The word data is most often used as a singular collective mass noun in educated everyday usage. However, due to the history and etymology of the word, considerable controversy has existed on whether it should be considered a mass noun used with verbs conjugated in the singular, or should be treated as the plural of the now-rarely-used datum. == Usage in English == In one sense, data is the plural form of datum. Datum actually can also be a count noun with the plural datums (see usage in datum article) that can be used with cardinal numbers (e.g., "80 datums"); data (originally a Latin plural) is not used like a normal count noun with cardinal numbers and can be plural with plural determiners such as these and many, or it can be used as a mass noun with a verb in the singular form. Even when a very small quantity of data is referenced (one number, for example), the phrase piece of data is often used, as opposed to datum. The debate over appropriate usage continues, but "data" as a singular form is far more common. In English, the word datum is still used in the general sense of "an item given". In cartography, geography, nuclear magnetic resonance and technical drawing, it is often used to refer to a single specific reference datum from which distances to all other data are measured. Any measurement or result is a datum, though data point is now far more common. Data is indeed most often used as a singular mass noun in educated everyday usage. Some major newspapers, such as The New York Times, use it either in the singular or plural. In The New York Times, the phrases "the survey data are still being analyzed" and "the first year for which data is available" have appeared within one day. The Wall Street Journal explicitly allows this usage in its style guide. The Associated Press style guide classifies data as a collective noun that takes the singular when treated as a unit but the plural when referring to individual items (e.g., "The data is sound" and "The data have been carefully collected"). In scientific writing, data is often treated as a plural, as in These data do not support the conclusions, but the word is also used as a singular mass entity like information (e.g., in computing and related disciplines). British usage now widely accepts treating data as singular in standard English, including everyday newspaper usage at least in non-scientific use. UK scientific publishing still prefers treating it as a plural. Some UK university style guides recommend using data for both singular and plural use, and others recommend treating it only as a singular in connection with computers. The IEEE Computer Society allows usage of data as either a mass noun or plural based on author preference, while IEEE in the editorial style manual indicates to always use the plural form. Some professional organizations and style guides require that authors treat data as a plural noun. For example, the Air Force Flight Test Center once stated that the word data is always plural, never singular.
Automotive security
Automotive security refers to the branch of computer security focused on the cyber risks related to the automotive context. The increasingly high number of ECUs in vehicles and, alongside, the implementation of multiple different means of communication from and towards the vehicle in a remote and wireless manner led to the necessity of a branch of cybersecurity dedicated to the threats associated with vehicles. Not to be confused with automotive safety. == Causes == The implementation of multiple ECUs (Electronic Control Units) inside vehicles began in the early '70s thanks to the development of integrated circuits and microprocessors that made it economically feasible to produce the ECUs on a large scale. Since then the number of ECUs has increased to up to 100 per vehicle. These units nowadays control almost everything in the vehicle, from simple tasks such as activating the wipers to more safety-related ones like brake-by-wire or ABS (Anti-lock Braking System). Autonomous driving is also strongly reliant on the implementation of new, complex ECUs such as the ADAS, alongside sensors (lidars and radars) and their control units. Inside the vehicle, the ECUs are connected with each other through cabled or wireless communication networks, such as CAN bus (controller area network), MOST bus (Media Oriented System Transport), FlexRay (Automotive Network Communications Protocol) or RF (radio frequency) as in many implementations of TPMSs (tire-pressure monitoring systems). Many of these ECUs require data received through these networks that arrive from various sensors to operate and use such data to modify the behavior of the vehicle (e.g., the cruise control modifies the vehicle's speed depending on signals arriving from a button usually located on the steering wheel). Since the development of cheap wireless communication technologies such as Bluetooth, LTE, Wi-Fi, RFID and similar, automotive producers and OEMs have designed ECUs that implement such technologies with the goal of improving the experience of the driver and passengers. Safety-related systems such as the OnStar from General Motors, telematic units, communication between smartphones and the vehicle's speakers through Bluetooth, Android Auto and Apple CarPlay. == Threat model == Threat models of the automotive world are based on both real-world and theoretically possible attacks. Most real-world attacks aim at the safety of the people in and around the car, by modifying the cyber-physical capabilities of the vehicle (e.g., steering, braking, accelerating without requiring actions from the driver), while theoretical