AppyStore is a comprehensive learning videos and games app for kids up to the age of 8 years. The platform developed by Mauj Mobile, a mobile value-added services (VAS) provider curates content to help in child development by leveraging technology. Mauj is funded by Sequoia Capital, Westbridge Capital and Intel Capital. == Background == AppyStore was launched in 2014 as a platform providing content for kids between the ages of 1.5 and 6 years. AppyStore subsequently extended its services for kids up to 8 years of age. The company operates on a subscription-based model and claims to have 5,000 learning games and videos segregated in 18 learning areas developed to help children gain optimal skills and qualities. According to an article published in Business Standard, the application is claimed to be one of the top 5 apps that help to enhance the logical and imaginative capabilities of children. AppyStore was awarded the Best app for kids by Google Play in December 2017. == Service == The company provides content via a website and an Android app. The website and android app provide learning games, rhymes, phonics, reading, stories, science, numbers, maths, logic videos comprising puzzles, worksheets, videos and fun activities and the premium subscription also includes physical worksheets which are home delivered. This content is educational and has been handpicked by teachers and experts with an understanding of the major areas of child development milestones for children up to 8 years of age. The mobile application also allows parents to track the progress of their child on the basis of the number of videos viewed.
Period-tracking app
Period-tracking apps are mobile applications used to track the menstrual cycle. They may be used to predict menstruation, to plan fertility, and to track health. Examples include Clue, Glow, and Flo. == Function == Users enter their dates of menstruation, and frequently other experiences such as vaginal discharge and spotting; premenstrual syndrome; changes in mood; menstrual cramps and other pain; and other symptoms such as appetite changes, bloating, and acne. The apps predict the date of users' next period, and often also their ovulation and fertile window. Some apps have additional features such as contraceptive reminders, educational content, tracking modes for use during pregnancy, or the ability to share one's menstrual cycle data with a partner. == Privacy == Period-tracking apps collect personal health data, potentially raising concerns about privacy. Researchers have warned that data may be transferred to third parties and used for consumer profiling and targeted advertising, used for employment and health insurance discrimination, or used to prosecute users for seeking abortions. After the 2022 decision by the United States Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade, and the bans and restrictions on abortion in many US states that followed, many American women uninstalled the apps amidst fear that the data could be accessed by law enforcement and used to prosecute users. WIRED published a ranking of several period-tracking apps by data privacy.
Cryptographic Module Testing Laboratory
Cryptographic Module Testing Laboratory (CMTL) is an information technology (IT) computer security testing laboratory that is accredited to conduct cryptographic module evaluations for conformance to the FIPS 140-2 U.S. Government standard. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredits CMTLs to meet Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) standards and procedures. This has been replaced by FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). == CMTL requirements == These laboratories must meet the following requirements: NIST Handbook 150, NVLAP Procedures and General Requirements NIST Handbook 150-17 Information Technology Security Testing - Cryptographic Module Testing NVLAP Specific Operations Checklist for Cryptographic Module Testing == FIPS 140-2 in relation to the Common Criteria == A CMTL can also be a Common Criteria (CC) Testing Laboratory (CCTL). The CC and FIPS 140-2 are different in the abstractness and focus of evaluation. FIPS 140-2 testing is against a defined cryptographic module and provides a suite of conformance tests to four FIPS 140 security levels. FIPS 140-2 describes the requirements for cryptographic modules and includes such areas as physical security, key management, self tests, roles and services, etc. The standard was initially developed in 1994 - prior to the development of the CC. The CC is an evaluation against a Protection Profile (PP), or security target (ST). Typically, a PP covers a broad range of products. A CC evaluation does not supersede or replace a validation to either FIPS 140-1, FIPS140-2 or FIPS 140-3. The four security levels in FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 do not map directly to specific CC EALs or to CC functional requirements. A CC certificate cannot be a substitute for a FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2 certificate. If the operational environment is a modifiable operational environment, the operating system requirements of the Common Criteria are applicable at FIPS Security Levels 2 and above. FIPS 140-1 required evaluated operating systems that referenced the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) classes C2, B1 and B2. However, TCSEC is no longer in use and has been replaced by the Common Criteria. Consequently, FIPS 140-2 now references the Common Criteria. FIPS 140-2 or FIPS 140-3 validation efforts can be in some parts reused in Common Criteria evaluations, specifically in areas related to entropy source and cryptographic algorithms.
