Confirmatory blockmodeling is a deductive approach in blockmodeling, where a blockmodel (or part of it) is prespecify before the analysis, and then the analysis is fit to this model. When only a part of analysis is prespecify (like individual cluster(s) or location of the block types), it is called partially confirmatory blockmodeling. This is so-called indirect approach, where the blockmodeling is done on the blockmodel fitting (e.g., a priori hypothesized blockmodel). Opposite approach to the confirmatory blockmodeling is an inductive exploratory blockmodeling.
VideoPoet
VideoPoet is a large language model developed by Google Research in 2023 for video making. It can be asked to animate still images. The model accepts text, images, and videos as inputs, with a program to add feature for any input to any format generated content. VideoPoet was publicly announced on December 19, 2023. It uses an autoregressive language model.
Mean shift
Mean shift is a non-parametric feature-space mathematical analysis technique for locating the maxima of a density function, a so-called mode-seeking algorithm. Application domains include cluster analysis in computer vision and image processing. == History == The mean shift procedure is usually credited to work by Fukunaga and Hostetler in 1975. It is, however, reminiscent of earlier work by Schnell in 1964. == Overview == Mean shift is a procedure for locating the maxima—the modes—of a density function given discrete data sampled from that function. This is an iterative method, and we start with an initial estimate x {\displaystyle x} . Let a kernel function K ( x i − x ) {\displaystyle K(x_{i}-x)} be given. This function determines the weight of nearby points for re-estimation of the mean. Typically a Gaussian kernel on the distance to the current estimate is used, K ( x i − x ) = e − c | | x i − x | | 2 {\displaystyle K(x_{i}-x)=e^{-c||x_{i}-x||^{2}}} . The weighted mean of the density in the window determined by K {\displaystyle K} is m ( x ) = ∑ x i ∈ N ( x ) K ( x i − x ) x i ∑ x i ∈ N ( x ) K ( x i − x ) {\displaystyle m(x)={\frac {\sum _{x_{i}\in N(x)}K(x_{i}-x)x_{i}}{\sum _{x_{i}\in N(x)}K(x_{i}-x)}}} where N ( x ) {\displaystyle N(x)} is the neighborhood of x {\displaystyle x} , a set of points for which K ( x i − x ) ≠ 0 {\displaystyle K(x_{i}-x)\neq 0} . The difference m ( x ) − x {\displaystyle m(x)-x} is called mean shift in Fukunaga and Hostetler. The mean-shift algorithm now sets x ← m ( x ) {\displaystyle x\leftarrow m(x)} , and repeats the estimation until m ( x ) {\displaystyle m(x)} converges. Although the mean shift algorithm has been widely used in many applications, a rigid proof for the convergence of the algorithm using a general kernel in a high dimensional space is still not known. Aliyari Ghassabeh showed the convergence of the mean shift algorithm in one dimension with a differentiable, convex, and strictly decreasing profile function. However, the one-dimensional case has limited real world applications. Also, the convergence of the algorithm in higher dimensions with a finite number of the stationary (or isolated) points has been proved. However, sufficient conditions for a general kernel function to have finite stationary (or isolated) points have not been provided. Gaussian Mean-Shift is an Expectation–maximization algorithm. == Details == Let data be a finite set S {\displaystyle S} embedded in the n {\displaystyle n} -dimensional Euclidean space, X {\displaystyle X} . Let K {\displaystyle K} be a flat kernel that is the characteristic function of the λ {\displaystyle \lambda } -ball in X {\displaystyle X} , In each iteration of the algorithm, s ← m ( s ) {\displaystyle s\leftarrow m(s)} is performed for all s ∈ S {\displaystyle s\in S} simultaneously. The first question, then, is how to estimate the density function given a sparse set of samples. One of the simplest approaches is to just smooth the data, e.g., by convolving it with a fixed kernel of width h {\displaystyle h} , where x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} are the input samples and k ( r ) {\displaystyle k(r)} is the kernel function (or Parzen window). h {\displaystyle h} is the only parameter in the algorithm and is called the bandwidth. This approach is known as kernel density estimation or the Parzen window technique. Once we have computed f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} from the equation above, we can find its local maxima using gradient ascent or some other optimization technique. The problem with this "brute force" approach is that, for higher dimensions, it becomes computationally prohibitive to evaluate f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} over the complete search space. Instead, mean shift uses a variant of what is known in the optimization literature as multiple restart gradient descent. Starting at some guess for a local maximum, y k {\displaystyle y_{k}} , which can be a random input data point x 1 {\displaystyle x_{1}} , mean shift computes the gradient of the density estimate f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} at y k {\displaystyle y_{k}} and takes an uphill step in that direction. == Types of kernels == Kernel definition: Let X {\displaystyle X} be the n {\displaystyle n} -dimensional Euclidean space, R n {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{n}} . The norm of x {\displaystyle x} is a non-negative number, ‖ x ‖ 2 = x ⊤ x ≥ 0 {\displaystyle \|x\|^{2}=x^{\top }x\geq 0} . A function K : X → R {\displaystyle