In abstract algebra, a residuated lattice is an algebraic structure that is simultaneously a lattice x ≤ y and a monoid x•y that admits operations x\z and z/y, loosely analogous to division or implication, when x•y is viewed as multiplication or conjunction, respectively. Called respectively right and left residuals, these operations coincide when the monoid is commutative. The general concept was introduced by Morgan Ward and Robert P. Dilworth in 1939. Examples, some of which existed prior to the general concept, include Boolean algebras, Heyting algebras, residuated Boolean algebras, relation algebras, and MV-algebras. Residuated semilattices omit the meet operation ∧, for example Kleene algebras and action algebras. == Definition == In mathematics, a residuated lattice is an algebraic structure L = (L, ≤, •, I) such that (i) (L, ≤) is a lattice. (ii) (L, •, I) is a monoid. (iii) For all z there exists for every x a greatest y, and for every y a greatest x, such that x•y ≤ z (the residuation properties). In (iii), the "greatest y", being a function of z and x, is denoted x\z and called the right residual of z by x. Think of it as what remains of z on the right after "dividing" z on the left by x. Dually, the "greatest x" is denoted z/y and called the left residual of z by y. An equivalent, more formal statement of (iii) that uses these operations to name these greatest values is (iii)' for all x, y, z in L, y ≤ x\z ⇔ x•y ≤ z ⇔ x ≤ z/y. As suggested by the notation, the residuals are a form of quotient. More precisely, for a given x in L, the unary operations x• and x\ are respectively the lower and upper adjoints of a Galois connection on L, and dually for the two functions •y and /y. By the same reasoning that applies to any Galois connection, we have yet another definition of the residuals, namely, x•(x\y) ≤ y ≤ x\(x•y), and (y/x)•x ≤ y ≤ (y•x)/x, together with the requirement that x•y be monotone in x and y. (When axiomatized using (iii) or (iii)' monotonicity becomes a theorem and hence not required in the axiomatization.) These give a sense in which the functions x• and x\ are pseudoinverses or adjoints of each other, and likewise for •x and /x. This last definition is purely in terms of inequalities, noting that monotonicity can be axiomatized as x • y ≤ (x∨z) • y and similarly for the other operations and their arguments. Moreover, any inequality x ≤ y can be expressed equivalently as an equation, either x∧y = x or x∨y = y. This along with the equations axiomatizing lattices and monoids then yields a purely equational definition of residuated lattices, provided the requisite operations are adjoined to the signature (L, ≤, •, I) thereby expanding it to (L, ∧, ∨, •, I, /, \). When thus organized, residuated lattices form an equational class or variety, whose homomorphisms respect the residuals as well as the lattice and monoid operations. Note that distributivity x • (y ∨ z) = (x • y) ∨ (x • z) and x•0 = 0 are consequences of these axioms and so do not need to be made part of the definition. This necessary distributivity of • over ∨ does not in general entail distributivity of ∧ over ∨, that is, a residuated lattice need not be a distributive lattice. However distributivity of ∧ over ∨ is entailed when • and ∧ are the same operation, a special case of residuated lattices called a Heyting algebra. Alternative notations for x•y include x◦y, x;y (relation algebra), and x⊗y (linear logic). Alternatives for I include e and 1'. Alternative notations for the residuals are x → y for x\y and y ← x for y/x, suggested by the similarity between residuation and implication in logic, with the multiplication of the monoid understood as a form of conjunction that need not be commutative. When the monoid is commutative the two residuals coincide. When not commutative, the intuitive meaning of the monoid as conjunction and the residuals as implications can be understood as having a temporal quality: x•y means x and then y, x → y means had x (in the past) then y (now), and y ← x means if-ever x (in the future) then y (at that time), as illustrated by the natural language example at the end of the examples. == Examples == One of the original motivations for the study of residuated lattices was the lattice of (two-sided) ideals of a ring. Given a ring R, the ideals of R, denoted Id(R), forms a complete lattice with set intersection acting as the meet operation and "ideal addition" acting as the join operation. The monoid operation • is given by "ideal multiplication", and the element R of Id(R) acts as the identity for this operation. Given two ideals A and B in Id(R), the residuals are given by A / B := { r ∈ R ∣ r B ⊆ A } {\displaystyle A/B:=\{r\in R\mid rB\subseteq A\}} B ∖ A := { r ∈ R ∣ B r ⊆ A } {\displaystyle B\setminus A:=\{r\in R\mid Br\subseteq A\}} It is worth noting that {0}/B and B\{0} are respectively the left and right annihilators of B. This residuation is related to the conductor (or transporter) in commutative algebra written as (A:B)=A/B. One difference in usage is that B need not be an ideal of R: it may just be a subset. Boolean algebras and Heyting algebras are commutative residuated lattices in which x•y = x∧y (whence the unit I is the top element 1 of the algebra) and both residuals x\y and y/x are the same operation, namely implication x → y. The second example is quite general since Heyting algebras include all finite