Knowledge integration is the process of synthesizing multiple knowledge models (or representations) into a common model (representation). Compared to information integration, which involves merging information having different schemas and representation models, knowledge integration focuses more on synthesizing the understanding of a given subject from different perspectives. For example, multiple interpretations are possible of a set of student grades, typically each from a certain perspective. An overall, integrated view and understanding of this information can be achieved if these interpretations can be put under a common model, say, a student performance index. The Web-based Inquiry Science Environment (WISE), from the University of California at Berkeley has been developed along the lines of knowledge integration theory. Knowledge integration has also been studied as the process of incorporating new information into a body of existing knowledge with an interdisciplinary approach. This process involves determining how the new information and the existing knowledge interact, how existing knowledge should be modified to accommodate the new information, and how the new information should be modified in light of the existing knowledge. A learning agent that actively investigates the consequences of new information can detect and exploit a variety of learning opportunities; e.g., to resolve knowledge conflicts and to fill knowledge gaps. By exploiting these learning opportunities the learning agent is able to learn beyond the explicit content of the new information. The machine learning program KI, developed by Murray and Porter at the University of Texas at Austin, was created to study the use of automated and semi-automated knowledge integration to assist knowledge engineers constructing a large knowledge base. A possible technique which can be used is semantic matching. More recently, a technique useful to minimize the effort in mapping validation and visualization has been presented which is based on Minimal Mappings. Minimal mappings are high quality mappings such that i) all the other mappings can be computed from them in time linear in the size of the input graphs, and ii) none of them can be dropped without losing property i). The University of Waterloo operates a Bachelor of Knowledge Integration undergraduate degree program as an academic major or minor. The program started in 2008.
Multi-armed bandit
In probability theory and machine learning, the multi-armed bandit problem (sometimes called the K- or N-armed bandit problem) is named from imagining a gambler at a row of slot machines (sometimes known as "one-armed bandits"), who has to decide which machines to play, how many times to play each machine and in which order to play them, and whether to continue with the current machine or try a different machine. More generally, it is a problem in which a decision maker iteratively selects one of multiple fixed choices (i.e., arms or actions) when the properties of each choice are only partially known at the time of allocation, and may become better understood as time passes. A fundamental aspect of bandit problems is that choosing an arm does not affect the properties of the arm or other arms. Instances of the multi-armed bandit problem include the task of iteratively allocating a fixed, limited set of resources between competing (alternative) choices in a way that minimizes the regret. A notable alternative setup for the multi-armed bandit problem includes the "best arm identification (BAI)" problem where the goal is instead to identify the best choice by the end of a finite number of rounds. The multi-armed bandit problem is a classic reinforcement learning problem that exemplifies the exploration–exploitation tradeoff dilemma. In contrast to general reinforcement learning, the selected actions in bandit problems do not affect the reward distribution of the arms. The multi-armed bandit problem also falls into the broad category of stochastic scheduling. In the problem, each machine provides a random reward from a probability distribution specific to that machine, that is not known a priori. The objective of the gambler is to maximize the sum of rewards earned through a sequence of lever pulls. The crucial tradeoff the gambler faces at each trial is between "exploitation" of the machine that has the highest expected payoff and "exploration" to get more information about the expected payoffs of the other machines. The trade-off between exploration and exploitation is also faced in machine learning. In practice, multi-armed bandits have been used to model problems such as managing research projects in a large organization, like a science foundation or a pharmaceutical company. In early versions of the problem, the gambler begins with no initial knowledge about the machines. Herbert Robbins in 1952, realizing the importance of the problem, constructed convergent population selection strategies in "some aspects of the sequential design of experiments". A theorem, the Gittins index, first published by John C. Gittins, gives an optimal policy for maximizing the expected discounted reward. == Empirical motivation == The multi-armed bandit problem models an agent that simultaneously attempts to acquire new knowledge (called "exploration") and optimize their