A virtual data room (sometimes called a VDR or Deal Room) is an online repository of information that is used for the storing and distribution of documents. In many cases, a virtual data room is used to facilitate the due diligence process during an M&A transaction, loan syndication, or private equity and venture capital transactions. This due diligence process has traditionally used a physical data room to accomplish the disclosure of documents. For reasons of cost, efficiency and security, virtual data rooms have widely replaced the more traditional physical data room. A virtual data room is an extranet to which the bidders and their advisers are given access via the internet. An extranet is essentially a website with limited controlled access, using a secure log-on supplied by the vendor, which can be disabled at any time, by the vendor, if a bidder withdraws. Much of the information released is confidential and restrictions are applied to the viewer's ability to release this to third parties (by means of forwarding, copying or printing). This can be effectively applied to protect the data using digital rights management. The virtual data room provides access to secure documents for authorized users through a dedicated web site, or through secure agent applications. In the process of mergers and acquisitions the data room is set up as part of the central repository of data relating to companies or divisions being acquired or sold. The data room enables the interested parties to view information relating to the business in a controlled environment where confidentiality can be preserved. Conventionally this was achieved by establishing a supervised, physical data room in secure premises with controlled access. In most cases, with a physical data room, only one bidder team can access the room at a time. A virtual data room is designed to have the same advantages as a conventional data room (controlling access, viewing, copying and printing, etc.) with fewer disadvantages. Due to their increased efficiency, many businesses and industries have moved to using virtual data rooms instead of physical data rooms. In 2006, a spokesperson for a company which sets up virtual deal rooms was reported claiming that the process reduced the bidding process by about thirty days compared to physical data rooms. In the process of startup fundraising, a virtual data room is set up to be a central location for key data, documents, and financials. These are shared with venture capital and angel investors and allows them to streamline due diligence. == Application == Any business dealing with private data can apply VDRs when secure transaction processing is required. This includes financial institutions that need to negotiate confidential customer information without involving third parties. VDRs have traditionally been used for IPOs and real estate asset management. Technology companies may use them to exchange and review code or confidential data needed for operations. The same is true for clients, who entrust their valuable code only to the most qualified people in the organisation. The code is not something that can be printed out and brought in a folder. It resides on a computer and must be used together. VDR can find application in any business that manages data in the form of documents, especially law firms, financial advisers or the B2B sector. The latter work with documents that must always be handled and controlled confidentially, and it is difficult to store them securely when they are on a server that other people can access. In addition, in B2B, it is important to close the deal as quickly as possible: the average sales cycle is one to three months. VDR can be compared to a locked filing cabinet where all those folders and documents are kept. It automates the mathematics of pricing to prevent revenue leakage, and initially integrates CRM to ensure accurate synchronisation of all account data, which is important for B2B in particular and sales in general. While virtual data rooms offer many advantages, they are not suitable for every industry. For example, some governments may decide to continue using physical data rooms for highly confidential information sharing. The damage from potential cyberattacks and data breaches exceeds the benefits offered by virtual data rooms. In such cases, the use of VDRs is not considered. Data breaches have particularly affected the US healthcare system from March 2021 to March 2022 - according to IBM Security the cost of the breach was a record high of $10.1 million.
Textual case-based reasoning
Textual case-based reasoning (TCBR) is a subtopic of case-based reasoning, in short CBR, a popular area in artificial intelligence. CBR suggests the ways to use past experiences to solve future similar problems, requiring that past experiences be structured in a form similar to attribute-value pairs. This leads to the investigation of textual descriptions for knowledge exploration whose output will be, in turn, used to solve similar problems. == Subareas == Textual case-base reasoning research has focused on: measuring similarity between textual cases mapping texts into structured case representations adapting textual cases for reuse automatically generating representations.
