Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems

Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems

The Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (abbreviated as NeurIPS and formerly NIPS) is a machine learning and computational neuroscience conference held annually in December. Along with ICLR and ICML, it is one of the three primary conferences of high impact in machine learning and artificial intelligence research. The conference includes three days of invited talks along with oral and poster presentations of refereed papers, followed by two days of workshops and competitions. == History == The NeurIPS meeting was first proposed in 1986 at the annual invitation-only Snowbird Meeting on Neural Networks for Computing organized by The California Institute of Technology and Bell Laboratories. NeurIPS was designed as a complementary open interdisciplinary meeting for researchers exploring biological and artificial Neural Networks. Reflecting this multidisciplinary approach, NeurIPS began in 1987 with information theorist Ed Posner as the conference president and learning theorist Yaser Abu-Mostafa as program chairman. Research presented in the early NeurIPS meetings included a wide range of topics from efforts to solve purely engineering problems to the use of computer models as a tool for understanding biological nervous systems. Since then, the biological and artificial systems research streams have diverged, and recent NeurIPS proceedings have been dominated by papers on machine learning, artificial intelligence and statistics. From 1987 until 2000 NeurIPS was held in Denver, United States. Since then, the conference was held in Vancouver, Canada (2001–2010), Granada, Spain (2011), and Lake Tahoe, United States (2012–2013). In 2014 and 2015, the conference was held in Montreal, Canada, in Barcelona, Spain in 2016, in Long Beach, United States in 2017, in Montreal, Canada in 2018 and Vancouver, Canada in 2019. Reflecting its origins at Snowbird, Utah, the meeting was accompanied by workshops organized at a nearby ski resort up until 2013, when it outgrew ski resorts. The first NeurIPS Conference was sponsored by the IEEE. The following NeurIPS Conferences have been organized by the NeurIPS Foundation, established by Ed Posner. Terrence Sejnowski has been the president of the NeurIPS Foundation since Posner's death in 1993. The board of trustees consists of previous general chairs of the NeurIPS Conference. The first proceedings was published in book form by the American Institute of Physics in 1987, and was entitled Neural Information Processing Systems, then the proceedings from the following conferences have been published by Morgan Kaufmann (1988–1993), MIT Press (1994–2004) and Curran Associates (2005–present) under the name Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. The conference was originally abbreviated as "NIPS". By 2018 a few commentators were criticizing the abbreviation as encouraging sexism due to its association with the word nipples, and as being a slur against Japanese. The board changed the abbreviation to "NeurIPS" in November 2018. == Topics == Along with machine learning and neuroscience, other fields represented at NeurIPS include cognitive science, psychology, computer vision, statistical linguistics, and information theory. Over the years, NeurIPS became a premier conference on machine learning and although the 'Neural' in