Raster graphics editors can be compared by many variables, including availability. == List == == General information == Basic general information about the editor: creator, company, license, etc. == Operating system support == The operating systems on which the editors can run natively, that is, without emulation, virtual machines or compatibility layers. In other words, the software must be specifically coded for the operation system; for example, Adobe Photoshop for Windows running on Linux with Wine does not fit. == Features == == Color spaces == == File support ==
Gallery software
Gallery software is software that helps the user publish or share photos, pictures, videos or other digital media. Most galleries are located on Web servers, where users are allowed to register and publish their pictures. Gallery software usually features automatic image resizing, allows digital media be categorized into sets, and allows comments. == Types == Early digital media publishing and sharing was done with imageboards. The boards are by topics, sometimes called "chan". Each discussion in a "chan" are started with a piece of digital media, and follow-up discussions can contain another piece too. Software works in this way: Futallaby, Danbooru. Traditionally, galleries are managed. An administrator maintains a set of or hierarchy of albums. The users can upload their digital media in one of the existing albums defined by an administrator, or create their own albums. The users with sufficient permission can re-categorise the digital media others uploaded. Often, the site's administrator can define which album the users are allowed to categorise their media into, or delete other user's content. Examples are open source galleries Coppermine, Gallery Project. There are decentralised gallery software that does not have an administrator for managing contents. Pinterest, Flickr and DeviantArt has been successful with this model. Open source gallery software MediaGoblin works in this way. Each user can create their own "collections", to categorise theirs or other users' media. However users cannot put media into other user's collections. Each user's category is separate. There is no centralised theme or hierarchy for the media.
AI Snake Oil
AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can't, and How to Tell the Difference is a 2024 non-fiction book written by scholars Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor. It is a critique of the tech industry's overly inflated promises and capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) as well as a debunking of the flawed science fueling AI hype while attempting to outline both the potential positives and negatives that come with different modes of the technology. == Contents == === Publication === The book was published in September 2024 by the Princeton University Press. AI Snake Oil consists of 360 pages and features eight chapters, and sections for acknowledgements, references, and an index. An updated edition with a new preface and epilogue by the authors was published in September 2025. The authors use the term "AI snake oil" derived from the U.S. idiom for a fraudulent remedy, to describe overhyped AI systems. === Chapter one: Introduction === Narayanan and Kapoor argue that many individuals do not yet have the literacy to detect functioning aspects of AI compared to potential snake oil, which they identify as "AI that does not and cannot work as advertised". Some of the major examples utilized by the authors include Allstate's 2013 use of predictive AI, as well as the concern surrounding actors and AI attempting to replicate or use their likeness. Important discussions regarding discrimination are brought up and explored in the first chapter, including the false arrests of six Black individuals due to errors with AI facial recognition tools. The chapter concludes with a comparison to the Industrial Revolution, where Narayanan and Kapoor highlight the extensive human labour that is necessary for artificial intelligence technologies to function. === Chapter two: How Predictive AI Goes Wrong === Chapter two focuses on predictive artificial intelligence, and criticizes the overestimation of the capabilities of the technology. === Chapter three: Why Can't AI Predict the Future? === Chapter three works to inform the reader about the history of early computational prediction attempts, with examples from companies like Simulatics. === Chapter four: The Long Road to Generative AI === The fourth chapter goes in more in-depth in explorations of generative AI. Generative AI software examples include ChatGPT, Midjourney, and DALL-E. The section begins with a positive example of generative AI. As the chapter progresses, the authors begin to provide examples of harm produced by generative AI, including the suicide of a Belgian man after connecting with Chai, a generative chatbot. Issues of deepfakes and preservation of artistic property are also discussed. The use of generative AI to create non-consensual pornographic deepfake content is discussed in relation to female celebrities. === Chapter five: Is Advanced AI an Existential Threat? === The fifth chapter draws attention the AGI, or Artificial General Intelligence. The authors describe AGI as "AI that can perform most or economically relevant tasks as effectively as any human". They summarize that many contributors to the field of artificial intelligence believe AGI