IBM 37xx
IBM 37xx (or 37x5) is a family of IBM Systems Network Architecture (SNA) programmable front-end processors used mainly in mainframe environments. All members of the family ran one of three IBM-supplied programs. Emulation Program (EP) mimicked the operation of the older IBM 270x non-programmable controllers. Network Control Program (NCP) supported Systems Network Architecture devices. Partitioned Emulation Program (PEP) combined the functions of the two. == Models == === 370x series === 3705 — the oldest of the family, introduced in 1972 to replace the non-programmable IBM 270x family. The 3705 could control up to 352 communications lines. 3704 was a smaller version, introduced in 1973. It supported up to 32 lines. === 371x === The 3710 communications controller was introduced in 1984. === 372x series === The 3725 and the 3720 systems were announced in 1983. The 3725 replaced the hardware line scanners used on previous 370x machines with multiple microcoded processors. The 3725 was a large-scale node and front end processor. The 3720 was a smaller version of the 3725, which was sometimes used as a remote concentrator. The 3726 was an expansion unit for the 3725. With the expansion unit, the 3725 could support up to 256 lines at data rates up to 256 kbit/s, and connect to up to eight mainframe channels. Marketing of the 372x machines was discontinued in 1989. IBM discontinued support for the 3705, 3720, 3725 in 1999. === 374x series === The 3745, announced in 1988, provides up to eight T1 circuits. At the time of the announcement, IBM was estimated to have nearly 85% of the over US$825 million market for communications controllers over rivals such as NCR Comten and Amdahl Corporation. The 3745 is no longer marketed, but still supported and used. The 3746 "Nways Controller" model 900, unveiled in 1992, was an expansion unit for the 3745 supporting additional Token Ring and ESCON connections. A stand-alone model 950 appeared in 1995. == Successors == IBM no longer manufactures 37xx processors. The last models, the 3745/46, were withdrawn from marketing in 2002. Replacement software products are Communications Controller for Linux on System z and Enterprise Extender. == Clones == Several companies produced clones of 37xx controllers, including NCR COMTEN and Amdahl Corporation.
Undeniable signature
An undeniable signature is a digital signature scheme which allows the signer to be selective to whom they allow to verify signatures. The scheme adds explicit signature repudiation, preventing a signer later refusing to verify a signature by omission; a situation that would devalue the signature in the eyes of the verifier. It was invented by David Chaum and Hans van Antwerpen in 1989. == Overview == In this scheme, a signer possessing a private key can publish a signature of a message. However, the signature reveals nothing to a recipient/verifier of the message and signature without taking part in either of two interactive protocols: Confirmation protocol, which confirms that a candidate is a valid signature of the message issued by the signer, identified by the public key. Disavowal protocol, which confirms that a candidate is not a valid signature of the message issued by the signer. The motivation for the scheme is to allow the signer to choose to whom signatures are verified. However, that the signer might claim the signature is invalid at any later point, by refusing to take part in verification, would devalue signatures to verifiers. The disavowal protocol distinguishes these cases removing the signer's plausible deniability. It is important that the confirmation and disavowal exchanges are not transferable. They achieve this by having the property of zero-knowledge; both parties can create transcripts of both confirmation and disavowal that are indistinguishable, to a third-party, of correct exchanges. The designated verifier signature scheme improves upon deniable signatures by allowing, for each signature, the interactive portion of the scheme to be offloaded onto another party, a designated verifier, reducing the burden on the signer. == Zero-knowledge protocol == The following protocol was suggested by David Chaum. A group, G, is chosen in which the discrete logarithm problem is intractable, and all operation in the scheme take place in this group. Commonly, this will be the finite cyclic group of order p contained in Z/nZ, with p being a large prime number; this group is equipped with the group operation of integer multiplication modulo n. An arbitrary primitive element (or generator), g, of G is chosen; computed powers of g then combine obeying fixed axioms. Alice generates a key pair, randomly chooses a private key, x, and then derives and publishes the public key, y = gx. === Message signing === Alice signs the message, m, by computing and publishing the signature, z = mx. === Confirmation (i.e., avowal) protocol === Bob wishes to verify the signature, z, of m by Alice under the key, y. Bob picks two random numbers: a and b, and uses them to blind the message, sending to Alice: c = magb. Alice picks a random number, q, uses it to blind, c, and then signing this using her private key, x, sending to Bob: s1 = cgq ands2 = s1x. Note that s1x = (cgq)x = (magb)xgqx = (mx)a(gx)b+q = zayb+q. Bob reveals a and b. Alice verifies that a and b are the correct blind values, then, if so, reveals q. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. Bob verifies s1 = cgq, proving q has not been chosen dishonestly, and s2 = zayb+q, proving z is valid signature issued by Alice's key. Note that zayb+q = (mx)a(gx)b+q. Alice can cheat at step 2 by attempting to randomly guess s2. === Disavowal protocol === Alice wishes to convince Bob that z is not a valid signature of m under the key, gx; i.e., z ≠ mx. Alice and Bob have agreed an integer, k, which sets the computational burden on Alice and the likelihood that she should succeed by chance. Bob picks random values, s ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} and a, and sends: v1 = msga and v2 = zsya, where exponentiating by a is used to blind the sent values. Note that v2 = zsya = (mx)s(gx)a = v1x. Alice, using her private key, computes v1x and then the quotient, v1xv2−1 = (msga)x(zsgxa)−1 = msxz−s = (mxz−1)s. Thus, v1xv2−1 = 1, unless z ≠ mx. Alice then tests v1xv2−1 for equality against the values: (mxz−1)i for i ∈ {0, 1, …, k}; which are calculated by repeated multiplication of mxz−1 (rather than exponentiating for each i). If the test succeeds, Alice conjectures the relevant i to be s; otherwise, she conjectures random value. Where z = mx, (mxz−1)i = v1xv2−1 = 1 for all i, s is unrecoverable. Alice commits to i: she picks a random r and sends hash(r, i) to Bob. Bob reveals a. Alice confirms that a is the correct blind (i.e., v1 and v2 can be generated using it), then, if so, reveals r. Revealing these blinds makes the exchange zero knowledge. Bob checks hash(r, i) = hash(r, s), proving Alice knows s, hence z ≠ mx. If Alice attempts to cheat at step 3 by guessing s at random, the probability of succeeding is 1/(k + 1). So, if k = 1023 and the protocol is conducted ten times, her chances are 1 to 2100.
Eigenface
An eigenface ( EYE-gən-) is the name given to a set of eigenvectors when used in the computer vision problem of human face recognition. The approach of using eigenfaces for recognition was developed by Sirovich and Kirby and used by Matthew Turk and Alex Pentland in face classification. The eigenvectors are derived from the covariance matrix of the probability distribution over the high-dimensional vector space of face images. The eigenfaces themselves form a basis set of all images used to construct the covariance matrix. This produces dimension reduction by allowing the smaller set of basis images to represent the original training images. Classification can be achieved by comparing how faces are represented by the basis set. == History == The eigenface approach began with a search for a low-dimensional representation of face images. Sirovich and Kirby showed that principal component analysis could be used on a collection of face images to form a set of basis features. These basis images, known as eigenpictures, could be linearly combined to reconstruct images in the original training set. If the training set consists of M images, principal component analysis could form a basis set of N images, where N < M. The reconstruction error is reduced by increasing the number of eigenpictures; however, the number needed is always chosen less than M. For example, if you need to generate a number of N eigenfaces for a training set of M face images, you can say that each face image can be made up of "proportions" of all the K "features" or eigenfaces: Face image1 = (23% of E1) + (2% of E2) + (51% of E3) + ... + (1% En). In 1991 M. Turk and A. Pentland expanded these results and presented the eigenface method of face recognition. In addition to designing a system for automated face recognition using eigenfaces, they showed a way of calculating the eigenvectors of a covariance matrix such that computers of the time could perform eigen-decomposition on a large number of face images. Face images usually occupy a high-dimensional space and conventional principal component analysis was intractable on such data sets. Turk and Pentland's paper demonstrated ways to extract the eigenvectors based on matrices sized by the number of images rather than the number of pixels. Once established, the eigenface method was expanded to include methods of preprocessing to improve accuracy. Multiple manifold approaches were also used to build sets of eigenfaces for different subjects and different features, such as the eyes. == Generation == A set of eigenfaces can be generated by performing a mathematical process called principal component analysis (PCA) on a large set of images depicting different human faces. Informally, eigenfaces can be considered a set of "standardized face ingredients", derived from statistical analysis of many pictures of faces. Any human face