the NeurIPS acronym had become something of a historical relic, the resurgence of deep learning in neural networks since 2012, fueled by faster computers and big data, has led to achievements in speech recognition, object recognition in images, image captioning, language translation and world championship performance in the game of Go, based on neural architectures inspired by the hierarchy of areas in the visual cortex (ConvNet) and reinforcement learning inspired by the basal ganglia (Temporal difference learning). Notable affinity groups have emerged from the NeurIPS conference and displayed diversity, including Black in AI (in 2017), Queer in AI (in 2016), and others. === Named lectures === In addition to invited talks and symposia, NeurIPS also organizes two named lectureships to recognize distinguished researchers. The NeurIPS Board introduced the Posner Lectureship in honor of NeurIPS founder Ed Posner; two Posner Lectures were given each year up to 2015. Past lecturers have included: 2010 – Josh Tenenbaum and Michael I. Jordan 2011 – Rich Sutton and Bernhard Schölkopf 2012 – Thomas Dietterich and Terry Sejnowski 2013 – Daphne Koller and Peter Dayan 2014 – Michael Kearns and John Hopfield 2015 – Zoubin Ghahramani and Vladimir Vapnik 2016 – Yann LeCun 2017 – John Platt 2018 – Joëlle Pineau 2019 – Yoshua Bengio 2020 – Christopher Bishop 2021 – Peter Bartlett In 2015, the NeurIPS Board introduced the Breiman Lectureship to highlight work in statistics relevant to conference topics. The lectureship was named for statistician Leo Breiman, who served on the NeurIPS Board from 1994 to 2005. Past lecturers have included: 2015 – Robert Tibshirani 2016 – Susan Holmes 2017 – Yee Whye Teh 2018 – David Spiegelhalter 2019 – Bin Yu 2020 – Marloes Maathuis 2021 – Gabor Lugosi 2022 – Emmanuel Candes 2023 – Susan Murphy 2024 – Arnaud Doucet == NeurIPS consistency experiment == In NIPS 2014, the program chairs duplicated 10% of all submissions and sent them through separate reviewers to evaluate randomness in the reviewing process. Several researchers interpreted the result. Regarding whether the decision in NIPS is completely random or not, John Langford writes: "Clearly not—a purely random decision would have arbitrariness of ~78%. It is, however, quite notable that 60% is much closer to 78% than 0%." He concludes that the result of the reviewing process is mostly arbitrary. In NeurIPS 2021, the program chairs repeated the 2014 experiment and found similar levels of review inconsistency; 23% of duplicated submissions received different accept/reject decisions, and 50.6% of accepted papers would have been rejected under re-review. == Locations == 1987–2000: Denver, Colorado, United States 2001–2010: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 2011: Granada, Spain 2012 & 2013: Stateline, Nevada, United States 2014 & 2015: Montréal, Quebec, Canada 2016: Barcelona, Spain 2017: Long Beach, California, United States 2018: Montréal, Quebec, Canada 2019: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 2020: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada (virtual conference) 2021: Virtual conference 2022 & 2023: New Orleans, Louisiana, United States 2024: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 2025: San Diego, California, United States and Mexico City, Mexico 2026: Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, with satellite events in Atlanta and Paris

