VP-Expert is an artificial intelligence development tool that gained popularity in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Published by Paperback Software, VP-Expert was designed to facilitate the creation of rule-based expert systems, primarily for applications in business and industry. It was the best-selling expert-system software for microcomputers in the late 1980s. == History == VP-Expert was created by Brian Sawyer and published by Paperback Software in 1987. VP-Expert was widely adopted during the late 1980s. By April 1989, InfoWorld described it as "the best-selling expert-system software for personal computers." In June 1991, ownership of VP-Expert transferred from Paperback Software to WordTech Systems, Inc. following Paperback Software’s liquidation after a legal dispute with Lotus Development Corporation regarding its VP-Planner spreadsheet. VP-Expert continued to receive positive reviews with InfoWorld stating in 1992 "for automatically creating simple expert systems and being able to edit them into more sophisticated applications, hardly a better product exists than VP-Expert". == Features == VP-Expert used an inference engine based on backward chaining to reach conclusions through English-like if/then rules. It operated through a text interface and included an explanation facility that showed the reasoning steps used to justify its conclusions. == Applications == VP-Expert found applications across various domains. In environmental analysis, researchers used VP-Expert to develop a knowledge-based system for analyzing the impact of particulate matter air pollution on human health. In engineering design, VP-Expert was utilized in the creation of a prototype expert system to assist in fishway design. In aviation management, the tool was employed to develop an expert system aimed at maximizing airport capacity while adhering to noise-mitigation plans. == Limitations == While VP-Expert offered certain advantages, it also had limitations. Its rule-based approach could become challenging to manage for large and complex knowledge bases, and the process of eliciting and encoding knowledge from experts could be time-consuming and difficult.
Ware report
Security Controls for Computer Systems, commonly called the Ware report, is a 1970 text by Willis Ware that was foundational in the field of computer security. == Development == A defense contractor in St. Louis, Missouri, had bought an IBM mainframe computer, which it was using for classified work on a fighter aircraft. To provide additional income, the contractor asked the Department of Defense (DoD) for permission to sell computer time on the mainframe to local businesses via remote terminals, while the classified work continued. At the time, the DoD did not have a policy to cover this. The DoD's Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) asked Ware - a RAND employee - to chair a committee to examine and report on the feasibility of security controls for computer systems. The committee's report was a classified document given in January 1970 to the Defense Science Board (DSB), which had taken over the project from ARPA. After declassification, the report was published by RAND in October 1979. == Influence == The IEEE Computer Society said the report was widely circulated, and the IEEE Annals of the History of Computing said that it, together with Ware's 1967 Spring Joint Computer Conference session, marked the start of the field of computer security. The report influenced security certification standards and processes, especially in the banking and defense industries, where the report was instrumental in creating the Orange Book.
EditDV
EditDV was a video editing software released by Radius, Inc. in late 1997 as an evolution of their earlier Radius Edit product. EditDV was one of the first products providing professional-quality editing of the then new DV format at a relatively affordable cost ($999 including Radius FireWire capture card) and was named "The Best Video Tool of 1998". Originally EditDV was available for Macintosh only but in February 2000 EditDV 2.0 for Windows was released. With version 3.0 EditDV's name was changed to CineStream. == Features == Originally bundled with a FireWire card, EditDV 1.5 got updated into a less expensive software only package for use with the newer PowerMac G3 that came with a FireWire interface. Later, a scaled down version named EditDV 1.6.1 Unplugged was released as a freeware version next to EditDV 2.0. Unlike many other applications at the time which transcoded video to M-JPEG for editing, EditDV provided lossless native editing of the DV format. Only transitions (such as dissolves or wipes), effects (such as rotating or scaling the video, adjusting the audio level, or adding titles) and filters (such as changing the brightness or color balance) needed to be rendered. This also had the disadvantage to not work with analogue video capture. EditDV was built on top of QuickTime and supported QuickTime filters as well as its own built-in effects and transitions. Effects could be animated using keyframes. EditDV 2.0 worked natively with Quicktime MOV format. For Microsoft Windows users, where the standard was AVI, this