Sliced inverse regression

Sliced inverse regression

Sliced inverse regression (SIR) is a tool for dimensionality reduction in the field of multivariate statistics. In statistics, regression analysis is a method of studying the relationship between a response variable y and its input variable x _ {\displaystyle {\underline {x}}} , which is a p-dimensional vector. There are several approaches in the category of regression. For example, parametric methods include multiple linear regression, and non-parametric methods include local smoothing. As the number of observations needed to use local smoothing methods scales exponentially with high-dimensional data (as p grows), reducing the number of dimensions can make the operation computable. Dimensionality reduction aims to achieve this by showing only the most important dimension of the data. SIR uses the inverse regression curve, E ( x _ | y ) {\displaystyle E({\underline {x}}\,|\,y)} , to perform a weighted principal component analysis. == Model == Given a response variable Y {\displaystyle \,Y} and a (random) vector X ∈ R p {\displaystyle X\in \mathbb {R} ^{p}} of explanatory variables, SIR is based on the model Y = f ( β 1 ⊤ X , … , β k ⊤ X , ε ) ( 1 ) {\displaystyle Y=f(\beta _{1}^{\top }X,\ldots ,\beta _{k}^{\top }X,\varepsilon )\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad (1)} where β 1 , … , β k {\displaystyle \beta _{1},\ldots ,\beta _{k}} are unknown projection vectors, k {\displaystyle \,k} is an unknown number smaller than p {\displaystyle \,p} , f {\displaystyle \;f} is an unknown function on R k + 1 {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{k+1}} as it only depends on k {\displaystyle \,k} arguments, and ε {\displaystyle \varepsilon } is a random variable representing error with E [ ε | X ] = 0 {\displaystyle E[\varepsilon |X]=0} and a finite variance of σ 2 {\displaystyle \sigma ^{2}} . The model describes an ideal solution, where Y {\displaystyle \,Y} depends on X ∈ R p {\displaystyle X\in \mathbb {R} ^{p}} only through a k {\displaystyle \,k} dimensional subspace; i.e., one can reduce the dimension of the explanatory variables from p {\displaystyle \,p} to a smaller number k {\displaystyle \,k} without losing any information. An equivalent version of ( 1 ) {\displaystyle \,(1)} is: the conditional distribution of Y {\displaystyle \,Y} given X {\displaystyle \,X} depends on X {\displaystyle \,X} only through the k {\displaystyle \,k} dimensional random vector ( β 1 ⊤ X , … , β k ⊤ X ) {\displaystyle (\beta _{1}^{\top }X,\ldots ,\beta _{k}^{\top }X)} . It is assumed that this reduced vector is as informative as the original X {\displaystyle \,X} in explaining Y {\displaystyle \,Y} . The unknown β i ′ s {\displaystyle \,\beta _{i}'s} are called the effective dimension reducing directions (EDR-directions). The space that is spanned by these vectors is denoted by the effective dimension reducing space (EDR-space). == Relevant linear algebra background == Given a _ 1 , … , a _ r ∈ R n {\displaystyle {\underline {a}}_{1},\ldots ,{\underline {a}}_{r}\in \mathbb {R} ^{n}} , then V := L ( a _ 1 , … , a _ r ) {\displaystyle V:=L({\underline {a}}_{1},\ldots ,{\underline {a}}_{r})} , the set of all linear combinations of these vectors is called a linear subspace and is therefore a vector space. The equation says that vectors a _ 1 , … , a _ r {\displaystyle {\underline {a}}_{1},\ldots ,{\underline {a}}_{r}} span V {\displaystyle \,V} , but the vectors that span space V {\displaystyle \,V} are not unique. The dimension of V ( ∈ R n ) {\displaystyle \,V(\in \mathbb {R} ^{n})} is equal to the maximum number of linearly independent vectors in V {\displaystyle \,V} . A set of n {\displaystyle \,n} linear independent vectors of R n {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{n}} makes up a basis of R n {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{n}} . The dimension of a vector space is unique, but the basis itself is not. Several bases can span the same space. Dependent vectors can still span a space, but the linear combinations of the latter are only suitable to a set of vectors lying on a straight line. == Inverse regression == Computing the inverse regression curve (IR) means instead of looking for E [ Y | X = x ] {\displaystyle \,E[Y|X=x]} , which is a curve in R p {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{p}} it is actually E [ X | Y = y ] {\displaystyle \,E[X|Y=y]} , which is also a curve in R p {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{p}} , but consisting of p {\displaystyle \,p} one-dimensional regressions. The center of the inverse regression curve is located at E [ E [ X | Y ] ] = E [ X ] {\displaystyle \,E[E[X|Y]]=E[X]} . Therefore, the centered inverse regression curve is E [ X | Y = y ] − E [ X ] {\displaystyle \,E[X|Y=y]-E[X]} which is a p {\displaystyle \,p} dimensional curve in R p {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{p}} . == Inverse regression versus dimension reduction == The centered inverse regression curve lies on a k {\displaystyle \,k} -dimensional subspace spanned by Σ x x β i ′ s {\displaystyle \,\Sigma _{xx}\beta _{i}\,'s} . This is a connection between the model and inverse regression. Given this condition and ( 1 ) {\displaystyle \,(1)} , the centered inverse regression curve E [ X | Y = y ] − E [ X ] {\displaystyle \,E[X|Y=y]-E[X]} is contained in the linear subspace spanned by Σ x x β k ( k = 1 , … , K ) {\displaystyle \,\Sigma _{xx}\beta _{k}(k=1,\ldots ,K)} , where Σ x x = C o v ( X ) {\displaystyle \,\Sigma _{xx}=Cov(X)} . == Estimation of the EDR-directions == After having had a look at all the theoretical properties, the aim now is to estimate the EDR-directions. For that purpose, weighted principal component analyses are needed. If the sample means m ^ h ′ s {\displaystyle \,{\hat {m}}_{h}\,'s} , X {\displaystyle \,X} would have been standardized to Z = Σ x x − 1 / 2 { X − E ( X ) } {\displaystyle \,Z=\Sigma _{xx}^{-1/2}\{X-E(X)\}} . Corresponding to the theorem above, the IR-curve m 1 ( y ) = E [ Z | Y = y ] {\displaystyle \,m_{1}(y)=E[Z|Y=y]} lies in the space spanned by ( η 1 , … , η k ) {\displaystyle \,(\eta _{1},\ldots ,\eta _{k})} , where η i = Σ x x 1 / 2 β i {\displaystyle \,\eta _{i}=\Sigma _{xx}^{1/2}\beta _{i}} . As a consequence, the covariance matrix c o v [ E [ Z | Y ] ] {\displaystyle \,cov[E[Z|Y]]} is degenerate in any direction orthogonal to the η i ′ s {\displaystyle \,\eta _{i}\,'s} . Therefore, the eigenvectors η k ( k = 1 , … , K ) {\displaystyle \,\eta _{k}(k=1,\ldots ,K)} associated with the largest K {\displaystyle \,K} eigenvalues are the standardized EDR-directions. == Algorithm == === SIR algorithm === The algorithm from Li, K-C. (1991) to estimate the EDR-directions via SIR is as follows. 1. Let Σ x x {\displaystyle \,\Sigma _{xx}} be the covariance matrix of X {\displaystyle \,X} . Standardize X {\displaystyle \,X} to Z = Σ x x − 1 / 2 { X − E ( X ) } {\displaystyle \,Z=\Sigma _{xx}^{-1/2}\{X-E(X)\}} ( 1 ) {\displaystyle \,(1)} can also be rewritten as Y = f ( η 1 ⊤ Z , … , η k ⊤ Z , ε ) {\displaystyle Y=f(\eta _{1}^{\top }Z,\ldots ,\eta _{k}^{\top }Z,\varepsilon )} where η k = β k Σ x x 1 / 2 ∀ k {\displaystyle \,\eta _{k}=\beta _{k}\Sigma _{xx}^{1/2}\quad \forall \;k} .) 2. Divide the range of y i {\displaystyle \,y_{i}} into S {\displaystyle \,S} non-overlapping slices H s ( s = 1 , … , S ) . n s {\displaystyle \,H_{s}(s=1,\ldots ,S).\;n_{s}} is the number of observations within each slice and I H s {\displaystyle \,I_{H_{s}}} is the indicator function for the slice: n s = ∑ i = 1 n I H s ( y i ) {\displaystyle n_{s}=\sum _{i=1}^{n}I_{H_{s}}(y_{i})} 3. Compute the mean of z i {\displaystyle \,z_{i}} over all slices, which is a crude estimate m ^ 1 {\displaystyle \,{\hat {m}}_{1}} of the inverse regression curve m 1 {\displaystyle \,m_{1}} : z ¯ s = n s − 1 ∑ i = 1 n z i I H s ( y i ) {\displaystyle \,{\bar {z}}_{s}=n_{s}^{-1}\sum _{i=1}^{n}z_{i}I_{H_{s}}(y_{i})} 4. Calculate the estimate for C o v { m 1 ( y ) } {\displaystyle \,Cov\{m_{1}(y)\}} : V ^ = n − 1 ∑ i = 1 S n s z ¯ s z ¯ s ⊤ {\displaystyle \,{\hat {V}}=n^{-1}\sum _{i=1}^{S}n_{s}{\bar {z}}_{s}{\bar {z}}_{s}^{\top }} 5. Identify the eigenvalues λ ^ i {\displaystyle \,{\hat {\lambda }}_{i}} and the eigenvectors η ^ i {\displaystyle \,{\hat {\eta }}_{i}} of V ^ {\displaystyle \,{\hat {V}}} , which are the standardized EDR-directions. 6. Transform the standardized EDR-directions back to the original scale. The estimates for the EDR-directions are given by: β ^ i = Σ ^ x x − 1 / 2 η ^ i {\displaystyle \,{\hat {\beta }}_{i}={\hat {\Sigma }}_{xx}^{-1/2}{\hat {\eta }}_{i}} (which are not necessarily orthogonal.)