Insider threat

An insider threat is a perceived threat to an organization that comes from people within the organization, such as employees, former employees, contractors or business associates, who have inside information concerning the organization's security practices, data and computer systems. The threat may involve fraud, the theft of confidential or commercially valuable information, the theft of intellectual property, or the sabotage of computer systems. == Overview == Insiders may have accounts giving them legitimate access to computer systems, with this access originally having been given to them to serve in the performance of their duties; these permissions could be abused to harm the organization. Insiders are often familiar with the organization's data and intellectual property as well as the methods that are in place to protect them. This makes it easier for the insider to circumvent any security controls of which they are aware. Physical proximity to data means that the insider does not need to hack into the organizational network through the outer perimeter by traversing firewalls; rather they are in the building already, often with direct access to the organization's internal network. Insider threats are harder to defend against than attacks from outsiders, since the insider already has legitimate access to the organization's information and assets. An insider may attempt to steal property or information for personal gain or to benefit another organization or country. The threat to the organization could also be through malicious software left running on its computer systems by former employees, a so-called logic bomb. == Research == Insider threat is an active area of research in academia and government. The CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie-Mellon University maintains the CERT Insider Threat Center, which includes a database of more than 850 cases of insider threats, including instances of fraud, theft and sabotage; the database is used for research and analysis. CERT's Insider Threat Team also maintains an informational blog to help organizations and businesses defend themselves against insider crime. The Threat Lab and Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (DOD PERSEREC) has also recently emerged as a national resource within the United States of America. The Threat Lab hosts an annual conference, the SBS Summit. They also maintain a website that contains resources from this conference. Complimenting these efforts, a companion podcast was created, Voices from the SBS Summit. In 2022, the Threat Lab created an interdisciplinary journal, Counter Insider Threat Research and Practice (CITRAP) which publishes research on insider threat detection. === Findings === In the 2022 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), Verizon found that 82% of breaches involved the human element, noting that employees continue to play a leading role in cybersecurity incidents and breaches. According to the UK Information Commissioners Office, 90% of all breaches reported to them in 2019 were the result of mistakes made by end users. This was up from 61% and 87% over the previous two years. A 2018 whitepaper reported that 53% of companies surveyed had confirmed insider attacks against their organization in the previous 12 months, with 27% saying insider attacks have become more frequent. A report published in July 2012 on the insider threat in the U.S. financial sector gives some statistics on insider threat incidents: 80% of the malicious acts were committed at work during working hours; 81% of the perpetrators planned their actions beforehand; 33% of the perpetrators were described as "difficult" and 17% as being "disgruntled". The insider was identified in 74% of cases. Financial gain was a motive in 81% of cases, revenge in 23% of cases, and 27% of the people carrying out malicious acts were in financial difficulties at the time. The US Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center published a report that describes approaches for detecting insider threats. Earlier it published ten case studies of insider attacks by information technology professionals. Cybersecurity experts believe that 38% of negligent insiders are victims of a phishing attack, whereby they receive an email that appears to come from a legitimate source such as a company. These emails normally contain malware in the form of hyperlinks. == Typologies and ontologies == Multiple classification systems and ontologies have been proposed to classify insider threats. Traditional models of insider threat identify three broad categories: Malicious insiders, which are people who take advantage of their access to inflict harm on an organization; Negligent insiders, which are people who make errors and disregard policies, which place their organizations at risk; and Infiltrators, who are external actors that obtain legitimate access credentials without authorization. == Criticisms == Insider threat research has been criticized. Critics have argued that insider threat is a poorly defined concept. Forensically investigating insider data theft is notoriously difficult, and requires novel techniques such as stochastic forensics. Data supporting insider threat is generally proprietary (i.e., encrypted data). Theoretical/conceptual models of insider threat are often based on loose interpretations of research in the behavioral and social sciences, using "deductive principles and intuitions of subject matter expert." Adopting sociotechnical approaches, researchers have also argued for the need to consider insider threat from the perspective of social systems. Jordan Schoenherr said that "surveillance requires an understanding of how sanctioning systems are framed, how employees will respond to surveillance, what workplace norms are deemed relevant, and what ‘deviance’ means, e.g., deviation for a justified organization norm or failure to conform to an organizational norm that conflicts with general social values." By treating all employees as potential insider threats, organizations might create conditions that lead to insider threats. == Sector-specific concerns == === Healthcare === The healthcare industry faces particularly acute insider threat risks due to the large number of workforce members who require access to sensitive patient records for legitimate clinical purposes. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has identified unauthorized access by insiders, including workforce snooping on patient records and theft of protected health information for identity fraud, as a persistent enforcement concern. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule addresses insider threats through several administrative safeguards, including workforce security procedures requiring covered entities to implement policies for authorizing and supervising workforce members who work with electronic protected health information, as well as termination procedures to revoke access when employment ends (45 CFR 164.308(a)(3)). The rule also requires audit controls to record and examine information system activity (45 CFR 164.312(b)), enabling detection of unauthorized access by insiders. The December 2024 Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to overhaul the HIPAA Security Rule would strengthen insider threat defenses by mandating role-based access controls, requiring notification of relevant workforce members within 24 hours of any changes to access privileges, and requiring regular review of audit logs to detect anomalous access patterns.