attacks have been supposed to focus also on privacy-related goals, such as obtaining GPS data on the vehicle, or capturing microphone signals and similar. Regarding the attack surfaces of the vehicle, they are usually divided in long-range, short-range, and local attack surfaces: LTE and DSRC can be considered long-range ones, while Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are usually considered short-range although still wireless. Finally, USB, OBD-II and all the attack surfaces that require physical access to the car are defined as local. An attacker that is able to implement the attack through a long-range surface is considered stronger and more dangerous than the one that requires physical access to the vehicle. In 2015 the possibility of attacks on vehicles already on the market has been proven possible by Miller and Valasek, that managed to disrupt the driving of a Jeep Cherokee while remotely connecting to it through remote wireless communication. === Controller area network attacks === The most common network used in vehicles and the one that is mainly used for safety-related communication is CAN, due to its real-time properties, simplicity, and cheapness. For this reason the majority of real-world attacks have been implemented against ECUs connected through this type of network. The majority of attacks demonstrated either against actual vehicles or in testbeds fall in one or more of the following categories: ==== Sniffing ==== Sniffing in the computer security field generally refers to the possibility of intercepting and logging packets or more generally data from a network. In the case of CAN, since it is a bus network, every node listens to all communication on the network. It is useful for the attacker to read data to learn the behavior of the other nodes of the network before implementing the actual attack. Usually, the final goal of the attacker is not to simply sniff the data on CAN, since the packets passing on this type of network are not usually valuable just to read. ==== Denial of service ==== Denial of service (DoS) in information security is usually described as an attack that has the objective of making a machine or a network unavailable. DoS attacks against ECUs connected to CAN buses can be done both against the network, by abusing the arbitration protocol used by CAN to always win the arbitration, and targeting the single ECU, by abusing the error handling protocol of CAN. In this second case the attacker flags the messages of the victim as faulty to convince the victim of being broken and therefore shut itself off the network. ==== Spoofing ==== Spoofing attacks comprise all cases in which an attacker, by falsifying data, sends messages pretending to be another node of the network. In automotive security usually spoofing attacks are divided into masquerade and replay attacks. Replay attacks are defined as all those where the attacker pretends to be the victim and sends sniffed data that the victim sent in a previous iteration of authentication. Masquerade attacks are, on the contrary, spoofing attacks where the data payload has been created by the attacker. == Real life automotive threat example == Security researchers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek have successfully demonstrated remote access to a wide variety of vehicle controls using a Jeep Cherokee as the target. They were able to control the radio, environmental controls, windshield wipers, and certain engine and brake functions. The method used to hack the system was implementation of pre-programmed chip into the controller area network (CAN) bus. By inserting this chip into the CAN bus, he was able to send arbitrary message to CAN bus. One other thing that Miller has pointed out is the danger of the CAN bus, as it broadcasts the signal which the message can be caught by the hackers throughout the network. The control of the vehicle was all done remotely, manipulating the system without any physical interaction. Miller states that he could control any of some 1.4 million vehicles in the United States regardless of the location or distance, the only thing needed is for someone to turn on the vehicle to gain access. The work by Miller and Valasek replicated earlier work completed and published by academics in 2010 and 2011 on a different vehicle. The earlier work demonstrated the ability to compromise a vehicle remotely, over multiple wireless channels (including cellular), and the ability to remotely control critical components on the vehicle post-compromise, including the telematics unit and the car's brakes. While the earlier academic work was publicly visible, both in peer-reviewed scholarly publications and in the press, the Miller and Valesek work received even greater public visibility. == Security measures == The increasing complexity of devices and networks in the automotive context requires the application of security measures to limit the capabilities of a potential attacker. Since the early 2000 many different countermeasures have been proposed and, in some cases, applied. Following, a list of the most common security measures: Sub-networks: to limit the attacker capabilities even if he/she manages to access the vehicle from remote through a remotely connected ECU, the networks of the vehicle are divided in multiple sub-networks, and the most critical ECUs are not placed in the same sub-networks of the ECUs that can be accessed from remote. Gateways: the sub-networks are divided by secure gateways or firewalls that block messages from crossing from a sub-network to the other if they were not intended to. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): on each critical sub-network, one of the nodes (ECUs) connected to it has the goal of reading all data passing on the sub-network and detect messages that, given some rules, are considered malicious (made by an attacker). The arbitrary messages can be caught by the passenger by using IDS which will notify the owner regarding with unexpected message. Authentication protocols: in order to implement authentication on networks where it is not already implemented (such as CAN), it is possible to design an authentication protocol that works on the higher layers of the ISO OSI model, by using part of the data payload of a message to authenticate the message itself. Hardware Security Modules: since many ECUs are not powerful enough to keep real-time delays whi