required the use of a provided external conversion tool afterwards when AVI was wanted. The user interface had a Project window for organising clips into bins, a Sequence window with a multi-track timeline for arranging clips into a program using three-point editing, and Source and Program monitor windows. A finished program could either be exported as a QuickTime movie or written back to DV tape using the "print to video" command. Version 3.0, then renamed CineStream, shifted towards web designers who wanted to add video streaming interactivity to a website. The new feature called EventStream allowed setting clickable hot spots to link to another location, either to another page with a URL or to another video. This feature distinguished CineStream from the rest of the competition. == Products == The EditDV product family included a number of related products, all sharing a similar name: EditDV Video editing software (Mac and Windows) SoftDV A QuickTime software codec for playing DV media, included as part of EditDV (Mac and Windows) MotoDV PCI-based FireWire interface with DV capture software (Mac and Windows) PhotoDV Software to capture high-quality stills from a DV tape using MotoDV hardware (Mac and Windows) RotoDV Software for rotoscoping (painting over video), released in Sept 1999 (Macintosh only) == Name changes and eventual demise == In 1999, the company Radius Inc. changed its name to Digital Origin. In 2000, Digital Origin Inc (and EditDV) was bought by Media 100. In early 2001, Media 100 released an updated version of EditDV under the new name CineStream 3.0. Later that year (October 2001) Media 100 was bought by Autodesk's Discreet Division. CineStream for Macintosh required classic Mac OS. It was never ported to Mac OS X and faced increasing competition on that platform from Apple's own Final Cut Pro application. Development of EditDV/Cinestream was officially discontinued in 2002.
Deluxe Paint Animation
DeluxePaint Animation is a 1990 graphics editor and animation creation package for MS-DOS, based on Deluxe Paint for the Amiga. It was adapted by Brent Iverson with additional animation features by Steve Shaw and released by Electronic Arts. The program requires VGA graphics, MS-DOS 2.1 or higher, and a mouse. == Features == Listed from the back of the box. Complete selection of painting tools — Draw any shape you want, any way you want. Turn any image into a brush. You can rotate, flip, shear, resize, smear, and shade it. 7 levels of magnification — Paint in magnified mode if you want. Use variable zoom for detailed editing at the pixel level. 3-D perspective — Move and rotate images in full 3-D, automatically. Use color cycling and gradient fills to create great special effects. Stencils — Protect your designs from the slip of the hand or a bad idea. A stencil masks your image so you can paint "behind" and "in front of" it. Use the handy Move Dialog to animate brushes in full 3-D — automatically! Ideal for creating spinning titles for low-cost videos. 37 multi-sized fonts
COVID-19 apps
COVID-19 apps include mobile-software applications for digital contact-tracing—i.e. the process of identifying persons ("contacts") who may have been in contact with an infected individual—deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Numerous tracing applications have been developed or proposed, with official government support in some territories and jurisdictions. Several frameworks for building contact-tracing apps have been developed. Privacy concerns have been raised, especially about systems that are based on tracking the geographical location of app users. Less overtly intrusive alternatives include the co-option of Bluetooth signals to log a user's proximity to other cellphones. (Bluetooth technology has form in tracking cell-phones' locations.)) On 10 April 2020, Google and Apple jointly announced that they would integrate functionality to support such Bluetooth-based apps directly into their Android and iOS operating systems. India's COVID-19 tracking app Aarogya Setu became the world's fastest growing application—beating Pokémon Go—with 50 million users in the first 13 days of its release. == Rationale == Contact tracing is an important tool in infectious disease control, but as the number of cases rises time constraints make it more challenging to effectively control transmission. Digital contact tracing, especially if widely deployed, may be more effective than traditional methods of contact tracing. In a March 2020 model by the University of Oxford Big Data Institute's Christophe Fraser's team, a coronavirus outbreak in a city of one million people is halted if 80% of all smartphone users take part in a tracking system; in the model, the elderly are still expected to self-isolate en masse, but individuals who are neither symptomatic nor elderly are exempt from isolation unless they receive an alert that they are at risk of carrying the disease. Some proponents advocate for legislation exempting certain COVID-19 apps from general privacy restrictions. == Issues == === Uptake === Ross Anderson, professor of security engineering at Cambridge University, listed a number of potential practical problems with app-based