Skyline operator

Skyline operator

The skyline operator is the subject of an optimization problem and computes the Pareto optimum on tuples with multiple dimensions. This operator is an extension to SQL proposed by Börzsönyi et al. to filter results from a database to keep only those objects that are not dominated by any other point on all dimensions. The name skyline comes from the view on Manhattan from the Hudson River, where those buildings can be seen that are not hidden by any other. A building is visible if it is not dominated by a building that is taller or closer to the river (two dimensions, distance to the river minimized, height maximized). Another application of the skyline operator involves selecting a hotel for a holiday. The user wants the hotel to be both cheap and close to the beach. However, hotels that are close to the beach may also be expensive. In this case, the skyline operator would only present those hotels that are not worse than any other hotel in both price and distance to the beach. == Formal specification == The skyline operator returns tuples that are not dominated by any other tuple. A tuple dominates another if it is at least as good in all dimensions and better in at least one dimension. Formally, we can think of each tuple as a vector p , q ∈ R n {\displaystyle p,q\in \mathbb {R} ^{n}} . p {\displaystyle p} dominates q {\displaystyle q} (written: p ≻ q {\displaystyle p\succ q} ) if p {\displaystyle p} is at least as good as q {\displaystyle q} in every dimension, and superior in at least one: p ≻ q ⇔ ∀ i ∈ [ n ] . p [ i ] ⪰ q [ i ] ∧ ∃ j ∈ [ n ] . p [ j ] ≻ q [ j ] . {\displaystyle p\succ q\Leftrightarrow \forall i\in [n].p[i]\succeq q[i]\wedge \exists j\in [n].p[j]\succ q[j].} Dominance ( p ≻ q {\displaystyle p\succ q} ) can be defined as any strict partial ordering, for example greater (with ≻:=> {\displaystyle \succ :=>} and ⪰:=≥ {\displaystyle \succeq :=\geq } ) or less (with ≻:=< {\displaystyle \succ :=<} and ⪰:=≤ {\displaystyle \succeq :=\leq } ). Assuming two dimensions and defining dominance in both dimensions as greater, we can compute the skyline in SQL-92 as follows: == Proposed syntax == As an extension to SQL, Börzsönyi et al. proposed the following syntax for the skyline operator: where d1, ... dm denote the dimensions of the skyline and MIN, MAX and DIFF specify whether the value in that dimension should be minimised, maximised or simply be different. Without an SQL extension, the SQL query requires an antijoin with not exists: == Implementation == The skyline operator can be implemented directly in SQL using current SQL constructs, but this has been shown to be very slow in disk-based database systems. Other algorithms have been proposed that make use of divide and conquer, indices, MapReduce and general-purpose computing on graphics cards. Skyline queries on data streams (i.e. continuous skyline queries) have been studied in the context of parallel query processing on multicores, owing to their wide diffusion in real-time decision making problems and data streaming analytics. Exasol features a native implementation.

Three-factor learning

In neuroscience and machine learning, three-factor learning is the combination of Hebbian plasticity with a third modulatory factor to stabilise and enhance synaptic learning. This third factor can represent various signals such as reward, punishment, error, surprise, or novelty, often implemented through neuromodulators. == Description == Three-factor learning introduces the concept of eligibility traces, which flag synapses for potential modification pending the arrival of the third factor, and helps temporal credit assignement by bridging the gap between rapid neuronal firing and slower behavioral timescales, from which learning can be done. Biological basis for Three-factor learning rules have been supported by experimental evidence. This approach addresses the instability of classical Hebbian learning by minimizing autocorrelation and maximizing cross-correlation between inputs.