National Library of Medicine classification

The National Library of Medicine (NLM) classification system is a library indexing system covering the fields of medicine and preclinical basic sciences. Operated and maintained by the U.S. National Library of Medicine, the NLM classification is patterned after the Library of Congress (LC) Classification system: alphabetical letters denote broad subject categories which are subdivided by numbers. For example, QW 279 would indicate a book on an aspect of microbiology or immunology. The one- or two-letter alphabetical codes in the NLM classification use a limited range of letters: only QS–QZ and W–WZ. This allows the NLM system to co-exist with the larger LC coding scheme as neither of these ranges are used in the LC system. There are, however, three pre-existing codes in the LC system which overlap with the NLM: Human Anatomy (QM), Microbiology (QR), and Medicine (R). To avoid further confusion, these three codes are not used in the NLM. The headings for the individual schedules (letters or letter pairs) are given in brief form (e.g., QW - Microbiology and Immunology; WG - Cardiovascular System) and together they provide an outline of the subjects covered by the NLM classification. Headings are interpreted broadly and include the physiological system, the specialties connected with them, the regions of the body chiefly concerned and subordinate related fields. The NLM system is hierarchical, and within each schedule, division by organ usually has priority. Each main schedule, as well as some sub-sections, begins with a group of form numbers ranging generally from 1–49 which classify materials by publication type, e.g., dictionaries, atlases, laboratory manuals, etc. The main schedules QS-QZ, W-WY, and WZ (excluding the range WZ 220–270) classify works published after 1913; the 19th century schedule is used for works published 1801–1913; and WZ 220-270 is used to provide century groupings for works published before 1801. == Classification categories == === Preclinical Sciences === QS Human Anatomy QT Physiology QU Biochemistry QV Pharmacology QW Microbiology & Immunology QX Parasitology QY Clinical Pathology QZ Pathology === Medicine and Related Subjects === W Health Professions WA Public Health WB Practice of Medicine WC Communicable Diseases WD Disorders of Systemic, Metabolic, or Environmental Origin, etc. WE Musculoskeletal System WF Respiratory System WG Cardiovascular System WH Hemic and Lymphatic Systems WI Digestive System WJ Urogenital System WK Endocrine System WL Nervous System WM Psychiatry WN Radiology. Diagnostic Imaging WO Surgery WP Gynecology WQ Obstetrics WR Dermatology WS Pediatrics WT Geriatrics. Chronic Disease WU Dentistry. Oral Surgery WV Otolaryngology WW Ophthalmology WX Hospitals & Other Health Facilities WY Nursing WZ History of Medicine 19th Century Schedule

