In decision tree learning, information gain ratio is a ratio of information gain to the intrinsic information. It was proposed by Ross Quinlan, to reduce a bias towards multi-valued attributes by taking the number and size of branches into account when choosing an attribute. Information gain is also known as mutual information. == Information gain calculation == Information gain is the reduction in entropy produced from partitioning a set with attributes a {\displaystyle a} and finding the optimal candidate that produces the highest value: IG ( T , a ) = H ( T ) − H ( T | a ) , {\displaystyle {\text{IG}}(T,a)=\mathrm {H} {(T)}-\mathrm {H} {(T|a)},} where T {\displaystyle T} is a random variable and H ( T | a ) {\displaystyle \mathrm {H} {(T|a)}} is the entropy of T {\displaystyle T} given the value of attribute a {\displaystyle a} . The information gain is equal to the total entropy for an attribute if for each of the attribute values a unique classification can be made for the result attribute. In this case the relative entropies subtracted from the total entropy are 0. == Split information calculation == The split information value for a test is defined as follows: SplitInformation ( X ) = − ∑ i = 1 n N ( x i ) N ( x ) ∗ log 2 N ( x i ) N ( x ) {\displaystyle {\text{SplitInformation}}(X)=-\sum _{i=1}^{n}{{\frac {\mathrm {N} (x_{i})}{\mathrm {N} (x)}}\log {_{2}}{\frac {\mathrm {N} (x_{i})}{\mathrm {N} (x)}}}} where X {\displaystyle X} is a discrete random variable with possible values x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i {\displaystyle {x_{1},x_{2},...,x_{i}}} and N ( x i ) {\displaystyle N(x_{i})} being the number of times that x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} occurs divided by the total count of events N ( x ) {\displaystyle N(x)} where x {\displaystyle x} is the set of events. The split information value is a positive number that describes the potential worth of splitting a branch from a node. This in turn is the intrinsic value that the random variable possesses and will be used to remove the bias in the information gain ratio calculation. == Information gain ratio calculation == The information gain ratio is the ratio between the information gain and the split information value: IGR ( T , a ) = IG ( T , a ) / SplitInformation ( T ) {\displaystyle {\text{IGR}}(T,a)={\text{IG}}(T,a)/{\text{SplitInformation}}(T)} IGR ( T , a ) = − ∑ i = 1 n P ( T ) log P ( T ) − ( − ∑ i = 1 n P ( T | a ) log P ( T | a ) ) − ∑ i = 1 n N ( t i ) N ( t ) ∗ log 2 N ( t i ) N ( t ) {\displaystyle {\text{IGR}}(T,a)={\frac {-\sum _{i=1}^{n}{\mathrm {P} (T)\log \mathrm {P} (T)}-(-\sum _{i=1}^{n}{\mathrm {P} (T|a)\log \mathrm {P} (T|a)})}{-\sum _{i=1}^{n}{{\frac {\mathrm {N} (t_{i})}{\mathrm {N} (t)}}\log {_{2}}{\frac {\mathrm {N} (t_{i})}{\mathrm {N} (t)}}}}}} == Example == Using weather data published by Fordham University, the table was created below: Using the table above, one can find the entropy, information gain, split information, and information gain ratio for each variable (outlook, temperature, humidity, and wind). These calculations are shown in the tables below: Using the above tables, one can deduce that Outlook has the highest information gain ratio. Next, one must find the statistics for the sub-groups of the Outlook variable (sunny, overcast, and rainy), for this example one will only build the sunny branch (as shown in the table below): One can find the following statistics for the other variables (temperature, humidity, and wind) to see which have the greatest effect on the sunny element of the outlook variable: Humidity was found to have the highest information gain ratio. One will repeat the same steps as before and find the statistics for the events of the Humidity variable (high and normal): Since the play values are either all "No" or "Yes", the information gain ratio value will be equal to 1. Also, now that one has reached the end of the variable chain with Wind being the last variable left, they can build an entire root to leaf node branch line of a decision tree. Once finished with reaching this leaf node, one would follow the same procedure for the rest of the elements that have yet to be split in the decision tree. This set of data was relatively small, however, if a larger set was used, the advantages of using the information gain ratio as the splitting factor of a decision tree can be seen more. == Advantages == Information gain ratio biases the decision tree against considering attributes with a large number of distinct values. For example, suppose that we are building a decision tree for some data describing a business's customers. Information gain ratio is used to decide which of the attributes are the most relevant. These will be tested near the root of the tree. One of the input attributes might be the customer's telephone number. This attribute has a high information gain, because it uniquely identifies each customer. Due to its high amount of distinct values, this will not be chosen to be tested near the root. == Disadvantages == Although information gain ratio solves the key problem of information gain, it creates another problem. If one is considering an amount of attributes that have a high number of distinct values, these will never be above one that has a lower number of distinct values. == Difference from information gain == Information gain's shortcoming is created by not providing a numerical difference between attributes with high distinct values from those that have less. Example: Suppose that we are building a decision tree for some data describing a business's customers. Information gain is often used to decide which of the attributes are the most relevant, so they can be tested near the root of the tree. One of the input attributes might be the customer's credit card number. This attribute has a high information gain, because it uniquely identifies each customer, but we do not want to include it in the decision tree: deciding how to treat a customer based on their credit card number is unlikely to generalize to customers we haven't seen before. Information gain ratio's strength is that it has a bias towards the attributes with the lower number of distinct values. Below is a table describing the differences of information gain and information gain ratio when put in certain scenarios.