Phase congruency

Phase congruency is a measure of feature significance in computer images, a method of edge detection that is particularly robust against changes in illumination and contrast. == Foundations == Phase congruency reflects the behaviour of the image in the frequency domain. It has been noted that edgelike features have many of their frequency components in the same phase. The concept is similar to coherence, except that it applies to functions of different wavelength. For example, the Fourier decomposition of a square wave consists of sine functions, whose frequencies are odd multiples of the fundamental frequency. At the rising edges of the square wave, each sinusoidal component has a rising phase; the phases have maximal congruency at the edges. This corresponds to the human-perceived edges in an image where there are sharp changes between light and dark. == Definition == Phase congruency compares the weighted alignment of the Fourier components of a signal A n {\displaystyle A_{\rm {n}}} with the sum of the Fourier components. P C ( t ) = max ϕ ¯ ∑ n A n cos ⁡ ( ϕ n ( t ) − ϕ ¯ ) ∑ n A n {\displaystyle PC(t)=\max _{\bar {\phi }}{\frac {\sum _{\rm {n}}A_{\rm {n}}\cos(\phi _{\rm {n}}(t)-{\bar {\phi }})}{\sum _{\rm {n}}A_{n}}}} where ϕ n {\displaystyle \phi _{\rm {n}}} is the local or instantaneous phase as can be calculated using the Hilbert transform and A n {\displaystyle A_{\rm {n}}} are the local amplitude, or energy, of the signal. When all the phases are aligned, this is equal to 1. Several ways of implementing phase congruency have been developed, of which two versions are available in open source, one written for MATLAB and the other written in Java as a plugin for the ImageJ software. Given the different notations used for its formulation, a unified version has been recently presented, where a methodology for the parameter tuning is also presented. == Advantages == The square-wave example is naive in that most edge detection methods deal with it equally well. For example, the first derivative has a maximal magnitude at the edges. However, there are cases where the perceived edge does not have a sharp step or a large derivative. The method of phase congruency applies to many cases where other methods fail. A notable example is an image feature consisting of a single line, such as the letter "l". Many edge-detection algorithms will pick up two adjacent edges: the transitions from white to black, and black to white. On the other hand, the phase congruency map has a single line. A simple Fourier analogy of this case is a triangle wave. In each of its crests there is a congruency of crests from different sinusoidal functions. == Disadvantages == Calculating the phase congruency map of an image is very computationally intensive, and sensitive to image noise. Techniques of noise reduction are usually applied prior to the calculation.

