Kurt Keutzer (born November 9, 1955) is an American computer scientist. == Early life and education == Kurt Keutzer grew up in Indianapolis, Indiana. He earned a bachelor's degree in mathematics from Maharishi University of Management (formerly Mararishi International University) in 1978, and a PhD in computer science from Indiana University Bloomington in 1984. == Career == Keutzer joined Bell Labs in 1984, where he worked on logic synthesis. In 1991, he joined the electronic design automation company Synopsys, where he was promoted to chief technology officer. He subsequently joined the University of California, Berkeley as a professor in 1998. His research at Berkeley has focused on the intersection of high performance computing and machine learning. Working with a number of graduate students at Berkeley, Keutzer developed FireCaffe, which scaled the training of deep neural networks to over 100 GPUs. Later, with LARS and LAMB optimizers, they scaled it to over 1000 servers. Keutzer and his students also developed deep neural networks such as SqueezeNet, SqueezeDet, and SqueezeSeg, which can run efficiently on mobile devices. Keutzer co-founded DeepScale with his PhD student Forrest Iandola in 2015, and Keutzer served as the company's chief strategy officer. The firm was focused on developing deep neural networks for advanced driver assistance systems in passenger cars. On October 1, 2019, electric vehicle manufacturer Tesla, Inc. purchased DeepScale to augment and accelerate its self-driving vehicle work. == Honors and awards == Keutzer was named a Fellow of the IEEE in 1996. Recipient of DAC Most Influential Paper (MIP) award (24th DAC, 1987) for his "Dagon: technology binding and local optimization by DAG matching” publication. == Books by Keutzer == 1988. Dwight Hill, Don Shugard, John Fishburn, and Kurt Keutzer. Algorithms and Techniques for VLSI Layout Synthesis. Springer. 1994. Srinivas Devadas, Abhijit Ghosh, and Kurt Keutzer. Logic Synthesis. McGraw-Hill. 2002. David Chinnery and Kurt Keutzer. Closing the Gap Between ASIC & Custom: Tools and Techniques for High-Performance ASIC Design. Springer. (2nd edition appeared in 2007.) 2004. Pinhong Chen, Desmond A. Kirkpatrick, and Kurt Keutzer. Static Crosstalk-Noise Analysis: For Deep Sub-Micron Digital Designs. Springer. 2005. Matthias Gries and Kurt Keutzer. Building ASIPs: The Mescal Methodology. Springer.
Night Sky (app)
Night Sky (app) is an application developed and published by indie studio iCandi Apps Ltd. from the UK. Night Sky is a stargazing reference app, where the user can explore a virtual representation of the night sky to identify stars, planets, constellations and satellites. The app is developed specifically for iOS, tvOS and watchOS devices. Night Sky was first released on November 1, 2011 for iOS, and has had multiple updates since launch. Night Sky was mentioned in the September 2016 Apple Keynote during the Apple Watch Series 2 announcement. In October 2016, Night Sky was featured as the Free App of The Week on the Apple App Store. == Reception == Night Sky was featured in Apple's 'Best of 2012' and has also been pre-installed onto iPads in Apple retail stores worldwide.
Landmark point
In morphometrics, landmark point or shortly landmark is a point in a shape object in which correspondences between and within the populations of the object are preserved. In other disciplines, landmarks may be known as vertices, anchor points, control points, sites, profile points, 'sampling' points, nodes, markers, fiducial markers, etc. Landmarks can be defined either manually by experts or automatically by a computer program. There are three basic types of landmarks: anatomical landmarks, mathematical landmarks or pseudo-landmarks. An anatomical landmark is a biologically-meaningful point in an organism. Usually experts define anatomical points to ensure their correspondences within the same species. Examples of anatomical landmark in shape of a skull are the eye corner, tip of the nose, jaw, etc. Anatomical landmarks determine homologous parts of an organism, which share a common ancestry. Mathematical landmarks are points in a shape that are located according to some mathematical or geometrical property, for instance, a high curvature point or an extreme point. A computer program usually determines mathematical landmarks used for an automatic pattern recognition. Pseudo-landmarks are constructed points located between anatomical or mathematical landmarks. A typical example is an equally spaced set of points between two anatomical landmarks to get more sample points from a shape. Pseudo-landmarks are useful during shape matching, when the matching process requires a large number of points.