PNGOUT
PNGOUT is a freeware command line optimizer for PNG images written by Ken Silverman. The transformation is lossless, meaning that the resulting image is visually identical to the source image. According to its author, this program can often get higher compression than other optimizers by 5–10%. It is possible to compress some inflated PNGs to a size below 1% of the original file. PNGOUT was also available as a plug-in for the freeware image viewer IrfanView and can be enabled as an option when saving files. It allows editing of various PNGOUT settings via a dialog box. PNGOUT integration was removed in IrfanView version 4.58 in favour of OptiPNG. In 2006, a commercial version of PNGOUT with a graphical user interface, known as PNGOUTWin, was released by Ardfry Imaging, a small company Silverman co-founded in 2005. There is also a freeware GUI frontend to PNGOUT available, known as PNGGauntlet. == Main operation == The main function of PNGOUT is to reduce the size of image data contained in the IDAT chunk. This chunk is compressed using the deflate algorithm. Deflate algorithms can vary in speed and compression ratio, with higher compression ratios generally implying lower speed. Ken Silverman wrote a deflate compressor for PNGOUT that is slower than the ones used in most graphics software, but produces smaller files. PNGOUT also performs automatic bit depth, color, and palette reduction where appropriate.
Social media use in African politics
Since the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and the Tunisian Revolution, social media, especially Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, began to gain traction as a political tool in Africa. Various political actors have used social media to pursue a wide range of political objectives. State actors can use social media to encourage political discourse, campaign, or implement censorship and surveillance. Non-state actors, such as civil society organizations and opposition movements, can use social media to address political concerns and to organize widespread uprisings, such as the 2014 Burkinabé uprising. Meanwhile, extremist organizations can use social media to further their propaganda and recruitment. However, social media has been criticized for its limited accessibility and for facilitating the spread of misinformation, causing some skepticism about its effectiveness. Due to low entry barriers and user-generated content, social media provides a platform where people from different social classes can engage and interact with one another. Under traditional media, the public had limited opportunities to voice their political opinions. Social media enables people to both create and consume content. The public has become increasingly comfortable and confident in expressing political opinions online, often away from government scrutiny. Scholars argue that social media use has democratizing effects in African countries. == State actors == === Promoting political discourse === Through social media, the government and its citizens can discuss policy ideas, policy implementation, and political actions. Regardless of geographical location and distance, people are able to voice their opinions to the government. Social media includes citizens who were previously not able to express their discontent or share their ideas to the government. As state actors keep the public informed, social media can increase civic engagement. With more civic engagement, policies can be discussed without politicization. Before the commonplace use of social media, African countries faced weak feedback mechanisms that effectively excluded the average African citizen from policy discourse. In South Africa, the government uses social media to connect with constituencies. The South African president runs an official Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr accounts to engage with the public. === Campaigning === Political parties also use social media for political campaigns during election periods. In South Africa, the ANC (African National Congress) and DA (Democratic Alliance) use social media for political purposes. These parties specifically use Facebook as a tool for campaigning and engaging with the public to improve their relationship with citizens. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan employed social media to campaign for the presidential election in 2011, which he won. When President Goodluck Jonathan announced his bid for the presidency on social media in 2010, it reached about 217,000 people. As his campaign progressed, President Goodluck Jonathan was able to increase his followers to half a million by early 2011. === Censorship & Surveillance === While state actors can use social media to encourage their party or discourse, social media can be used to censor and surveil citizens. For example, the ANC and DA use Facebook to monitor South Africans. The government is able to track down people who have spoken against the government and translate this information into physical action to stop any possibility of a revolution. Social media platforms can be shut down to manipulate the flow of information. In Chad, citizens cannot access information through online platforms. This censorship blocked "Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Viber". In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the government shut down the internet before contested elections. In Zimbabwe, the government shut down the internet to hide civilian protests against fuel price increases. == Non-state actors == === Civil society organizations (CSOs) === Civil society organizations have also used social media