Termcap
Termcap (terminal capability) is a legacy software library and database used on Unix-like computers that enables programs to use display computer terminals in a terminal-independent manner, which greatly simplifies the process of writing portable text mode applications. It was superseded by the terminfo database used by ncurses, tput, and other programs. A termcap database can describe the capabilities of hundreds of different display terminals. This allows programs to have character-based display output, independent of the type of terminal. On-screen text editors such as vi and Emacs are examples of programs that may use termcap. Other programs are listed in the Termcap category. Access to the termcap database was usually provided by separate libraries, e.g. GNU Termcap. Examples of what the database describes: how many columns wide the display is what string to send to move the cursor to an arbitrary position (including how to encode the row and column numbers) how to scroll the screen up one or several lines how much padding is needed for such a scrolling operation. == History == Bill Joy wrote the first termcap library in 1978 for the Berkeley Unix operating system; it has since been ported to most Unix and Unix-like environments, even OS-9. Joy's design was reportedly influenced by the design of the terminal data store in the earlier Incompatible Timesharing System. == Data model == Termcap databases consist of one or more descriptions of terminals. === Indices === Each description must contain the canonical name of the terminal. It may also contain one or more aliases for the name of the terminal. The canonical name or aliases are the keys by which the library searches the termcap database. === Data values === The description contains one or more capabilities, which have conventional names. The capabilities are typed: boolean, numeric and string. The termcap library has no predetermined type for each capability name. It determines the types of each capability by the syntax: string capabilities have an "=" between the capability name and its value, numeric capabilities have a "#" between the capability name and its value, and boolean capabilities have no associated value (they are always true if specified). Applications which use termcap do expect specific types for the commonly used capabilities, and obtain the values of capabilities from the termcap database using library calls that return successfully only when the database contents matches the assumed type. === Hierarchy === Termcap descriptions can be constructed by including the contents of one description in another, suppressing capabilities from the included description or overriding or adding capabilities. No matter what storage model is used, the termcap library constructs the terminal description from the requested description, including, suppressing or overriding at the time of the request. == Storage model == Termcap data is stored as text, making it simple to modify. The text can be retrieved by the termcap library from files or environment variables. === Environment variables === The TERM environment variable contains the terminal type name. The TERMCAP environment variable may contain a termcap database. It is most often used to store a single termcap description, set by a terminal emulator to provide the terminal's characteristics to the shell and dependent programs. The TERMPATH environment variable is supported by newer termcap implementations and defines a search path for termcap files. === Flat file === The original (and most common) implementation of the termcap library retrieves data from a flat text file. Searching a large termcap file, e.g., 500 kB, can be slow. To aid performance, a utility such as reorder is used to put the most frequently used entries near the beginning of the file. === Hashed database === 4.4BSD based implementations of termcap store the terminal description in a hashed database (e.g., something like Berkeley DB version 1.85). These store two types of records: aliases which point to the canonical entry, and the canonical entry itself. The text of the termcap entry is stored literally. == Limitations and extensions == The original termcap implementation was designed to use little memory: the first name is two characters, to fit in 16 bits capability names are two characters descriptions are limited to 1023 characters. only one termcap entry with its definitions can be included, and must be at the end. Newer implementations of the termcap interface generally do not require the two-character name at the beginning of the entry. Capability names are still two characters in all implementations. The tgetent function used to read the terminal description uses a buffer whose size must be large enough for the data, and is assumed to be 1024 characters. Newer implementations of the termcap interface may relax this constraint by allowing a null pointer in place of the fixed buffer, or by hiding the data which would not fit, e.g., via the ZZ capability in NetBSD termcap. The terminfo library interface also emulates the termcap interface, and does not actually use the fixed-size buffer. The terminfo library's emulation of termcap allows multiple other entries to be included without restricting the position. A few other newer implementations of the termcap library may also provide this ability, though it is not well documented. == Obsolete features == A special capability, the "hz" capability, was defined specifically to support the Hazeltine 1500 terminal, which had the unfortunate characteristic of using the ASCII tilde character ('~') as a control sequence introducer. In order to support that terminal, not only did code that used the database have to know about using the tilde to introduce certain control sequences, but it also had to know to substitute another printable character for any tildes in the displayed text, since a tilde in the text would be interpreted by the terminal as the start of a control sequence, resulting in missing text and screen garbling. Additionally, attribute markers (such as start and end of underlining) themselves took up space on the screen. Comments in the database source code often referred to this as "Hazeltine braindamage". Since the Hazeltine 1500 was a widely used terminal in the late 1970s, it was important for applications to be able to deal with its limitations.
