PGP word list

The PGP Word List ("Pretty Good Privacy word list", also called a biometric word list for reasons explained below) is a list of words for conveying data bytes in a clear unambiguous way via a voice channel. They are analogous in purpose to the NATO phonetic alphabet, except that a longer list of words is used, each word corresponding to one of the 256 distinct numeric byte values. == History and structure == The PGP Word List was designed in 1995 by Patrick Juola, a computational linguist, and Philip Zimmermann, creator of PGP. The words were carefully chosen for their phonetic distinctiveness, using genetic algorithms to select lists of words that had optimum separations in phoneme space. The candidate word lists were randomly drawn from Grady Ward's Moby Pronunciator list as raw material for the search, successively refined by the genetic algorithms. The automated search converged to an optimized solution in about 40 hours on a DEC Alpha, a particularly fast machine in that era. The Zimmermann–Juola list was originally designed to be used in PGPfone, a secure VoIP application, to allow the two parties to verbally compare a short authentication string to detect a man-in-the-middle attack (MiTM). It was called a biometric word list because the authentication depended on the two human users recognizing each other's distinct voices as they read and compared the words over the voice channel, binding the identity of the speaker with the words, which helped protect against the MiTM attack. The list can be used in many other situations where a biometric binding of identity is not needed, so calling it a biometric word list may be imprecise. Later, it was used in PGP to compare and verify PGP public key fingerprints over a voice channel. This is known in PGP applications as the "biometric" representation. When it was applied to PGP, the list of words was further refined, with contributions by Jon Callas. More recently, it has been used in Zfone and the ZRTP protocol, the successor to PGPfone. The list is actually composed of two lists, each containing 256 phonetically distinct words, in which each word represents a different byte value between 0 and 255. Two lists are used because reading aloud long random sequences of human words usually risks three kinds of errors: 1) transposition of two consecutive words, 2) duplicate words, or 3) omitted words. To detect all three kinds of errors, the two lists are used alternately for the even-offset bytes and the odd-offset bytes in the byte sequence. Each byte value is actually represented by two different words, depending on whether that byte appears at an odd or an even offset from the beginning of the byte sequence. The two lists are readily distinguished by the number of syllables; the odd list has words of three syllables, the even list has two. The two lists have a maximum word length of 11 and 9 letters, respectively. Using a two-list scheme was suggested by Zhahai Stewart. == Examples == Each byte in a bytestring is encoded as a single word. A sequence of bytes is rendered in network byte order, from left to right. For example, the leftmost (i.e. byte 0) is considered "even" and is encoded using the PGP Even Word table. The next byte to the right (i.e. byte 1) is considered "odd" and is encoded using the PGP Odd Word table. This process repeats until all bytes are encoded. Thus, "E582" produces "topmost Istanbul", whereas "82E5" produces "miser travesty". A PGP public key fingerprint that displayed in hexadecimal as E582 94F2 E9A2 2748 6E8B 061B 31CC 528F D7FA 3F19 would display in PGP Words (the "biometric" fingerprint) as topmost Istanbul Pluto vagabond treadmill Pacific brackish dictator goldfish Medusa afflict bravado chatter revolver Dupont midsummer stopwatch whimsical cowbell bottomless The order of bytes in a bytestring depends on endianness. == Other word lists for data == There are several other word lists for conveying data in a clear unambiguous way via a voice channel: the NATO phonetic alphabet maps individual letters and digits to individual words the S/KEY system maps 64 bit numbers to 6 short words of 1 to 4 characters each from a publicly accessible 2048-word dictionary. The same dictionary is used in RFC 1760 and RFC 2289. the Diceware system maps five base-6 random digits (almost 13 bits of entropy) to a word from a dictionary of 7,776 distinct words. the Electronic Frontier Foundation has published a set of improved word lists based on the same concept FIPS 181: Automated Password Generator converts random numbers into somewhat pronounceable "words". mnemonic encoding converts 32 bits of data into 3 words from a vocabulary of 1626 words. what3words encodes geographic coordinates in 3 dictionary words. the BIP39 standard permits encoding a cryptographic key of fixed size (128 or 256 bits, usually the unencrypted master key of a Cryptocurrency wallet) into a short sequence of readable words known as the seed phrase, for the purpose of storing the key offline. This is used in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Monero. Like the PGP word list, the Bytewords standard maps each possible byte to a word. There is only one list, rather than two. The words are uniformly four letters long and can be uniquely identified by their first and last letters