can be considered to be a combination of these standard faces. For example, one's face might be composed of the average face plus 10% from eigenface 1, 55% from eigenface 2, and even −3% from eigenface 3. Remarkably, it does not take many eigenfaces combined together to achieve a fair approximation of most faces. Also, because a person's face is not recorded by a digital photograph, but instead as just a list of values (one value for each eigenface in the database used), much less space is taken for each person's face. The eigenfaces that are created will appear as light and dark areas that are arranged in a specific pattern. This pattern is how different features of a face are singled out to be evaluated and scored. There will be a pattern to evaluate symmetry, whether there is any style of facial hair, where the hairline is, or an evaluation of the size of the nose or mouth. Other eigenfaces have patterns that are less simple to identify, and the image of the eigenface may look very little like a face. The technique used in creating eigenfaces and using them for recognition is also used outside of face recognition: handwriting recognition, lip reading, voice recognition, sign language/hand gestures interpretation and medical imaging analysis. Therefore, some do not use the term eigenface, but prefer to use 'eigenimage'. === Practical implementation === To create a set of eigenfaces, one must: Prepare a training set of face images. The pictures constituting the training set should have been taken under the same lighting conditions, and must be normalized to have the eyes and mouths aligned across all images. They must also be all resampled to a common pixel resolution (r × c). Each image is treated as one vector, simply by concatenating the rows of pixels in the original image, resulting in a single column with r × c elements. For this implementation, it is assumed that all images of the training set are stored in a single matrix T, where each column of the matrix is an image. Subtract the mean. The average image a has to be calculated and then subtracted from each original image in T. Calculate the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix S. Each eigenvector has the same dimensionality (number of components) as the original images, and thus can itself be seen as an image. The eigenvectors of this covariance matrix are therefore called eigenfaces. They are the directions in which the images differ from the mean image. Usually this will be a computationally expensive step (if at all possible), but the practical applicability of eigenfaces stems from the possibility to compute the eigenvectors of S efficiently, without ever computing S explicitly, as detailed below. Choose the principal components. Sort the eigenvalues in descending order and arrange eigenvectors accordingly. The number of principal components k is determined arbitrarily by setting a threshold ε on the total variance. Total variance v = ( λ 1 + λ 2 + . . . + λ n ) {\displaystyle v=(\lambda _{1}+\lambda _{2}+...+\lambda _{n})} , n = number of components, and λ {\displaystyle \lambda } represents component eigenvalue. k is the smallest number that satisfies ( λ 1 + λ 2 + . . . + λ k ) v > ϵ {\displaystyle {\frac {(\lambda _{1}+\lambda _{2}+...+\lambda _{k})}{v}}>\epsilon } These eigenfaces can now be used to represent both existing and new faces: we can project a new (mean-subtracted) image on the eigenfaces and thereby record how that new face differs from the mean face. The eigenvalues associated with each eigenface represent how much the images in the training set vary from the mean image in that direction. Information is lost by projecting the image on a subset of the eigenvectors, but losses are minimized by keeping those eigenfaces with the largest eigenvalues. For instance, working with a 100 × 100 image will produce 10,000 eigenvectors. In practical applications, most faces can typically be identified using a projection on between 100 and 150 eigenfaces, so that most of the 10,000 eigenvectors can be discarded. === Matlab example code === Here is an example of calculating eigenfaces with Extended Yale Face Database B. To evade computational and storage bottleneck, the face images are sampled down by a factor 4×4=16. Note that although the covariance matrix S generates many eigenfaces, only a fraction of those are needed to represent the majority of the faces. For example, to represent 95% of the total variation of all face images, only the first 43 eigenfaces are needed. To calculate this result, implement the following code: === Computing the eigenvectors === Performing PCA directly on the covariance matrix of the images is often computationally infeasible. If small images are used, say 100 × 100 pixels, each image is a point in a 10,000-dimensional space and the covariance matrix S is a matrix of 10,000 × 10,000 = 108 elements. However the rank of the covariance matrix is limited by the number of training examples: if there are N training examples, there will be at