Language-Theoretic Security
Language-theoretic security, or LangSec, is an approach to software security that focuses on input handling, complexity, and program design as strategies to improve the verifiability of computer programs. It was introduced in 2005 by Robert J. Hansen and Meredith L. Patterson at BlackHat and in 2011 by Len Sassaman and Patterson. It aims to create a formal description of which software is likely to have security vulnerabilities of particular classes, and why. It considers programs to have an inherent parser component, whether or not explicit, composed of that part of the program which operates on external input before that input is fully parsed. A central hypothesis of language-theoretic security is that vulnerabilities in software increase according to the computational power of the notional input-accepting automaton equivalent to this parser, using the definitions of automata theory. The lower bound on this computational power is the input language complexity of the program. The extent to which reducing this complexity is possible is a function of the specification of the communication protocol or file format the program takes as input. == Parsing as a security mechanism == The behaviour of a program is defined with reference to its expected input. Unexpected input being used by a program is a factor in numerous security bugs, including the so-called Android master key vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787), because accepting unexpected input renders the program's specification ambiguous. In that instance, the unexpected ambiguity came in the form of a ZIP file with duplicate filenames. If a program fully parses its input and only acts on input that unambiguously meets the specification, it follows that the program will avoid these types of vulnerabilities. This is an intentional inversion of the Postel principle. Accepting only unambiguous and valid input is a more formal requirement than input validation or sanitization, and narrows the number of possible but unanticipated program states that can be induced in an application via user input. Conversely, failure to do this is associated with security vulnerabilities. Input sanitization in particular is held to be an inadequate approach to avoiding malicious input because it inherently ignores context-sensitive properties of the input; it can therefore result in paradoxical effects, such as sanitization code activating otherwise inert cross-site scripting payloads in browsers. === Parser differentials === If the language of accepted program input is sufficiently simple, it is possible to verify that two implementations parse the same input language consistently. This is advantageous because it shows no parser differential exists between the two implementations. The requisite level of simplicity is theoretically that for which there is a solution to the equivalence problem. If the two parsers involved in CVE-2013-4787 were equivalent - that is, if they rendered the same output state given the same input state - the vulnerability could not have existed. One strategy for doing this is to publish machine-readable specifications of a format or protocol, and then use a parser generator to generate the parser code. An example of a parser generator built for this purpose is DaeDaLus. The combination of Lex with any of GNU Bison, ANTLR, or Yacc also accomplishes this. However, many parser generators allow the mixing of general purpose code with the parsing definitions, which weakens the guarantees provided by parsing. === Analysis of injection attacks === Injection attacks are generally the result of differences between the serializer (or "unparser") and the corresponding parser at a layer boundary in a system; therefore, they are a special case of parser differentials. In a SQL injection attack, for example, an attacker is able to cause the application with which they are interacting to serialize a SQL query that has different semantics than intended. In the simplest case where the payload ends a string and adds new code, the payload has crossed the code-data boundary in SQL. In language-theoretic security, this is treated as a bug in the serializer of the SQL query, which should instead be written in a way that constrains its possible outputs to those within the scope of the intended query. === Parser combinators === If a parser generator is not used, it is still possible to avoid implementation bugs by using parser combinator such as Nom to implement the parser code. This has the drawback of relying on a programmer correctly translating the specification into the language of the parser generator library, though this task is still less error-prone than hand-coding a parser. == Input format complexity == Complexity in computer programs is associated with security vulnerabilities. Within the domain of language-theoretic security, complexity is described with reference to the computational power of the abstract machine necessary to implement the program, or more particularly, to implement the parser for its input language. This complexity describes whether it is possible to show that there is no unintended or undesired functionality in the program which might be exploitable by an attacker. To be bounded in complexity, the program's input must be well-defined both in terms of form and of semantics. === Weird machines === A weird machine is a model of computation in a program that exists in parallel with, but is distinct from, the intended abstract model of computation in that program. Some