K:X\rightarrow \mathbb {R} } is said to be a kernel if there exists a profile, k : [ 0 , ∞ ] → R {\displaystyle k:[0,\infty ]\rightarrow \mathbb {R} } , such that K ( x ) = k ( ‖ x ‖ 2 ) {\displaystyle K(x)=k(\|x\|^{2})} and k is non-negative. k is non-increasing: k ( a ) ≥ k ( b ) {\displaystyle k(a)\geq k(b)} if a < b {\displaystyle a Amália is a Portuguese large language model (LLM) announced in November 2024 by the Portuguese Prime-Minister Luís Montenegro. Its final version is expected to be launched in 2026. It is being developed by Center for Responsible AI (Centro para a AI Responsável) and by the research centers of NOVA School of Science and Technology and Instituto Superior Técnico. == History == In 2024 it was announced that the Portuguese Agency for Administrative Modernization (Agência para a Modernização Administrativa) transpose this LLM to Portuguese Public Administration. According to Paulo Dimas (CEO of the Center for Responsible AI) the three fundamental points of this LLM project are the linguistic variant (European Portuguese), cultural representation and data protection. In April 2025 it was announced that Amália had entered beta phase with an improved version being expected to be launched in September 2025. The beta version released in September is available only to the Public Administration, but the website launched in October reiterates the final version will be an open model. Hough transforms are techniques for object detection, a critical step in many implementations of computer vision, or data mining from images. Specifically, the Randomized Hough transform is a probabilistic variant to the classical Hough transform, and is commonly used to detect curves (straight line, circle, ellipse, etc.) The basic idea of Hough transform (HT) is to implement a voting procedure for all potential curves in the image, and at the termination of the algorithm, curves that do exist in the image will have relatively high voting scores. Randomized Hough transform (RHT) is different from HT in that it tries to avoid conducting the computationally expensive voting process for every nonzero pixel in the image by taking advantage of the geometric properties of analytical curves, and thus improve the time efficiency and reduce the storage requirement of the original algorithm. == Motivation == Although Hough transform (HT) has been widely used in curve detection, it has two major drawbacks: First, for each nonzero pixel in the image, the parameters for the existing curve and redundant ones are both accumulated during the voting procedure. Second, the accumulator array (or Hough space) is predefined in a heuristic way. The more accuracy needed, the higher parameter resolution should be defined. These two needs usually result in a large storage requirement and low speed for real applications. Therefore, RHT was brought up to tackle this problem. == Implementation == In comparison with HT, RHT takes advantage of the fact that some analytical curves can be fully determined by a certain number of points on the curve. For example, a straight line can be determined by two points, and an ellipse (or a circle) can be determined by three points. The case of ellipse detection can be used to illustrate the basic idea of RHT. The whole process generally consists of three steps: Fit ellipses with randomly selected points. Update the accumulator array and corresponding scores. Output the ellipses with scores higher than some predefined threshold. === Ellipse fitting === One general equation for defining ellipses is: a ( x − p ) 2 + 2 b ( x − p ) ( y − q ) + c ( y − q ) 2 = 1 {\displaystyle a(x-p)^{2}+2b(x-p)(y-q)+c(y-q)^{2}=1} with restriction: a c − b 2 > 0 {\displaystyle ac-b^{2}>0} However, an ellipse can be fully determined if one knows three points on it and the tangents in these points. RHT starts by randomly selecting three points on the ellipse. Let them be X 1 {\displaystyle X_{1}} , X 2 {\displaystyle X_{2}} and X 3 {\displaystyle X_{3}} . The first step is to find the tangents of these three points. They can be found by fitting a straight line using least squares technique for a small window of neighboring pixels. The next step is to find the intersection points of the tangent lines. This can be easily done by solving the line equations found in the previous step. Then let the intersection points be T 12 {\displaystyle T_{12}} and T 23 {\displaystyle T_{23}} , the midpoints of line segments X 1 X 2 {\displaystyle X_{1}X_{2}} and X 2 X 3 {\displaystyle X_{2}X_{3}} be M 12 {\displaystyle M_{12}} and M 23 {\displaystyle M_{23}} . Then the center of the ellipse will lie in the intersection of T 12 M 12 {\displaystyle T_{12}M_{12}} and T 23 M 23 {\displaystyle T_{23}M_{23}} . Again, the coordinates of the intersected point can be determined by solving line equations and the detailed process is skipped here for conciseness. Let the coordinates of ellipse center found in previous step be ( x 0 , y 0 ) {\displaystyle (x_{0},y_{0})} . Then the center can be translated to the origin with x ′ = x − x 0 {\displaystyle x'=x-x_{0}} and y ′ = y − y 0 {\displaystyle y'=y-y_{0}} so that the ellipse equation can be simplified to: a x ′ 2 + 2 b x ′ y ′ + c y ′ 2 = 1 {\displaystyle ax'^{2}+2bx'y'+cy'^{2}=1} Now we can solve for the rest of ellipse parameters: a {\displaystyle a} , b {\displaystyle b} and c {\displaystyle c} by substituting the coordinates of X 1 {\displaystyle X_{1}} , X 2 {\displaystyle X_{2}} and X 3 {\displaystyle X_{3}} into the equation