decisions based on existing knowledge (called "exploitation"). The agent attempts to balance these competing tasks in order to maximize their total value over the period of time considered. There are many practical applications of the bandit model, for example: clinical trials investigating the effects of different experimental treatments while minimizing patient losses, adaptive routing efforts for minimizing delays in a network, financial portfolio design In these practical examples, the problem requires balancing reward maximization based on the knowledge already acquired with attempting new actions to further increase knowledge. This is known as the exploitation vs. exploration tradeoff in machine learning. The model has also been used to control dynamic allocation of resources to different projects, answering the question of which project to work on, given uncertainty about the difficulty and payoff of each possibility. Originally considered by Allied scientists in World War II, it proved so intractable that, according to Peter Whittle, the problem was proposed to be dropped over Germany so that German scientists could also waste their time on it. The version of the problem now commonly analyzed was formulated by Herbert Robbins in 1952. == The multi-armed bandit model == The multi-armed bandit (short: bandit or MAB) can be seen as a set of real distributions B = { R 1 , … , R K } {\displaystyle B=\{R_{1},\dots ,R_{K}\}} , each distribution being associated with the rewards delivered by one of the K ∈ N + {\displaystyle K\in \mathbb {N} ^{+}} levers. Let μ 1 , … , μ K {\displaystyle \mu _{1},\dots ,\mu _{K}} be the mean values associated with these reward distributions. The gambler iteratively plays one lever per round and observes the associated reward. The objective is to maximize the sum of the collected rewards. The horizon H {\displaystyle H} is the number of rounds that remain to be played. The bandit problem is formally equivalent to a one-state Markov decision process. The regret ρ {\displaystyle \rho } after T {\displaystyle T} rounds is defined as the expected difference between the reward sum associated with an optimal strategy and the sum of the collected rewards: ρ = T μ ∗ − ∑ t = 1 T r ^ t {\displaystyle \rho =T\mu ^{}-\sum _{t=1}^{T}{\widehat {r}}_{t}} , where μ ∗ {\displaystyle \mu ^{}} is the maximal reward mean, μ ∗ = max k { μ k } {\displaystyle \mu ^{}=\max _{k}\{\mu _{k}\}} , and r ^ t {\displaystyle {\widehat {r}}_{t}} is the reward in round t {\displaystyle t} . A zero-regret strategy is a strategy whose average regret per round ρ / T {\displaystyle \rho /T} tends to zero with probability 1 when the number of played rounds tends to infinity. Intuitively, zero-regret strategies are guaranteed to converge to a (not necessarily unique) optimal strategy if enough rounds are played. == Variations == A common formulation is the Binary multi-armed bandit or Bernoulli multi-armed bandit, which issues a reward of one with probability p {\displaystyle p} , and otherwise a reward of zero. Another formulation of the multi-armed bandit has each arm representing an independent Markov machine. Each time a particular arm is played, the state of that machine advances to a new one, chosen according to the Markov state evolution probabilities. There is a reward depending on the current state of the machine. In a generalization called the "restless bandit problem", the states of non-played arms can also evolve over time. There has also been discussion of systems where the number of choices (about which arm to play) increases over time. Computer science researchers have studied multi-armed bandits under worst-case assumptions, obtaining algorithms to minimize regret in both finite and infinite (asymptotic) time horizons for both stochastic and non-stochastic arm payoffs. === Best arm identification === An important variation of the classical regret minimization problem in multi-armed bandits is best arm identification (BAI), also known as pure exploration. This problem is crucial in various applications, including clinical trials, adaptive routing, recommendation systems, and A/B testing. In BAI, the objective is to identify the arm having the highest expected reward. An algorithm in this setting is characterized by a sampling rule, a decision rule, and a stopping rule, described as follows: Sampling rule: ( a t ) t ≥ 1 {\displaystyle (a_{t})_{t\geq 1}} is a sequence of actions at each time step Stopping rule: τ {\displaystyle \tau } is a (random) stopping time which suggests when to stop collecting samples Decision rule: a ^ τ {\displaystyle {\hat {a}}_{\tau }} is a guess on the best arm based on the data collected up to time τ {\displaystyle \tau } There are two predominant settings in BAI: Fixed budget setting: Given a time horizon T ≥ 1 {\displaystyle T\geq 1} , the objective is to identify the arm with the highest expected reward a ⋆ ∈ arg max k μ k {\displaystyle a^{\star }\in \arg \max _{k}\mu _{k}} minimizing probability of error δ {\displaystyle \delta } . Fixed confidence setting: Given a confidence level δ ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) {\displaystyle \delta \in (0,1)} , the objective is to identify the arm with the highest expected reward a ⋆ ∈ arg max k μ k {\displaystyle a^{\star }\in \arg \max _{k}\mu _{k}} with the least possible amount of trials and with probability of error P ( a ^ τ ≠ a ⋆ ) ≤ δ {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} ({\hat {a}}_{\tau }\neq a^{\star })\leq \delta } . For example using a decision rule, we could use m 1 {\displaystyle m_{1}} where m {\displaystyle m} is the machine no.1 (you can use a different variable respectively) and 1 {\displaystyle 1} is the amount for each time an attempt is made at pulling the lever, where ∫ ∑ m 1 , m 2 , ( . . . ) = M {\displaystyle \int \sum m_{1},m_{2},(...)=M} , identify M {\displaystyle M} as the sum of each attempts m 1 + m 2 {\displaystyle m_{1}+m_{2}} , (...) as needed, and from there you can get a ratio, sum or mean as quantitative probability and sample your formulation for each slots. You can also do ∫ ∑ k ∝ i N − (