classes of weird machine arise from the multi-layered nature of computer programs, or the context in which the programs run; others result from the unanticipated functionality a program has due to its complexity or to software bugs. The more complex the computation model of a program, the more likely it is to implement a weird machine. Depending on context, the weird machine may or may not be concretely useful for an attacker. Since the space of weird machines in the context of some program is the universe of all possible states that are not within the program's intended states, many exploited states including remote code execution and injection attacks belong to the domain of weird machines. A reduction in weird machines is therefore a likely correlate with reduced program vulnerability. === SafeDocs project === SafeDocs is a DARPA project undertaken in 2018 to take existing file formats, create safer subsets of them, and develop programming tools to work for the safer formats. The initial test case for this was PDF. The purpose of creating safer subsets in this case is to lower the minimum bound on parser complexity so that it becomes possible to create tools that will generate correct, normative parsers for them. == Relation to programming languages == The analytic framework of language-theoretic security assumes programs to be virtual machines that execute their input. A document that is read by an application is in this sense a form of machine code, in a generalization of the data as code idea, following the automata theory description of parsers. === Type-safe programming languages === Parsing input and serializing output are operations that consume one data type and emit another. A programming language can therefore check that data is correctly parsed and contains the expected structure by checking data types, and correct serializing (or unparsing) can be implemented as operations on the data types that are relevant to the program's output. This approach can be used to show that the recognizer and unparser patterns have been implemented. It is also possible to implement type checking across a distributed system to enforce parsing and unparsing of the expected structures and to verify that the assumptions made in designing the compositional properties of a distributed system have been followed. === Memory-safe programming languages === In the general case, spatial memory correctness is undecidable. If any proof of spatial memory correctness is to be made, it is therefore necessary to bound the complexity of the code. Interpreted languages such as Java and Python effectively accomplish this via runtime bounds checking, and frameworks for runtime bounds checking also exist for C. The effect of these strategies for spatial memory correctness are to create a halt state in place of a spatial memory correctness violation; therefore, it can be shown that the program will not violate spatial memory correctness, but in exchange, it cannot be shown in the general case that programs will not have runtime bounds checking exceptions. Some programming languages, such as Rust, accomplish this using borrow checking. The borrow checker acts to assure spatial memory correctness by compile-time reference counting. Code for which spatial memory correctness cannot be shown to not be violated therefore does not compile, inherently limiting the complexity of the spatial memory correctness of the program to what is decidable. Thi
Hierarchical RBF
In computer graphics, hierarchical RBF is an interpolation method based on radial basis functions (RBFs). Hierarchical RBF interpolation has applications in treatment of results from a 3D scanner, terrain reconstruction, and the construction of shape models in 3D computer graphics (such as the Stanford bunny, a popular 3D model). This problem is informally named as "large scattered data point set interpolation." == Method == The steps of the interpolation method (in three dimensions) are as follows: Let the scattered points be presented as set P = { c i = ( x i , y i , z i ) | i = 1 N ⊂ R 3 } {\displaystyle \mathbf {P} =\{\mathbf {c} _{i}=(\mathbf {x} _{i},\mathbf {y} _{i},\mathbf {z} _{i})\vert _{i=1}^{N}\subset \mathbb {R} ^{3}\}} Let there exist a set of values of some function in scattered points H = { h i | i = 1 N ⊂ R } {\displaystyle \mathbf {H} =\{\mathbf {h} _{i}\vert _{i=1}^{N}\subset \mathbb {R} \}} Find a function f ( x ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {f} (\mathbf {x} )} that will meet the condition f ( x ) = 1 {\displaystyle \mathbf {f} (\mathbf {x} )=1} for points lying on the shape and f ( x ) ≠ 1 {\displaystyle \mathbf {f} (\mathbf {x} )\neq 1} for points not lying on the shape As J. C. Carr et al. showed, this function takes the form f ( x ) = ∑ i = 1 N λ i φ ( x , c i ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {f} (\mathbf {x} )=\sum _{i=1}^{N}\lambda _{i}\varphi (\mathbf {x} ,\mathbf {c} _{i})} where φ {\displaystyle \varphi } is a radial basis function and λ {\displaystyle \lambda } are the coefficients that are the solution of the following linear system of equations: [ φ ( c 1 , c 1 ) φ ( c 1 , c 2 ) . . . φ ( c 1 , c N ) φ ( c 2 , c 1 ) φ ( c 2 , c 2 ) . . . φ ( c 2 , c N ) . . . . . . . . . . . . φ ( c N , c 1 ) φ ( c N , c 2 ) . . . φ ( c N , c N ) ] ∗ [ λ 1 λ 2 . . . λ N ] = [ h 1 h 2 . . . h N ] {\displaystyle {\begin{bmatrix}\varphi (c_{1},c_{1})&\varphi (c_{1},c_{2})&...&\varphi (c_{1},c_{N})\\\varphi (c_{2},c_{1})&\varphi (c_{2},c_{2})&...&\varphi (c_{2},c_{N})\\...&...&...&...