AI Security Institute

The AI Security Institute (AISI) is a research organisation under the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, UK, that aims "to equip governments with a scientific understanding of the risks posed by advanced AI". It conducts research and develop and test mitigations. Previously, it was known as the AI Safety Institute. Its creation followed world's first major AI Safety Summit that was held in Bletchley Park in 2023. The institute's professed goal is "building the world's leading understanding of advanced AI risks and solutions, to inform governments so they can keep the public safe". It is designed like a startup in the government "combining the authority of government with the expertise and agility of the private sector". AISI has made access agreements with Anthropic, Google and OpenAI to test their models before release. It has an open source platform called Inspect that permits companies, governments and academics to run standardised safety tests for AI usage. Among the works AISI has done is the reported detection of multiple serious vulnerabilities that could enable development of biological weapons; the vulnerabilities were fixed before the model was launched. It conducts research on diverse fields of AI application. One study by AISI found that LLMs post-trained for political persuasiveness became systematically less accurate and up to 51% more persuasive on political issues. AISI has also worked on the usage of AI for emotional needs. It found that nearly 10 percent of UK citizens used systems like chatbots for emotional purposes on a weekly basis. It found that "systems are now outperforming PhD-level researchers on scientific knowledge tests and helping non-experts succeed at lab work that would previously have been out of reach" in a report published in December 2025. Former chief AI officer of GCHQ Adam Beaumont is the institution's interim director. UK prime minister's AI advisor Jade Leung is the chief technology officer.

Pepper (cryptography)

In cryptography, a pepper is a secret added to an input such as a password during hashing with a cryptographic hash function. This value differs from a salt in that it is not stored alongside a password hash, but rather the pepper is kept separate using another meachanism, such as a Hardware Security Module. Note that the National Institute of Standards and Technology refers to this value as a secret key rather than a pepper. A pepper is similar in concept to a salt or an encryption key. It is like a salt in that it is a randomized value that is added to a password hash, and it is similar to an encryption key in that it should be kept secret. A pepper performs a comparable role to a salt or an encryption key, but while a salt is not secret (merely unique) and can be stored alongside the hashed output, a pepper is secret and must not be stored with the output. The hash and salt are usually stored in a database, but, if stored, a pepper must be stored separately to prevent it from being obtained by the attacker in case of a database breach. == History == The idea of a site- or service-specific salt (in addition to a per-user salt) has a long history, with Steven M. Bellovin proposing a local parameter in a Bugtraq post in 1995. In 1996 Udi Manber also described the advantages of such a scheme, terming it a secret salt. However, he suggested not storing the value of the secret salt, but instead rediscovering it by trial and error at password verification time. The term pepper has been used, by analogy to salt, but with a variety of meanings. For example, when discussing a challenge-response scheme, pepper has been used for a salt-like quantity, though not used for password storage; it has been used for a data transmission technique where a pepper must be guessed; and even as a part of jokes. The term pepper was proposed for a secret or local parameter stored separately from the password in a discussion of protecting passwords from rainbow table attacks. This usage did not immediately catch on: for example, Fred Wenzel added support to Django password hashing for storage based on a combination of bcrypt and HMAC with separately stored nonces, without using the term. Usage has since become more common. == Types == There are multiple different types of pepper: A shared secret that is common to all users. A randomly-selected number that must be re-discovered on every password input. These mechanisms could be combined with password salting, iterated hashing or even one another. == Shared-secret pepper == Bellovin and Webster suggest prepend a shared secret to the password before hashing, which allows easy use of existing hash functions. For example, consider two users to be added to a database. This table contains two combinations of username and password. The password is not saved, and the 8-byte (64-bit) 44534C70C6883DE2 pepper is saved in a safe place separate from the output values of the hash, in this case SHA256. Unlike the salt, the pepper does not provide protection to users who use the same password, but protects against dictionary attacks, unless the attacker has the pepper value available. Since the same pepper is not shared between different applications, an attacker is unable to reuse the hashes of one compromised database to another. A complete scheme for saving passwords may include both salt and pepper use. For example, it has been suggested to combine the pepper by encrypting salted password hashes, which allows rotation of the pepper. In the case of a shared-secret pepper, a single compromised password (via password reuse or other attack) along with a user's salt can lead to an attack to discover the pepper, rendering it ineffective. If an attacker knows a plaintext password and a user's salt, as well as the algorithm used to hash the password, then discovering the pepper can be a matter of brute forcing the values of the pepper. This is why NIST recommends the secret value be at least 112 bits, so that discovering it by exhaustive search is prohibitively expensive. The pepper must be generated anew for every application it is deployed in, otherwise a breach of one application would result in lowered security of another application. Without knowledge of the pepper, other passwords in the database will be far more difficult to extract from their hashed values, as the attacker would need to guess the password as well as the pepper. A pepper adds security to a database of salts and hashes because unless the attacker is able to obtain the pepper, cracking even a single hash is intractable, no matter how weak the original password. Even with a list of (salt, hash) pairs, an attacker must also guess the secret pepper in order to find the password which produces the hash. The NIST specification for a secret salt suggests using a Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) with an approved Pseudorandom Function such as HMAC with SHA-3 as the hash function of the HMAC. The NIST recommendation is also to perform at least 1000 iterations of the PBKDF, and a further minimum 1000 iterations using the secret salt in place of the non-secret salt. == Randomly-selected pepper that must be re-discovered == The aim of this mechanism is to slow down password the password verification step, thus slowing attacks. The aim is similar increasing the iteration count on bcrypt or Argon2, but the mechanism is different. The secret salt or pepper must be rediscovered by the verifier or attacker each time by guessing. In this situation, the password hashing function is calculated using both the password and the pepper. At password storage time, the pepper is chosen randomly from a range between 1 and R, the hash output is calculated using the password and the pepper. The hash output is stored with the username. The pepper is then discarded. At password verification time, the verifier is provided with a username and password to verify. The originally calculated hash is retrieved for the given username, and then the hash of the password and each value between 1 and R is calculated. If any of these hash values match the stored password hash, the password is considered valid. Note, the possible values of the pepper should not be tested in a fixed order known to an attacker, otherwise a timing attack may reveal the pepper. If the password is correct, the correct pepper will be found in R/2 hash evaluations on average. If the password is incorrect, all R values must be tested before the password can be rejected.