to be an impending threat that demands attention. However, they argue that the perceived threat of AGI would only exist if the technology continually functioned reliably. In order to better illustrate the hype surrounding AGI, Narayanan and Kapoor use the Ladder of Generality, which is described as a visual tool in which "each rung represents a way of computing that is more flexible, and more general, than the previous one". They note that we are not yet aware of the next rungs on the ladder, or if the ladder will eventually result in a dead end. The rungs that have been identified so far are as follows: (0, or floor) special purpose hardware, (1) programmable computers, (2) stored program computers, (3) machine learning, (4) deep learning, (5) pretrained models, and, finally, (6) instruction-tuned models. The potential for future rungs and what those rungs might be are currently undetermined. The chapter also discusses the ELIZA effect, which Lawrence Switzky discusses in his article "ELIZA Effects". Switzky attributes the coined term ELIZA Effect to Sherry Turke, who defined it as "our more general tendency to treat responsive computer programs as more intelligent than they really are". === Chapter six: Why Can't AI Fix Social Media? === The sixth chapter focuses on content moderation, why it is important, and how it has been and could be affected by artificial automation. The first issue raised in regard to AI-driven content moderation is the inability for computers and machines to understand context and nuance, resulting in potential for discriminatory moderation and shadow banning. While they note that there are issues with automating content moderation, Narayanan and Kapoor also highlight the psychological impact on human content moderators and their labour. They indicate the hidden labour behind moderation, which is often outsourced to less developed countries, where labourers sort through potentially traumatizing content for pay. However, the discussion focuses more heavily on why automated moderation can be problematic, including discriminatory algorithms and lack of nuance. To balance their argument, issues of discrimination and bias are also discussed in relation the human content moderators. To automate moderation, there are two types of AI used, which are fingerprint matching and machine learning. === Chapter seven: Why Do Myths about AI Persist? === The seventh chapter outlines possible factors that contribute to hype surrounding AI. Narayanan and Kapoor explain how companies often promote their new AI models without properly disclosing how the model works, and what it is learning from. They attribute hype to several different groups, including journalists, researchers, and companies. They explain the impact of companies and the misplaced hype that they spread can be attributed to greed and a desire to grow corporate funds. For journalists, one of the stated sources of hype, they argue that news media has a tendency to prioritize financial incentives over validity and quality of writing. As well, Narayanan and Kapoor point out the emergence of company statement regurgitation in news media, leading to clickbait. Hype from researchers is potentially linked to lack of reproducibility in studies as well as leakage, which occurs when AI models are tested on their training data. === Chapter eight: Where do we go from here? === The final chapter, chapter eight, turns its attention to the future. The authors express their ideas and predictions for how the technology will evolve and be utilized in the upcoming years. == Authors == Author Narayanan is a computer science professor at Princeton University. Kapoor is a doctoral candidate at the same university, and both scholars are located at the Center for Information Technology at Princeton. In 2023, Narayanan and Kapoor appeared on the TIME100 Artificial Intelligence list, which features influential figures in the field. == Reception == Nature, a science and technology peer-reviewed journal, released an article highlighting the top "10 essential reads from the past year", listing Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor's AI Snake Oil. The article states the that text is "one of the best on this controversial subject". Elizabeth Quill, in her review of the text in Science News, writes that the authors "squarely achieve their stated goal: to empower people to distinguish AI that works well from AI snake oil". Joshua Rothman of The New Yorker writes that "compared with many technologists, Narayanan, Kapoor, and Vallor [Shannon Vallor, University of Edinburgh], are deeply skeptical about today's A.I. technology and what it can achieve. Perhaps they shouldn't be". Rothman argues, following an interview with prominent computer scientist Geoffrey Hinton of University of Toronto, that the potential for AI to replicate complexity is already here and continues to be heavily funded, enhancing the prospective capabilities of the technology. However, he does praise the author's ability to address questions regarding the existential human experience. Alexya Martinez discusses the text in a book review for Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, critiquing AI Snake Oil for its extensive focus on the West. Martinez writes that Narayanan and Kapoor "do not fully explore how AI impacts other countries", and suggests more focus on countries outside of the United States to enhance their argument.