Deep Learning Indaba
The Deep Learning Indaba is an annual conference and educational event that aims to strengthen machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) capacity across Africa. Launched in 2017, it brings together students, researchers, industry practitioners, and policymakers from across the African continent. == History == The Deep Learning Indaba began in 2017 at the University of the Witwatersrand with over 300 participants from 23 African countries, offering tutorials in advanced AI topics and featuring notable speakers like Nando de Freitas. In 2018, it expanded to 650 delegates at Stellenbosch University, introducing parallel sessions to encourage collaboration. The 2019 edition in Nairobi, Kenya, reflected further growth, with increasing sponsorship and support from major tech companies like Google and Microsoft. === Deep Learning IndabaX ===
Second-order co-occurrence pointwise mutual information
In computational linguistics, second-order co-occurrence pointwise mutual information (SOC-PMI) is a method used to measure semantic similarity, or how close in meaning two words are. The method does not require the two words to appear together in a text. Instead, it works by analyzing the "neighbor" words that typically appear alongside each of the two target words in a large body of text (corpus). If the two target words frequently share the same neighbors, they are considered semantically similar. For example, the words "cemetery" and "graveyard" may not appear in the same sentence often, but they both frequently appear near words like "buried," "dead," and "funeral." SOC-PMI uses this shared context to determine that they have a similar meaning. The method is called "second-order" because it doesn't look at the direct co-occurrence of the target words (which would be first-order), but at the co-occurrence of their neighbors (a second level of association). The strength of these associations is quantified using pointwise mutual information (PMI). == History == The method builds on earlier work like the PMI-IR algorithm, which used the AltaVista search engine to calculate word association probabilities. The key advantage of a second-order approach like SOC-PMI is its ability to measure similarity between words that do not co-occur often, or at all. The British National Corpus (BNC) has been used as a source for word frequencies and contexts for this method. == Methodology == The SOC-PMI algorithm measures the similarity between two words, w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} and w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} , in several steps. === Step 1: Score neighboring words with PMI === First, for each target word ( w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} and w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} ), the algorithm identifies its "neighbor" words within a certain text window (e.g., within 5 words to the left or right) across a large corpus. The strength of the association between a target word t i {\displaystyle t_{i}} and its neighbor w {\displaystyle w} is calculated using pointwise mutual information (PMI). A higher PMI value means the two words appear together more often than would be expected by chance. The PMI between a target word t i {\displaystyle t_{i}} and a neighbor word w {\displaystyle w} is calculated as: f pmi ( t i , w ) = log 2 f b ( t i , w ) × m f t ( t i ) f t ( w ) {\displaystyle f^{\text{pmi}}(t_{i},w)=\log _{2}{\frac {f^{b}(t_{i},w)\times m}{f^{t}(t_{i})f^{t}(w)}}} where: f b ( t i , w ) {\displaystyle f^{b}(t_{i},w)} is the number of times t i {\displaystyle t_{i}} and w {\displaystyle w} appear together in the context window. f t ( t i ) {\displaystyle f^{t}(t_{i})} is the total number of times t i {\displaystyle t_{i}} appears in the corpus. f t ( w ) {\displaystyle f^{t}(w)} is the total number of times w {\displaystyle w} appears in the corpus. m {\displaystyle m} is the total number of tokens (words) in the corpus. === Step 2: Create a semantic 'signature' for each word === For each target word ( w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} and w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} ), the algorithm creates a list of its most significant neighbors. This is done by taking the top β {\displaystyle \beta } neighbor words, sorted in descending order by their PMI score with the target word. This list of top neighbors, X w {\displaystyle X^{w}} , acts as a semantic "signature" for the word w {\displaystyle w} . X w = { X i w } {\displaystyle X^{w}=\{X_{i}^{w}\}} , for i = 1 , 2 , … , β {\displaystyle i=1,2,\ldots ,\beta } The size of this list, β {\displaystyle \beta } , is a parameter of the method. === Step 3: Compare the signatures === The algorithm then compares the signatures of w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} and w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} . It looks for words that are present in both signatures. The similarity of w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} to w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} is calculated by summing the PMI scores of w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} with every word in w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} 's signature list. The β {\displaystyle \beta } -PMI summation function defines this score. The score for w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} with