distributive lattices, as well as all chains or total orders, for example the unit interval [0,1] in the real line, or the integers and ± ∞ {\displaystyle \pm \infty } . The structure (Z, min, max, +, 0, −, −) (the integers with subtraction for both residuals) is a commutative residuated lattice such that the unit of the monoid is not the greatest element (indeed there is no least or greatest integer), and the multiplication of the monoid is not the meet operation of the lattice. In this example the inequalities are equalities because − (subtraction) is not merely the adjoint or pseudoinverse of + but the true inverse. Any totally ordered group under addition such as the rationals or the reals can be substituted for the integers in this example. The nonnegative portion of any of these examples is an example provided min and max are interchanged and − is replaced by monus, defined (in this case) so that x-y = 0 when x ≤ y and otherwise is ordinary subtraction. A more general class of examples is given by the Boolean algebra of all binary relations on a set X, namely the power set of X2, made a residuated lattice by taking the monoid multiplication • to be composition of relations and the monoid unit to be the identity relation I on X consisting of all pairs (x,x) for x in X. Given two relations R and S on X, the right residual R\S of S by R is the binary relation such that x(R\S)y holds just when for all z in X, zRx implies zSy (notice the connection with implication). The left residual is the mirror image of this: y(S/R)x holds just when for all z in X, xRz implies ySz. This can be illustrated with the binary relations < and > on {0,1} in which 0 < 1 and 1 > 0 are the only relationships that hold. Then x(>\<)y holds just when x = 1, while x()y holds just when y = 0, showing that residuation of < by > is different depending on whether we residuate on the right or the left. This difference is a consequence of the difference between <•> and >•<, where the only relationships that hold are 0(<•>)0 (since 0<1>0) and 1(>•<)1 (since 1>0<1). Had we chosen ≤ and ≥ instead of < and >, ≥\≤ and ≤/≥ would have been the same because ≤•≥ = ≥•≤, both of which always hold between all x and y (since x≤1≥y and x≥0≤y). The Boolean algebra 2Σ of all formal languages over an alphabet (set) Σ forms a residuated lattice whose monoid multiplication is language concatenation LM and whose monoid unit I is the language {ε} consisting of just the empty string ε. The right residual M\L consists of all words w over Σ such that Mw ⊆ L. The left residual L/M is the same with wM in place of Mw. The residuated lattice of all binary relations on X is finite just when X is finite, and commutative just when X has at most one element. When X is empty the algebra is the degenerate Boolean algebra in which 0 = 1 = I. The residuated lattice of all languages on Σ is commutative just when Σ has at most one letter. It is finite just when Σ is empty, consisting of the two languages 0 (the empty language {}) and the monoid unit I = {ε} = 1. The examples forming a Boolean algebra have special properties treated in the article on residuated Boolean algebras. == Residuated semilattice == A residuated semilattice is defined almost identically for residuated lattices, omitting just the meet operation ∧. Thus it is an algebraic structure L = (L, ∨, •, 1, /, \) satisfying all the residuated lattice equations as specified above except those containing an occurrence of the symbol ∧. The option of defining x ≤ y as x∧y = x is then not available, leaving on
Deadbot
A deadbot, deathbot, or griefbot is a digital avatar, created with artificial intelligence, which resembles a person who is dead. Griefbots employ natural language processing and machine-learning techniques to approximate the style and personality of a deceased person. They may appear as chatbots, voice assistants, or animated avatars, and are often trained on an individual's digital remains. == History == Among the earliest researchers, Muhammad Aurangzeb Ahmad of the University of Washington, developed the Grandpa Bot project, a conversational simulation of his late father designed for his children to interact with. Other efforts include journalist James Vlahos's Dadbot, which evolved into the commercial platform HereAfter AI. Hossein Rahnama's Augmented Eternity research at MIT Media Lab and Toronto Metropolitan University, and game designer Jason Rohrer's "Project December", have enabled users to converse with language-model representations of loved ones. Early commercial projects such as Eternime, founded by Marius Ursache, also popularized the notion of interactive digital immortality. == Cultural and societal impact == Scholars have proposed frameworks and critiques addressing the ethics of these technologies. Tomasz Hollanek and Katarzyna Nowaczyk-Basińska developed a design-ethics taxonomy distinguishing the data donor, data recipient, and interactant. Edina Harbinja and Lilian Edwards formalized the concept of post-mortem privacy, and Carl J. Öhman at the Oxford Internet Institute studied the management of large-scale digital remains. Cultural acceptance varies: while some view them as expressions of remembrance, others regard them as unsettling or ethically problematic. Concerns have been raised about deadbots' potential for creating psychological harm. Griefbots are considered part of the phenomenon of artificial intimacy.
CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance
The CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance are a set of principles intended to guide open data projects in engaging Indigenous Peoples rights and interests. CARE was created in 2019 by the International Indigenous Data Sovereignty Interest Group, a group that is a part of the Research Data Alliance. It outlines collective rights related to open data in the context of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Indigenous data sovereignty. CARE is an acronym which stands for Collective Benefit, Authority to Control, Responsibility, Ethics. The CARE Principles are 'people and purpose-oriented, reflecting the crucial role of data in advancing Indigenous innovation and self-determination', and intended as a complement to the data-oriented perspective of other standards such as FAIR data (findable, accessible, interoperable, reusable). The CARE principles have been embedded into the Beta version of Standardised Data on Initiatives (STARDIT). CARE principles were the basis of a submission to the UN's Global Digital Compact.
Transmission security
Transmission security (TRANSEC) is the component of communications security (COMSEC) that results from the application of measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. Goals of transmission security include: Low probability of interception (LPI) Low probability of detection (LPD) Antijam — resistance to jamming (EPM or ECCM) This involves securing communication links from being compromised by techniques like jamming, eavesdropping, and signal interception. TRANSEC includes the use of frequency hopping, spread spectrum and the physical protection of communication links to obscure the patterns of transmission. It is particularly vital in military and government communication systems, where the security of transmitted data is critical to prevent adversaries from gathering intelligence or disrupting operations. TRANSEC is often implemented alongside COMSEC (Communications Security) to form a comprehensive approach to communication security. Methods used to achieve transmission security include frequency hopping and spread spectrum where the required pseudorandom sequence generation is controlled by a cryptographic algorithm and key. Such keys are known as transmission security keys (TSK). Modern U.S. and NATO TRANSEC-equipped radios include SINCGARS and HAVE QUICK.
Kerckhoffs's principle
Kerckhoffs's principle (also called Kerckhoffs's desideratum, assumption, axiom, doctrine or law) of cryptography was stated by the Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs in the 19th century. The principle holds that a cryptosystem should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. This concept is widely embraced by cryptographers, in contrast to security through obscurity, which is not. Kerckhoffs's principle was phrased by the American mathematician Claude Shannon as "the enemy knows the system", i.e., "one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them". In that form, it is called Shannon's maxim. Another formulation by American researcher and professor Steven M. Bellovin is: In other words—design your system assuming that your opponents know it in detail. (A former official at NSA's National Computer Security Center told me that the standard assumption there was that serial number 1 of any new device was delivered to the Kremlin.) == Origins == The invention of telegraphy radically changed military communications and increased the number of messages that needed to be protected from the enemy dramatically, leading to the development of field ciphers which had to be easy to use without large confidential codebooks prone to capture on the battlefield. It was this environment which led to the development of Kerckhoffs's requirements. Auguste Kerckhoffs was a professor of German language at Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) in Paris. In early 1883, Kerckhoffs's article, La Cryptographie Militaire, was published in two parts in the Journal of Military Science, in which he stated six design rules for military ciphers. Translated from French, they are: The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable; It should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands; It must be possible to communicate and remember the key without using written notes, and correspondents must be able to change or modify it at will; It must be applicable to telegraph communications; It must be portable, and should not require several persons to handle or operate; Lastly, given the circumstances in which it is to be used, the system must be easy to use and should not be stressful to use or require its users to know and comply with a long list of rules. Some are no longer relevant given the ability of computers to perform complex encryption. The second rule, now known as Kerckhoffs's principle, is still critically important. == Explanation of the principle == Kerckhoffs viewed cryptography as a rival to, and a better alternative than, steganographic encoding, which was common in the nineteenth century for hiding the meaning of military messages. One problem with encoding schemes is that they rely on humanly-held secrets such as "dictionaries" which disclose for example, the secret meaning of words. Steganographic-like dictionaries, once revealed, permanently compromise a corresponding encoding system. Another problem is that the risk of exposure increases