Uncertain inference
Uncertain inference was first described by C. J. van Rijsbergen as a way to formally define a query and document relationship in Information retrieval. This formalization is a logical implication with an attached measure of uncertainty. == Definitions == Rijsbergen proposes that the measure of uncertainty of a document d to a query q be the probability of its logical implication, i.e.: P ( d → q ) {\displaystyle P(d\to q)} A user's query can be interpreted as a set of assertions about the desired document. It is the system's task to infer, given a particular document, if the query assertions are true. If they are, the document is retrieved. In many cases the contents of documents are not sufficient to assert the queries. A knowledge base of facts and rules is needed, but some of them may be uncertain because there may be a probability associated to using them for inference. Therefore, we can also refer to this as plausible inference. The plausibility of an inference d → q {\displaystyle d\to q} is a function of the plausibility of each query assertion. Rather than retrieving a document that exactly matches the query we should rank the documents based on their plausibility in regards to that query. Since d and q are both generated by users, they are error prone; thus d → q {\displaystyle d\to q} is uncertain. This will affect the plausibility of a given query. By doing this it accomplishes two things: Separate the processes of revising probabilities from the logic Separate the treatment of relevance from the treatment of requests Multimedia documents, like images or videos, have different inference properties for each datatype. They are also different from text document properties. The framework of plausible inference allows us to measure and combine the probabilities coming from these different properties. Uncertain inference generalizes the notions of autoepistemic logic, where truth values are either known or unknown, and when known, they are true or false. == Example == If we have a query of the form: q = A ∧ B ∧ C {\displaystyle q=A\wedge B\wedge C} where A, B and C are query assertions, then for a document D we want the probability: P ( D → ( A ∧ B ∧ C ) ) {\displaystyle P(D\to (A\wedge B\wedge C))} If we transform this into the conditional probability P ( ( A ∧ B ∧ C ) | D ) {\displaystyle P((A\wedge B\wedge C)|D)} and if the query assertions are independent we can calculate the overall probability of the implication as the product of the individual assertions probabilities. == Further work == Croft and Krovetz applied uncertain inference to an information retrieval system for office documents they called OFFICER. In office documents the independence assumption is valid since the query will focus on their individual attributes. Besides analysing the content of documents one can also query about the author, size, topic or collection for example. They devised methods to compare document and query attributes, infer their plausibility and combine it into an overall rating for each document. Besides that uncertainty of document and query contents also had to be addressed. Probabilistic logic networks is a system for performing uncertain inference; crisp true/false truth values are replaced not only by a probability, but also by a confidence level, indicating the certitude of the probability. Markov logic networks allow uncertain inference to be performed; uncertainties are computed using the maximum entropy principle, in analogy to the way that Markov chains describe the uncertainty of finite-state machines.
Agent mining
Agent mining is a research field that combines two areas of computer science: multiagent systems and data mining. It explores how intelligent computer agents can work together to discover, analyze, and learn from large amounts of data more effectively than traditional methods. == Historical context == The interaction and the integration between multiagent systems and data mining have a long history. The very early work on agent mining focused on agent-based knowledge discovery, agent-based distributed data mining, and agent-based distributed machine learning, and using data mining to enhance agent intelligence. The International Workshop on Agents and Data Mining Interaction has been held for more than 10 times, co-located with the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. Several proceedings are available from Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Quantum artificial life
Quantum artificial life is the application of quantum algorithms with the ability to simulate biological behavior. Quantum computers offer many potential improvements to processes performed on classical computers, including machine learning and artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence applications are often inspired by the idea of mimicking human brains through closely related biomimicry. This has been implemented to a certain extent on classical computers (using neural networks), but quantum computers offer many advantages in the simulation of artificial life. Artificial life and artificial intelligence are extremely similar, with minor differences; the goal of studying artificial life is to understand living beings better, while the goal of artificial intelligence is to create intelligent beings. In 2016, Alvarez-Rodriguez et al. developed a proposal for a quantum artificial life algorithm with the ability to simulate life and