Hardware backdoor

A hardware backdoor is a backdoor implemented within the physical components of a computer system, also known as its hardware. They can be created by introducing malicious code to a component's firmware, or even during the manufacturing process of an integrated circuit. Often, they are used to undermine security in smartcards and cryptoprocessors, unless investment is made in anti-backdoor design methods. They have also been considered for car hacking. Backdoors differ from hardware Trojans as backdoors are introduced intentionally by the original designer or during the design process, whereas hardware Trojans are inserted later by an external party. == Background == The existence of hardware backdoors poses significant security risks for several reasons. They are difficult to detect and are impossible to remove using conventional methods like antivirus software. They can also bypass other security measures, such as disk encryption. Hardware trojans can be introduced during manufacturing where the end-user lacks control over the production chain. == History == In 2008, the FBI reported the discovery of approximately 3,500 counterfeit Cisco network components in the United States, some of which were introduced in military and government infrastructure. In the same year, the possibility of a backdoor SPARC CPU was demonstrated with an FPGA running Linux that supported various hidden malicious services. A few years later, in 2011, Jonathan Brossard presented "Rakshasa", a proof-of-concept hardware backdoor. This backdoor could be installed by an individual with physical access to the hardware. It utilized coreboot to re-flash the BIOS with a SeaBIOS and iPXE-based bootkit composed of legitimate, open-source tools, allowing malware to be fetched from the internet during the boot process. The following year, in 2012, Sergei Skorobogatov and Christopher Woods from the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory reported the discovery of a backdoor in a military-grade FPGA device, which could be exploited to access and modify sensitive information. It has been said that this was proven to be a software problem and not a deliberate attempt at sabotage. This still brought to attention that equipment manufacturers should ensure that microchips operate as intended. Later that year, two mobile phones developed by the Chinese company ZTE were found to carry a root access backdoor. According to security researcher Dmitri Alperovitch, the exploit used a hard-coded password in its software. Starting in 2012, the United States stated that Huawei might have backdoors present in their products. In 2013, researchers at the University of Massachusetts devised a method of breaking a CPU's internal cryptographic mechanisms by introducing specific impurities into the crystalline structure of transistors to change Intel's random-number generator. Documents revealed from 2013 onwards during the surveillance disclosures initiated by Edward Snowden showed that the Tailored Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees intercepted servers, routers, and other network gear being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance to install covert implant firmware onto them before delivery. These tools include custom BIOS exploits that survive the reinstallation of operating systems and USB cables with spy hardware and radio transceiver packed inside. In June 2016 it was reported that University of Michigan Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science had built a hardware backdoor that leveraged "analog circuits to create a hardware attack" so that after the capacitors store up enough electricity to be fully charged, it would be switched on, to give an attacker complete access to whatever system or device − such as a PC − that contains the backdoored chip. In the study that won the "best paper" award at the IEEE Symposium on Privacy and Security they also note that microscopic hardware backdoor wouldn't be caught by practically any modern method of hardware security analysis, and could be planted by a single employee of a chip factory. In October 2018 Bloomberg reported that an attack by Chinese spies reached almost 30 U.S. companies, including Amazon and Apple, by compromising America's technology supply chain. == Countermeasures == Skorobogatov has developed a technique capable of detecting malicious insertions into chips. New York University Tandon School of Engineering researchers have developed a way to corroborate a chip's operation using verifiable computing whereby "manufactured for sale" chips contain an embedded verification module that proves the chip's calculations are correct and an associated external module validates the embedded verification module. Another technique developed by researchers at University College London (UCL) relies on distributing trust between multiple identical chips from disjoint supply chains. Assuming that at least one of those chips remains honest the security of the device is preserved. Researchers at the University of Southern California Ming Hsieh Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Photonic Science Division at the Paul Scherrer Institute have developed a new technique called Ptychographic X-ray laminography. This technique is the only current method that allows for verification of the chips blueprint and design without destroying or cutting the chip. It also does so in significantly less time than other current methods. Anthony F. J. Levi Professor of electrical and computer engineering at University of Southern California explains “It’s the only approach to non-destructive reverse engineering of electronic chips—[and] not just reverse engineering but assurance that chips are manufactured according to design. You can identify the foundry, aspects of the design, who did the design. It’s like a fingerprint.” This method currently is able to scan chips in 3D and zoom in on sections and can accommodate chips up to 12 millimeters by 12 millimeters easily accommodating an Apple A12 chip but not yet able to scan a full Nvidia Volta GPU. "Future versions of the laminography technique could reach a resolution of just 2 nanometers or reduce the time for a low-resolution inspection of that 300-by-300-micrometer segment to less than an hour, the researchers say."