Line splice
In electrical engineering and telecommunications, a line splice is a joint directly connecting lengths of electrical cables (electrical splice) or optical fibers (optical splice). The splices are often protected by sleeves. == Splicing of copper wires == The splicing of copper wires happens in the following steps: The cores are laid one above the other at the junction. The core insulation is removed. The wires are wrapped two to three times around each other (twisting). The bare veins on a length of about 3 cm "strangle" or "twist". In some cases, the strangulation is soldered. To isolate the splice, an insulating sleeve made of paper or plastic is pushed over it. The splicing of copper wires is mainly used on paper insulated wires. LSA techniques (LSA: soldering, screwing and stripping free) are used to connect copper wires, making the copper wires faster and easier to connect. LSA techniques include: Wire connection sleeves (AVH = Adernverbindungshülsen) and other crimp connectors. The two wires to be connected are inserted into the AVH without being stripped, which is then compressed with special pliers. The about 2 cm long AVH consist of contact, pressure and insulation. For wire connection strips (AVL = Adernverbindungsleisten) several pairs of wires (10 = AVL10 or 20 = AVL20) are inserted, the strip is then closed with a lid and pressed together with a hydraulic press, which ensures the connection. == Splicing of glass fibers == Fiber-optic cables are spliced using a special arc-splicer, with installation cables connected at their ends to respective "pigtails" - short individual fibers with fiber-optic connectors at one end. The splicer precisely adjusts the light-guiding cores of the two ends of the glass fibers to be spliced. The adjustment is done fully automatically in modern devices, whereas in older models this is carried out manually by means of micrometer screws and microscope. An experienced splicer can precisely position the fiber ends within a few seconds. Subsequently, the fibers are fused together (welded) with an electric arc. Since no additional material is added, such as gas welding or soldering, this is called a "fusion splice". Depending on the quality of the splicing process, attenuation values at the splice points are achieved by 0.3 dB, with good splices also below 0.02 dB. For newer generation devices, alignment is done automatically by motors. Here one differentiates core and jacket centering. At core centering (usually single-mode fibers), the fiber cores are aligned. A possible core offset with respect to the jacket is corrected. In the jacket centering (usually in multimode fibers), the fibers are adjusted to each other by means of electronic image processing in front of the splice. When working with good equipment, the damping value is according to experience at max. 0.1 dB. Measurements are made by means of special measuring devices including optical time-domain reflectometry (OTDR). A good splice should have an attenuation of less than 0.3 dB over the entire distance. Finished fiber optic splices are housed in splice boxes. One differentiates: Fusion splice Adhesive splicing Crimp splice or NENP (no-epoxy no-polish), mechanical splice
Texas House Bill 20
An Act Relating to censorship of or certain other interference with digital expression, including expression on social media platforms or through electronic mail messages, also known as Texas House Bill 20 (HB20), is a Texas anti-deplatforming law enacted on September 9, 2021. It prohibits large social media platforms from removing, moderating, or labeling posts made by users in the state of Texas based on their "viewpoints", unless considered illegal under federal law or otherwise falling into exempted categories. It also requires them to make various public disclosures relating to their business practices (including the impact of algorithmic and moderation decisions on the content that is delivered to users). The bill is part of a wider array of Republican-backed legislation seeking to prohibit the censorship of political speech, based on allegations that the moderation policies of large social media platforms are not politically neutral. It has been challenged in NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, and is currently the subject of a circuit split between the Fifth Circuit, and a decision by the Eleventh Circuit that struck down a similar bill in the state of Florida. In September 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear NetChoice v. Paxton jointly with NetChoice v. Moody on questions of whether the Florida and Texas state laws are in compliance with the 1st Amendment. == Content == The law applies to "social media platforms" that serve users in the state of Texas, and have more than 50 million monthly active users in the United States. They are defined as any public internet