most N − 1 eigenvectors with non-zero eigenvalues. If the number of training examples is smaller than the dimensionality of the images, the principal components can be computed more easily as follows. Let T be the matrix of preprocessed training examples, where each column contains one mean-subtracted image. The covariance matrix can then be computed as S = TTT and the eigenvector decomposition of S is given by S v i = T T T v i = λ i v i {\displaystyle \mathbf {Sv} _{i}=\mathbf {T} \mathbf {T} ^{T}\mathbf {v} _{i}=\lambda _{i}\mathbf {v} _{i}} However TTT is a large matrix, and if instead we take the eigenvalue decomposition of T T T u i = λ i u i {\displaystyle \mathbf {T} ^{T}\mathbf {T} \mathbf {u} _{i}=\lambda _{i}\mathbf {u} _{i}} then we notice that by pre-multiplying both sides of the equation with T, we obtain T T T T u i = λ i T u i {\displaystyle \mathbf {T} \mathbf {T} ^{T}\mathbf {T} \mathbf {u} _{i}=\lambda _{i}\mathbf {T} \mathbf {u} _{i}} Meaning that, if ui is an eigenvector of TTT, then vi = Tui is an eigenvector of S. If we have
Interplanetary Internet
The interplanetary Internet is a conceived computer network in space, consisting of a set of network nodes that can communicate with each other. These nodes are the planet's orbiters and landers, and the Earth ground stations. For example, the orbiters collect the scientific data from the Curiosity rover on Mars through near-Mars communication links, transmit the data to Earth through direct links from the Mars orbiters to the Earth ground stations via the NASA Deep Space Network, and finally the data routed through Earth's internal internet. Interplanetary communication is greatly delayed by interplanetary distances, as data transmission can only go as fast as the speed of light, so a new set of protocols and technologies that are tolerant to large delays and errors are required. The interplanetary Internet has been envisioned as a store and forward network of internets that is often disconnected, has a wireless backbone fraught with error-prone links and delays ranging from tens of minutes to even hours, even when there is a connection. As of 2024 agencies and companies working towards bringing the network to fruition include NASA, ESA, SpaceX and Blue Origin. == Challenges and reasons == In the core implementation of Interplanetary Internet, satellites orbiting a planet communicate to other planet's satellites. Simultaneously, these planets revolve around the Sun with long distances, and thus many challenges face the communications. The reasons and the resultant challenges are: The motion and long distances between planets: The interplanetary communication is greatly delayed due to the interplanetary distances and the motion of the planets. The delay is variable and long, ranging from a couple of minutes (Earth-to-Mars), to a couple of hours (Pluto-to-Earth), depending on their relative positions. The interplanetary communication also suspends due to the solar conjunction, when the sun's radiation hinders the direct communication between the planets. As such, the communication characterizes lossy links and intermittent link connectivity. Low embeddable payload: Satellites can only carry a small payload, which poses challenges to the power, mass, size, and cost for communication hardware design. An asymmetric bandwidth would be the result of this limitation. This asymmetry reaches ratios up to 1000:1 as downlink:uplink bandwidth portion. Absence of fixed infrastructure: The graph of participating nodes in a specific planet-to-planet communication keeps changing over time, due to the constant motion. The routes of the planet-to-planet communication are planned and scheduled rather than being opportunistic. The Interplanetary Internet design must address these challenges to operate successfully and achieve good communication with other planets. It also must use the few available resources efficiently in the system. == Development == Space communication technology has steadily evolved from expensive, one-of-a-kind point-to-point architectures, to the re-use of technology on successive missions, to the development of standard protocols agreed upon by space agencies of many countries. This last phase has gone on since 1982 through the efforts of the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), a body composed of the major space agencies of the world. It has 11 member agencies, 32 observer agencies, and over 119 industrial associates. The evolution of space data system standards has gone on in parallel with the evolution of the Internet, with conceptual cross-pollination where fruitful, but largely as a separate evolution. Since the late 1990s, familiar Internet protocols and CCSDS space link protocols have integrated and converged in several ways; for example, the successful FTP file transfer to Earth-orbiting STRV 1B on January 2, 1996, which ran FTP over the CCSDS IPv4-like Space Communications Protocol Specifications (SCPS) protocols. Internet Protocol use without CCSDS has taken