Fingerprint scanner

Fingerprint scanners are a type of biometric security device that identify an individual by identifying the structure of their fingerprints. They are used in police stations, security industries, smartphones, and other mobile devices. == Fingerprints == People have patterns of friction ridges on their fingers, these patterns are called the fingerprints. Fingerprints are uniquely detailed, durable over an individual's lifetime, and difficult to alter. Due to the unique combinations, fingerprints have become an ideal means of identification. == Types of fingerprint scanners == There are four types of fingerprint scanners: Optical scanners take a visual image of the fingerprint using a digital camera. Capacitive or CMOS scanners use capacitors and thus electric current to form an image of the fingerprint. This type of scanner tends to excel in terms of precision. Ultrasonic fingerprint scanners use high frequency sound waves to penetrate the epidermal (outer) layer of the skin. Thermal scanners sense the temperature differences on the contact surface, in between fingerprint ridges and valleys. All fingerprint scanners are susceptible to spoofing through fingerprints replicated using photographs and 3D printing. == Construction forms == Each type of fingerprint sensor can take two basic forms: the stagnant and the moving fingerprint scanner. Stagnant: The scanning module is mounted statically, and the user is required to swipe their fingers across it. This is cheaper but also less reliable than the moving form. Imaging can be less than ideal if the finger is not dragged over the scanning area at constant speed. Moving: The scanning module is mounted on a movable surface, while the user's finger can remain static. Because this layout allows the scanning module to pass the fingerprint at a constant speed, this method is generally more reliable. == Form factors == === Peripherals === Add-on fingerprint readers for PCs initially appeared in the late 1990's in the form of PCMCIA modules. Microsoft released a model in its IntelliMouse line with an integrated fingerprint reader in 2005. === Integrated readers === Laptops with built-in readers emerged around the same time as peripheral readers with devices such as NECs MC/R730F. IBM produced laptops with integrated readers starting in 2004. Apple introduced fingerprint scanners to their devices under the name Touch ID in 2013. These were initially released on the iPhone 5S, with the technology remaining exclusive to iPhones until the release of the 2016 MacBook Pro. On both laptops and smartphones, the fingerprint sensor usually uses a USB or I2C interface internally.

Nuclear electronics

Nuclear electronics is a subfield of electronics concerned with the design and use of high-speed electronic systems for nuclear physics and elementary particle physics research, and for industrial and medical use. Essential elements of such systems include fast detectors for charged particles, discriminators for separating them by energy, counters for counting the pulses produced by individual particles, fast logic circuits (including coincidence and veto gates), for identification of particular types of complex particle events, and pulse height analyzers (PHAs) for sorting and counting gamma rays or particle interactions by energy, for spectral analysis. == Elementary components == Some of the essential components that make up the elements of a nuclear electronic analysis system include: Detectors Bias voltage supplies Preamplifiers Discriminators Coincidence and veto logic gates Counters Pulse height analyzers These elements were originally developed and built in the laboratories of the scientists doing the pioneering work in the field, but are nowadays designed, developed, and manufactured by a variety of specialized vendors: EG&G Ortec Oxford Instruments Stanford Research Systems Tennelec CAEN