Zero-day vulnerability

A zero-day (also known as a 0-day) is a vulnerability or security hole in a computer system unknown to its developers or anyone capable of mitigating it. Until the vulnerability is remedied, threat actors can exploit it in a zero-day exploit, or zero-day attack. The term "zero-day" originally referred to the number of days since a new piece of software was released to the public, so "zero-day software" was obtained by hacking into a developer's computer before release. Eventually the term was applied to the vulnerabilities that allowed this hacking, and to the number of days that the vendor has had to fix them. Vendors who discover the vulnerability may create patches or advise workarounds to mitigate it, though users need to deploy that mitigation to eliminate the vulnerability in their systems. Zero-day attacks are severe threats. == Definition == Despite developers' goal of delivering a product that works entirely as intended, virtually all products contain software and hardware bugs. If a bug creates a security risk, it is called a vulnerability. Vulnerabilities vary in their ability to be exploited by malicious actors. Some are not usable at all, while others can be used to disrupt the device with a denial of service attack. The most dangerous allow the attacker to inject and run their own code, without the user being aware of it. Although the term "zero-day" initially referred to the time since the vendor had become aware of the vulnerability, zero-day vulnerabilities can also be defined as the subset of vulnerabilities for which no patch or other fix is available. A zero-day exploit is any exploit that takes advantage of such a vulnerability. == Exploits == An exploit is the delivery mechanism that takes advantage of the vulnerability to penetrate the target's systems, for such purposes as disrupting operations, installing malware, or exfiltrating data. Researchers Lillian Ablon and Andy Bogart write that "little is known about the true extent, use, benefit, and harm of zero-day exploits". Exploits based on zero-day vulnerabilities are considered more dangerous than those that take advantage of a known vulnerability. However, it is likely that most cyberattacks use known vulnerabilities, not zero-days. Governments of states are the primary users of zero-day exploits, not only because of the high cost of finding or buying vulnerabilities, but also the significant cost of writing the attack software. Nevertheless, anyone can use a vulnerability, and according to research by the RAND Corporation, "any serious attacker can always get an affordable zero-day for almost any target". Many targeted attacks and most advanced persistent threats rely on zero-day vulnerabilities. In 2017, the average time to develop an exploit from a zero-day vulnerability was estimated at 22 days. The difficulty of developing exploits has been increasing over time due to increased anti-exploitation features in popular software. === Window of vulnerability === Zero-day vulnerabilities are often classified as alive—meaning that there is no public knowledge of the vulnerability—and dead—the vulnerability has been disclosed, but not patched. If the software's maintainers are actively searching for vulnerabilities, it is a living vulnerability; such vulnerabilities in unmaintained software are called immortal. Zombie vulnerabilities can be exploited in older versions of the software but have been patched in newer versions. Even publicly known and zombie vulnerabilities are often exploitable for an extended period. Security patches can take months to develop, or may never be developed. A patch can have negative effects on the functionality of software and users may need to test the patch to confirm functionality and compatibility. Larger organizations may fail to identify and patch all dependencies, while smaller enterprises and personal users may not install patches. Research suggests that risk of cyberattack increases if the vulnerability is made publicly known or a patch is released. Cybercriminals can reverse engineer the patch to find the underlying vulnerability and develop exploits, often faster than users install the patch. According to research by RAND Corporation published in 2017, zero-day exploits remain usable for 6.9 years on average, although those purchased from a third party only remain usable for 1.4 years on average. The researchers were unable to determine if any particular platform or software (such as open-source software) had any relationship to the life expectancy of a zero-day vulnerability. Although the RAND researchers found that 5.7 percent of a stockpile of secret zero-day vulnerabilities will have been discovered by someone else within a year, another study found a higher overlap rate, as high as 10.8 percent to 21.9 percent per year. == Countermeasures == Because, by definition, there is no patch that can block a zero-day exploit, all systems employing the software or hardware with the vulnerability are at risk. This includes secure systems such as banks and governments that have all patches up to date. Security systems are designed around known vulnerabilities, and repeated exploitations of a zero-day exploit could continue undetected for an extended period of time. Although there have been many proposals for a system that is effective at detecting zero-day exploits, this remains an active area of research in 2023. Many organizations have adopted defense-in-depth tactics so that attacks are likely to require breaching multiple levels of security, which makes it more difficult to achieve. Conventional cybersecurity measures such as training and access control — including multi-factor authentication, least-privilege access, and air-gapping makes it harder to compromise systems with a zero-day exploit. Since writing perfectly secure software is impossible, some researchers argue that driving up the cost of exploits is considered a good strategy to reduce the burden of cyberattacks. == Market == Zero-day exploits can fetch millions of dollars. There are three main types of buyers: White: the vendor, or to third parties such as the Zero Day Initiative that disclose to the vendor. Often such disclosure is in exchange for a bug bounty. Not all companies respond positively to disclosures, as they can cause legal liability and operational overhead. It is not uncommon to receive cease-and-desist letters from software vendors after disclosing a vulnerability for free. Gray: the largest and most lucrative. Government or intelligence agencies buy zero-days and may use it in an attack, stockpile the vulnerability, or notify the vendor. The United States federal government is one of the largest buyers. As of 2013, the Five Eyes (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) captured the plurality of the market and other significant purchasers included Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, and Iran. Middle Eastern countries were poised to become the biggest spenders. Black: organized crime, which typically prefers exploit software rather than just knowledge of a vulnerability. These users are more likely to employ "half-days" where a patch is already available. In 2015, the markets for government and crime were estimated at least ten times larger than the white market. Sellers are often hacker groups that seek out vulnerabilities in widely used software for financial reward. Some will only sell to certain buyers, while others will sell to anyone. White market sellers are more likely to be motivated by non pecuniary rewards such as recognition and intellectual challenge. Selling zero-day exploits is legal. Despite calls for more regulation, law professor Mailyn Fidler says there is little chance of an international agreement because key players such as Russia and Israel are not interested. The sellers and buyers that trade in zero-days tend to be secretive, relying on non-disclosure agreements and classified information laws to keep the exploits secret. If the vulnerability becomes known, it can be patched and its value consequently crashes. Because the market lacks transparency, it can be hard for parties to find a fair price. Sellers might not be paid if the vulnerability was disclosed before it was verified, or if the buyer declined to purchase it but used it anyway. With the proliferation of middlemen, sellers could never know to what use the exploits could be put. Buyers could not guarantee that the exploit was not sold to another party. Both buyers and sellers advertise on the dark web. Research published in 2022 based on maximum prices paid as quoted by a single exploit broker found a 44 percent annualized inflation rate in exploit pricing. Remote zero-click exploits could fetch the highest price, while those that require local access to the device are much cheaper. Vulnerabilities in widely used software are also more expensive. They estimated that around 400 to 1,500 people sold exploits to th