place on spacecraft, e.g., demonstrations on the UoSAT-12 satellite, and operationally on the Disaster Monitoring Constellation. Having reached the era where networking and IP on board spacecraft have been shown to be feasible and reliable, a forward-looking study of the bigger picture was the next phase. The Interplanetary Internet study at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was started by a team of scientists at JPL led by internet pioneer Vinton Cerf and the late Adrian Hooke. Cerf was appointed as a distinguished visiting scientist at JPL in 1998, while Hooke was one of the founders and directors of CCSDS. While IP-like SCPS protocols are feasible for short hops, such as ground station to orbiter, rover to lander, lander to orbiter, probe to flyby, and so on, delay-tolerant networking is needed to get information from one region of the Solar System to another. It becomes apparent that the concept of a region is a natural architectural factoring of the Interplanetary Internet. A region is an area where the characteristics of communication are the same. Region characteristics include communications, security, the maintenance of resources, perhaps ownership, and other factors. The Interplanetary Internet is a "network of regional internets". What is needed then, is a standard way to achieve end-to-end communication through multiple regions in a disconnected, variable-delay environment using a generalized suite of protocols. Examples of regions might include the terrestrial Internet as a region, a region on the surface of the Moon or Mars, or a ground-to-orbit region. The recognition of this requirement led to the concept of a "bundle" as a high-level way to address the generalized Store-and-Forward problem. Bundles are an area of new protocol development in the upper layers of the OSI model, above the Transport Layer with the goal of addressing the issue of bundling store-and-forward information so that it can reliably traverse radically dissimilar environments constituting a "network of regional internets". Delay-tolerant networking (DTN) was designed to enable standardized communications over long distances and through time delays. At its core is the Bundle Protocol (BP), which is similar to the Internet Protocol, or IP, that serves as the heart of the Internet here on Earth. The big difference between the regular Internet Protocol (IP) and the Bundle Protocol is that IP assumes a seamless end-to-end data path, while BP is built to account for errors and disconnections — glitches that commonly plague deep-space communications. Bundle Service Layering, implemented as the Bundling protocol suite for delay-tolerant networking, will provide general-purpose delay-tolerant protocol services in support of a range of applications: custody transfer, segmentation and reassembly, end-to-end reliability, end-to-end security, and end-to-end routing among them. The Bundle Protocol was first tested in space on the UK-DMC satellite in 2008. An example of one of these end-to-end applications flown on a space mission is the CCSDS File Delivery Protocol (CFDP), used on the Deep Impact comet mission. CFDP is an international standard for automatic, reliable file transfer in both directions. CFDP should not be confused with Coherent File Distribution Protocol, which has the same acronym and is an IETF-documented experimental protocol for rapidly deploying files to multiple targets in a highly networked environment. In addition to reliably copying a file from one entity (such as a spacecraft or ground station) to another entity, CFDP has the capability to reliably transmit arbitrarily small messages defined by the user, in the metadata accompanying the file, and to reliably transmit commands relating to file system management that are to be executed automatically on the remote end-point entity (such as a spacecraft) upon successful reception of a file. == Protocol == The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) packet telemetry standard defines the protocol used for the transmission of spacecraft instrument data over the deep-space channel. Under this standard, an image or other data sent from a spacecraft instrument is transmitted using one or more packets. === CCSDS packet definition === A packet is a block of data with length that can vary between successive packets, ranging from 7 to 65,542 bytes, including the packet header. Packetized data is transmitted via frames, which are fixed-length data blocks. The size of a frame, including frame header and control information, can range up to 2048 bytes. Packet sizes are fixed during the development phase. Because packet lengths are variable but frame lengths are fixed, packet boundaries usually do not coincide with frame boundaries. === Telecom processing notes === Data in a frame is typically protected from channel errors by error-correcting codes. Even when the channel errors exceed the correction capability of the error-correcting code, the presence of errors is nearly always detected by the e