Darwinian evolution. In 2018, the same research team led by Alvarez-Rodriguez performed the proposed algorithm on the IBM ibmqx4 quantum computer, and received optimistic results. The results accurately simulated a system with the ability to undergo self-replication at the quantum scale. == Artificial life on quantum computers == The growing advancement of quantum computers has led researchers to develop quantum algorithms for simulating life processes. Researchers have designed a quantum algorithm that can accurately simulate Darwinian Evolution. Since the complete simulation of artificial life on quantum computers has only been actualized by one group, this section shall focus on the implementation by Alvarez-Rodriguez, Sanz, Lomata, and Solano on an IBM quantum computer. Individuals were realized as two qubits, one representing the genotype of the individual and the other representing the phenotype. The genotype is copied to transmit genetic information through generations, and the phenotype is dependent on the genetic information as well as the individual's interactions with their environment. In order to set up the system, the state of the genotype is instantiated by some rotation of an ancillary state ( | 0 ⟩ ⟨ 0 | {\displaystyle |0\rangle \langle 0|} ). The environment is a two-dimensional spatial grid occupied by individuals and ancillary states. The environment is divided into cells that are able to possess one or more individuals. Individuals move throughout the grid and occupy cells randomly; when two or more individuals occupy the same cell they interact with each other. === Self replication === The ability to self-replicate is critical for simulating life. Self-replication occurs when the genotype of an individual interacts with an ancillary state, creating a genotype for a new individual; this genotype interacts with a different ancillary state in order to create the phenotype. During this interaction, one would like to copy some information about the initial state into the ancillary state, but by the no cloning theorem, it is impossible to copy an arbitrary unknown quantum state. However, physicists have derived different methods for quantum cloning which does not require the exact copying of an unknown state. The method that has been implemented by Alvarez-Rodriguez et al. is one that involves the cloning of the expectation value of some observable. For a unitary U {\displaystyle U} which copies the expectation value of some set of observables X {\displaystyle {\mathsf {X}}} of state ρ {\displaystyle \rho } into a blank state ρ e {\displaystyle \rho _{e}} , the cloning machine is defined by any ( U , ρ e , X ) {\displaystyle (U,\rho _{e},{\mathsf {X}})} that fulfill the following: ∀ ρ ∀ X ∈ X {\displaystyle \forall \rho \forall X\in {\mathsf {X}}} X ¯ = X 1 ¯ = X 2 ¯ {\displaystyle {\bar {X}}={\bar {X_{1}}}={\bar {X_{2}}}} Where X ¯ {\displaystyle {\bar {X}}} is the mean value of the observable in ρ {\displaystyle \rho } before cloning, X 1 ¯ {\displaystyle {\bar {X_{1}}}} is the mean value of the observable in ρ {\displaystyle \rho } after cloning, and X 2 ¯ {\displaystyle {\bar {X_{2}}}} is the mean value of the observable in ρ e {\displaystyle \rho _{e}} after cloning. Note that the cloning machine has no dependence on ρ {\displaystyle \rho } because we want to be able to clone the expectation of the observables for any initial state. It is important to note that cloning the mean value of the observable transmits more information than is allowed classically. The calculation of the mean value is defined naturally as: X ¯ = T r [ ρ X ] {\displaystyle {\bar {X}}=Tr[\rho X]} , X 1 ¯ = T r [ R X ⊗ I ] {\displaystyle {\bar {X_{1}}}=Tr[RX\otimes I]} , X 2 ¯ = T r [ R I ⊗ X ] {\displaystyle {\bar {X_{2}}}=Tr[RI\otimes X]} where R = U ρ ⊗ ρ e U † {\displaystyle R=U\rho \otimes \rho _{e}U^{\dagger }} The simplest cloning machine clones the expectation value of σ z {\displaystyle \sigma _{z}} in arbitrary state ρ = | ψ ⟩ ⟨ ψ | {\displaystyle \rho =|\psi \rangle \langle \psi |} to ρ e = | 0 ⟩ ⟨ 0 | {\displaystyle \rho _{e}=|0\rangle \langle 0|} using U = C N O T {\displaystyle U=CNOT} . This is the cloning machine implemented for self-replication by Alvarez-Rodriguez et al. The self-replication process clearly only requires interactions between two qubits, and therefore this cloning machine is the only one necessary for self replication. === Interactions === Interactions occur between individuals when the two take up the same space on the environmental grid. The presence of interactions between individuals provides an advantage for shorter-lifespan individuals. When two individuals interact, exchanges of information between the two phenotypes may or may not occur based on their existing values. When both individual's control qubits (genotypes) are alike, no information will be exchanged. When the control qubits differ, the target qubits (phenotype) will be exchanged between the two individuals. This procedure produces a constantly changing predator-prey dynamic in the simulation. Therefore, long-living qubits, with a larger genetic makeup in the simulation, are at a disadvantage. Since information is only exchanged when interacting with an individual of different genetic makeup, the short-lived population has the advantage. === Mutation === Mutations exist in the artificial world with limited probability, equivalent to their occurrence in the real world. There are two ways