respect to w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} is: f ( w 1 , w 2 , β ) = ∑ i = 1 β ( f pmi ( X i w 1 , w 2 ) ) γ {\displaystyle f(w_{1},w_{2},\beta )=\sum _{i=1}^{\beta }(f^{\text{pmi}}(X_{i}^{w_{1}},w_{2}))^{\gamma }} This sum only includes terms where the PMI value is positive. The exponent γ {\displaystyle \gamma } (with a value > 1) is used to give more weight to neighbors that are more strongly associated with w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} . This calculation is done in both directions: The similarity of w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} with respect to w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} : f ( w 1 , w 2 , β 1 ) = ∑ i = 1 β 1 ( f pmi ( X i w 1 , w 2 ) ) γ {\displaystyle f(w_{1},w_{2},\beta _{1})=\sum _{i=1}^{\beta _{1}}(f^{\text{pmi}}(X_{i}^{w_{1}},w_{2}))^{\gamma }} The similarity of w 2 {\displaystyle w_{2}} with respect to w 1 {\displaystyle w_{1}} : f ( w 2 , w 1 , β 2 ) = ∑ i = 1 β 2 ( f pmi ( X i w 2 , w 1 ) ) γ {\displaystyle f(w_{2},w_{1},\beta _{2})=\sum _{i=1}^{\beta _{2}}(f^{\text{pmi}}(X_{i}^{w_{2}},w_{1}))^{\gamma }} === Step 4: Calculate final similarity score === Finally, the total semantic similarity is the average of the two scores from the previous step. S i m ( w 1 , w 2 ) = f ( w 1 , w 2 , β 1 ) β 1 + f ( w 2 , w 1 , β 2 ) β 2 {\displaystyle \mathrm {Sim} (w_{1},w_{2})={\frac {f(w_{1},w_{2},\beta _{1})}{\beta _{1}}}+{\frac {f(w_{2},w_{1},\beta _{2})}{\beta _{2}}}} This score can be normalized to fall between 0 and 1. For example, using this method, the words cemetery and graveyard achieve a high similarity score of 0.986 (with specific parameter settings).
Insider threat
An insider threat is a perceived threat to an organization that comes from people within the organization, such as employees, former employees, contractors or business associates, who have inside information concerning the organization's security practices, data and computer systems. The threat may involve fraud, the theft of confidential or commercially valuable information, the theft of intellectual property, or the sabotage of computer systems. == Overview == Insiders may have accounts giving them legitimate access to computer systems, with this access originally having been given to them to serve in the performance of their duties; these permissions could be abused to harm the organization. Insiders are often familiar with the organization's data and intellectual property as well as the methods that are in place to protect them. This makes it easier for the insider to circumvent any security controls of which they are aware. Physical proximity to data means that the insider does not need to hack into the organizational network through the outer perimeter by traversing firewalls; rather they are in the building already, often with direct access to the organization's internal network. Insider threats are harder to defend against than attacks from outsiders, since the insider already has legitimate access to the organization's information and assets. An insider may attempt to steal property or information for personal gain or to benefit another organization or country. The threat to the organization could also be through malicious software left running on its computer systems by former employees, a so-called logic bomb. == Research == Insider threat is an active area of research in academia and government. The CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie-Mellon University maintains the CERT Insider Threat Center, which includes a database of more than 850 cases of insider threats, including instances of fraud, theft and sabotage; the database is used for research and analysis. CERT's Insider Threat Team also maintains an informational blog to help organizations and businesses defend themselves against insider crime. The Threat Lab and Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (DOD PERSEREC) has also recently emerged as a national resource within the United States of America. The Threat Lab hosts an annual conference, the SBS Summit. They also maintain a website that contains resources from this conference. Complimenting these efforts, a companion podcast was created, Voices from the SBS Summit. In 2022, the Threat Lab created an interdisciplinary journal, Counter Insider Threat Research and Practice (CITRAP) which publishes research on insider threat detection. === Findings === In the 2022 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), Verizon found that 82% of breaches involved the human element, noting that employees continue to play a leading role in cybersecurity incidents and breaches. According to the UK Information Commissioners Office, 90% of all breaches reported to them in 2019 were the result of mistakes made by end users. This was up from 61% and 87% over the previous two years. A 2018 whitepaper reported that 53% of companies surveyed had confirmed insider attacks against their organization in the previous 12 months, with 27% saying insider attacks have become more frequent. A report published in July 2012 on the insider threat in the U.S. financial sector gives some statistics on insider threat incidents: 80% of the malicious acts were committed at work during working hours; 81% of the perpetrators planned their actions beforehand; 33% of the perpetrators were described as "difficult" and 