above. === Accumulating === With the ellipse parameters determined from previous stage, the accumulator array can be updated correspondingly. Different from classical Hough transform, RHT does not keep "grid of buckets" as the accumulator array. Rather, it first calculates the similarities between the newly detected ellipse and the ones already stored in accumulator array. Different metrics can be used to calculate the similarity. As long as the similarity exceeds some predefined threshold, replace the one in the accumulator with the average of both ellipses and add 1 to its score. Otherwise, initialize this ellipse to an empty position in the accumulator and assign a score of 1. === Termination === Once the score of one candidate ellipse exceeds the threshold, it is determined as existing in the image (in other words, this ellipse is detected), and should be removed from the image and accumulator array so that the algorithm can detect other potential ellipses faster. The algorithm terminates when the number of iterations reaches a maximum limit or all the ellipses have been detected. Pseudo code for RHT: while (we find ellipses AND not reached the maximum epoch) { for (a fixed number of iterations) { Find a potential ellipse. if (the ellipse is similar to an ellipse in the accumulator) then Replace the one in the accumulator with the average of two ellipses and add 1 to the score; else Insert the ellipse into an empty position in the accumulator with a score of 1; } Select the ellipse with the best score and save it in a best ellipse table; Eliminate the pixels of the best ellipse from the image; Empty the accumulator; } Computer security compromised by hardware failure is a branch of computer security applied to hardware. The objective of computer security includes protection of information and property from theft, corruption, or natural disaster, while allowing the information and property to remain accessible and productive to its intended users. Such secret information could be retrieved by different ways. This article focus on the retrieval of data thanks to misused hardware or hardware failure. Hardware could be misused or exploited to get secret data. This article collects main types of attack that can lead to data theft. Computer security can be compromised by devices, such as keyboards, monitors or printers (thanks to electromagnetic or acoustic emanation for example) or by components of the computer, such as the memory, the network card or the processor (thanks to time or temperature analysis for example). == Devices == === Monitor === The monitor is the main device used to access data on a computer. It has been shown that monitors radiate or reflect data on their environment, potentially giving attackers access to information displayed on the monitor. ==== Electromagnetic emanations ==== Video display units radiate: narrowband harmonics of the digital clock signals; broadband harmonics of the various 'random' digital signals such as the video signal. Known as compromising emanations or TEMPEST radiation, a code word for a U.S. government programme aimed at attacking the problem, the electromagnetic broadcast of data has been a significant concern in sensitive computer applications. Eavesdroppers can reconstruct video screen content from radio frequency emanations. Each (radiated) harmonic of the video signal shows a remarkable resemblance to a broadcast TV signal. It is therefore possible to reconstruct the picture displayed on the video display unit from the radiated emission by means of a normal television receiver. If no preventive measures are taken, eavesdropping on a video display unit is possible at distances up to several hundreds of meters, using only a normal black-and-white TV receiver, a directional antenna and an antenna amplifier. It is even possible to pick up information from some types of video display units at a distance of over 1 kilometer. If more sophisticated receiving and decoding equipment is used, the maximum distance can be much greater. ==== Compromising reflections ==== What is displayed by the monitor is reflected on the environment. The time-varying diffuse reflections of the light emitted by a CRT monitor can be exploited to recover the original monitor image. This is an eavesdropping technique for spying at a distance on data that is displayed on an arbitrary computer screen, including the currently prevalent LCD monitors. The technique exploits reflections of the screen's optical emanations in various objects that one commonly finds close to the screen and uses those reflections to recover the original screen content. Such objects include eyeglasses, tea pots, spoons, plastic bottles, and even the eye of the user. This attack can be successfully mounted to spy on even small fonts using inexpensive, off-the-shelf equipment (less than 1500 dollars) from a distance of up to 10 meters. Relying on more expensive equipment allowed to conduct this attack from over 30 meters away, demonstrating that similar attacks are feasible from the other side of the street or from a close by building. Many objects that may be found at a usual workplace can be exploited to retrieve information on a computer's display by an outsider. Particularly good results were obtained from reflections in a user's eyeglasses or a tea pot located on the desk next to the screen. Reflections that stem from the eye of the user also provide good results. However, eyes are harder to spy on at a distance because they are fast-moving objects and require high