Multiple encryption

Multiple encryption is the process of encrypting an already encrypted message one or more times, either using the same or a different algorithm. It is also known as cascade encryption, cascade ciphering, cipher stacking, multiple encryption, and superencipherment. Superencryption refers to the outer-level encryption of a multiple encryption. Some cryptographers, like Matthew Green of Johns Hopkins University, say multiple encryption addresses a problem that mostly doesn't exist: Modern ciphers rarely get broken... You’re far more likely to get hit by malware or an implementation bug than you are to suffer a catastrophic attack on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). However, from the previous quote an argument for multiple encryption can be made, namely poor implementation. Using two different cryptomodules and keying processes from two different vendors requires both vendors' wares to be compromised for security to fail completely. == Independent keys == Picking any two ciphers, if the key used is the same for both, the second cipher could possibly undo the first cipher, partly or entirely. This is true of ciphers where the decryption process is exactly the same as the encryption process (a reciprocal cipher) – the second cipher would completely undo the first. If an attacker were to recover the key through cryptanalysis of the first encryption layer, the attacker could possibly decrypt all the remaining layers, assuming the same key is used for all layers. To prevent that risk, one can use keys that are statistically independent for each layer (e.g. independent RNGs). Ideally each key should have separate and different generation, sharing, and management processes. == Independent Initialization Vectors == For en/decryption processes that require sharing an Initialization Vector (IV) / nonce these are typically, openly shared or made known to the recipient (and everyone else). Its good security policy never to provide the same data in both plaintext and ciphertext when using the same key and IV. Therefore, its recommended (although at this moment without specific evidence) to use separate IVs for each layer of encryption. == Importance of the first layer == With the exception of the one-time pad, no cipher has been theoretically proven to be unbreakable. Furthermore, some recurring properties may be found in the ciphertexts generated by the first cipher. Since those ciphertexts are the plaintexts used by the second cipher, the second cipher may be rendered vulnerable to attacks based on known plaintext properties (see references below). This is the case when the first layer is a program P that always adds the same string S of characters at the beginning (or end) of all ciphertexts (commonly known as a magic number). When found in a file, the string S allows an operating system to know that the program P has to be launched in order to decrypt the file. This string should be removed before adding a second layer. To prevent this kind of attack, one can use the method provided by Bruce Schneier: Generate a random pad R of the same size as the plaintext. Encrypt R using the first cipher and key. XOR the plaintext with the pad, then encrypt the result using the second cipher and a different (!) key. Concatenate both ciphertexts in order to build the final ciphertext. A cryptanalyst must break both ciphers to get any information. This will, however, have the drawback of making the ciphertext twice as long as the original plaintext. Note, however, that a weak first cipher may merely make a second cipher that is vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack also vulnerable to a known plaintext attack. However, a block cipher must not be vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack to be considered secure. Therefore, the second cipher described above is not secure under that definition, either. Consequently, both ciphers still need to be broken. The attack illustrates why strong assumptions are made about secure block ciphers and ciphers that are even partially broken should never be used. == The Rule of Two == The Rule of Two is a data security principle from the NSA's Commercial Solutions for Classified Program (CSfC). It specifies two completely independent layers of cryptography to protect data. For example, data could be protected by both hardware encryption at its lowest level and software encryption at the application layer. It could mean using two FIPS-validated software cryptomodules from different vendors to en/decrypt data. The importance of vendor and/or model diversity between the layers of components centers around removing the possibility that the manufacturers or models will share a vulnerability. This way if one components is compromised there is still an entire layer of encryption protecting the information at rest or in transit. The CSfC Program offers solutions to achieve diversity in two ways. "The first is to implement each layer using components produced by different manufacturers. The second is to use components from the same manufacturer, where that manufacturer has provided NSA with sufficient evidence that the implementations of the two components are independent of one another." The principle is practiced in the NSA's secure mobile phone called Fishbowl. The phones use two layers of encryption protocols, IPsec and Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), to protect voice communications. The Samsung Galaxy S9 Tactical Edition is also an approved CSfC Component.