IDMS

The Integrated Database Management System (IDMS) is a network model (CODASYL) database management system for mainframes. It was first developed at BFGoodrich and later marketed by Cullinane Database Systems (renamed Cullinet in 1983). Since 1989 the product has been owned by Computer Associates (now CA Technologies), who renamed it Advantage CA-IDMS and later simply to CA IDMS. In 2018 Broadcom acquired CA Technologies, renaming it back to IDMS. == History == The roots of IDMS go back to the pioneering database management system called Integrated Data Store (IDS), developed at General Electric by a team led by Charles Bachman and first released in 1964. In the early 1960s IDS was taken from its original form, by the computer group of the BFGoodrich Chemical Division, and re-written in a language called Intermediate System Language (ISL). ISL was designed as a portable system programming language able to produce code for a variety of target machines. Since ISL was actually written in ISL, it was able to be ported to other machine architectures with relative ease, and then to produce code that would execute on them. The Chemical Division computer group had given some thought to selling copies of IDMS to other companies, but was told by management that they were not in the software products business. Eventually, a deal was struck with John Cullinane to buy the rights and market the product. Because Cullinane was required to remit royalties back to B.F. Goodrich, all add-on products were listed and billed as separate products – even if they were mandatory for the core IDMS product to work. This sometimes confused customers. The original platforms were the GE 235 computer and GE DATANET-30 message switching computer: later the product was ported to IBM mainframes and to DEC and ICL hardware. The IBM-ported version runs on IBM mainframe systems (System/360, System/370, System/390, zSeries, System z9). In the mid-1980s, it was claimed that some 2,500 IDMS licenses had been sold. Users included the Strategic Air Command, Ford of Canada, Ford of Europe, Jaguar Cars, Clarks Shoes UK, Axa/PPP, MAPFRE, Royal Insurance, Tesco, Manulife, Hudson's Bay Company, Cleveland Clinic, Bank of Canada, General Electric, Aetna and BT in the UK. A version for use on the Digital Equipment Corporation PDP-11 series of computers was sold to DEC and was marketed as DBMS-11. In 1976 the source code was licensed to ICL, who ported the software to run on their 2900 series mainframes, and subsequently also on the older 1900 range. ICL continued development of the software independently of Cullinane, selling the original ported product under the name ICL 2900 IDMS and an enhanced version as IDMSX. In this form it was used by many large UK users, an example being the Pay-As-You-Earn system operated by Inland Revenue. Many of these IDMSX systems for UK Government were still running in 2013. In the early to mid-1980s, relational database management systems started to become more popular, encouraged by increasing hardware power and the move to minicomputers and client–server architecture. Relational databases offered improved development productivity over CODASYL systems, and the traditional objections based on poor performance were slowly diminishing. Cullinet attempted to continue competing against IBM's DB2 and other relational databases by developing a relational front-end and a range of productivity tools. These included Automatic System Facility (ASF), which made use of a pre-existing IDMS feature called LRF (Logical Record Facility). ASF was a fill-in-the-blanks database generator that would also develop a mini-application to maintain the tables. It is difficult to judge whether such features may have been successful in extending the selling life of the product, but they made little impact in the long term. Those users who stayed with IDMS were primarily interested in its high performance, not in its relational capabilities. It was widely recognized (helped by a high-profile campaign by E. F. Codd, the father of the relational model) that there was a significant difference between a relational database and a network database with a relational veneer. In 1989 Computer Associates continued after Cullinet acquisition with the development and released Release 12.0 with full SQL in 1992–93. CA Technologies continued to market and support the CA IDMS and enhanced IDMS in subsequent releases by TCP/IP support, two phase commit support, XML publishing, zIIP