in which the individual can mutate: through random single qubit rotations and by errors in the self-replication process. There are two different operators that act on the individual and cause mutations. The M operation causes a spontaneous mutation within the individual by rotating a single qubit by parameter θ. The parameter θ is random for each mutation, which creates biodiversity within the artificial environment. The M operation is a unitary matrix which can be described as: M = ( cos ( θ ) s i n ( θ ) s i n ( θ ) − c o s ( θ ) ) {\displaystyle M={\begin{pmatrix}\cos(\theta )&sin(\theta )\\sin(\theta )&-cos(\theta )\end{pmatrix}}} The other possible way for mutations to occur is due to errors in the replication process. Due to the no-cloning theorem, it is impossible to produce perfect copies of systems that are originally in unknown quantum states. However, quantum cloning machines make it possible to create imperfect copies of quantum states, in other words, the process introduces some degree of error. The error that exists in current quantum cloning machines is the root cause for the second kind of mutations in the artificial life experiment. The imperfect cloning operation can be seen as: U M ( θ ) = I 4 + 1 2 ( 0 0 0 1 ) ⊗ ( − 1 1 1 − 1 ) ( c o s θ + i s i n θ + 1 ) {\displaystyle U_{M}(\theta )=\mathrm {I} _{4}+{\frac {1}{2}}{\begin{pmatrix}0&0\\0&1\end{pmatrix}}\otimes {\begin{pmatrix}-1&1\\1&-1\end{pmatrix}}(cos\theta +isin\theta +1)} The two kinds of mutations affect the individual differently. While the spontaneous M operation does not affect the phenotype of the individual, the self-replicating error mutation, UM, alters both the genotype of the individual, and its associated lifetime. The presence of mutations in the quantum artificial life experiment is critical for providing randomness and biodiversity. The inclusion of mutations helps to increase the accuracy of the quantum algorithm. === Death === At the instant the individual is created (when the genotype is copied into the phenotype), the phenotype interacts with the environment. As time evolves, the interaction of the individual with the environment simulates aging which eventually leads to the death of the individual. The death of an individual occurs when the expectation value of σ z {\displaystyle \sigma _{z}} is within some ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } of 1 in the phenotype, or, equivalently, when ρ p = | 0 ⟩ ⟨ 0 | {\displaystyle \rho _{p}=|0\rangle \langle 0|} The Lindbladian describes the interaction of the individual with the environment: ρ
Computing Machinery and Intelligence
"Computing Machinery and Intelligence" is a paper written by Alan Turing on the topic of artificial intelligence. The paper, published in 1950 in Mind, was the first to introduce his concept of what is now known as the Turing test to the general public. Turing's paper considers the question "Can machines think?" Turing says that since the words "think" and "machine" cannot clearly be defined, we should "replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words." To achieve this objective, Turing proposes a three-step approach. First, he identifies a simple and unambiguous concept to substitute for the term "think." Second, he delineates the specific "machines" under consideration. Third, armed with these tools, he poses a new question related to the first, which he believes he can answer in the affirmative. == Turing's test == Rather than trying to determine if a machine is thinking, Turing suggests we should ask if the machine can win a game, called the "Imitation Game". The original Imitation game, that Turing described, is a simple party game involving three players. Player A is a man, player B is a woman and player C (who plays the role of the interrogator) can be of either sex. In the Imitation Game, player C is unable to see either player A or player B (and knows them only as X and Y), and can communicate with them only through written notes or any other form that does not give away any details about their gender. By asking questions of player A and player B, player C tries to determine which of the two is the man and which is the woman. Player A's role is to trick the interrogator into making the wrong decision, while player B attempts to assist the interrogator in making the right one. Turing proposes a variation of this game that involves the computer: We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?" So the modified game becomes one that involves three participants in isolated rooms: a computer (which is being tested), a human, and a (human) judge. The human judge can converse with both the human and the computer by typing into a terminal. Both the computer and the human try to convince the judge that they are the human. If the judge cannot consistently tell which is which, then the computer wins the game. Researchers in the United Kingdom had been exploring "machine intelligence" for up to ten years prior to the founding of the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research in 1956. It was a common topic among the members of the Ratio Club, an informal group of British cybernetics and electronics researchers that included Alan Turing. Turing, in particular, had been running the notion of machine intelligence since at least 1941 and one of the earliest-known mentions of "computer intelligence" was made by him in 1947. As Stevan Harnad notes, the question has become "Can