17% as being "disgruntled". The insider was identified in 74% of cases. Financial gain was a motive in 81% of cases, revenge in 23% of cases, and 27% of the people carrying out malicious acts were in financial difficulties at the time. The US Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center published a report that describes approaches for detecting insider threats. Earlier it published ten case studies of insider attacks by information technology professionals. Cybersecurity experts believe that 38% of negligent insiders are victims of a phishing attack, whereby they receive an email that appears to come from a legitimate source such as a company. These emails normally contain malware in the form of hyperlinks. == Typologies and ontologies == Multiple classification systems and ontologies have been proposed to classify insider threats. Traditional models of insider threat identify three broad categories: Malicious insiders, which are people who take advantage of their access to inflict harm on an organization; Negligent insiders, which are people who make errors and disregard policies, which place their organizations at risk; and Infiltrators, who are external actors that obtain legitimate access credentials without authorization. == Criticisms == Insider threat research has been criticized. Critics have argued that insider threat is a poorly defined concept. Forensically investigating insider data theft is notoriously difficult, and requires novel techniques such as stochastic forensics. Data supporting insider threat is generally proprietary (i.e., encrypted data). Theoretical/conceptual models of insider threat are often based on loose interpretations of research in the behavioral and social sciences, using "deductive principles and intuitions of subject matter expert." Adopting sociotechnical approaches, researchers have also argued for the need to consider insider threat from the perspective of social systems. Jordan Schoenherr said that "surveillance requires an understanding of how sanctioning systems are framed, how employees will respond to surveillance, what workplace norms are deemed relevant, and what ‘deviance’ means, e.g., deviation for a justified organization norm or failure to conform to an organizational norm that conflicts with general social values." By treating all employees as potential insider threats, organizations might create conditions that lead to insider threats. == Sector-specific concerns == === Healthcare === The healthcare industry faces particularly acute insider threat risks due to the large number of workforce members who require access to sensitive patient records for legitimate clinical purposes. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has identified unauthorized access by insiders, including workforce snooping on patient records and theft of protected health information for identity fraud, as a persistent enforcement concern. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule addresses insider threats through several administrative safeguards, including workforce security procedures requiring covered entities to implement policies for authorizing and supervising workforce members who work with electronic protected health information, as well as termination procedures to revoke access when employment ends (45 CFR 164.308(a)(3)). The rule also requires audit controls to record and examine information system activity (45 CFR 164.312(b)), enabling detection of unauthorized access by insiders. The December 2024 Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to overhaul the HIPAA Security Rule would strengthen insider threat defenses by mandating role-based access controls, requiring notification of relevant workforce members within 24 hours of any changes to access privileges, and requiring regular review of audit logs to detect anomalous access patterns.
Landmark point
In morphometrics, landmark point or shortly landmark is a point in a shape object in which correspondences between and within the populations of the object are preserved. In other disciplines, landmarks may be known as vertices, anchor points, control points, sites, profile points, 'sampling' points, nodes, markers, fiducial markers, etc. Landmarks can be defined either manually by experts or automatically by a computer program. There are three basic types of landmarks: anatomical landmarks, mathematical landmarks or pseudo-landmarks. An anatomical landmark is a biologically-meaningful point in an organism. Usually experts define anatomical points to ensure their correspondences within the same species. Examples of anatomical landmark in shape of a skull are the eye corner, tip of the nose, jaw, etc. Anatomical landmarks determine homologous parts of an organism, which share a common ancestry. Mathematical landmarks are points in a shape that are located according to some mathematical or geometrical property, for instance, a high curvature point or an extreme point. A computer program usually determines mathematical landmarks used for an automatic pattern recognition. Pseudo-landmarks are constructed points located between anatomical or mathematical landmarks. A typical example is an equally spaced set of points between two anatomical landmarks to get more sample points from a shape. Pseudo-landmarks are useful during shape matching, when the matching process requires a large number of points.