that there is too much to watch and read. Constant information that is available to people through social media causes the fear of missing out as people feel worse about themselves for not staying up to date with relevant information. Social media shows just exactly what people are missing out on in real time including events like parties, opportunities, and other events leading for people to fear missing out on other related future events. Another survey indicates that almost 40% of people from ages 12 through 67 i
Symbolic artificial intelligence
In artificial intelligence, symbolic artificial intelligence (also known as classical artificial intelligence or logic-based artificial intelligence) is the term for the collection of all methods in artificial intelligence research that are based on high-level symbolic (human-readable) representations of problems, logic, and search. Symbolic AI used tools such as logic programming, production rules, semantic nets and frames, and it developed applications such as knowledge-based systems (in particular, expert systems), symbolic mathematics, automated theorem provers, ontologies, the semantic web, and automated planning and scheduling systems. The Symbolic AI paradigm led to important ideas in search, symbolic programming languages, agents, multi-agent systems, the semantic web, and the strengths and limitations of formal knowledge and reasoning systems. Symbolic AI was the dominant paradigm of AI research from the mid-1950s until the mid-1990s. Researchers in the 1960s and the 1970s were convinced that symbolic approaches would eventually succeed in creating a machine with artificial general intelligence and considered this the ultimate goal of their field. An early boom, with early successes such as the Logic Theorist and Samuel's Checkers Playing Program, led to unrealistic expectations and promises and was followed by the first AI Winter as funding dried up. A second boom (1969–1986) occurred with the rise of expert systems, their promise of capturing corporate expertise, and an enthusiastic corporate embrace. That boom, and some early successes, e.g., with XCON at DEC, was followed again by later disappointment. Problems with difficulties in knowledge acquisition, maintaining large knowledge bases, and brittleness in handling out-of-domain problems arose. Another, second, AI Winter (1988–2011) followed. Subsequently, AI researchers focused on addressing underlying problems in handling uncertainty and in knowledge acquisition. Uncertainty was addressed with formal methods such as hidden Markov models, Bayesian reasoning, and statistical relational learning. Symbolic machine learning addressed the knowledge acquisition problem with contributions including Version Space, Valiant's PAC learning, Quinlan's ID3 decision-tree learning, case-based learning, and inductive logic programming to learn relations. Neural networks, a subsymbolic approach, had been pursued from early days and reemerged strongly in 2012. Early examples are Rosenblatt's perceptron learning work, the backpropagation work of Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams, and work in convolutional neural networks by LeCun et al. in 1989. However, neural networks were not viewed as successful until about 2012: "Until Big Data became commonplace, the general consensus in the Al community was that the so-called neural-network approach was hopeless. Systems just didn't work that well, compared to other methods. ... A revolution came in 2012, when a number of people, including a team of researchers working with Hinton, worked out a way to use the power of GPUs to enormously increase the power of neural networks." Over the next several years, deep learning had spectacular success in handling vision, speech recognition, speech synthesis, image generation, and machine translation, though symbolic approaches continue to be useful in a few domains such as computer algebra systems and proof assistants. == History == A short history of symbolic AI to the present day follows below. Time periods and titles are drawn from Henry Kautz's 2020 AAAI Robert S. Engelmore Memorial Lecture and the longer Wikipedia article on the History of AI, with dates and titles differing slightly for increased clarity. === The first AI summer: irrational exuberance, 1948–1966 === Success at early attempts in AI occurred in three main areas: artificial neural networks, knowledge representation, and heuristic search, contributing to high expectations. This section summarizes Kautz's reprise of early AI history. ==== Approaches inspired by human or animal cognition or behavior ==== Cybernetic approaches attempted to replicate the feedback loops between animals and their environments. A robotic turtle, with sensors, motors for driving and steering, and seven vacuum tubes for control, based on a preprogrammed neural net, was built as early as 1948. This work can be seen as an early precursor to later work in neural networks, reinforcement learning, and situated robotics. An important early