machines do what we (as thinking entities) can do?" In other words, Turing is no longer asking whether a machine can "think"; he is asking whether a machine can act indistinguishably from the way a thinker acts. This question avoids the difficult philosophical problem of pre-defining the verb "to think" and focuses instead on the performance capacities that being able to think makes possible, and how a causal system can generate them. Since Turing introduced his test, it has been both highly influential and widely criticised, and has become an important concept in the philosophy of artificial intelligence. Some of its criticisms, such as John Searle's Chinese room, are themselves controversial. Some have taken Turing's question to have been "Can a computer, communicating over a teleprinter, fool a person into believing it is human?" but it seems clear that Turing was not talking about fooling people but about generating human cognitive capacity. == Digital machines == Turing also notes that we need to determine which "machines" we wish to consider. He points out that a human clone, while man-made, would not provide a very interesting example. Turing suggested that we should focus on the capabilities of digital machinery—machines which manipulate the binary digits of 1 and 0, rewriting them into memory using simple rules. He gave two reasons. First, there is no reason to speculate whether or not they can exist. They already did in 1950. Second, digital machinery is "universal". Turing's research into the foundations of computation had proved that a digital computer can, in theory, simulate the behaviour of any other digital machine, given enough memory and time. (This is the essential insight of the Church–Turing thesis and the universal Turing machine.) Therefore, if any digital machine can "act like it is thinking", then every sufficiently powerful digital machine can. Turing writes, "all digital computers are in a sense equivalent." This allows the original question to be made even more specific. Turing now restates the original question as "Let us fix our attention on one particular digital computer C. Is it true that by modifying this computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of action, and providing it with an appropriate programme, C can be made to play satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B being taken by a man?" Hence, Turing states that the focus is not on "whether all digital computers would do well in the game nor whether the computers that are presently available would do well, but whether there are imaginable computers which would do well". What is more important is to consider the advancements possible in the state of our machines today regardless of whether we have the available resource to create one or not. == Nine common objections == Having clarified the question, Turing turned to answering it: he considered the following nine common objections, which include all the major arguments against artificial intelligence raised in the years since his paper was first published. Religious Objection: This states that thinking is a function of man's immortal soul; therefore, a machine cannot think. "In attempting to construct such machines," wrote Turing, "we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates." 'Heads in the Sand' Objection: "The consequences of machines thinking would be too dreadful. Let us hope and believe that they cannot do so." This thinking is popular among intellectual people, as they believe superiority derives from higher intelligence and the possibility of being overtaken is a threat (as machines have efficient memory capacities and processing speed, machines exceeding the learning and knowledge capabilities are highly probable). This objection is a fallacious appeal to consequences, confusing what should not be with what can or cannot be (Wardrip-Fruin, 56). The Mathematical Objection: This objection uses mathematical theorems, such as Gödel's incompleteness theorem, to show that there are limits to what questions a computer system based on logic can answer. Turing suggests that humans are too often wrong themselves and pleased at the fallibility of a machine. (This argument would be made again by philosopher John Lucas in 1961 and physicist Roger Penrose in 1989, and later would be called Penrose–Lucas argument.) Argument From Consciousness: This argument, suggested by Professor Geoffrey Jefferson in his 1949 Lister Oration (acceptance speech for his 1948 award of Lister Medal) states that "not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain." Turing replies by saying that we have no way of knowing that any individual other than ourselves experiences emotions, and that therefore we should accept the test. He adds, "I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness ... [b]ut I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question [of whether machines can think]." (This argument, that a computer can't have conscious experiences or understanding, would be made in 1980 by philosopher John Searle in his Chinese room argument. Turing's reply is now known as the "other minds reply". See also Can a machine have a mind? in the philosophy of AI.) Arguments from various disabilities. These arguments all have the form "a computer will never do X". Turing offers a selection:Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humour, tell right from wrong, make mistakes, fall in love, enjo