website or application that allows users to "communicate with other users for the primary purpose of posting information, comments, messages, or images", excluding internet service providers, electronic mail, and services where communication features are "incidental to, directly related to, or dependent on" content that is pre-selected by the operator. In the bill, to "censor" is defined as to "block, ban, remove, deplatform, demonetize, de-boost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to, or otherwise discriminate against" expression. The law prohibits social media platforms from "censoring on the basis of user viewpoint, user expression, or the ability of a user to receive the expression of others", or on the basis of a user's geographic location in Texas. This includes removal or labeling posts with warnings and disclaimers. Social media platforms may only censor content if it is unlawful, they are "specifically authorized" to do so by federal law, based on requests from "an organization with the purpose of preventing the sexual exploitation of children or protecting survivors of sexual abuse from ongoing harassment", or "directly incites" criminal activity or contains threats of violence against persons based on protected categories. It is disputed over whether this provision is actually enforceable, as it may be preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (which states that the operators of interactive computer services are not responsible for the actions of their users). Social media platforms must make public disclosures regarding the algorithmic techniques and moderation polices that are used to determine the content provided to users, must publish a compliant acceptable use policy (AUP), and must publish a biannual transparency report containing specific details on all actions made by the service regarding the moderation of users and content. The law also prohibits email providers from "intentionally imped[ing] the transmission of another person's electronic mail message based on the content." == Legislative history == Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed the bill into law on September 9, 2021. Democrat-proposed amendments excluding Holocaust denial, terrorism content, and vaccine misinformation from the bill were rejected. Following a suit by the industry groups Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA) and NetChoice, NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, the bill was blocked by U.S. District Judge Robert Pitman in December 2021, on First Amendment grounds. Texas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Judges Edith Jones, Andrew Oldham, and Leslie H. Southwick, lifted the injunction on May 11, 2022, but the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court which suspended the bill pending a full review in the Fifth Circuit. On September 16, 2022, the Fifth Circuit reversed the injunction, allowing the bill to take effect; Judge Oldham stated that the bill "chills censorship" and "does not chill speech", and accused the plaintiffs of "attempt[ing] to extract a freewheeling censorship right from the Constitution's free speech guarantee. The Platforms are not newspapers. Their censorship is not speech." Southwick dissented, stating that "we are in a new arena, a very extensive one, for speakers and for those who would moderate their speech. None of the precedents fit seamlessly." The CCIA and NetChoice requested a stay on the ruling and that the case be taken to the Supreme Court, arguing that the reversal conflicts with an Eleventh Circuit decision in NetChoice v. Moody which struck down a similar anti-moderation bill imposed by the state of Florida. On October 12, 2022, the Fifth Circuit granted the stay.
The Holocaust and social media
The representation of the Holocaust on social media has been a subject of scholarly inquiry and media attention. == Selfies at Holocaust memorial sites == Some visitors take selfies at Holocaust memorials, which has been the subject of controversy. In 2018, Rhian Sugden, a British model, received criticism after posting a selfie at the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin with the caption "ET phone home". She later removed the caption, but defended taking the photograph. Other celebrities have also been criticised for photographs at the Berlin memorial, including Indian actress Priyanka Chopra and US politician Pete Buttigieg, whose husband posted a photograph of him at the memorial on a personal social media account. The Israeli artist and satirist Shahak Shapira set up the website yolocaust.de in 2017 to expose people who take inappropriate selfies at the Holocaust memorial in Berlin. Shapira went through thousands of selfies posted to social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Tinder, and Grindr, choosing the twelve that he found most offensive. When the images were moused over, the website replaces the memorial backdrop with black and white images of Nazi victims. "Yolocaust" is a portmanteau of "Holocaust" and YOLO, an acronym for "you only live once". The website went viral, receiving 1.2 million views in the first 24 hours after its launch. Shapira honored requests to take down all of the photographs, which he had used without permission, and the website remains with only a textual documentation of the project. In an analysis of comments by Internet users on the project, Christoph Bareither estimated that 75% were positive. However, the memorial's architect, Peter Eisenman, criticized the website. In his 2018 book Postcards from Auschwitz, Grinnell professor Daniel P. Reynolds defends the