The U.S. Tech Force (also styled as US Tech Force, Tech Force, or Government Tech Force) is a federal hiring initiative launched by the second Donald Trump administration in December 2025. The program, administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), aims to recruit about 1,000 early-career technology professionals into two-year government jobs to modernize federal IT systems, advance artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, and address technological gaps in government operations. The initiative is an effort to plug capability gaps created by Trump-administration efforts to shrink the federal government, which led to the departure of some 220,000 federal employees, including many in IT. The initiative seeks early-career workers; officials said it would offer competitive salaries and opportunities to work on high-impact government technology projects. Major technology companies—including Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Meta, Google, and OpenAI—agreed to help identify and refer candidates. Candidates are allowed to take Tech Force positions on leaves of absence and without divesting their stock, raising conflict-of-interest questions. In January 2026, OPM direction Scott Kupor said the deadline for applying to Tech Force was being extended because of "tremendous interest" without saying how many people had actually applied. Also in December 2025, news broke that the administration is planning another novel use of private-sector workers: hiring cybersecurity firms for offensive cyber operations.
List of large language models
A large language model (LLM) is a type of machine learning model designed for natural language processing tasks such as language generation. LLMs are language models with many parameters, and are trained with self-supervised learning on a vast amount of text. == List == For the training cost column, 1 petaFLOP-day equals 1 petaFLOP/sec × 1 day, or 8.64×1019 FLOP (floating point operations). Only the cost of the largest model is shown. The number of parameters is measured in billions, and the training cost is measured in petaFLOP-days. === 2018 === === 2019 === === 2020 === === 2021 === === 2022 === === 2023 === === 2024 === === 2025 === === 2026 ===
Data verification
Data verification is a process in which different types of data are checked for accuracy and inconsistencies after data migration is done. In some domains it is referred to Source Data Verification (SDV), such as in clinical trials. Data verification helps to determine whether data was accurately translated when data is transferred from one source to another, is complete, and supports processes in the new system. During verification, there may be a need for a parallel run of both systems to identify areas of disparity and forestall erroneous data loss. Methods for data verification include double data entry, proofreading and automated verification of data. Proofreading data involves someone checking the data entered against the original document. This is also time-consuming and costly. Automated verification of data can be achieved using one way hashes locally or through use of a SaaS based service such as Q by SoLVBL to provide immutable seals to allow verification of the original data.
Verifiable secret sharing
In cryptography, a secret sharing scheme is verifiable if auxiliary information is included that allows players to verify their shares as consistent. More formally, verifiable secret sharing ensures that even if the dealer is malicious there is a well-defined secret that the players can later reconstruct. (In standard secret sharing, the dealer is assumed to be honest.) The concept of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) was first introduced in 1985 by Benny Chor, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali and Baruch Awerbuch. In a VSS protocol a distinguished player who wants to share the secret is referred to as the dealer. The protocol consists of two phases: a sharing phase and a reconstruction phase. Sharing: Initially the dealer holds secret as input and each player holds an independent random input. The sharing phase may consist of several rounds. At each round each player can privately send messages to other players and can also broadcast a message. Each message sent or broadcast by a player is determined by its input, its random input and messages received from other players in previous rounds. Reconstruction: In this phase each player provides its entire view from the sharing phase and a reconstruction function is applied and is taken as the protocol's output. An alternative definition given by Oded Goldreich defines VSS as a secure multi-party protocol for computing