\\\varphi (c_{N},c_{1})&\varphi (c_{N},c_{2})&...&\varphi (c_{N},c_{N})\end{bmatrix}}{\begin{bmatrix}\lambda _{1}\\\lambda _{2}\\...\\\lambda _{N}\end{bmatrix}}={\begin{bmatrix}h_{1}\\h_{2}\\...\\h_{N}\end{bmatrix}}} For determination of surface, it is necessary to estimate the value of function f ( x ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {f} (\mathbf {x} )} in specific points x. A lack of such method is a considerable complication on the order of O ( n 2 ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {n} ^{2})} to calculate RBF, solve system, and determine surface. == Other methods == Reduce interpolation centers ( O ( n 2 ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {n} ^{2})} to calculate RBF and solve system, O ( m n ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {m} \mathbf {n} )} to determine surface) Compactly support RBF ( O ( n log n ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {n} \log {\mathbf {n} })} to calculate RBF, O ( n 1.2..1.5 ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {n} ^{1.2..1.5})} to solve system, O ( m log n ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {m} \log {\mathbf {n} })} to determine surface) FMM ( O ( n 2 ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {n} ^{2})} to calculate RBF, O ( n log n ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {n} \log {\mathbf {n} })} to solve system, O ( m + n log n ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {O} (\mathbf {m} +\mathbf {n} \log {\mathbf {n} })} to determine surface) == Hierarchical algorithm == A hierarchical algorithm allows for an acceleration of calculations due to decomposition of intricate problems on the great number of simple (see picture). In this case, hierarchical division of space contains points on elementary parts, and the system of small dimension solves for each. The calculation of surface in this case is taken to the hierarchical (on the basis of tree-structure) calculation of interpolant. A method for a 2D case is offered by Pouderoux J. et al. For a 3D case, a method is used in the tasks of 3D graphics by W. Qiang et al. and modified by Babkov V.
Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales
Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales, or ADAMS was a $35 million DARPA project designed to identify patterns and anomalies in very large data sets. It is under DARPA's Information Innovation office and began in 2011 and ended in August 2014 The project was intended to detect and prevent insider threats such as "a soldier in good mental health becoming homicidal or suicidal", an "innocent insider becoming malicious", or "a government employee [who] abuses access privileges to share classified information". Specific cases mentioned are Nadal Malik Hasan and WikiLeaks source Chelsea Manning. Commercial applications may include finance. The intended recipients of the system output are operators in the counterintelligence agencies. A final report was published on May 11, 2015, detailing a system known as Anomaly Detection Engine for Networks, or ADEN, developed by the University of Maryland, College Park, whose goal was to "identify malicious users within a network." Using multiple datasets from Wikipedia, Slashdot, and others, researchers were able to identify vandals and malicious users on a website using both conventional algorithms and artificial intelligence. The Proactive Discovery of Insider Threats Using Graph Analysis and Learning was part of the ADAMS project. The Georgia Tech team includes noted high-performance computing researcher David Bader (computer scientist).
MetaMask
MetaMask is a software cryptocurrency wallet developed by ConsenSys for interacting with the Ethereum blockchain and other EVM-compatible networks. It enables users to manage Ethereum accounts and connect to decentralized applications (dApps) via a browser extension or mobile app. As of early 2026, MetaMask reports over 100 million users worldwide. == Overview == MetaMask allows users to store and manage private keys, send and receive Ethereum-based cryptocurrencies and tokens (including ERC-20 and ERC-721 standards), broadcast transactions, and interact with dApps. dApps connect to the wallet via JavaScript interfaces, prompting users to approve signatures or transactions. The wallet features MetaMask Swaps, an in-app token swap aggregator sourcing liquidity from multiple decentralized exchanges (DEXs), with a service fee of 0.875%. In 2025, MetaMask introduced the MetaMask Rewards program (initially mobile-only), where users earn points for activities such as swaps, bridging, and referrals. Season 1 (October 2025 – January 2026) distributed over $30 million in Linea tokens and other perks to participants. == History == MetaMask launched in 2016 as open-source software under the MIT license. It initially supported browser extensions for Chrome and Firefox. Mobile versions were in closed beta from 2019 and publicly released for iOS and Android in September 2020. In August 2020, the license changed to a custom proprietary one. MetaMask Swaps launched on desktop in October 2020 and on mobile in March 2021. The Rewards program launched in late 2025 with Linea integration. == Criticism == MetaMask has faced criticism over privacy, including default analytics settings that share some user data (which can be disabled). Its reliance on Infura (acquired by ConsenSys in 2019) has raised concerns about centralization in Ethereum infrastructure. The wallet regularly issues warnings about phishing scams and fake airdrops impersonating MetaMask.