Initialization vector

In cryptography, an initialization vector (IV) or starting variable is an input to a cryptographic primitive being used to provide the initial state. The IV is typically required to be random or pseudorandom, but sometimes an IV only needs to be unpredictable or unique. Randomization is crucial for some encryption schemes to achieve semantic security, a property whereby repeated usage of the scheme under the same key does not allow an attacker to infer relationships between (potentially similar) segments of the encrypted message. For block ciphers, the use of an IV is described by the modes of operation. Some cryptographic primitives require the IV only to be non-repeating, and the required randomness is derived internally. In this case, the IV is commonly called a nonce (a number used only once), and the primitives (e.g. CBC) are considered stateful rather than randomized. This is because an IV need not be explicitly forwarded to a recipient but may be derived from a common state updated at both sender and receiver side. (In practice, a short nonce is still transmitted along with the message to consider message loss.) An example of stateful encryption schemes is the counter mode of operation, which has a sequence number for a nonce. The IV size depends on the cryptographic primitive used; for block ciphers it is generally the cipher's block-size. In encryption schemes, the unpredictable part of the IV has at best the same size as the key to compensate for time/memory/data tradeoff attacks. When the IV is chosen at random, the probability of collisions due to the birthday problem must be taken into account. Traditional stream ciphers such as RC4 do not support an explicit IV as input, and a custom solution for incorporating an IV into the cipher's key or internal state is needed. Some designs realized in practice are known to be insecure; the WEP protocol is a notable example, and is prone to related-IV attacks. == Motivation == A block cipher is one of the most basic primitives in cryptography, and frequently used for data encryption. However, by itself, it can only be used to encode a data block of a predefined size, called the block size. For example, a single invocation of the AES algorithm transforms a 128-bit plaintext block into a ciphertext block of 128 bits in size. The key, which is given as one input to the cipher, defines the mapping between plaintext and ciphertext. If data of arbitrary length is to be encrypted, a simple strategy is to split the data into blocks each matching the cipher's block size, and encrypt each block separately using the same key. This method is not secure as equal plaintext blocks get transformed into equal ciphertexts, and a third party observing the encrypted data may easily determine its content even when not knowing the encryption key. To hide patterns in encrypted data while avoiding the re-issuing of a new key after each block cipher invocation, a method is needed to randomize the input data. In 1980, the NIST published a national standard document designated Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 81, which specified four so-called block cipher modes of operation, each describing a different solution for encrypting a set of input blocks. The first mode implements the simple strategy described above, and was specified as the electronic codebook (ECB) mode. In contrast, each of the other modes describe a process where ciphertext from one block encryption step gets intermixed with the data from the next encryption step. To initiate this process, an additional input value is required to be mixed with the first block, and which is referred to as an initialization vector. For example, the cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode requires an unpredictable value, of size equal to the cipher's block size, as additional input. This unpredictable value is added to the first plaintext block before subsequent encryption. In turn, the ciphertext produced in the first encryption step is added to the second plaintext block, and so on. The ultimate goal for encryption schemes is to provide semantic security: by this property, it is practically impossible for an attacker to draw any knowledge from observed ciphertext. It can be shown that each of the three additional modes specified by the NIST are semantically secure under so-called chosen-plaintext attacks. == Properties == Properties of an IV depend on the cryptographic scheme used. A basic requirement is