the randomized functionality corresponding to some (non-verifiable) secret sharing scheme. This definition is stronger than that of the other definitions and is very convenient to use in the context of general secure multi-party computation. Verifiable secret sharing is important for secure multiparty computation. Multiparty computation is typically accomplished by making secret shares of the inputs, and manipulating the shares to compute some function. To handle "active" adversaries (that is, adversaries that corrupt nodes and then make them deviate from the protocol), the secret sharing scheme needs to be verifiable to prevent the deviating nodes from throwing off the protocol. == Feldman's scheme == A commonly used example of a simple VSS scheme is the protocol by Paul Feldman, which is based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme combined with any encryption scheme which satisfies a specific homomorphic property (that is not necessarily satisfied by all homomorphic encryption schemes). The following description gives the general idea, but is not secure as written. (Note, in particular, that the published value gs leaks information about the dealer's secret s.) First, a cyclic group G of prime order q, along with a generator g of G, is chosen publicly as a system parameter. The group G must be chosen such that computing discrete logarithms is hard in this group. (Typically, one takes an order-q subgroup of (Z/pZ)×, where q is a prime dividing p − 1.) The dealer then computes (and keeps secret) a random polynomial P of degree t with coefficients in Zq, such that P(0) = s, where s is the secret. Each of the n share holders will receive a value P(1), ..., P(n) modulo q. Any t + 1 share holders can recover the secret s by using polynomial interpolation modulo q, but any set of at most t share holders cannot. (In fact, at this point any set of at most t share holders has no information about s.) So far, this is exactly Shamir's scheme. To make these shares verifiable, the dealer distributes commitments to the coefficients of P modulo q. If P(x) = s + a1x + ... + atxt, then the commitments that must be given are: c0 = gs, c1 = ga1, ... ct = gat. Once these are given, any party can verify their share. For instance, to verify that v = P(i) modulo q, party i can check that g v = c 0 c 1 i c 2 i 2 ⋯ c t i t = ∏ j = 0 t c j i j = ∏ j = 0 t g a j i j = g ∑ j = 0 t a j i j = g P ( i ) {\displaystyle g^{v}=c_{0}c_{1}^{i}c_{2}^{i^{2}}\cdots c_{t}^{i^{t}}=\prod _{j=0}^{t}c_{j}^{i^{j}}=\prod _{j=0}^{t}g^{a_{j}i^{j}}=g^{\sum _{j=0}^{t}a_{j}i^{j}}=g^{P(i)}} . This scheme is, at best, secure against computationally bounded adversaries, namely the intractability of computing discrete logarithms. Pedersen proposed later a scheme where no information about the secret is revealed even with a dealer with unlimited computing power. == Baghery's hash-based scheme == A recent line of research has proposed a unified framework, for building practical VSS schemes that do not necessarily require homomorphic commitments —a key requirement in traditional constructions such as Feldman's and Pedersen's schemes. The framework allows instantiations with different commitment schemes, including post-quantum secure options such as hash-based commitments. This offers a flexible and efficient approach to build VSS schemes, in which the verifiability of shares is decoupled from the need for homomorphic commitments, which are often tied to assumptions like the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem, known to be insecure against quantum adversaries. One instantiation of the new framework uses hash-based commitments and a random oracle to construct a hash-based VSS scheme based on Shamir's secret sharing. === Protocol Overview === Sharing Phase: Given a secure hash-based commitment scheme C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {C}}} and a hash function H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}} (modeled as a random oracle), to share a secret value s {\displaystyle s} among n {\displaystyle n} parties with threshold t {\displaystyle t} , the dealer acts as follows: Following Shamir sharing, the dealer samples a random degree- t {\displaystyle t} polynomial P ( X ) {\displaystyle P(X)} over a filed or ring, with P ( 0 ) = s {\displaystyle P(0)=s} . Each of the n {\displaystyle n} parties will receive a value v i = P ( i ) {\displaystyle v_{i}=P(i)} modulo q {\displaystyle q} as a share. To prove the validity of the shares, the dealer acts as follows: Samples another random degree- t {\displaystyle t} polynomial R ( X ) {\displaystyle R(X)} and n {\displaystyle n} random values γ 1 , … , γ n {\displaystyle \gamma _{1},\dots ,\gamma _{n}} from the same filed or ring. Computes a set of commitments c i = C ( P ( i ) , R ( i ) , γ i ) {\displaystyle c_{i}={\mathcal {C}}(P(i),R(i),\gamma _{i})} for i = 1 , 2 , … , n {\displaystyle i=1,2,\dots ,n} . Note that, the additional randomness γ i {\displaystyle \gamma _{i}} is used when the secret s {\displaystyle s} does not have sufficient entropy, but it can be omitted when sharing a uniformly random secret. Each of the n {\displaystyle n} parties will also receive a value γ i {\displaystyle \gamma _{i}} modulo q {\displaystyle q} as a share. Calculates a challenge value d {\displaystyle d} via a hash function d = H ( c 1 , … , c n ) {\displaystyle d={\mathcal {H}}(c_{1},\dots ,c_{n})} and then computes a polynomial Z ( X ) = R ( X ) + d ⋅ P ( X ) {\displaystyle Z(X)=R(X)+d\cdot P(X)} . Broadcasts the commitments c 1 , … , c n {\displaystyle c_{1},\dots ,c_{n}} along with Z ( X ) {\displaystyle Z(X)} as the proof and privately sends ( v i , γ i ) {\displaystyle (v_{i},\gamma _{i})} as the individual share to party i {\displaystyle i} . Verification Phase: Given an individual share ( v i , γ i ) {\displaystyle (v_{i},\gamma _{i})} and a proof ( c 1 , … , c n , Z ( X ) ) {\displaystyle (c_{1},\dots ,c_{n},Z(X))} , party i {\displaystyle i} verifies the correctness of it as below: Checks that Z ( X ) {\displaystyle Z(X)} is a valid (up to) degree- t {\displaystyle t} polynomial. Recomputes the challenge value d = H ( c 1 , … , c n ) {\displaystyle d={\mathcal {H}}(c_{1},\dots ,c_{n})} , and verifies the commitment equation c i = C ( v i , Z ( i ) − d v i , γ i ) {\displaystyle c_{i}={\mathcal {C}}(v_{i},Z(i)-dv_{i},\gamma _{i})} . If the verification fails, similar to Feldman’s and Pedersen’s schemes, the party raises a complaint. If too many complaints (more than t {\displaystyle t} ) are raised, the dealer is disqualified. In case of a complaint, the dealer can publicly reveal the disputed share to allow global verification. Honest parties can then collectively agree to either continue or disqualify the dealer. This scheme supports the sharing of both low-entropy and high-entropy secrets. Moreover, since it relies solely on secure hash functions for commitments and on a (quantum) random oracle, it plausibly achieves security even against quantum adversaries. Additionally, by using only lightweight cryptographic primitives, the scheme is considerably more efficient in practice compared to traditional VSS constructions based on number-theoretic assumptions. == Benaloh's scheme == Once n shares are distributed to their holders, each holder should be able to verify that all shares are collectively t-consistent (i.e., any subset t of n shares will yield the same, correct, polynomial without exposing the secret). In Shamir's secret sharing scheme the shares s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n {\displaystyle s_{1},s_{2},...,s_{n}} are t-consistent if and only if the interpolation of the points ( 1 , s 1 ) , ( 2 , s 2 ) , . . . , (
Communications security
Communications security is the discipline of preventing unauthorized interceptors from accessing telecommunications in an intelligible form, while still delivering content to the intended recipients. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization culture, including United States Department of Defense culture, it is often referred to by the abbreviation COMSEC. The field includes cryptographic security, transmission security, emissions security and physical security of COMSEC equipment and associated keying material. COMSEC is used to protect both classified and unclassified traffic on military communications networks, including voice, video, and data. It is used for both analog and digital applications, and both wired and wireless links. Voice over secure internet protocol VOSIP has become the de facto standard for securing voice communication, replacing the need for Secure Terminal Equipment (STE) in much of NATO, including the U.S.A. USCENTCOM moved entirely to VOSIP in 2008. == Specialties == Cryptographic security: The component of communications security that results from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. This includes ensuring message confidentiality and authenticity. Emission security (EMSEC): The protection resulting from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from communications systems and cryptographic equipment intercepts and the interception and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptographic equipment, information systems, and telecommunications systems. Transmission security (TRANSEC): The component of communications security that results from the application of measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis (e.g. frequency hopping and spread spectrum). Physical security: The component of communications security that results from all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. == Related terms == ACES – Automated Communications Engineering Software AEK – Algorithmic Encryption Key AKMS – the Army Key Management System CCI – Controlled Cryptographic Item - equipment which contains COMSEC embedded devices CT3 – Common Tier 3 DTD – Data Transfer Device ICOM – Integrated COMSEC, e.g. a radio with built in encryption KEK – Key Encryption Key KG-30 – family of COMSEC equipment KOI-18 – Tape Reader General Purpose KPK – Key production key KYK-13 – Electronic Transfer Device KYX-15 – Electronic Transfer Device LCMS – Local COMSEC Management Software OTAR – Over the Air Rekeying OWK – Over the Wire Key SKL – Simple Key Loader SOI – Signal operating instructions STE – Secure Terminal Equipment (secure phone) STU-III – (obsolete secure phone, replaced by STE) TED – Trunk Encryption Device such as the WALBURN/KG family TEK – Traffic Encryption Key TPI – Two person integrity TSEC – Telecommunications Security (sometimes referred to in error transmission security or TRANSEC) Types of COMSEC equipment: Authentication equipment Crypto equipment: Any equipment that embodies cryptographic logic or performs one or more cryptographic functions (key generation, encryption, and authentication). Crypto-ancillary equipment: Equipment designed specifically to facilitate efficient or reliable operation of crypto-equipment, without performing cryptographic functions itself. Crypto-production equipment: Equipment used to produce or load keying material == DoD Electronic Key Management System == The Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) is a United States Department of Defense (DoD) key management, COMSEC material distribution, and logistics support system. The National Security Agency (NSA) established the EKMS program to supply electronic key to COMSEC devices in securely and timely manner, and to provide COMSEC managers with an automated system capable of ordering, generation, production, distribution, storage, security accounting, and access control. The Army's platform in the four-tiered EKMS, AKMS, automates frequency management and COMSEC management operations. It eliminates paper keying material, hardcopy Signal operating instructions (SOI) and saves the time and resources required for courier distribution. It has 4 components: LCMS provides automation for the detailed accounting required for every COMSEC account, and electronic key generation and distribution capability. ACES is the frequency management portion of AKMS. ACES has been designated by the Military Communications Electronics Board as the joint standard for use by all services in development of frequency management and crypto-net planning. CT3 with DTD software is in a fielded, ruggedized hand-held device that handles, views, stores, and loads SOI, Key, and electronic protection data. DTD provides an improved net-control device to automate crypto-net control operations for communications networks employing electronically keyed COMSEC equipment. SKL is a hand-held PDA that handles, views, stores, and loads SOI, Key, and electronic protection data. == Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) Program == KMI is intended to replace the legacy Electronic Key Management System to provide a means for securely ordering, generating, producing, distributing, managing, and auditing cryptographic products (e.g., asymmetric keys, symmetric keys, manual cryptographic systems, and cryptographic applications). This system is currently being fielded by Major Commands and variants will be required for non-DoD Agencies with a COMSEC Mission.
Convolution
In mathematics (in particular, functional analysis), convolution is a mathematical operation on two functions f {\displaystyle f} and g {\displaystyle g} that produces a third function f ∗ g {\displaystyle fg} , as the integral of the product of the two functions after one is reflected about the y-axis and shifted. The term convolution refers to both the resulting function and to the process of computing it. The integral is evaluated for all values of shift, producing the convolution function. The choice of which function is reflected and shifted before the integral does not change the integral result (see commutativity). Graphically, it expresses how the 'shape' of one function is modified by the other. Some features of convolution are similar to cross-correlation: for real-valued functions, of a continuous or discrete variable, convolution f ∗ g {\displaystyle fg} differs from cross-correlation f ⋆ g {\displaystyle