networks in an effort to recruit supporters and communicate with the public. CSOs can use social media to mobilize people to support their cause, such as the Ghanaian Committee for Joint Action (CJA). In 2005 and 2006, the CJA gathered support to protest against the 50% fuel price increase. CSOs can play the role of a counterforce against state actors and state propaganda during times of crises, such as protests and military clashes. In some cases, CSOs release their own videos and photos on social media which challenges traditional forms of media. CSOs have also served to monitor elections to reduce corruption and violence during election day. For instance, the Zambian Bantu Watch started the #bantuwatch social media campaign to monitor the 2011 presidential election. Zambians used Facebook and Twitter to report polling station results to mitigate election fraud and election violence. In South Africa, CSOs created 'amandla.mobi' to campaign for public policies by creating petitions. Through 'amandla.mobi', CSOs are able to circulate petitions on social media to collect signatures. South African CSOs reported how social media helped their organizations to gain support and share ideas. However, CSOs struggle to attract media attention and often have to pay for media coverage. === Opposition forces against the government === Social media is also used by the public or opposition forces against the government. Through horizontal social media, organizing can lead to street protests and revolutions, some of which are successful. For instance, during the Egyptian revolution of 2011, "The Day of the Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption, and Unemployment" and "We Are All Khaled Said" gathered support against President Hosni Mubarak. In particular, "We Are All Khaled Said" had Egyptian citizens gather around the death of Khaled Said who was brutally tortured and killed by the Egyptian government because Said wanted to uncover government corruption. As unrest erupted into public demonstrations, President Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign. Witnessing the success of social media during the Egyptian revolution, the Tunisian Revolution, or the Jasmine Revolution, mobilized through Facebook and Twitter. Likewise, in South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique, these countries have used social media as "new protest drums." Due to social media's low entry barrier, opposition forces against the government can facilitate political discourse that can lead to accountability. Whistleblowers and opposition forces are able to expose corruption through social media, where they face less repression while reaching a larger audience. For example, the youth of Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook to discuss politics without judgment. Specifically, in Zimbabwe, political youth used Facebook to avoid state surveillance. Social media is used as a supplemental tool for activism. In 2015, South African student activists started the hashtag #RhodesMustFall to push the issue of colonialism and racism at the forefront of the public. === Extremist organizations === Social media is easily accessible and created by user-based content. Therefore, marginalized groups are able to use social media to spread extremist ideas. For instance, Boko Haram created the Media Office of West Africa Province and perpetuated propaganda through Twitter and YouTube. Boko Haram's online propaganda campaign targets and persuades young dissuaded Nigerians to join their cause. It is important to note that social media has also been used against Boko Haram. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls and an international campaign fought for their return through #BringBackOurGirls. Another extremist group, Al-Shabaab, has created an online presence through Twitter and YouTube. Through these social media networks, Al-Shabaab recruits new members to their extremist group through their propaganda which emphasizes the group's successes. Albeit their efforts, Al-Shabaab has not been very successful in coordinating their members but they are successful in financing their group. Furthermore, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use social media to target and recruit individuals to their cause. ISIL's social media usage is more diverse compared to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab; ISIL uses "Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram, JustPaste.it, Kik and Ask.fm." Since ISIL's Twitter accounts kept getting shut down, ISIL uses Telegram and WhatsApp chat rooms to privately conduct meetings. Due to the spread of extremist ideology, Zhuravskaya et al. acknowledge social media's potential to be misused. == Challenges == Although social media can be used as a political tool, it faces challenges in Africa. Due to low literacy rates in Africa, social media networks exclude many of the population members. In addition, lack of access to electricity and the internet can fur
Vans challenge
The Vans challenge is a viral internet challenge that began in March 2019 where people show their Vans shoes landing right-side up after tossing them in the air. The viral sensation reportedly started after a Twitter user shared a video of the occurrence, which was captioned: “Did you know it doesn’t matter how you throw your Vans they will land facing up.” Since then, multiple people on social media posted similar videos of them throwing their Vans in the air and landing right-side up, along with Crocs, UGG boots, and other popular shoes. This theory proved false, as these shoes have not always landed facing up after tossing them.