Sarvam AI

Sarvam AI is an Indian artificial intelligence company headquartered in Bengaluru, Karnataka. Founded in 2023, the company develops large language models (LLMs) and multimodal AI systems with a focus on Indian languages and region-specific use cases. The company has received venture capital backing and has participated in government-supported AI initiatives, including India's sovereign large language model programme under the IndiaAI Mission. == History == Sarvam AI was founded in August 2023 by Vivek Raghavan and Pratyush Kumar, who were previously associated with AI4Bharat at the Indian Institute of Technology Madras. In December 2023, the company announced a combined seed and Series A funding round of approximately US$41 million. The round was led by Lightspeed Venture Partners, with participation from Peak XV Partners and Khosla Ventures. In April 2025, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) selected Sarvam AI as one of the companies to develop an indigenous foundational model under the IndiaAI Mission. As part of the initiative, the company received access to government-supported computing infrastructure, including GPUs allocated for model training over a specified period. In February 2026, Sarvam AI introduced two large language models at the AI Impact Summit held at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi. == Products and technology == Sarvam AI develops language models trained on datasets that include multiple Indian languages and code-mixed text. The company uses mixture-of-experts (MoE) architectures in some of its models. === Foundational language models === On 18 February 2026, the company announced the release of two foundational models: Sarvam-30B – A 30-billion parameter model based on a mixture-of-experts design. According to company disclosures reported by the media, the model activates approximately 1 billion parameters per token and supports a 32,000-token context window. Sarvam-105B – A 105-billion parameter model activating approximately 9 billion parameters per token, with a 128,000-token context window. The model is positioned for complex reasoning and enterprise applications. On 20th February 2026, the company released a beta version of the Sarvam-105B model which is named Indus. It is available on the Apple App Store, Google Play Store and the web. === Speech and vision systems === Sarvam AI has also developed multimodal systems including speech-to-text and vision-language models. Its speech model, referred to as Saaras V3 in company materials, supports multiple Indian languages. The company has also introduced a vision-language model known as Sarvam Vision, intended for document understanding and optical character recognition (OCR) in Indian scripts. === Devices === 'Sarvam Kaze' is an indigenous AI-powered wearable glass that listens, understands, and captures what users see the world through their eyes in real time. The device supports more than 10 Indian languages, enabling voice-based interaction and potentially real-time translation. The company plans to launch the device in May 2026. == Startup support == In March 2026, Sarvam AI launched the Sarvam Startup Program, an initiative providing selected early-stage companies with 6–12 months of API credits scaled to their needs, priority engineering support, and access to production infrastructure for developing multilingual AI applications in areas such as speech, translation, and large language models. == Open-source release == In February 2026, Sarvam AI announced and open-sourced two large language models: Sarvam 30B (30 billion parameters) and Sarvam 105B (105 billion parameters, using a Mixture-of-Experts architecture with 10.3 billion active parameters). Both models were trained from scratch on datasets focused on Indian languages and support advanced reasoning, multilingual tasks, mathematics, and coding. The models are hosted on Hugging Face under the Apache License and are intended for enterprise and developer applications in Indian languages. The models were subsequently released as open source under the Apache License 2.0, with model weights made available on Hugging Face (sarvamai/sarvam-30b and sarvamai/sarvam-105b) and AIKosh in early March 2026. == Government and institutional collaborations == In 2025, Sarvam AI was selected to contribute to India's sovereign AI model initiative under the IndiaAI Mission. The initiative aims to support domestic AI infrastructure and model development. In March 2025, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) announced a collaboration with Sarvam AI to integrate AI-based voice interactions and multilingual support into Aadhaar-related services. Sarvam AI has also worked with AI4Bharat and academic institutions on language datasets and speech research projects. == Industry participation == Sarvam AI presented its foundational models at the India AI Impact Summit 2026 in New Delhi. The company has also been listed among Indian members of the AI Alliance, a consortium focused on open-source artificial intelligence initiatives. == List of models ==