specialty processor support, Web-enabled access in combination with CA IDMS Server, SQL Option and GUI database administration via CA IDMS Visual DBA tool. CA-IDMS systems are today still running businesses worldwide. Many customers have opted to web-enable their applications via the CA-IDMS SQL Option which is part of CA Technologies' Dual Database Strategy. == Integrated Data Dictionary == One of the sophisticated features of IDMS was its built-in Integrated data dictionary (IDD). The IDD was primarily developed to maintain database definitions. It was itself an IDMS database. DBAs (database administrators) and other users interfaced with the IDD using a language called Data Dictionary Definition Language (DDDL). IDD was also used to store definitions and code for other products in the IDMS family such as ADS/Online and IDMS-DC. IDD's power was that it was extensible and could be used to create definitions of just about anything. Some companies used it to develop in-house documentation. == Overview == === Logical Data Model === The data model offered to users is the CODASYL network model. The main structuring concepts in this model are records and sets. Records essentially follow the COBOL pattern, consisting of fields of different types: this allows complex internal structure such as repeating items and repeating groups. The most distinctive structuring concept in the Codasyl model is the set. Not to be confused with a mathematical set, a Codasyl set represents a one-to-many relationship between records: one owner, many members. The fact that a record can be a member in many different sets is the key factor that distinguishes the network model from the earlier hierarchical model. As with records, each set belongs to a named set type (different set types model different logical relationships). Sets are in fact ordered, and the sequence of records in a set can be used to convey information. A record can participate as an owner and member of any number of sets. Records have identity, the identity being represented by a value known as a database key. In IDMS, as in most other Codasyl implementations, the database key is directly related to the physical address of the record on disk. Database keys are also used as pointers to implement sets in the form of linked lists and trees. This close correspondence between the logical model and the physical implementation (which is not a strictly necessary part of the Codasyl model, but was a characteristic of all successful implementations) is responsible for the efficiency of database retrieval, but also makes operations such as database loading and restructuring rather expensive. Records can be accessed directly by database key, by following set relationships, or by direct access using key values. Initially the only direct access was through hashing, a mechanism known in the Codasyl model as CALC access. In IDMS, CALC access is implemented through an internal set, linking all records that share the same hash value to an owner record that occupies the first few bytes of every disk page. In subsequent years, some versions of IDMS added the ability to access records using BTree-like indexes. === Storage === IDMS organizes its databases as a series of files. These files are mapped and pre-formatted into so-called areas. The areas are subdivided into pages which correspond to physical blocks on the disk. The database records are stored within these blocks. The DBA allocates a fixed number of pages in a file for each area. The DBA then defines which records are to be stored in each area, and details of how they are to be stored. IDMS intersperses special space-allocation pages throughout the database. These pages are used to keep track of the free space available in each page in the database. To reduce I/O requirements, the free space is only tracked for all pages when the free space for the area falls below 30%. Four methods are available for storing records in an IDMS database: Direct, Sequential, CALC, and VIA. The Fujitsu/ICL IDMSX version extends this with two more methods, Page Direct, and Random. In direct mode the target database key is specified by the user and is stored as close as possible to that DB key, with the actual DB key on which the record is stored being returned to the application program. Sequential placement (not to be confused with indexed sequential), simply places each new record at the end of the area. This option is rarely used. CALC uses a hashing algo