practice of selfie-taking at Holocaust sites. In 2019, the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum requested that visitors not take inappropriate selfies, although the museum's staff acknowledged that other visitors take selfies in a thoughtful and respectful manner, which they did not criticize. In an academic paper, Gemma Commane and Rebekah Potton analyze the use of Instagram to share tourist photographs at Holocaust sites and conclude that "Instagram encourages conversation and empathy, keeping the Holocaust visible in youth discourses". According to their analysis, most images are tagged with respectful hashtags such as #tragic, #remembrance, and #sadness. The Auschwitz museum has an official Instagram account, auschwitzmemorial, which it uses to share selected appropriate Instagram posts. However, the image feed for the hashtag "Auschwitz" includes potentially offensive images such as an image of "Nazi Vs. Jews #beerpong". This image, according to the authors, expresses "mockery and contempt" for Holocaust victims. They also document offensive memes using images of Holocaust atrocities and shared on Instagram. Some social media users post in order to criticize what they see as inappropriate behavior at Holocaust sites, with one commenting, "Taking photos posing next to razor wire, selfies with victim's hair in the background, and even group shots in front of the crematoria had to be seen to be believed." == Assessment of tourism == Social media posts have been used by researchers to analyze the phenomenon of Holocaust-related tourism. == Social media groups == People have created groups on Facebook to discuss issues related to the Holocaust. One paper analyses two such groups, "The Holocaust and My Family" and "The Descendants of the Victims and Survivors of the Holocaust" in which people engage in collective trauma processing. == Eva.stories == In 2019, Israeli high-tech entrepreneur Mati Kochavi created a fictitious Instagram account for Eva Heyman, a Hungarian-Jewish girl who was murdered in Auschwitz concentration camp. The project met with mixed reception. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu praised the project, saying that it "exposes the immense tragedy of our people through the story of one girl". == Holocaust denial == The issue of Holocaust denial on social media has also attracted attention. In October 2020, Facebook reversed its policy and banned Holocaust denial from the platform. Founder Mark Zuckerberg had previously argued that such content should not be banned on freedom of speech grounds.
VideoPoet
VideoPoet is a large language model developed by Google Research in 2023 for video making. It can be asked to animate still images. The model accepts text, images, and videos as inputs, with a program to add feature for any input to any format generated content. VideoPoet was publicly announced on December 19, 2023. It uses an autoregressive language model.
Computer aided transceiver
Computer aided transceiver (CAT) is a non-generic serial protocol used by radio amateurs for (remotely) controlling a transceiver radio receiver equipment using a computer. Conventional transmitters are manually controlled and used to transmit voice using buttons, dials, etc. However, advances in electronics have come to market devices that can be controlled by a computer and allow digital modes such as packet radio and also the use of satellite tracking, because it can continuously change the device's frequency according to the Doppler effect. This is done by connecting a Radio receiver and a PC using a CAT interface and a CAT Program Additionally, CAT interfaces can also be used to position tracking antennas, in controllers. As a satellite moves overhead. A CAT interface is a piece of hardware that connects the PC and radio that provides a connection to allows the radio and the PC to communicate with each other. The CAT interface provides the signals to and fro via correct voltage levels and in the case of a Universal Serial Bus (USB) CAT interface it requires a "protocol" for communication but communication itself is down to the radio and the software on the PC. Software that may be called a CAT program allows a radio to be controlled through the PC. Changes made on the radio through user interactions on the CAT Program are (generally) shown on the PC's screen. The functionality of CAT equipment (software & interface) depends on the radio and what features the software writers included in the CAT software. Modern radio systems do have more CAT functionality If you run a logging program that supports CAT, then that software may take advantage of the CAT system by retrieving information from the radio to help fill in log details, such as the frequency that the contact was made. CAT is also useful on many radios where there are many sub-menus in the radios menu system, and many of the sub-menu items can be easily changed via the PC. On many HF radios, the CAT system is also used to program the memories on the radio, but you would need to use appropriate programming software. A CAT interface does not receive or transmit any DATA mode, that is the purpose of a DATA interface. Although, both may be used at the same time with the correct CAT Equipment. DATA modes, and getting audio to and from the PC is the function of a DATA interface. A completely different thing but it is easier and more useful when CAT and DATA are used at the same time. Wouldn't it be nice to have an interface that could operate Frequency-shift keying (FSK), Audio FSK (AFSK), (real) Morse Code (CW), with a CAT interface and its own sound card..... (eg. The DigiMaster Pro3).