uniqueness, which means that no IV may be reused under the same key. For block ciphers, repeated IV values devolve the encryption scheme into electronic codebook mode: equal IV and equal plaintext result in equal ciphertext. In stream cipher encryption uniqueness is crucially important as plaintext may be trivially recovered otherwise. Example: Stream ciphers encrypt plaintext P to ciphertext C by deriving a key stream K from a given key and IV and computing C as C = P xor K. Assume that an attacker has observed two messages C1 and C2 both encrypted with the same key and IV. Then knowledge of either P1 or P2 reveals the other plaintext since C1 xor C2 = (P1 xor K) xor (P2 xor K) = P1 xor P2. Many schemes require the IV to be unpredictable by an adversary. This is effected by selecting the IV at random or pseudo-randomly. In such schemes, the chance of a duplicate IV is negligible, but the effect of the birthday problem must be considered. As for the uniqueness requirement, a predictable IV may allow recovery of (partial) plaintext. Example: Consider a scenario where a legitimate party called Alice encrypts messages using the cipher-block chaining mode. Consider further that there is an adversary called Eve that can observe these encryptions and is able to forward plaintext messages to Alice for encryption (in other words, Eve is capable of a chosen-plaintext attack). Now assume that Alice has sent a message consisting of an initialization vector IV1 and starting with a ciphertext block CAlice. Let further PAlice denote the first plaintext block of Alice's message, let E denote encryption, and let PEve be Eve's guess for the first plaintext block. Now, if Eve can determine the initialization vector IV2 of the next message she will be able to test her guess by forwarding a plaintext message to Alice starting with (IV2 xor IV1 xor PEve); if her guess was correct this plaintext block will get encrypted to CAlice by Alice. This is because of the following simple observation: CAlice = E(IV1 xor PAlice) = E(IV2 xor (IV2 xor IV1 xor PAlice)). Depending on whether the IV for a cryptographic scheme must be random or only unique the scheme is either called randomized or stateful. While randomized schemes always require the IV chosen by a sender to be forwarded to receivers, stateful schemes allow sender and receiver to share a common IV state, which is updated in a predefined way at both sides. == Block ciphers == Block cipher processing of data is usually described as a mode of operation. Modes are primarily defined for encryption as well as authentication, though newer designs exist that combine both security solutions in so-called authenticated encryption modes. While encryption and authenticated encryption modes usually take an IV matching the cipher's block size, authentication modes are commonly realized as deterministic algorithms, and the IV is set to zero or some other fixed value. == Stream ciphers == In stream ciphers, IVs are loaded into the keyed internal secret state of the cipher, after which a number of cipher rounds are executed prior to releasing the first bit of output. For performance reasons, designers of stream ciphers try to keep that number of rounds as small as possible, but because determining the minimal secure number of rounds for stream ciphers is not a trivial task, and considering other issues such as entropy loss, unique to each cipher construction, related-IVs and other IV-related attacks are a known security issue for stream ciphers, which makes IV loading in stream ciphers a serious concern and a subject of ongoing research. == WEP IV == The 802.11 encryption algorithm called WEP (short for Wired Equivalent Privacy) used a short, 24-bit IV, leading to reused IVs with the same key, which led to it being easily cracked. Packet injection allowed for WEP to be cracked in times as short as several seconds. This ultimately led to the deprecation of WEP. == SSL 2.0 IV == In cipher-block chaining mode (CBC mode), the IV need not be secret, but must be unpredictable (In particular, for any given plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be associated to the plaintext in advance of the generation of the IV.) at encryption time. Additionally for the output feedback mode (OFB mode), the IV must be unique. In particular, the (previously) common practice of re-using the last ciphertext block of a message as the IV for the next message is insecure (for example, this method was used by SSL 2.0). If an attacker knows