Defence Information Infrastructure
Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) is a secure military network owned by the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence MOD. It is used by all branches of the armed forces, including the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force as well as MOD civil servants. It reaches to deployed bases and ships at sea, but not to aircraft in flight. In 2000, the MOD began to plan the systems replacement project. In March 2005, the MOD gave a contract to the Atlas Consortium, with EDS as prime contractor, for installation and management over 10 years. That has developed into a consortium made up of DXC Technology (formerly EDS), Fujitsu, Airbus Defence and Space (formerly EADS Defence & Security) and CGI (formerly Logica). Starting in May 2016, MOD users of DII begin to migrate to the New Style of IT within the defence to be known as MODNET; again supported by ATLAS. == Overview == DII supports 2,000 MOD sites with some 150,000 terminals (desktops and laptops) and 300,000 user accounts. It is designed to offer a high level of resilience, flexibility, and security in the provision of connectivity from ‘business space to battlespace’ in MOD offices in the UK, bases overseas, at sea, and on the front line. It aims to rationalise and improve IT provision for the defence sector in the 21st century; involving a major culture change for MOD users and their ways of working through a structure of shared working areas with controlled security and access. It should provide a records management system and search facility together with a range of office services. It hosts several hundred COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) and bespoke MOD applications from a range of suppliers judged to meet the required security standards. The network handles alphanumeric data, graphics, and video. The system carries information from Restricted to above-Secret levels, but users are able to see only the data and applications for which they are authorised. == Incremental approach == In order to de-risk the programme Atlas and the MOD took an incremental approach to the development and implementation of DII, with a separate contract for each increment. The extended timeline allowed the MOD flexibility in defining its requirements. Increment 1: Contract awarded March 2005. This covered 70,000 user access devices (UADs) and 200,000 user accounts in the Restricted and Secret domains in 680 fixed locations. Increment 2a: Contract awarded December 2006. This was for an additional 44,000 UADs and 58,000 user accounts in the Restricted and Secret domains, again in fixed locations. Increment 2b: Contract awarded September 2007: This extended DII(F) into the deployed environment with the provision of UADs to support land and maritime deployed operations. Increment 2c: Signed in January 2009. This extended the DII footprint into the above-Secret domain to support a number of key operations and intelligence initiatives. Increment 3a: Contract awarded January 2010. Atlas provided 42,000 UADs operating in the Restricted and Secret domains to the remaining MOD fixed sites. This supported some 60,000 personnel, notably within the RAF, at Joint Helicopter Command and other MOD locations. Increment 3a received an MOD Chief of Defence Materiel commendation. == Costs and transparency == The Ministry of Defence informed Parliament the system would cost £2.3bn, even though it knew the cost would be at least £5.8bn. By 2008 the programme was running at least 18 months late; had delivered only 29,000 of a contracted 63,000 terminals; and had delivered none of the contracted Secret capability. In January 2010 the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence announced that the Ministry of Defence had authorised DII increment 3a at a cost of around £540 million to provide 42,000 terminals within the RAF and at Joint Helicopter Command. He stated that the project would deliver "benefits" worth over £1.6 billion over the 10 years of the contract. That year the project was scheduled to cost at least £7bn, however, the UK government said it might attempt to reduce this sum. By 2014 the rollout of all UK terminals was complete and a refresh of the original desktops and printers to new hardware underway. The overseas rollout was coming to an end and well over half the fleet, including aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, equipped. The final part of Secret capability deployment was scheduled to complete in summer of 2014.