symbolic AI program was the Logic theorist, written by Allen Newell, Herbert Simon and Cliff Shaw in 1955–56, as it was able to prove 38 elementary theorems from Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica. Newell, Simon, and Shaw later generalized this work to create a domain-independent problem solver, GPS (General Problem Solver). GPS solved problems represented with formal operators via state-space search using means-ends analysis. During the 1960s, symbolic approaches achieved great success at simulating intelligent behavior in structured environments such as game-playing, symbolic mathematics, and theorem-proving. AI research was concentrated in four institutions in the 1960s: Carnegie Mellon University, Stanford, MIT and (later) University of Edinburgh. Each one developed its own style of research. Earlier approaches based on cybernetics or artificial neural networks were abandoned or pushed into the background. Herbert Simon and Allen Newell studied human problem-solving skills and attempted to formalize them, and their work laid the foundations of the field of artificial intelligence, as well as cognitive science, operations research and management science. Their research team used the results of psychological experiments to develop programs that simulated the techniques that people used to solve problems. This tradition, centered at Carnegie Mellon University would eventually culminate in the development of the Soar architecture in the middle 1980s. ==== Heuristic search ==== In addition to the highly specialized domain-specific kinds of knowledge that we will see later used in expert systems, early symbolic AI researchers discovered another more general application of knowledge. These were called heuristics, rules of thumb that guide a search in promising directions: "How can non-enumerative search be practical when the underlying problem is exponentially hard? The approach advocated by Simon and Newell is to employ heuristics: fast algorithms that may fail on some inputs or output suboptimal solutions." Another important advance was to find a way to apply these heuristics that guarantees a solution will be found, if there is one, not withstanding the occasional fallibility of heuristics: "The A algorithm provided a general frame for complete and optimal heuristically guided search. A is used as a subroutine within practically every AI algorithm today but is still no magic bullet; its guarantee of completeness is bought at the cost of worst-case exponential time. ==== Early work on knowledge representation and reasoning ==== Early work covered both applications of formal reasoning emphasizing first-order logic, along with attempts to handle common-sense reasoning in a less formal manner. ===== Modeling formal reasoning with logic: the "neats" ===== Unlike Simon and Newell, John McCarthy felt that machines did not need to simulate the exact mechanisms of human thought, but could instead try to find the essence of abstract reasoning and problem-solving with logic, regardless of whether people used the same algorithms. His laboratory at Stanford (SAIL) focused on using formal logic to solve a wide variety of problems, including knowledge representation, planning and learning. Logic was also the focus of the work at the University of Edinburgh and elsewhere in Europe which led to the development of the programming language Prolog and the science of logic programming. ===== Modeling implicit common-sense knowledge with frames and scripts: the "scruffies" ===== Researchers at MIT (such as Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert) found that solving difficult problems in vision and natural language processing required ad hoc solutions—they argued that no simple and general principle (like logic) would capture all the aspects of intelligent behavior. Roger Schank described their "anti-logic" approaches as "scruffy" (as opposed to the "neat" paradigms at CMU and Stanford). Commonsense knowledge bases (such as Doug Lenat's Cyc) are an example of "scruffy" AI, since they must be built by hand, one complicated concept at a time. === The first AI winter: crushed dreams, 1967–1977 === The first AI winter was a shock: During the first AI summer, many people thought that machine intelligence could be achieved in just a few years. The Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched programs to support AI research to use AI to solve problems of national security; in particular, to automate the translation of Russian to English for inte
Alt TikTok