as the number of users holding the secrets increases. Nineteenth century cryptography, in contrast, used simple tables which provided for the transposition of alphanumeric characters, generally given row-column intersections which could be modified by keys which were generally short, numeric, and could be committed to human memory. The system was considered "indecipherable" because tables and keys do not convey meaning by themselves. Secret messages can be compromised only if a matching set of table, key, and message falls into enemy hands in a relevant time frame. Kerckhoffs viewed tactical messages as only having a few hours of relevance. Systems are not necessarily compromised, because their components (i.e. alphanumeric character tables and keys) can be easily changed. === Advantage of secret keys === Using secure cryptography is supposed to replace the difficult problem of keeping messages secure with a much more manageable one, keeping relatively small keys secure. A system that requires long-term secrecy for something as large and complex as the whole design of a cryptographic system obviously cannot achieve that goal. It only replaces one hard problem with another. However, if a system is secure even when the enemy knows everything except the key, then all that is needed is to manage keeping the keys secret. There are a large number of ways the internal details of a widely used system could be discovered. The most obvious is that someone could bribe, blackmail, or otherwise threaten staff or customers into explaining the system. In war, for example, one side will probably capture some equipment and people from the other side. Each side will also use spies to gather information. If a method involves software, someone could do memory dumps or run the software under the control of a debugger in order to understand the method. If hardware is being used, someone could buy or steal some of the hardware and build whatever programs or gadgets needed to test it. Hardware can also be dismantled so that the chip details can be examined under the microscope. === Maintaining security === A generalization some make from Kerckhoffs's principle is: "The fewer and simpler the secrets that one must keep to ensure system security, the easier it is to maintain system security." Bruce Schneier ties it in with a belief that all security systems must be designed to fail as gracefully as possible: Kerckhoffs's principle applies beyond codes and ciphers to security systems in general: every secret creates a potential failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime cause of brittleness—and therefore something likely to make a system prone to catastrophic collapse. Conversely, openness provides ductility. Any security system depends crucially on keeping some things secret. However, Kerckhoffs's principle points out that the things kept secret ought to be those least costly to change if inadvertently disclosed. For example, a cryptographic algorithm may be implemented by hardware and software that is widely distributed among users. If security depends on keeping that secret, then disclosure leads to major logistic difficulties in developing, testing, and distributing implementations of a new algorithm – it is "brittle". On the other hand, if keeping the algorithm secret is not important, but only the keys used with the algorithm must be secret, then disclosure of the keys simply requires the simpler, less costly process of generating and distributing new keys. == Applications == In accordance with Kerckhoffs's principle, the majority of civilian cryptography makes use of publicly known algorithms. By contrast, ciphers used to protect classified government or military information are often kept secret (see Type 1 encryption). However, it should not be assumed that government/military ciphers must be kept secret to maintain security. It is possible that they are intended to be as cryptographically sound as public algorithms, and the decision to keep them secret is in keeping with a layered security posture. == Security through obscurity == It is moderately common for companies to keep the inner workings of a system secret. Some argue this "security by obscurity" makes the product safer and less vulnerable to attack. A counter-argument is that keeping the innards secret may improve security in the short term, but in the long run, only systems that have been published and analyzed should be trusted. Steven Bellovin and Randy Bush commented: Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous Hiding security vulnerabilities in algorithms, software, and/or hardware decreases the likelihood they will be repaired and increases the likelihood that they can and will be exploited. Discouraging or outlawing discussion of weaknesses and vulnerabilities is extremely dangerous and deleterious to the security of computer systems, the network, and its citizens. Open Discussion Encourages Better Security The long history of cryptography and cryptoanalysis has shown time and time again that open discussion and analysis of algorithms exposes weaknesses not thought of by the original authors, and thereby leads to better and more secure algorithms. As Kerckhoffs noted about cipher systems in 1883 [Kerc83], "Il faut qu'il n'exige pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les mains de l'ennemi." (Roughly, "the system must not require secrecy and must be able to be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble.")