f\star g} only in that either f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} or g ( x ) {\displaystyle g(x)} is reflected about the y-axis in convolution; thus it is a cross-correlation of g ( − x ) {\displaystyle g(-x)} and f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} , or f ( − x ) {\displaystyle f(-x)} and g ( x ) {\displaystyle g(x)} . For complex-valued functions, the cross-correlation operator is the adjoint of the convolution operator. Convolution has applications that include probability, statistics, acoustics, spectroscopy, signal processing and image processing, computer vision and human vision, geophysics, engineering, physics, and differential equations. The convolution can be defined for functions on Euclidean space and other groups (as algebraic structures). For example, periodic functions, such as the discrete-time Fourier transform, can be defined on a circle and convolved by periodic convolution. (See row 18 at DTFT § Properties.) A discrete convolution can be defined for functions on the set of integers. Generalizations of convolution have applications in the field of numerical analysis and numerical linear algebra, and in the design and implementation of finite impulse response filters in signal processing. Computing the inverse of the convolution operation is known as deconvolution. == Definition == The convolution of f {\displaystyle f} and g {\displaystyle g} is written f ∗ g {\displaystyle fg} , denoting the operator with the symbol ∗ {\displaystyle } . It is defined as the integral of the product of the two functions after one is reflected about the y-axis and shifted. As such, it is a particular kind of integral transform: ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) := ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( τ ) g ( t − τ ) d τ . {\displaystyle (fg)(t):=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(\tau )g(t-\tau )\,d\tau .} An equivalent definition is (see commutativity): ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) := ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( t − τ ) g ( τ ) d τ . {\displaystyle (fg)(t):=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(t-\tau )g(\tau )\,d\tau .} While the symbol t {\displaystyle t} is used above, it need not represent the time domain. At each t {\displaystyle t} , the convolution formula can be described as the area under the function f ( τ ) {\displaystyle f(\tau )} weighted by the function g ( − τ ) {\displaystyle g(-\tau )} shifted by the amount t {\displaystyle t} . As t {\displaystyle t} changes, the weighting function g ( t − τ ) {\displaystyle g(t-\tau )} emphasizes different parts of the input function f ( τ ) {\displaystyle f(\tau )} ; If t {\displaystyle t} is a positive value, then g ( t − τ ) {\displaystyle g(t-\tau )} is equal to g ( − τ ) {\displaystyle g(-\tau )} that slides or is shifted along the τ {\displaystyle \tau } -axis toward the right (toward + ∞ {\displaystyle +\infty } ) by the amount of t {\displaystyle t} , while if t {\displaystyle t} is a negative value, then g ( t − τ ) {\displaystyle g(t-\tau )} is equal to g ( − τ ) {\displaystyle g(-\tau )} that slides or is shifted toward the left (toward − ∞ {\displaystyle -\infty } ) by the amount of | t | {\displaystyle |t|} . For functions f {\displaystyle f} , g {\displaystyle g} supported on only [ 0 , ∞ ) {\displaystyle [0,\infty )} (i.e., zero for negative arguments), the integration limits can be truncated, resulting in: ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) = ∫ 0 t f ( τ ) g ( t − τ ) d τ for f , g : [ 0 , ∞ ) → R . {\displaystyle (fg)(t)=\int _{0}^{t}f(\tau )g(t-\tau )\,d\tau \quad \ {\text{for }}f,g:[0,\infty )\to \mathbb {R} .} For the multi-dimensional formulation of convolution, see domain of definition (below). === Notation === A common engineering notational convention is: f ( t ) ∗ g ( t ) := ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( τ ) g ( t − τ ) d τ ⏟ ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) , {\displaystyle f(t)g(t)\mathrel {:=} \underbrace {\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(\tau )g(t-\tau )\,d\tau } _{(fg)(t)},} which has to be interpreted carefully to avoid confusion. For instance, f ( t ) ∗ g ( t − t 0 ) {\displaystyle f(t)g(t-t_{0})} is equivalent to ( f ∗ g ) ( t − t 0 ) {\displaystyle (fg)(t-t_{0})} , but f ( t − t 0 ) ∗ g ( t − t 0 ) {\displaystyle f(t-t_{0})g(t-t_{0})} is in fact equivalent to ( f ∗ g ) ( t − 2 t 0 ) {\displaystyle (fg)(t-2t_{0})} . === Relations with other transforms === Given two functions f ( t ) {\displaystyle f(t)} and g ( t ) {\displaystyle g(t)} with bilateral Laplace transforms (two-sided Laplace transform) F ( s ) = ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s u f ( u ) d u {\displaystyle F(s)=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-su}\ f(u)\ {\text{d}}u} and G ( s ) = ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s v g ( v ) d v {\displaystyle G(s)=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-sv}\ g(v)\ {\text{d}}v} respectively, the convolution operation ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) {\displaystyle (fg)(t)} can be defined as the inverse Laplace transform of the product of F ( s ) {\displaystyle F(s)} and G ( s ) {\displaystyle G(s)} . More precisely, F ( s ) ⋅ G ( s ) = ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s u f ( u ) d u ⋅ ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s v g ( v ) d v = ∫ − ∞ ∞ ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s ( u + v ) f ( u ) g ( v ) d u d v {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}F(s)\cdot G(s)&=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-su}\ f(u)\ {\text{d}}u\cdot \int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-sv}\ g(v)\ {\text{d}}v\\&=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-s(u+v)}\ f(u)\ g(v)\ {\text{d}}u\ {\text{d}}v\end{aligned}}} Let t = u + v {\displaystyle t=u+v} , then F ( s ) ⋅ G ( s ) = ∫ − ∞ ∞ ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s t f ( u ) g ( t − u ) d u d t = ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s t ∫ − ∞ ∞ f ( u ) g ( t − u ) d u ⏟ ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) d t = ∫ − ∞ ∞ e − s t ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) d t . {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}F(s)\cdot G(s)&=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-st}\ f(u)\ g(t-u)\ {\text{d}}u\ {\text{d}}t\\&=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-st}\underbrace {\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }f(u)\ g(t-u)\ {\text{d}}u} _{(fg)(t)}\ {\text{d}}t\\&=\int _{-\infty }^{\infty }e^{-st}(fg)(t)\ {\text{d}}t.\end{aligned}}} Note that F ( s ) ⋅ G ( s ) {\displaystyle F(s)\cdot G(s)} is the bilateral Laplace transform of ( f ∗ g ) ( t ) {\displaystyle (fg)(t)} . A similar derivation can be done using the unilateral Laplace transform (one-sided Laplace transform). The convolution operation also describes the output (in terms of the input) of an important class of operations known as linear time-invariant (LTI). See LTI system theory for a derivation of convolution as the result of LTI constraints. In terms of the Fourier transforms of the input and output of an LTI operation, no new frequency components are created. The existing ones are only modified (amplitude and/or phase). In other words, the output transform is the pointwise product of the input transform with a third transform (known as a transfer function). See Convolution theorem for a derivation of that property of convolution. Conversely, convolution can be derived as the inverse Fourier transform of the pointwise product of two Fourier transforms. == Visual explanation == == Historical developments == One of the earliest uses of the convolution integral appeared in D'Alembert's derivation of Taylor's theorem in Recherches sur différents points importants du système du monde, published in 1754. Also, an expression of the type: ∫ f ( u ) ⋅ g ( x − u ) d u {\displaystyle \int f(u)\cdot g(x-u)\,du} is used by Sylvestre François Lacroix on page 505 of his book entitled Treatise on differences and series, which is the last of 3 volumes of the encyclopedic series: Traité du calcul différentiel et du calcul intégral, Chez Courcier, Paris, 1797–1800. Soon thereafter, convolution operations appear in the works of Pierre Simon Laplace, Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier, Siméon Denis Poisson, and others. The term itself did not come into wide use until the 1950s or 1960s. Prior to that it was sometimes known as Faltung (which means folding in German), composition product, superposition integral, and Carson's integral. Yet it appears as early as 1903, though the definition is rather unfamiliar in older uses. The operation: ∫ 0 t φ ( s ) ψ ( t − s ) d s , 0 ≤ t < ∞ , {\displaystyle \int _{0}^{t}\varphi (s)\psi (t-s)\,ds,\quad 0\leq t<\infty ,} is a particular case of composition products considered by the Italian mathematician Vito Volterra in 1913. == Circular c
Virtual influencer