systems, including false positives and the potential lack of effectiveness if takeup of the app is limited to only a small fraction of the population. In Singapore, only one person in three had downloaded the TraceTogether app by the end of June 2020, despite legal requirements for most workers; the app was also underused, as it required users to keep it open at all times on iOS. A team at the University of Oxford simulated the effect of a contact tracing app on a city of 1 million. They estimated that if the app was used in conjunction with the shielding of over-70s, then 56% of the population would have to be using the app for it to suppress the virus. This would be equivalent to 80% of smartphone users in the United Kingdom. They found that the app could still slow the spread of the virus if fewer people downloaded it, with one infection being prevented for every one or two users. In August 2020, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued that there were disparities in smartphone use between demographics and minority groups, and that "even the most comprehensive, all-seeing contact tracing system is of little use without social and medical systems in place to help those who may have the virus — including access to medical care, testing, and support for those who are quarantined." === App store restrictions === Addressing concerns about the spread of misleading or harmful apps, Apple, Google and Amazon set limits on which types of organizations could add coronavirus-related apps to its App Store, limiting them to only "official" or otherwise reputable organizations. === Ethical principles of mass surveillance using COVID-19 contact tracing apps === The advent of COVID-19 contact tracing apps has led to concerns around privacy, the rights of app users, and governmental authority. The European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations and the Siracusa Principles have outlined 4 principles to consider when looking at the ethical principles of mass surveillance with COVID-19 contact tracing apps. These are necessity, proportionality, scientific validity, and time boundedness. Necessity is defined as the idea that governments should only interfere with a person's rights when deemed essential for public health interests. The potential risks associated with infringements of personal privacy must be outweighed by the possibility of reducing significant harm to others. Potential benefits of contact-tracing apps that may be considered include allowing for blanket population-level quarantine measures to be lifted sooner and the minimization of people under quarantine. Hence, some contend that contact-tracing apps are justified as they may be less intrusive than blanket quarantine measures. Furthermore, the delay of an effective contact-tracing app with significant health and economic benefits may be considered unethical. Proportionality refers to the concept that a contact tracing app's potential negative impact on a person's rights should be justifiable by the severity of the health risks that are being addressed. Apps must use the most privacy-preserving options available to achieve their goals, and the selected option should not only be a logical option for achieving the goal but also an effective one. Scientific validity evaluates whether an app is effective, timely and accurate. Traditional manual contact-tracing procedures are not efficient enough for the COVID-19 pandemic, and do not consider asymptomatic transmission. Contact-tracing apps, on the other hand, can be effective COVID-19 contact-tracing tools that reduce R value to less than 1, leading to sustained epidemic suppression. However, for apps to be effective, there needs to be a minimum 56-60% uptake in the population. Apps should be continually modified to reflect current knowledge on the diseases being monitored. Some argue that contact-tracing apps should be considered societal experimental trials where results and adverse effects are evaluated according to the stringent guidelines of social experiments. Analyses should be conducted by independent research bodies and published for wide dissemination. Despite the current urgency of our pandemic situation, we should still adhere to the standard rigors of scientific evaluation. Time boundedness describe the need for establishing legal and technical sunset clauses so that they are only allowed to operate as long as necessary to address the pandemic situation. Apps should be withdrawn as soon as possible after the end of the pandemic. If the end of the pandemic cannot be predicted, the use of apps should be regularly reviewed and decisions about continued use should be made at each review. Collected data should only be retained by public health authorities for research purposes with clear stipulations on how long the data will be held for and who will be responsible for security, oversight, and ownership. === Privacy, discrimination and marginalisation concerns === The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has published a set of principles for technology-assisted contact tracing and Amnesty International and over 100 other organizations issued a statement calling for limits on this kind of