Brill tagger

The Brill tagger is an inductive method for part-of-speech tagging. It was described and invented by Eric Brill in his 1993 PhD thesis. It can be summarized as an "error-driven transformation-based tagger". It is: a form of supervised learning, which aims to minimize error; and, a transformation-based process, in the sense that a tag is assigned to each word and changed using a set of predefined rules. In the transformation process, if the word is known, it first assigns the most frequent tag, or if the word is unknown, it naively assigns the tag "noun" to it. High accuracy is eventually achieved by applying these rules iteratively and changing the incorrect tags. This approach ensures that valuable information such as the morphosyntactic construction of words is employed in an automatic tagging process. == Algorithm == The algorithm starts with initialization, which is the assignment of tags based on their probability for each word (for example, "dog" is more often a noun than a verb). Then "patches" are determined via rules that correct (probable) tagging errors made in the initialization phase: Initialization: Known words (in vocabulary): assigning the most frequent tag associated to a form of the word Unknown word == Rules and processing == The input text is first tokenized, or broken into words. Typically in natural language processing, contractions such as "'s", "n't", and the like are considered separate word tokens, as are punctuation marks. A dictionary and some morphological rules then provide an initial tag for each word token. For example, a simple lookup would reveal that "dog" may be a noun or a verb (the most frequent tag is simply chosen), while an unknown word will be assigned some tag(s) based on capitalization, various prefix or suffix strings, etc. (such morphological analyses, which Brill calls Lexical Rules, may vary between implementations). After all word tokens have (provisional) tags, contextual rules apply iteratively, to correct the tags by examining small amounts of context. This is where the Brill method differs from other part of speech tagging methods such as those using Hidden Markov Models. Rules are reapplied repeatedly, until a threshold is reached, or no more rules can apply. Brill rules are of the general form: tag1 → tag2 IF Condition where the Condition tests the preceding and/or following word tokens, or their tags (the notation for such rules differs between implementations). For example, in Brill's notation: IN NN WDPREVTAG DT while would change the tag of a word from IN (preposition) to NN (common noun), if the preceding word's tag is DT (determiner) and the word itself is "while". This covers cases like "all the while" or "in a while", where "while" should be tagged as a noun rather than its more common use as a conjunction (many rules are more general). Rules should only operate if the tag being changed is also known to be permissible, for the word in question or in principle (for example, most adjectives in English can also be used as nouns). Rules of this kind can be implemented by simple Finite-state machines. See Part of speech tagging for more general information including descriptions of the Penn Treebank and other sets of tags. Typical Brill taggers use a few hundred rules, which may be developed by linguistic intuition or by machine learning on a pre-tagged corpus. == Code == Brill's code pages at Johns Hopkins University are no longer on the web. An archived version of a mirror of the Brill tagger at its latest version as it was available at Plymouth Tech can be found on Archive.org. The software uses the MIT License.