Automated dispensing cabinet

An automated dispensing cabinet (ADC), also called a unit-based cabinet (UBC), automated dispensing device (ADD), or automated dispensing machine (ADM)[1], is a computerized medicine cabinet for hospitals and healthcare settings. ADCs allow medications to be stored and dispensed near the point of care while controlling and tracking drug distribution. == Overview == Hospital pharmacies have provided medications for patients by filling patient-specific cassettes of unit-dose medications that were then delivered to the nursing unit and stored in medication cabinets or carts. ADCs, originally designed for hospital use, were introduced in hospitals in the 1980s and have facilitated the transition to alternative delivery models and more decentralized medication distribution systems.[2] Implementing automated dispensing cabinets as part of a decentralized or hybrid medication distribution system can improve patient safety and the accountability of the inventory, streamline certain billing processes. However, in the 2000s, the technology began to be deployed into other care settings where medication doses were stored onsite, and higher security methods were needed to control inventory, access, and dispensing of each patient dose. Settings that now deploy ADCs include long-term care facilities, hospice, critical access hospitals, surgery centers, group homes, residential care facilities, rehab and psych environments, animal health, dental clinics, and nursing education simulation. These diverse care settings share a common need to safely store, account for, and dispense individual doses of medications, especially narcotics and high-value medications, at the point of care.[3] ADCs track user access and dispensed medications, and their use can improve control over medication inventory. The real-time inventory reports generated by many cabinets can simplify the filling process and help the pharmacy track expired drugs. Furthermore, by restricting individual drugs – such as high-risk medications and controlled substances – to unique drawers within the cabinet, overall inventory management, patient safety, and medication security can be improved. Automated dispensing cabinets allow the pharmacy department to profile physician orders before they are dispensed.[4] ADCs can also enable providers to record medication charges upon dispensing, reducing the billing paperwork the pharmacy is responsible for. In addition, nurses can note returned medications using the cabinets' computers, enabling direct credits to patients' accounts. Since automated cabinets can be located on the nursing unit floor, nursing have speedier access to a patient's medications. Also, shorter waiting time ensures improved patient comfort and care.[5] == Role of automated dispensing in healthcare == Automated dispensing is a pharmacy practice in which a device dispenses medications and fills prescriptions. ADCs, which can handle many different medications, are available from a number of manufacturers such as BD, ARxIUM, and Omnicell. Though members of the pharmacy community have been utilizing automation technology since the 1980s, companies are constantly improving ADCs to meet changing needs and health standards in the industry. Several goals can be met by implementing an automated product in a healthcare facility. Patient safety can be ensured with the use of ADC technology such as barcoding. Anesthesia ADCs in operating rooms and perioperative areas may include label printing to prevent mix-ups such as errors between morphine and hydromorphone, two different opioid analgesics that frequently get confused. These systems also communicate with the pharmacy and its information management system to track medications removed and support inventory replenishment. == Key features == ADCs are like automated teller machines whose specific technologies such as barcode scanning and clinical decision support can improve medication safety. Some have metal locking drawers for added security and some have automated single-dose dispensing to prevent the need for a blind count each time a controlled substance is accessed. Over the years, ADCs have been adapted to facilitate compliance with emerging regulatory requirements such as pharmacy review of medication orders and safe practice recommendations. ADCs incorporate advanced software and electronic interfaces to synthesize high-risk steps in the medication use process. These unit-based medication repositories provide computer-controlled storage, dispensation, tracking, and documentation of medication distribution in the resident care unit. Since automated dispensing cabinets are not located in the pharmacy, they are considered "decentralized" medication distribution systems. Instead, they can be found at the point of care on the resident care unit. Tracking of the stocking and distribution process can occur by interfacing the unit with a central pharmacy computer. These cabinets can also be interfaced with other external databases such as resident profiles, the facility's admission/discharge/transfer system, and billing systems. Most ADC providers offer scalable systems since several important factors vary widely by facility such as budget, physical room size, patient population/demographics, type of healthcare facility, etc.