Chunked transfer encoding
Chunked transfer encoding is a streaming data transfer mechanism available in Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) version 1.1, defined in RFC 9112 §7.1. In chunked transfer encoding, the data stream is divided into a series of non-overlapping "chunks". The chunks are sent out and received independently of one another. At any given time, no knowledge of the data stream outside the currently-being-processed chunk is necessary for either the sender or the receiver. Each chunk is preceded by its size in bytes and transmission ends when a zero-length chunk is received. The chunked keyword in the Transfer-Encoding header is used to indicate chunked transfer. Chunked transfer encoding is not supported in HTTP/2, which provides its own mechanisms for data streaming. == Rationale == The introduction of chunked encoding provided various benefits: Chunked transfer encoding allows a server to maintain an HTTP persistent connection for dynamically generated content. In this case, the HTTP Content-Length header cannot be used to delimit the content and the next HTTP request/response, as the content size is not yet known. Chunked encoding has the benefit that it is not necessary to generate the full content before writing the header, as it allows streaming of content as chunks and explicitly signaling the end of the content, making the connection available for the next HTTP request/response. Chunked encoding allows the sender to send additional header fields after the message body. This is important in cases where values of a field cannot be known until the content has been produced, such as when the content of the message must be digitally signed. Without chunked encoding, the sender would have to buffer the content until it was complete in order to calculate a field value and send it before the content. == Applicability == For version 1.1 of the HTTP protocol, the chunked transfer mechanism is considered to be always and anyway acceptable, even if not listed in the Transfer-Encoding (TE) request header field, and when used with other transfer mechanisms, should always be applied last to the transferred data and never more than one time. This transfer encoding method also allows additional entity header fields to be sent after the last chunk if the client specified the "trailers" parameter as an argument of the TE request field. The origin server of the response can also decide to send additional entity trailers even if the client did not specify the "trailers" parameter, but only if the metadata is optional (i.e. the client can use the received entity without them). Whenever the trailers are used, the server should list their names in the Trailer header field; three header field types are specifically prohibited from appearing as a trailer field: Content-Length, Trailer, and Transfer-Encoding. == Format == If a Transfer-Encoding field with a value of "chunked" is specified in an HTTP message (either a request sent by a client or the response from the server), the body of the message consists of one or more chunks and one terminating chunk with an optional trailer before the final ␍␊ sequence (i.e. carriage return followed by line feed). Each chunk starts with the number of octets of the data it embeds expressed as a hexadecimal number in ASCII followed by optional parameters (chunk extension) and a terminating ␍␊ sequence, followed by the chunk data. The chunk is terminated by ␍␊. If chunk extensions are provided, the chunk size is terminated by a semicolon and followed by the parameters, each also delimited by semicolons. Each parameter is encoded as an extension name followed by an optional equal sign and value. These parameters could be used for a running message digest or digital signature, or to indicate an estimated transfer progress, for instance. The terminating chunk is a special chunk of zero length. It may contain a trailer, which consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of entity header fields. Normally, such header fields would be sent in the message's header; however, it may be more efficient to determine them after processing the entire message entity. In that case, it is useful to send those headers in the trailer. Header fields that regulate the use of trailers are Transfer-Encoding with the "trailers" parameter (used in requests) and Trailer (used in responses). == Use with compression == HTTP servers often use compression to optimize transmission, for example with Content-Encoding: gzip or Content-Encoding: deflate. If both compression and chunked encoding are enabled, then the content stream is first compressed, then chunked; so the chunk encoding itself is not compressed, and the data in each chunk is compressed holistically (i.e. based on the whole content). The remote endpoint then decodes the stream by concatenating the chunks and uncompressing the result. == Example == === Encoded data === The following example contains three chunks of size 4, 7, and 11 (hexadecimal "B") octets of data. 4␍␊Wiki␍␊7␍␊pedia i␍␊B␍␊n ␍␊chunks.␍␊0␍␊␍␊ Below is an annotated version of the encoded data. 4␍␊ (chunk size is four octets) Wiki (four octets of data) ␍␊ (end of chunk) 7␍␊ (chunk size is seven octets) pedia i (seven octets of data) ␍␊ (end of chunk) B␍␊ (chunk size is eleven octets) n ␍␊chunks. (eleven octets of data) ␍␊ (end of chunk) 0␍␊ (chunk size is zero octets, no more chunks) ␍␊ (end of final chunk with zero data octets) Note: Each chunk's size excludes the two ␍␊ bytes that terminate the data of each chunk. === Decoded data === Decoding the above example produces the following octets: Wikipedia in ␍␊chunks. The bytes above are typically displayed as Wikipedia in chunks.