surveillance. The organisations declared eight conditions on governmental projects: surveillance would have to be "lawful, necessary and proportionate"; extensions of monitoring and surveillance would have to have sunset clauses; the use of data would have to be limited to COVID-19 purposes; data security and anonymity would have to be protected and shown to be protected based on evidence; digital surveillance would have to address the risk of exacerbating discrimination and marginalisation; any sharing of data with third parties would have to be defined in law; there would have to be safeguards against abuse and the rights of citizens to respond to abuses; "meaningful participation" by all "relevant stakeholders" would be required, including that of public health experts and marginalised groups. The German Chaos Computer Club (CCC) and Reporters Without Borders also issued checklists. The Exposure Notification service intends to address the problem of persistent surveillance by removing the tracing mechanism from their device operating systems once it is no longer needed. On 20 April 2020, it was reported that over 300 academics had signed a statement favouring decentralised proximity tracing applications over centralised models, given the difficulty in precluding centralised options being used "to enable unwarranted discrimination and surveillance." In a centralised model, a central database records the ID codes of meetings between users. In a decentralised model, this information is recorded on individual phones, with the role of the central
Thunderspy
Thunderspy is a type of security vulnerability, based on the Intel Thunderbolt 3 port, first reported publicly on 10 May 2020, that can result in an evil maid (i.e., attacker of an unattended device) attack gaining full access to a computer's information in about five minutes, and may affect millions of Apple, Linux and Windows computers, as well as any computers manufactured before 2019, and some after that. According to Björn Ruytenberg, the discoverer of the vulnerability, "All the evil maid needs to do is unscrew the backplate, attach a device momentarily, reprogram the firmware, reattach the backplate, and the evil maid gets full access to the laptop. All of this can be done in under five minutes." The malicious firmware is used to clone device identities which makes classical DMA attack possible. == History == The Thunderspy security vulnerabilities were first publicly reported by Björn Ruytenberg of Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands on 10 May 2020. Thunderspy is similar to Thunderclap, another security vulnerability, reported in 2019, that also involves access to computer files through the Thunderbolt port. == Impact == The security vulnerability affects millions of Apple, Linux and Windows computers, as well as all computers manufactured before 2019, and some after that. However, this impact is restricted mainly to how precise a bad actor would have to be to execute the attack. Physical access to a machine with a vulnerable Thunderbolt controller is necessary, as well as a writable ROM chip for the Thunderbolt controller's firmware. Additionally, part of Thunderspy, specifically the portion involving re-writing the firmware of the controller, requires the device to be in sleep, or at least in some sort of powered-on state, to be effective. Machines that force power-off when the case is open may assist in resisting this attack to the extent that the feature (switch) itself resists tampering. Due to the nature of attacks that require extended physical access to hardware, it's unlikely the attack will affect users outside of a business or government environment. == Mitigation == The researchers claim there is no easy software solution, and may only be mitigated by disabling the Thunderbolt port altogether. However, the impacts of this attack (reading kernel level memory without the machine needing to be powered off) are largely mitigated by anti-intrusion features provided by many business machines. Intel claims enabling such features would substantially restrict the effectiveness of the attack. Microsoft's official security recommendations recommend disabling sleep mode while using BitLocker. Using hibernation in place of sleep mode turns the device off, mitigating potential risks of attack on encrypted data.
Audio-visual speech recognition
Audio visual speech recognition (AVSR) is a technique that uses image processing capabilities in lip reading to aid speech recognition systems in recognizing indeterministic phones or giving preponderance among near probability decisions. Each system of lip reading and speech recognition works separately, then their results are mixed at the stage of feature fusion. As the name suggests, it has two parts. First one is the audio part and second one is the visual part. In audio part we use features like log mel spectrogram, mfcc etc. from the raw audio samples and we build a model to get feature vector out of it . For visual part generally we use some variant of convolutional neural network to compress the image to a feature vector after that we concatenate these two vectors (audio and visual ) and try to predict the target object.