Hardware-based encryption

Hardware-based encryption is the use of computer hardware to assist software, or sometimes replace software, in the process of data encryption. Typically, this is implemented as part of the processor's instruction set. For example, the AES encryption algorithm (a modern cipher) can be implemented using the AES instruction set on the ubiquitous x86 architecture. Such instructions also exist on the ARM architecture. However, more unusual systems exist where the cryptography module is separate from the central processor, instead being implemented as a coprocessor, in particular a secure cryptoprocessor or cryptographic accelerator, of which an example is the IBM 4758, or its successor, the IBM 4764. Hardware implementations can be faster and less prone to exploitation than traditional software implementations, and furthermore can be protected against tampering. == History == Prior to the use of computer hardware, cryptography could be performed through various mechanical or electro-mechanical means. An early example is the Scytale used by the Spartans. The Enigma machine was an electro-mechanical system cipher machine notably used by the Germans in World War II. After World War II, purely electronic systems were developed. In 1987 the ABYSS (A Basic Yorktown Security System) project was initiated. The aim of this project was to protect against software piracy. However, the application of computers to cryptography in general dates back to the 1940s and Bletchley Park, where the Colossus computer was used to break the encryption used by German High Command during World War II. The use of computers to encrypt, however, came later. In particular, until the development of the integrated circuit, of which the first was produced in 1960, computers were impractical for encryption, since, in comparison to the portable form factor of the Enigma machine, computers of the era took the space of an entire building. It was only with the development of the microcomputer that computer encryption became feasible, outside of niche applications. The development of the World Wide Web lead to the need for consumers to have access to encryption, as online shopping became prevalent. The key concerns for consumers were security and speed. This led to the eventual inclusion of the key algorithms into processors as a way of both increasing speed and security. == Implementations == === In the instruction set === ==== x86 ==== The X86 architecture, as a CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computer) Architecture, typically implements complex algorithms in hardware. Cryptographic algorithms are no exception. The x86 architecture implements significant components of the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm, which can be used by the NSA for Top Secret information. The architecture also includes support for the SHA Hashing Algorithms through the Intel SHA extensions. Whereas AES is a cipher, which is useful for encrypting documents, hashing is used for verification, such as of passwords (see PBKDF2). ==== ARM ==== ARM processors can optionally support Security Extensions. Although ARM is a RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) architecture, there are several optional extensions specified by ARM Holdings. === As a coprocessor === IBM 4758 – The predecessor to the IBM 4764. This includes its own specialised processor, memory and a Random Number Generator. IBM 4764 and IBM 4765, identical except for the connection used. The former uses PCI-X, while the latter uses PCI-e. Both are peripheral devices that plug into the motherboard. === Proliferation === Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) processors are also x86 devices, and have supported the AES instructions since the 2011 Bulldozer processor iteration. Due to the existence of encryption instructions on modern processors provided by both Intel and AMD, the instructions are present on most modern computers. They also exist on many tablets and smartphones due to their implementation in ARM processors. == Advantages == Implementing cryptography in hardware means that part of the processor is dedicated to the task. This can lead to a large increase in speed. In particular, modern processor architectures that support pipelining can often perform other instructions concurrently with the execution of the encryption instruction. Furthermore, hardware can have methods of protecting data from software. Consequently, even if the operating system is compromised, the data may still be secure (see Software Guard Extensions). == Disadvantages == If, however, the hardware implementation is compromised, major issues arise. Malicious software can retrieve the data from the (supposedly) secure hardware – a large class of method used is the timing attack. This is far more problematic to solve than a software bug, even within the operating system. Microsoft regularly deals with security issues through Windows Update. Similarly, regular security updates are released for Mac OS X and Linux, as well as mobile operating systems like iOS, Android, and Windows Phone. However, hardware is a different issue. Sometimes, the issue will be fixable through updates to the processor's microcode (a low level type of software). However, other issues may only be resolvable through replacing the hardware, or a workaround in the operating system which mitigates the performance benefit of the hardware implementation, such as in the Spectre exploit.