Trace zero cryptography
First proposed by Gerhard Frey in 1998, trace zero cryptography refers to the use of trace zero varieties (TZV) for cryptographic purpose. Trace zero varieties are subgroups of the divisor class group on a low genus hyperelliptic curve defined over a finite field. These groups can be used to establish asymmetric cryptography using the discrete logarithm problem as cryptographic primitive. Trace zero varieties feature a better scalar multiplication performance than elliptic curves. This allows fast arithmetic in these groups, which can speed up the calculations with a factor 3 compared with elliptic curves and hence speed up the cryptosystem. Another advantage is that for groups of cryptographically relevant size, the order of the group can simply be calculated using the characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius endomorphism. This is not the case, for example, in elliptic curve cryptography when the group of points of an elliptic curve over a prime field is used for cryptographic purpose. However, to represent an element of the trace zero variety more bits are needed compared with elements of elliptic or hyperelliptic curves. Another disadvantage is the fact that it is possible to reduce the security of the TZV of 1/6th of the bit length using cover attack. == Mathematical background == A hyperelliptic curve C of genus g over a prime field F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} where q = pn (p prime) of odd characteristic is defined as C : y 2 + h ( x ) y = f ( x ) , {\displaystyle C:~y^{2}+h(x)y=f(x),} where f monic, deg(f) = 2g + 1 and deg(h) ≤ g. The curve has at least one F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} -rational Weierstraßpoint. The Jacobian variety J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} of C is for all finite extension F q n {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q^{n}}} isomorphic to the ideal class group Cl ( C / F q n ) {\displaystyle \operatorname {Cl} (C/\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} . With the Mumford's representation it is possible to represent the elements of J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} with a pair of polynomials [u, v], where u, v ∈ F q n [ x ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q^{n}}[x]} . The Frobenius endomorphism σ is used on an element [u, v] of J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} to raise the power of each coefficient of that element to q: σ([u, v]) = [uq(x), vq(x)]. The characteristic polynomial of this endomorphism has the following form: χ ( T ) = T 2 g + a 1 T 2 g − 1 + ⋯ + a g T g + ⋯ + a 1 q g − 1 T + q g , {\displaystyle \chi (T)=T^{2g}+a_{1}T^{2g-1}+\cdots +a_{g}T^{g}+\cdots +a_{1}q^{g-1}T+q^{g},} where ai in Z {\displaystyle \mathbb {Z} } With the Hasse–Weil theorem it is possible to receive the group order of any extension field F q n {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q^{n}}} by using the complex roots τi of χ(T): | J C ( F q n ) | = ∏ i = 1 2 g ( 1 − τ i n ) {\displaystyle |J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})|=\prod _{i=1}^{2g}(1-\tau _{i}^{n})} Let D be an element of the J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} of C, then it is possible to define an endomorphism of J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} , the so-called trace of D: Tr ( D ) = ∑ i = 0 n − 1 σ i ( D ) = D + σ ( D ) + ⋯ + σ n − 1 ( D ) {\displaystyle \operatorname {Tr} (D)=\sum _{i=0}^{n-1}\sigma ^{i}(D)=D+\sigma (D)+\cdots +\sigma ^{n-1}(D)} Based on this endomorphism one can reduce the Jacobian variety to a subgroup G with the property, that every element is of trace zero: G = { D ∈ J C ( F q n ) | Tr ( D ) = 0 } , ( 0 neutral element in J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle G=\{D\in J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})~|~{\text{Tr}}(D)={\textbf {0}}\},~~~({\textbf {0}}{\text{ neutral element in }}J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} G is the kernel of the trace endomorphism and thus G is a group, the so-called trace zero (sub)variety (TZV) of J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} . The intersection of G and J C ( F q ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q})} is produced by the n-torsion elements of J C ( F q ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q})} . If the greatest common divisor gcd ( n , | J C ( F q ) | ) = 1 {\displaystyle \gcd(n,|J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q})|)=1} the intersection is empty and one can compute the group order of G: | G | = | J C ( F q n ) | | J C ( F q ) | = ∏ i = 1 2 g ( 1 − τ i n ) ∏ i = 1 2 g ( 1 − τ i ) {\displaystyle |G|={\dfrac {|J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})|}{|J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q})|}}={\dfrac {\prod _{i=1}^{2g}(1-\tau _{i}^{n})}{\prod _{i=1}^{2g}(1-\tau _{i})}}} The actual group used in cryptographic applications is a subgroup G0 of G of a large prime order l. This group may be G itself. There exist three different cases of cryptographical relevance for TZV: g = 1, n = 3 g = 1, n = 5 g = 2, n = 3 == Arithmetic == The arithmetic used in the TZV group G0 based on the arithmetic for the whole group J C ( F q n ) {\displaystyle J_{C}(\mathbb {F} _{q^{n}})} , But it is possible to use the Frobenius endomorphism σ to speed up the scalar multiplication. This can be archived if G0 is generated by D of order l then σ(D) = sD, for some integers s. For the given cases of TZV s can be computed as follows, where ai come from the characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius endomorphism : For g = 1, n = 3: s = q − 1 1 − a 1 mod ℓ {\displaystyle s={\dfrac {q-1}{1-a_{1}}}{\bmod {\ell }}} For g = 1, n = 5: s = q 2 − q − a 1 2 q + a 1 q + 1 q − 2 a 1 q + a 1 3 − a 1 2 + a 1 − 1 mod ℓ {\displaystyle s={\dfrac {q^{2}-q-a_{1}^{2}q+a_{1}q+1}{q-2a_{1}q+a_{1}^{3}-a_{1}^{2}+a_{1}-1}}{\bmod {\ell }}} For g = 2, n = 3: s = − q 2 − a 2 + a 1 a 1 q − a 2 + 1 mod ℓ {\displaystyle s=-{\dfrac {q^{2}-a_{2}+a_{1}}{a_{1}q-a_{2}+1}}{\bmod {\ell }}} Knowing this, it is possible to replace any scalar multiplication mD (|m| ≤ l/2) with: m 0 D + m 1 σ ( D ) + ⋯ + m n − 1 σ n − 1 ( D ) , where m i = O ( ℓ 1 / ( n − 1 ) ) = O ( q g ) {\displaystyle m_{0}D+m_{1}\sigma (D)+\cdots +m_{n-1}\sigma ^{n-1}(D),~~~~{\text{where }}m_{i}=O(\ell ^{1/(n-1)})=O(q^{g})} With this trick the multiple scalar product can be reduced to about 1/(n − 1)th of doublings necessary for calculating mD, if the implied constants are small enough. == Security == The security of cryptographic systems based on trace zero subvarieties according to the results of the papers comparable to the security of hyper-elliptic curves of low genus g' over F p ′ {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{p'}} , where p' ~ (n − 1)(g/g' ) for |G| ~128 bits. For the cases where n = 3, g = 2 and n = 5, g = 1 it is possible to reduce the security for at most 6 bits, where |G| ~ 2256, because one can not be sure that G is contained in a Jacobian of a curve of genus 6. The security of curves of genus 4 for similar fields are far less secure. == Cover attack on a trace zero crypto-system == The attack published in shows, that the DLP in trace zero groups of genus 2 over finite fields of characteristic diverse than 2 or 3 and a field extension of degree 3 can be transformed into a DLP in a class group of degree 0 with genus of at most 6 over the base field. In this new class group the DLP can be attacked with the index calculus methods. This leads to a reduction of the bit length 1/6th.