Key-agreement protocol

In cryptography, a key-agreement protocol is a protocol whereby two (or more) parties generate a cryptographic key as a function of information provided by each honest party so that no party can predetermine the resulting value. In particular, all honest participants influence the outcome. A key-agreement protocol is a specialisation of a key-exchange protocol. At the completion of the protocol, all parties share the same key. A key-agreement protocol precludes undesired third parties from forcing a key choice on the agreeing parties. A secure key agreement can ensure confidentiality and data integrity in communications systems, ranging from simple messaging applications to complex banking transactions. Secure agreement is defined relative to a security model, for example the Universal Model. More generally, when evaluating protocols, it is important to state security goals and the security model. For example, it may be required for the session key to be authenticated. A protocol can be evaluated for success only in the context of its goals and attack model. An example of an adversarial model is the Dolev–Yao model. In many key exchange systems, one party generates the key, and sends that key to the other party; the other party has no influence on the key. == Exponential key exchange == The first publicly known public-key agreement protocol that meets the above criteria was the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, in which two parties jointly exponentiate a generator with random numbers, in such a way that an eavesdropper cannot feasibly determine what the resultant shared key is. Exponential key agreement in and of itself does not specify any prior agreement or subsequent authentication between the participants. It has thus been described as an anonymous key agreement protocol. == Symmetric key agreement == Symmetric key agreement (SKA) is a method of key agreement that uses solely symmetric cryptography and cryptographic hash functions as cryptographic primitives. It is related to symmetric authenticated key exchange. SKA may assume the use of initial shared secrets or a trusted third party with whom the agreeing parties share a secret is assumed. If no third party is present, then achieving SKA can be trivial: we tautologically assume that two parties that share an initial secret and have achieved SKA. SKA contrasts with key-agreement protocols that include techniques from asymmetric cryptography, such as key encapsulation mechanisms. The initial exchange of a shared key must be done in a manner that is private and integrity-assured. Historically, this was achieved by physical means, such as by using a trusted courier. An example of a SKA protocol is the Needham–Schroeder protocol. It establishes a session key between two parties on the same network, using a server as a trusted third party. The original Needham–Schroeder protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Timestamps and nonces are included to fix this attack. It forms the basis for the Kerberos protocol. === Types of key agreement === Boyd et al. classify two-party key agreement protocols according to two criteria as follows: whether a pre-shared key already exists or not the method of generating the session key. The pre-shared key may be shared between the two parties, or each party may share a key with a trusted third party. If there is no secure channel (as may be established via a pre-shared key), it is impossible to create an authenticated session key. The session key may be generated via: key transport, key agreement and hybrid. If there is no trusted third party, then the cases of key transport and hybrid session key generation are indistinguishable. SKA is concerned with protocols in which the session key is established using only symmetric primitives. == Authentication == Anonymous key exchange, like Diffie–Hellman, does not provide authentication of the parties, and is thus vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. A wide variety of cryptographic authentication schemes and protocols have been developed to provide authenticated key agreement to prevent man-in-the-middle and related attacks. These methods generally mathematically bind the agreed key to other agreed-upon data, such as the following: public–private key pairs shared secret keys passwords === Public keys === A widely used mechanism for defeating such attacks is the use of digitally signed keys that must be integrity-assured: if Bob's key is signed by a trusted third party vouching for his identity, Alice can have considerable confidence that a signed key she receives is not an attempt to intercept by Eve. When Alice and Bob have a public-key infrastructure, they may digitally sign an agreed Diffie–Hellman key, or exchanged Diffie–Hellman public keys. Such signed keys, sometimes signed by a certificate authority, are one of the primary mechanisms used for secure web traffic (including HTTPS, SSL or TLS protocols). Other specific examples are MQV, YAK and the ISAKMP component of the IPsec protocol suite for securing Internet Protocol communications. However, these systems require care in endorsing the match between identity information and public keys by certificate authorities in order to work properly. === Hybrid systems === Hybrid systems use public-key cryptography to exchange secret keys, which are then used in a symmetric-key cryptography systems. Most practical applications of cryptography use a combination of cryptographic functions to implement an overall system that provides all of the four desirable features of secure communications (confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation). === Passwords === Password-authenticated key agreement protocols require the separate establishment of a password (which may be smaller than a key) in a manner that is both private and integrity-assured. These are designed to resist man-in-the-middle and other active attacks on the password and the established keys. For example, DH-EKE, SPEKE, and SRP are password-authenticated variations of Diffie–Hellman. === Other tricks === If one has an integrity-assured way to verify a shared key over a public channel, one may engage in a Diffie–Hellman key exchange to derive a short-term shared key, and then subsequently authenticate that the keys match. One way is to use a voice-authenticated read-out of the key, as in PGPfone. Voice authentication, however, presumes that it is infeasible for a man-in-the-middle to spoof one participant's voice to the other in real-time, which may be an undesirable assumption. Such protocols may be designed to work with even a small public value, such as a password. Variations on this theme have been proposed for Bluetooth pairing protocols. In an attempt to avoid using any additional out-of-band authentication factors, Davies and Price proposed the use of the interlock protocol of Ron Rivest and Adi Shamir, which has been subject to both attack and subsequent refinement.