Digital on-screen graphic

A digital on-screen graphic, digitally originated graphic (DOG, bug, network bug, on-screen bug or screenbug) is a watermark-like station logo that most television broadcasters overlay over a portion of the screen area of their programs to identify the channel. They are thus a form of permanent visual station identification, increasing brand recognition and asserting ownership of the video signal. The graphic identifies the source of programming, even if it has been time-shifted or recorded. Many of these technologies allow viewers to skip or omit traditional between-programming station identification; thus the use of a DOG enables the station or network to enforce brand identification even when standard commercials are skipped. DOG watermarking helps to reduce off-the-air copyright infringement—for example, the distribution of a current series' episodes on DVD: the watermarked content is easily differentiated from "official" DVD releases, and can help identify not only the station from which the broadcast was captured, but usually the actual date of the broadcast as well. Graphics may be used to identify if the correct subscription is being used for a type of venue. For example, showing Sky Sports within a pub in the United Kingdom requires a more expensive subscription; a channel authorized under this subscription adds a pint glass graphic to the bottom of the screen for inspectors to see. The graphic changes at certain times, making it harder to counterfeit. On the other hand, watermarks pollute the picture, distract viewers' attention and may cover an important piece of information presented in the television program. Extremely bright watermarks may cause screen burn-in or image persistence on some types of television sets such as the now mostly discontinued and rarely used plasma and CRT displays, and currently commonly used OLED and LCD displays. Usage of visually perceptible embedded watermarks requires the program author to have a separate clean copy for archival purposes, but this practice was not common decades ago when watermarking became popular among broadcasters. Watermarks present an issue when archival videos are used for a documentary that strives to create a coherent story. In some cases, watermarks are blurred or digitally removed if possible to clean up the picture. In the absence of visually perceptible watermarks, content control can be ensured with visually imperceptible digital watermarks. In some cases, the graphic also shows the name of the current program. Some television networks may place additional logos or text alongside their DOG to advertise significant upcoming programs. For example, broadcasters of the Olympic Games (most notably United States broadcaster NBC) often add the Olympic rings to their DOG for a period of time leading up to and during the Games. == Usage == == Connections with sponsor tags == Another graphic on television usually connected with sports (particularly in North America, though not in Europe) is the sponsor tag. It shows the logos of certain sponsors, accompanied by some background relevant to the game, the network logo, announcement and music of some kind. == Usage in ham radio and television == In most countries, the ham station is required to periodically identify their amateur-television transmission. Such stations frequently overlay their callsign on the signal instead of placing a card in the background. Most hams use homebuilt devices or old consumer character generators to generate such identifications rather than using graphical superimposes of high cost to do so. Only rarely one can see real graphics, as the callsign is usually written in the "OSD font". == Live DOGs by hobbyists == One of the easiest and most sought-after devices used to generate DOGs by hobbyists is the 1980s vintage Sony XV-T500 video superimposer. This device can luma-key a signal, capture a still frame into memory and then overlay the keyed graphic in one of eight colors onto any CVBS signal. Another method commonly used by hobbyists and even low-budgeted television stations was Amiga computers with genlock interfaces.