exposure times. Using more expensive equipment with lower exposure times helps to remedy this problem. The reflections gathered from curved surfaces on close by objects indeed pose a substantial threat to the confidentiality of data displayed on the screen. Fully invalidating this threat without at the same time hiding the screen from the legitimate user seems difficult, without using curtains on the windows or similar forms of strong optical shielding. Most users, however, will not be aware of this risk and may not be willing to close the curtains on a nice day. The reflection of an object, a computer display, in a curved mirror creates a virtual image that is located behind the reflecting surface. For a flat mirror this virtual image has the same size and is located behind the mirror at the same distance as the original object. For curved mirrors, however, the situation is more complex. === Keyboard === ==== Electromagnetic emanations ==== Computer keyboards are often used to transmit confidential data such as passwords. Since they contain electronic components, keyboards emit electromagnetic waves. These emanations could reveal sensitive information such as keystrokes. Electromagnetic emanations have turned out to constitute a security threat to computer equipment. The figure below presents how a keystroke is retrieved and what material is necessary. The approach is to acquire the raw signal directly from the antenna and to process the entire captured electromagnetic spectrum. Thanks to this method, four different kinds of compromising electromagnetic emanations have been detected, generated by wired and wireless keyboards. These emissions lead to a full or a partial recovery of the keystrokes. The best practical attack fully recovered 95% of the keystrokes of a PS/2 keyboard at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls. Because each keyboard has a specific fingerprint based on the clock frequency inconsistencies, it can determine the source keyboard of a compromising emanation, even if multiple keyboards from the same model are used at the same time. The four different kinds way of compromising electromagnetic emanations are described below. ===== The Falling Edge Transition Technique ===== When a key is pressed, released or held down, the keyboard sends a packet of information known as a scan code to the computer. The protocol used to transmit these scan codes is a bidirectional serial communication, based on four wires: Vcc (5 volts), ground, data and clock. Clock and data signals are identically generated. Hence, the compromising emanation detected is the combination of both signals. However, the edges of the data and the clock lines are not superposed. Thus, they can be easily separated to obtain independent signals. ===== The Generalized Transition Technique ===== The Falling Edge Transition attack is limited to a partial recovery of the keystrokes. This is a significant limitation. The GTT is a falling edge transition attack improved, which recover almost all keystrokes. Indeed, between two traces, there is exactly one data rising edge. If attackers are able to detect this transition, they can fully recover the keystrokes. ===== The Modulation Technique ===== Harmonics compromising electromagnetic emissions come from unintentional emanations such as radiations emitted by the clock, non-linear elements, crosstalk, ground pollution, etc. Determining theoretically the reasons of these compromising radiations is a very complex task. These harmonics correspond to a carrier of approximately 4 MHz which is very likely the internal clock of the micro-controller inside the keyboard. These harmonics are correlated with both clock and data signals, which describe modulated signals (in amplitude and frequency) and the full state of both clock and data signals. This means that the scan code can be completely recovered from these harmonics. ===== The Matrix Scan Technique ===== Keyboard manufacturers arrange the keys in a matrix. The keyboard controller, often an 8-bit processor, parses columns one-by-one and recovers the state of 8 keys at once. This matrix scan process can be described as 192 keys (some keys may not be used, for instance modern keyboards use 104/105 keys) arranged in 24 columns and 8 rows. These columns are continuously pulsed one-by-one for at least 3μs. Thus, these leads may act as an antenna and generate electromagnetic emanations. If an attacker is able to capture these emanations, he can easily recover the column of the pressed key. Even if this signal does not fully describe the pressed key, it still gives partial information on the transmitted scan code, i.e. the column number. Note that the matrix scan routine loops continuously. When no key is pressed, we still have a signal composed of multiple equidistant peaks. These emanations may be used to remotely detect the presence of powered computers. Concerning wireless keyboards, the wireless data burst transmission can be used as an electromagnetic trigger to detect exactly when a key is pressed, while the matrix s VideoPoet is a large language model developed by Google Research in 2023 for video making. It can be asked to animate still images. The model accepts text, images, and videos as inputs, with a program to add feature for any input to any format generated content. VideoPoet was publicly announced on December 19, 2023. It uses an autoregressive language model.Amália (LLM)
Randomized Hough transform
Computer security compromised by hardware failure
VideoPoet