A virtual influencer, sometimes described as a virtual persona or virtual model, is a computer-generated fictional character that can be used for a variety of marketing-related purposes, but most frequently for social media marketing, in lieu of online human "influencers". Most virtual influencers are designed using computer graphics and motion capture technology to resemble real people in realistic situations. Common derivatives of virtual influencers include VTubers, which broadly refer to online entertainers and YouTubers who represent themselves using virtual avatars instead of their physical selves. == History == Virtual influencers are fundamentally synonymous with virtual idols, which originate from Japan's anime and Japanese idol culture that dates back to the 1980s. The first virtual idol created was Lynn Minmay, a fictional singer and main character of the anime television series Super Dimension Fortress Macross (1982) and the animated film adaptation Macross: Do You Remember Love? (1984). Minmay's success led to the production of more Japanese virtual idols, such as EVE from the Japanese cyberpunk anime Megazone 23 (1985), and Sharon Apple in Macross Plus (1994). Virtual idols were not always well received – in 1995, Japanese talent agency Horipro created Kyoko Date, which was inspired by the Macross franchise and dating sim games such as Tokimeki Memorial (1994). Date failed to gain commercial success despite drawing headlines for her debut as a CGI idol, largely due to technical limitations leading to issues such as unnatural movements, an issue also known as the uncanny valley. Since their inception, many virtual idols created have achieved continual success, with notable names including the Vocaloid singer Hatsune Miku, and the VTuber Kizuna AI. Technological advancements have also enabled production teams to use artificial intelligence and advanced techniques to customize the personalities and behavior of virtual idols. Due to modern-day advancements in technology, many virtual idols have held real-life tours and events. Notable ones include Hatsune Miku's titular tour Miku Expo and Hololive's concerts with many of their idols from their English, Japanese and Indonesian branches. Some notable events including virtual singers and influencers have included: Hatsune Miku opening for Lady Gaga in 2014 and Hoshimachi Suisei's concerts at the famous Budokan venue in Japan and her addition to the Forbes Japan list of '30 Under 30' individuals who are changing the world in their respective fields. == Benefits and criticism == From a branding perspective, virtual influencers are perceived to be much less likely to be mired in scandals. In China, celebrities caught in bad publicity such as singer Wang Leehom and entertainer Kris Wu have heightened the appeal of virtual influencers, since their existence relies entirely on computer-generated imagery and they are therefore unlikely to cause any damage to a brand's image by association. Some studies have also suggested that Generation Z consumers have a unique appetite for virtual idols and influencers, since they grew up in the age of the internet. Studies also show that human-like appearance of virtual influencers show higher message credibility than anime-like virtual influencers. Scholars and commentators have also questioned the ethics and cultural impact of virtual influencers, arguing that computer-generated personas can entrench unrealistic beauty standards while diffusing accountability for labor, identity, and consent. Business and marketing analysts have also warned that disclosure and governance remain inconsistent, recommending clearer guardrails and transparency when brands deploy synthetic spokespeople. In 2025, reporting highlighted concerns that AI-driven "virtual humans" could displace human creators and sales workers, intensifying debates over the future of creative labor and authenticity online. == Notable examples == === Virtual bands === Eternity - A South Korean virtual idol group formed by Pulse9. Gorillaz - A virtual band formed in 1998. K/DA - A virtual K-pop girl group created as part of the League of Legends video game franchise. MAVE: - A South Korean virtual girl group formed in 2023 by Metaverse Entertainment. Pentakill - A virtual heavy metal band created as part of the League of Legends video game franchise. Plave (band) - A South Korean virtual boy band formed by VLast. Squid Sisters and Off the Hook - Two virtual pop idol duos as part of the Splatoon series. Studio Killers - A Finnish-Danish-British virtual band formed in 2011. === Vocaloids === Hatsune Miku (modeled after Saki Fujita) Kagamine Rin/Len (modeled after Asami Shimoda) Megurine Luka (modeled after Yū Asakawa) Meiko (modeled after Meiko Haigō) Kaito (modeled after Naoto Fūga) === VTubers === Kano Kizuna AI Neuro-sama VShojo Ironmouse Projekt Melody Nijisanji Hololive Akai Haato Gawr Gura Hoshimachi Suisei Natsuiro Matsuri === Other examples === Ami Yamato Crazy Frog FN Meka IA Kuki AI Kyoko Date Kyra Miquela Naevis Shudu Gram