Direct Graphics Access
Direct Graphics Access is a plug-in for the X display servers that allows client programs direct access to the frame buffer. Graphics hardware communicates via a chunk of memory called a frame buffer. This is an array of values that represent pixel color values on the screen. Writing the appropriate values into the frame buffer therefore allows a program to paint areas of the screen. However, as with any shared resource, problems occur when multiple programs attempt to access the same resource, as they tend to write over each other's work. In the X Window System, this is solved by having a central display server that mediates between programs that want to draw on the screen. The display server also used to perform a lot of the drawing work, allowing programs to say Draw me a circle of this radius filled with this pattern or draw this text in this font. The X server does all this work, freeing programmers from having to write their own drawing code. Another advantage of the X architecture is that it works over a network, allowing programs on one machine to display output on the screen of another. Direct Graphics Access allows direct access to the frame buffer and the X-server hands over control of the frame buffer to the client program and waits for the client to hand it back. This means that the client program has control of the whole screen, and so it is mostly used for full-screen video/games.
Hardware random number generator
In computing, a hardware random number generator (HRNG), true random number generator (TRNG), non-deterministic random bit generator (NRBG), or physical random number generator is a device that generates random numbers from a physical process capable of producing entropy, unlike a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) that utilizes a deterministic algorithm and non-physical nondeterministic random bit generators that do not include hardware dedicated to generation of entropy. Many natural phenomena generate low-level, statistically random "noise" signals, including thermal and shot noise, jitter and metastability of electronic circuits, Brownian motion, and atmospheric noise. Researchers also used the photoelectric effect, involving a beam splitter, other quantum phenomena, and even nuclear decay (due to practical considerations the latter, as well as the atmospheric noise, is not viable except for fairly restricted applications or online distribution services). While "classical" (non-quantum) phenomena are not truly random, an unpredictable physical system is usually acceptable as a source of randomness, so the qualifiers "true" and "physical" are used interchangeably. A hardware random number generator is expected to output near-perfect random numbers ("full entropy"). A physical process usually does not have this property, and a practical TRNG typically includes a few blocks: a noise source that implements the physical process producing the entropy. Usually this process is analog, so a digitizer is used to convert the output of the analog source into a binary representation; a conditioner (randomness extractor) that improves the quality of the random bits; health tests. TRNGs are mostly used in cryptographical algorithms that get completely broken if the random numbers have low entropy, so the testing functionality is usually included. Hardware random number generators generally produce only a limited number of random bits per second. In order to increase the available output data rate, they are often used to generate the "seed" for a faster PRNG. PRNG also helps with the noise source "anonymization" (whitening out the noise source identifying characteristics) and entropy extraction. With a proper PRNG algorithm selected (cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator, CSPRNG), the combination can satisfy the requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards and Common Criteria standards. == Uses == Hardware random number generators can be used in any application that needs randomness. However, in many scientific applications additional cost and complexity of a TRNG (when compared with pseudo random number generators) provide no meaningful benefits. TRNGs have additional drawbacks for data science and statistical applications: impossibility to re-run a series of numbers unless they are stored, reliance on an analog physical entity can obscure the failure of the source. The TRNGs therefore are primarily used in the applications where their unpredictability and the impossibility to re-run the sequence of numbers are crucial to the success of the implementation: in cryptography and gambling machines. === Cryptography === The major use for hardware random number generators is in the field of data encryption, for example to create random cryptographic keys and nonces needed to encrypt and sign data. In addition to randomness, there are at least two additional requirements imposed by the cryptographic applications: forward secrecy guarantees that the knowledge of the past output and internal state of the device should not enable the attacker to predict future data; backward secrecy protects the "opposite direction": knowledge of the output and internal state in the future