Chinchilla (language model)
Chinchilla is a family of large language models (LLMs) developed by the research team at Google DeepMind, presented in March 2022. == Models == It is named "chinchilla" because it is a further development over a previous model family named Gopher. Both model families were trained in order to investigate the scaling laws of large language models. It claimed to outperform GPT-3. It considerably simplifies downstream utilization because it requires much less computer power for inference and fine-tuning. Based on the training of previously employed language models, it has been determined that if one doubles the model size, one must also have twice the number of training tokens. This hypothesis has been used to train Chinchilla by DeepMind. Similar to Gopher in terms of cost, Chinchilla has 70B parameters and four times as much data. Chinchilla has an average accuracy of 67.5% on the Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) benchmark, which is 7% higher than Gopher's performance. Chinchilla was still in the testing phase as of January 12, 2023. Chinchilla contributes to developing an effective training paradigm for large autoregressive language models with limited compute resources. The Chinchilla team recommends that the number of training tokens is twice for every model size doubling, meaning that using larger, higher-quality training datasets can lead to better results on downstream tasks. It has been used for the Flamingo vision-language model. == Architecture == Both the Gopher family and Chinchilla family are families of transformer models. In particular, they are essentially the same as GPT-2, with different sizes and minor modifications. Gopher family uses RMSNorm instead of LayerNorm; relative positional encoding rather than absolute positional encoding. The Chinchilla family is the same as the Gopher family, but trained with AdamW instead of Adam optimizer. The Gopher family contains six models of increasing size, from 44 million parameters to 280 billion parameters. They refer to the largest one as "Gopher" by default. Similar naming conventions apply for the Chinchilla family. Table 1 of shows the entire Gopher family: Table 4 of compares the 70-billion-parameter Chinchilla with Gopher 280B.
Myrinet
Myrinet, ANSI/VITA 26-1998, is a high-speed local area networking system designed by the company Myricom to be used as an interconnect between multiple machines to form computer clusters. == Description == Myrinet was promoted as having lower protocol overhead than standards such as Ethernet, and therefore better throughput, less interference, and lower latency while using the host CPU. Although it can be used as a traditional networking system, Myrinet is often used directly by programs that "know" about it, thereby bypassing a call into the operating system. Earlier versions of Myrinet used a variety of media and connectors: Generation 2 used copper media with DC-37 (Myrinet-LAN, M2L- controllers and switches) or microribbon (Myrinet-SAN, M2M-) connectors. Generation 3 used copper media with HSSDC (Myrinet-Serial, M3S-) or microribbon (Myrinet-SAN, M3M-) connectors, or fiber with LC-connectors (Myrinet-Fiber, M3F-). The later versions of Myrinet physically consist of two fibre optic cables, upstream and downstream, connected to the host computers with a single connector. Machines are connected via low-overhead routers and switches, as opposed to connecting one machine directly to another. Myrinet includes a number of fault-tolerance features, mostly backed by the switches. These include flow control, error control, and "heartbeat" monitoring on every link. The "fourth-generation" Myrinet, called Myri-10G, supported a 10 Gbit/s data rate and can use 10 Gigabit Ethernet on PHY, the physical layer (cables, connectors, distances, signaling). Myri-10G started shipping at the end of 2005. Myrinet was approved in 1998 by the American National Standards Institute for use on the VMEbus as ANSI/VITA 26-1998. One of the earliest publications on Myrinet is a 1995 IEEE article. === Performance === Myrinet is a lightweight protocol with little overhead that allows it to operate with throughput close to the basic signaling speed of the physical layer. For supercomputing, the low latency of Myrinet is even more important than its throughput performance, since, according to Amdahl's law, a high-performance parallel system tends to be bottlenecked by its slowest sequential process, which in all but the most embarrassingly parallel supercomputer workloads is often the latency of message transmission across the network. === Deployment === According to Myricom, 141 (28.2%) of the June 2005 TOP500 supercomputers used Myrinet technology. In the November 2005 TOP500, the number of supercomputers using Myrinet was down to 101 computers, or 20.2%, in November 2006, 79 (15.8%), and by November 2007, 18 (3.6%), a long way behind gigabit Ethernet at 54% and InfiniBand at 24.2%. In the June 2014 TOP500 list, the number of supercomputers using Myrinet interconnect was 1 (0.2%). In November 2013, the assets of Myricom (including the Myrinet technology) were acquired by CSP Inc. In 2016, it was reported that Google had also offered to buy the company.