Social media use in health awareness
Social media is being increasingly used for health awareness. It is not only used to promote health and wellness but also to motivate and guide public for various disease and ailments. Use of social media was proven to be cornerstone for awareness during COVID-19 management. In recent times, it is one of the most cost effective tool for cardiovascular health awareness since it can be used to motivate people for adoption of healthy lifestyle practices. Over the span of a decade, and Doctor Mike utilized social media to significantly impact the public about cardiovascular health awareness. == Background == Social media is proven to be useful for various chronic and incurable diseases where patients form groups and connect for sharing of knowledge. Similarly, health professionals, health institutions, and various other individuals and organizations have their own social media accounts for health information, awareness, guidance, or motivation for their patients. The utilization of social media for health awareness campaigns has become increasingly prevalent in recent years. The history of utilizing social media in health campaigns can be traced back to the early 2000s with the rise of platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. == Health campaigns == Health campaigns especially for chronic diseases like cancer and heart diseases are increasingly common on different social media platforms because social media serves as a cost-effective medium for launching and promoting health campaigns. Many organizations and governmental bodies use platforms like Twitter and Instagram to reach a wide audience. This wide outreach gives health campaigns more attention and support while raising awareness of their specific cause. Recently, there have been increasing calls for health organizations to involve the public and consumer groups in their social media health campaigns to ensure their acceptability with the target audience, encouraging use of collaborations and co-design of messages. == Research == When incorporating social media into health research recruitment, there is potential for a greater number of individuals to participate. Social media allows researchers to reach a wide range of participants while also allowing for recruitment 24 hours a day. There are many health organizations with large social media followings to allow them to reach a large amount of individuals. If these organizations pair with researchers and post flyers or make posts about a study they may be able to find the population that they are looking for. Although there are positives to using social media for health research recruitment, looking at the issues is important. Using this method in recruitment may cause competition between companies for the attention of the users. Another important point is that this is dependent on the type of health condition that is being researched. For chronic conditions, there are many organizations and platforms for support while for acute illnesses, there are not as many organizations that would be able to promote these studies and post for outreach. == Patient education == Patients increasingly turn to social media for health communication and health-related information. Online health communities, forums and blogs enable individuals to share their experiences, offer support, and seek advice from peers. Healthcare professionals also use social media to provide valuable insights and address common health concerns. The use of social media for patient education allows individuals to gain more information for their illness or disease along with gaining support from individuals who may be experiencing the same. Many health organizations such as cancer organizations or organizations for chronic health conditions often have social media platforms that allow individuals to connect and even share their own stories. Peer support is beneficial to patients emotionally and even for them to understand their condition and how to cope. Another way that social media allows individuals to gain more information is the improvement of health literacy. Medical jargon can be confusing for individuals especially when they are newly diagnosed with an illness or disease. Social media has been able to create platforms that explain the information that individuals may need when they are newly diagnosed or if they just want to learn more about their illness. Medical conditions can be confusing but using social media may allow for individuals to develop a better understanding in a manner that they understand. When patients have a better understanding of their health there will be a result of better health outcomes. == Misinformation == While social media is a powerful tool for health awareness, it comes with challenges. Misinformation can spread rapidly, potentially leading to incorrect or harmful health practices. Ensuring the accuracy of health-related information on social media is an ongoing concern. Health misinformation can be easily spread through social media to large amounts of individuals which can make this dangerous. Often, critics will question whether health-related information that is shared online is credible. Social media does not require the amount of regulation that could prevent false medical information from being disseminated online. According