should not divulge the preceding data. A typical way to fulfill these requirements is to use a TRNG to seed a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator. == History == Physical devices were used to generate random numbers for thousands of years, primarily for gambling. Dice in particular have been known for more than 5000 years (found on locations in modern Iraq and Iran), and flipping a coin (thus producing a random bit) dates at least to the times of ancient Rome. The first documented use of a physical random number generator for scientific purposes was by Francis Galton (1890). He devised a way to sample a probability distribution using a common gambling die. In addition to the top digit, Galton also looked at the face of a die closest to him, thus creating 64 = 24 outcomes (about 4.6 bits of randomness). Kendall and Babington-Smith (1938) used a fast-rotating 10-sector disk that was illuminated by periodic bursts of light. The sampling was done by a human who wrote the number under the light beam onto a pad. The device was utilized to produce a 100,000-digit random number table (at the time such tables were used for statistical experiments, like PRNG nowadays). On 29 April 1947, the RAND Corporation began generating random digits with an "electronic roulette wheel", consisting of a random frequency pulse source of about 100,000 pulses per second gated once per second with a constant frequency pulse and fed into a five-bit binary counter. Douglas Aircraft built the equipment, implementing Cecil Hasting's suggestion (RAND P-113) for a noise source (most likely the well known behavior of the 6D4 miniature gas thyratron tube, when placed in a magnetic field). Twenty of the 32 possible counter values were mapped onto the 10 decimal digits and the other 12 counter values were discarded. The results of a long run from the RAND machine, filtered and tested, were converted into a table, which originally existed only as a deck of punched cards, but was later published in 1955 as a book, 50 rows of 50 digits on each page (A Million Random Digits with 100,000 Normal Deviates). The RAND table was a significant breakthrough in delivering random numbers because such a large and carefully prepared table had never before been available. It has been a useful source for simulations, modeling, and for deriving the arbitrary constants in cryptographic algorithms to demonstrate that the constants had not been selected maliciously ("nothing up my sleeve numbers"). Since the early 1950s, research into TRNGs has been highly active, with thousands of research works published and about 2000 patents granted by 2017. == Physical phenomena with random properties == Multiple different TRNG designs were proposed over time with a large variety of noise sources and digitization techniques ("harvesting"). However, practical considerations (size, power, cost, performance, robustness) dictate the following desirable traits: use of a commonly available inexpensive silicon process; exclusive use of digital design techniques. This allows an easier system-on-chip integration and enables the use of FPGAs; compact and low-power design. This discourages use of analog components (e.g., amplifiers); mathematical justification of the entropy collection mechanisms. Stipčević & Koç in 2014 classified the physical phenomena used to implement TRNG into four groups: electrical noise; free-running oscillators; chaos; quantum effects. === Electrical noise-based RNG === Noise-based RNGs generally follow the same outline: the source of a noise generator is fed into a comparator. If the voltage is above threshold, the comparator output is 1, otherwise 0. The random bit value is latched using a flip-flop. Sources of noise vary and include: Johnson–Nyquist noise ("thermal noise"); Zener noise; avalanche breakdown. The drawbacks of using noise sources for an RNG design are: noise levels are hard to control, they vary with environmental changes and device-to-device; calibration processes needed to ensure a guaranteed amount of entropy are time-consuming; noise levels are typically low, thus the design requires power-hungry amplifiers. The sensitivity of amplifier inputs enables manipulation by an attacker; circuitry located nearby generates a lot of non-random noise thus lowering the entropy; a proof of randomness is near-impossible as multiple interacting physical processes are involved. === Chaos-based RNG === The idea of chaos-based noise stems from the use of a complex system that is hard to characterize by observing its behavior over time. For example, lasers can be put into (undesirable in other applications) chaos mode with chaotically fluctuating power, with power detected using a photodiode and sampled by a comparator. The design can be quite small, as all photonics elements can be integrated on-chip. Stipčević & Koç characterize this technique as "most objectionable", mostly due to the fact that chaotic behavior is usually controlled by a differential equation and no new randomness is introduced, thus there is a possibility of the chaos-based TRNG producing a limited subset of possible output strings. === Free-running oscillators-based RNG === The TRNGs based on a free-running oscilla