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) was an independent commission of the United States of America from 2018 to 2021. Its mission was to make recommendations to the President and Congress to "advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States". The commission's 15 members were nominated by the United States Congress. The NSCAI was dissolved on 1 October 2021. == History and reporting == The NSCAI began working in March 2019 and by November 2019 it had received more than 200 classified and unclassified briefings to help with the creation of its final report due in 2021.On 4 November 2019, the NSCAI shared its interim report with Congress, where it explained the 27 initial judgements to base its ongoing work. In the interim report the commission also agreed on seven principles: Global leadership in AI technology is a national security priority AI adoption is an urgent imperative for national security A shared sense of responsibility for the American peoples security must be created from government officials and private sector leaders. It needs to find local AI talent and use it to attract the world’s best minds Actions used for the protection of America’s AI leadership against foreign threats needs to follow the principles of free enterprise, free inquiry and free flow of ideas. The technical limitations of AI are universally known, however, a strong desire remains for powerful, dependable, and secure AI systems. United States used AI must follow American values including the rule of law Fundamental areas of effort for the preservation of U.S. advantages were also agreed upon in the interim report of 2019. The NSCAI released its first report of recommendations in March 2020, most of which were included in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act. In July 2020, the commission published the second report to Congress. It identified 35 actions for both Executive and Legislative branches, which were focused on six fundamental areas. This report was available to the public. In January 2021, a draft of the final report was presented at a panel led by Schmidt. The report recommended the US to use AI technology for military use and development. It issued its final report in March 2021, saying that the U.S. is not sufficiently prepared to defend or compete against China in the AI era. It was broken up into two parts, the first titled “Defending America in the AI Era”, and the second “Winning the Technology Competition”. The report spoke about China’s efforts and investments into integration and that it could very well take the lead in AI in the next few years. Additional suggestions were made to concentrate on AI in everything we do and to implement it into US national security on multiple levels, as well as focus on bringing in new talent to develop AI and to introduce it to the working force on both civilian and military levels. Another recommendation of the NSCAI report was to develop and provide China and Russia with alternative models that are based on norms and democratic values. The final report also included a proposed $40 billion budget for government spending. On 14 April 2021, NSCAI executive director Ylli Bajraktari and director of Research and Analysis Justin Lynch participated in an event held by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) to discuss the final report findings. In October 2021, NSCAI chair Eric Schmidt founded the bipartisan, non-profit Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) through his family led non-profit Eric & Wendy Schmidt Fund for Strategic Innovation in order to carry on the NSCAI’s efforts and expand beyond national security. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies held an event in June 2023, called “Thinking Forward After the NSCAI and CSC: A Discussion on AI and Cyber Policy”, with former members of NSCAI on the moderation panel, including Eric Schmidt and Ylli Bajraktari. == Members == Members of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence: Eric Schmidt (chair), former CEO of Google Robert Work (Vice Chair), former Deputy Secretary of Defense Mignon Clyburn, former Commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission Chris Darby, CEO of In-Q-Tel Kenneth M. Ford, CEO of the Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition Jose-Marie Griffiths, President of Dakota State University Eric Horvitz, Technical Fellow at Microsoft Katrina G. McFarland, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Jason Matheny, Director of the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University Gilman Louie, partner at Alsop Louie Partners William Mark, vice president at SRI International Andy Jassy, CEO of Amazon Web Services (AWS) Safra Catz, CEO of Oracle Steve Chien, Technical Fellow at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Andrew Moore, Google/Alphabet == Recommendations == The report's recommendations include: Dramatically increasing non-defense federal spending on AI research and development, doubling every year from $2 billion in 2022, to $32 billion in 2026. That would bring it up to a level similar to spending on biomedical research A dramatic increase in undergraduate scholarship and graduate studies fellowships in AI Creation of a Digital Corps to bring skilled tech workers into government Founding of a Digital Service Academy: an accredited university providing subsidized education in exchange for a commitment to work for a time in government Include civil rights and civil liberty reports for new AI systems or major updates to existing systems Expanding allocations of employment-based green cards, and giving them to every AI PhD graduate from an accredited U.S. university Reforming the acquisition management system Department of Defense to make it faster and easier to introduce new technologies == Transparency == In December 2019, a ruling was made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that the NSCAI must also provide historical documents upon request. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed the lawsuit against the NSCAI in September 2019 after being refused information about the upcoming meetings and prepared records of the commission under FOIA and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in June 2020 that the NSCAI must comply with FACA and therefore hold open meetings and provide records to the public. The lawsuit was also filed by EPIC.

Apache OpenNLP

The Apache OpenNLP library is a machine learning based toolkit for the processing of natural language text. It supports the most common NLP tasks, such as language detection, tokenization, sentence segmentation, part-of-speech tagging, named entity extraction, chunking, parsing and coreference resolution. These tasks are usually required to build more advanced text processing services.

Guideline execution engine

A guideline execution engine is a computer program which can interpret a clinical guideline represented in a computerized format and perform actions towards the user of an electronic medical record. A guideline execution engine needs to communicate with a host clinical information system. Virtual Medical Record (vMR) is one possible interface which can be used. The engine's main function is to manage instances of executed guidelines of individual patients. == Architecture == The following modules are generally needed for any engine: interface to clinical information system new guidelines loading module guideline interpreter module clinical events parser alert/recommendations dispatch == Guideline Interchange Format == The Guideline Interchange Format (GLIF) is a computer representation format for clinical guidelines. Represented guidelines can be executed using a guideline execution engine. The format has several versions as it has been improved. In 2003 GLIF3 was introduced. == Use of third party workflow engine as a guideline execution engine == Some commercial electronic health record systems use a workflow engine to execute clinical guidelines. RetroGuide and HealthFlow are examples of such an approach.