to The Influencer Effect: Exploring the persuasive communication tactics of social media influencers in the health and wellness industry by Deborah Deutsch, "the information shared is often lacking accepted scientific evidence or is contrary to industry standards, and, at times, deceptive, unethical, and misleading." One example of this was in 2020, when President Donald Trump said in speeches and on Twitter that hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine could be used to treat COVID-19. While these drugs are antimalaria, it was being spread that they could be used for COVID-19. This resulted in increased deaths and individuals falling ill from taking this drug and the misinformation that was spread about this drug. Spreading misinformation regarding health is one of the biggest concerns when using social media for health awareness. When spreading misinformation about health there is an increase in confusion about what is true and what is false regardless of who is saying this information. Along with the confusion of the public, there is a sense of mistrust that is a consequence of misinformation. Individuals are seeing different opinions which leads people to a situation where they do not know who to trust. While health misinformation is one of the largest issues, there are ways to help prevent it. As individuals, it is important to know where you are getting your information from and learn how to identify what is misinformation and avoid the spread of it. == Privacy and ethical issues == The sharing of personal health information on social media raises privacy and ethical concerns. Striking a balance between raising awareness and respecting individuals' privacy remains a delicate issue.
OpenPipeline
openPipeline is an open-source plug-in for Autodesk Maya that is designed to assist in a Production Pipeline structure and Computer animation. == Development == Created in Maya Embedded Language, openPipeline was initiated at Eyebeam Atelier and further developed at Pratt Institute in the Digital Arts Lab. The initial release date was December 28, 2006. == Contributors == Rob O'Neill (Creator) Paris Mavroidis Meng-Han Ho
Kerckhoffs's principle
Kerckhoffs's principle (also called Kerckhoffs's desideratum, assumption, axiom, doctrine or law) of cryptography was stated by the Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs in the 19th century. The principle holds that a cryptosystem should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. This concept is widely embraced by cryptographers, in contrast to security through obscurity, which is not. Kerckhoffs's principle was phrased by the American mathematician Claude Shannon as "the enemy knows the system", i.e., "one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them". In that form, it is called Shannon's maxim. Another formulation by American researcher and professor Steven M. Bellovin is: In other words—design your system assuming that your opponents know it in detail. (A former official at NSA's National Computer Security Center told me that the standard assumption there was that serial number 1 of any new device was delivered to the Kremlin.) == Origins == The invention of telegraphy radically changed military communications and increased the number of messages that needed to be protected from the enemy dramatically, leading to the development of field ciphers which had to be easy to use without large confidential codebooks prone to capture on the battlefield. It was this environment which led to the development of Kerckhoffs's requirements. Auguste Kerckhoffs was a professor of German language at Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) in Paris. In early 1883, Kerckhoffs's article, La Cryptographie Militaire, was published in two parts in the Journal of Military Science, in which he stated six design rules for military ciphers. Translated from French, they are: The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable; It should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands; It must be possible to communicate and remember the key without using written notes, and correspondents must be able to change or modify it at will; It must be applicable to telegraph communications; It must be portable, and should not require several persons to handle or operate; Lastly, given the circumstances in which it is to be used, the system must be easy to use and should not be stressful to use or require its users to know and comply with a long list of rules. Some are no longer relevant given the ability of computers to perform complex encryption. The second rule, now known as Kerckhoffs's principle, is still critically important. == Explanation of the principle == Kerckhoffs viewed cryptography as a rival to, and a better alternative than, steganographic encoding, which was common in the nineteenth century for hiding the meaning of military messages. One problem with encoding schemes is that they rely on humanly-held secrets such as "dictionaries" which disclose for example, the secret meaning of words. Steganographic-like dictionaries, once revealed, permanently compromise a corresponding encoding system. Another problem is that the risk of exposure increases as the number of users holding the secrets increases. Nineteenth century cryptography, in contrast, used simple tables which provided