Open Cloud Computing Interface

The Open Cloud Computing Interface (OCCI) is a set of specifications delivered through the Open Grid Forum, for cloud computing service providers. OCCI has a set of implementations that act as proofs of concept. It builds upon World Wide Web fundamentals by using the Representational State Transfer (REST) approach for interacting with services. == Scope == The aim of the Open Cloud Computing Interface is the development of an open specification and API for cloud offerings. The focus was on Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) based offerings but the interface can be extended to support Platform and Software as a Service offerings as well. IaaS is one of three primary segments of the cloud computing industry in which compute, storage and network resources are provided as services. The API is based on a review of existing service-provider functionality and a set of use cases contributed by the working group. OCCI is a boundary API that acts as a service front-end to an IaaS provider’s internal infrastructure management framework. OCCI provides commonly understood semantics, syntax and a means of management in the domain of consumer-to-provider IaaS. It covers management of the entire life-cycle of OCCI-defined model entities and is compatible with existing standards such as the Open Virtualization Format (OVF) and the Cloud Data Management Interface (CDMI). Notably, it serves as an integration point for standardization efforts including Distributed Management Task Force, Internet Engineering Task Force and the Storage Networking Industry Association. == Context == OCCI began in March 2009 and was initially led by RabbitMQ and the Complutense University of Madrid. Today, the working group has over 250 members and includes numerous individuals, industry and academic parties. The OCCI operates under the umbrella of the Open Grid Forum (OGF), using a wiki and a mailing list for collaboration. == Goals == Interoperability: allow different Cloud providers to work together without data schema/format translation, facade/proxying between APIs and understanding and/or dependency on multiple APIs Portability: no technical/vendor lock-in and enable services to move between providers allows clients to easily switch between providers based on business objectives (e.g., cost) with minimal technical costs, thus enabling and fostering competition. Integration: the specification can be implemented with both the latest infrastructures or legacy ones. Extensibility: thanks to the use of a meta-model and capabilities discovery features, an OCCI client is able to interact with any OCCI server using provider-specific OCCI extensions. == Specific Implementations == They implement specific extensions of OCCI for a particular service: IaaS, PaaS, brokering, etc. Several implementations have been announced or released. == Generic Implementations (frameworks) == Here are frameworks to build OCCI APIs. Complementing these are a variety of developer tools. == Alternatives == Alternative approaches include the use of the Cloud Infrastructure Management Interface (CIMI) and related standards set from DMTF and the Amazon Web Services interfaces from Amazon. (The latter have not been endorsed by any known Standards organization). OpenNebula conducted a survey of their users in which the results showed, 38% do not expose cloud APIs, their users only interface through the Sunstone GUI, 36% mostly use the Amazon Web Services API, and 26% mostly use the OpenNebula’s OCCI API or the OCCI API offered by rOCCI.

Packed pixel

In packed pixel or chunky framebuffer organization, the bits defining each pixel are clustered and stored consecutively. For example, if there are 16 bits per pixel, each pixel is represented in two consecutive (contiguous) 8-bit bytes in the framebuffer. If there are 4 bits per pixel, each framebuffer byte defines two pixels, one in each nibble. The latter example is as opposed to storing a single 4-bit pixel in a byte, leaving 4 bits of the byte unused. If a pixel has more than one channel, the channels are interleaved when using packed pixel organization. Packed pixel displays were common on early microcomputer system that shared a single main memory for both the central processing unit (CPU) and display driver. In such systems, memory was normally accessed a byte at a time, so by packing the pixels, the display system could read out several pixels worth of data in a single read operation. Packed pixel is one of two major ways to organize graphics data in memory, the other being planar organization, where each pixel is made of individual bits stored in their own plane. For a 4-bit color value, memory would be organized as four screen-sized planes of one bit each and a single pixel's value built up by selecting the appropriate bit from each plane. Planar organization has the advantage that the data can be accessed in parallel, and is used when memory bandwidth is an issue.