Alt TikTok (or 2020 Alt) was an online youth subculture and internet community that emerged on TikTok in 2020. Alt TikTok users (also known as alt girls, alt boys, or alt kids) emerged as primarily LGBTQ+ individuals who were in contrast to "Straight TikTok" which was seen as the mainstream and heteronormative side of the platform. The subculture became closely associated with music surrounding the hyperpop scene, particularly 100 gecs and also led to a short-lived fashion style and Internet aesthetic adopted by Generation Z during the COVID-19 lockdowns. Notable artists associated with the movement included Girl in Red, Freddie Dredd, David Shawty, WHOKILLEDXIX, and 645AR. While "alt kid" might imply a general association with traditional alternative fashion, the subculture was more an offshoot of e-girls and e-boys. In 2023, the hashtag #altfashion on TikTok amassed over 1.8 billion views. == History == Around mid-2020, users on TikTok began to group different content on the site into labels like "elite TikTok", "deep TikTok", and "floptok". These categories acted as different "sides of TikTok", deviating from mainstream lip syncing, online trends, and dance videos. Alt TikTok became one of the many subcultural communities to emerge during this period, initially referred to interchangeably with "elite TikTok". The movement quickly identified itself with alternative and queer users, in contrast to "Straight TikTok", also known as the "straight side of TikTok", which was seen as the mainstream and heteronormative side of the platform. Alt TikTok was accompanied by memes with surrealist or supernatural themes (sometimes being described as cursed), such as videos with heavy saturation and humanoid animals. One of the popular videos from Alt TikTok, gaining 18 million likes, shows a llama dancing to a cover of a song from a Russian commercial by the cereal brand Miel Pops, later becoming a viral audio. Some Alt TikTok users personified brands and products in what was referred to as Retail TikTok. In 2020, Rolling Stone described Alt TikTok as "one of the primary countercultures on the app." In 2020, American journalist Taylor Lorenz stated in an article of The New York Times, "Every pop sensation needs its ironic counterpoints. Alt Tiktok gets it done. [...] alt TikTok stars like Mooptopia are mainstays on the more indie side of the app. They aren't the popular crowd, but their cool, quirky content still attracts millions." === Trump rally trolling === In June 2020, alt TikTok and K-pop twitter users coordinated a strategy to ruin a Trump rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma. American politician and activist Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez later saluted the individuals for their "Trump troll". == Alt subculture == In 2020, Alt TikTok was one of many subcultural communities to emerge on TikTok, alongside Deep TikTok (aka DeepTok) and Flop TikTok (aka Floptok). The alt kid subculture emerged from Alt TikTok primarily among young Gen Z women, influenced by online fashion and aesthetics shaped by e-girls and e-boys. The movement was accelerated by the COVID-19 lockdowns, while the subculture itself stood in opposition to mainstream "Straight TikTok" and the VSCO girl movement, primarily adopting aspects of queer and alternative culture. While the phrase might imply a general association with alternative fashion or alternative culture, it is more accurately understood as a specific internet-driven outgrowth of online aesthetic youth subcultures like e-girls and e-boys. The alt subculture's visual style blended influences from goth, punk, emo, and grunge, often expressed through fashion, music taste, and online presence. === Style and music === The style of alt-girls is reminiscent of a myriad of previous alternative fashion trends, often blending these influences with online aesthetics. In 2020, TikTok alt-girls were teens ranging from ages 13 to 16, who tended to wear friendship bracelets, goth boots, Dr. Martens, bunny and frog hats, piercings, and split-dyed hair, as well as iconography lifted from Monster Energy and Hello Kitty. Some alt-girls displayed a love of cosplay, while drawing from Japanese anime and manga, particularly Danganronpa and Haikyu!!, which originally gained traction on the app through Anime TikTok (aka Anitok). Alt TikTok has been noted for being primarily influenced by queer and alternative culture, positioning itself in contrast to "Straight TikTok", which focused on mainstream dances and music. Alt kids frequently intersected with the e-girls and e-boys subculture, in terms of music, style, visual media, and aesthetics. Several musicians and artists were closely associated with the alt subculture, particularly those in the hyperpop scene, while alt tiktok users became important in the wider popularization of artists like 100 gecs. Notable prominent artists associated with Alt Tiktok included Girl in Red, Freddie Dredd, David Shawty, WHOKILLEDXIX, and 645AR, alongside music by YouTubers turned musicians such as Wilbur Soot's "I'm in Love With an E‐Girl" and Corpse Husband's "E-Girls Are Ruining My Life!". == Legacy == In 2020, Pitchfork claimed Alt TikTok as having an influence on wider music trends, stating: "Alt TikTok's music is now a hot zone for major record labels, pushing it even further into the mainstream". After the COVID-19 lockdowns, Alt TikTok, alongside its subculture, fell out of prominence and was taken over by other Gen Z-related internet aesthetics, developments, and online trends.