for the transposition of alphanumeric characters, generally given row-column intersections which could be modified by keys which were generally short, numeric, and could be committed to human memory. The system was considered "indecipherable" because tables and keys do not convey meaning by themselves. Secret messages can be compromised only if a matching set of table, key, and message falls into enemy hands in a relevant time frame. Kerckhoffs viewed tactical messages as only having a few hours of relevance. Systems are not necessarily compromised, because their components (i.e. alphanumeric character tables and keys) can be easily changed. === Advantage of secret keys === Using secure cryptography is supposed to replace the difficult problem of keeping messages secure with a much more manageable one, keeping relatively small keys secure. A system that requires long-term secrecy for something as large and complex as the whole design of a cryptographic system obviously cannot achieve that goal. It only replaces one hard problem with another. However, if a system is secure even when the enemy knows everything except the key, then all that is needed is to manage keeping the keys secret. There are a large number of ways the internal details of a widely used system could be discovered. The most obvious is that someone could bribe, blackmail, or otherwise threaten staff or customers into explaining the system. In war, for example, one side will probably capture some equipment and people from the other side. Each side will also use spies to gather information. If a method involves software, someone could do memory dumps or run the software under the control of a debugger in order to understand the method. If hardware is being used, someone could buy or steal some of the hardware and build whatever programs or gadgets needed to test it. Hardware can also be dismantled so that the chip details can be examined under the microscope. === Maintaining security === A generalization some make from Kerckhoffs's principle is: "The fewer and simpler the secrets that one must keep to ensure system security, the easier it is to maintain system security." Bruce Schneier ties it in with a belief that all security systems must be designed to fail as gracefully as possible: Kerckhoffs's principle applies beyond codes and ciphers to security systems in general: every secret creates a potential failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime cause of brittleness—and therefore something likely to make a system prone to catastrophic collapse. Conversely, openness provides ductility. Any security system depends crucially on keeping some things secret. However, Kerckhoffs's principle points out that the things kept secret ought to be those least costly to change if inadvertently disclosed. For example, a cryptographic algorithm may be implemented by hardware and software that is widely distributed among users. If security depends on keeping that secret, then disclosure leads to major logistic difficulties in developing, testing, and distributing implementations of a new algorithm – it is "brittle". On the other hand, if keeping the algorithm secret is not important, but only the keys used with the algorithm must be secret, then disclosure of the keys simply requires the simpler, less costly process of generating and distributing new keys. == Applications == In accordance with Kerckhoffs's principle, the majority of civilian cryptography makes use of publicly known algorithms. By contrast, ciphers used to protect classified government or military information are often kept secret (see Type 1 encryption). However, it should not be assumed that government/military ciphers must be kept secret to maintain security. It is possible that they are intended to be as cryptographically sound as public algorithms, and the decision to keep them secret is in keeping with a layered security posture. == Security through obscurity == It is moderately common for companies to keep the inner workings of a system secret. Some argue this "security by obscurity" makes the product safer and less vulnerable to attack. A counter-argument is that keeping the innards secret may improve security in the short term, but in the long run, only systems that have been published and analyzed should be trusted. Steven Bellovin and Randy Bush commented: Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous Hiding security vulnerabilities in algorithms, software, and/or hardware decreases the likelihood they will be repaired and increases the likelihood that they can and will be exploited. Discouraging or outlawing discussion of weaknesses and vulnerabilities is extremely dangerous and deleterious to the security of computer systems, the network, and its citizens. Open Discussion Encourages Better Security The long history of cryptography and cryptoanalysis has shown time and time again that open discussion and analysis of algorithms exposes weaknesses not thought of by the original authors, and thereby leads to better and more secure algorithms. As Kerckhoffs noted about cipher systems in 1883 [Kerc83], "Il faut qu'il n'exige pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les mains de l'ennemi." (Roughly, "the system must not require secrecy and must be able to be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble.")