A digital backlot or virtual backlot is a motion-picture set that is neither a genuine location nor a constructed studio; the shooting takes place entirely on a stage with a blank background (often a greenscreen) that will later on project an artificial environment put in during post-production. Digital backlots are mainly used for genres such as science fiction, where building a real set would be too expensive or outright impossible. == Notable films == Among the first films to introduce the technique was Mini Moni the Movie by Shinji Higuchi in 2002, predated by Rest In Peace by Stolpskott Film (2000). Others include: === Released === Rest in Peace (Sweden, 2000) – Shot entirely with green-screen. Some sections fully CGI. Casshern (Japan, 2004) – Shot on celluloid. A few practical set pieces used. Able Edwards (United States, 2004) – Shot digitally on Canon XL1 cameras. Immortal (France, 2004) – Shot on celluloid. Also showed CGI characters interacting with live actors. Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow (United States, 2004) – Shot digitally on Sony CineAlta cameras. Sin City (United States, 2005) – Shot digitally on CineAlta cameras. Three practical sets used. MirrorMask (United States/United Kingdom, 2005) – Shot on celluloid. 80% of film uses digital backlot. Some practical set pieces used. The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (United States, 2005) – Shot digitally. 300 (United States, 2007) – Shot on celluloid. Two practical sets used. Speed Racer (United States, 2008) – Directed by the Wachowskis. Three practical sets used. The Spirit (United States, 2008) – Director Frank Miller shot the film with the same techniques he and Robert Rodriguez used on Sin City. Avatar (United States, 2009) – Directed by James Cameron. Two practical sets used. Goemon (Japan, 2009) – The second film from Casshern helmer Kazuaki Kiriya. Alice in Wonderland (United States, 2010) – Directed by Tim Burton. Practical sets used. Sin City: A Dame to Kill For (United States 2014) – Co-directed by Robert Rodriguez and Frank Miller. Sequel to Sin City. === Upcoming === Tribes of October
ImHex
ImHex is a free cross-platform hex editor available on Windows, macOS, and Linux. ImHex is used by programmers and reverse engineers to view and analyze binary data. == History == The initial release of the project in November 2020, saw significant interest on GitHub. == Features == Features include: Hex editor Custom pattern matching and analysis scripting language Visual, node based data pre-processor Disassembler Running and visualizing of YARA rules Bookmarks Binary data diffing Additional Tools MSVC, Itanium, D and Rust name demangler ASCII table Calculator Base converter File utilities IEEE 754 floating point decoder Division by invariant multiplication calculator TCP/IP client and server Support for: Data importing and exporting ASCII string, Unicode string, numeric, hexadecimal and regular expressions search Byte manipulation File hashing Plug-ins
Generatrix
In geometry, a generatrix () or describent is a point, curve or surface that, when moved along a given path, generates a new shape. The path directing the motion of the generatrix motion is called a directrix or dirigent. == Examples == A cone can be generated by moving a line (the generatrix) fixed at the future apex of the cone along a closed curve (the directrix); if that directrix is a circle perpendicular to the line connecting its center to the apex, the motion is rotation around a fixed axis and the resulting shape is a circular cone. The generatrix of a cylinder, a limiting case of a cone, is a line that is kept parallel to some axis.
Connection string
In computing, a connection string is a string that specifies information about a data source and the means of connecting to it. It is passed in code to an underlying driver or provider in order to initiate the connection. Whilst commonly used for a database connection, the data source could also be a spreadsheet or text file. The connection string may include attributes such as the name of the driver, server and database, as well as security information such as user name and password. == Examples == This example shows a PostgreSQL connection string for connecting to wikipedia.com with SSL and a connection timeout of 180 seconds: DRIVER={PostgreSQL Unicode};SERVER=www.wikipedia.com;SSL=true;SSLMode=require;DATABASE=wiki;UID=wikiuser;Connect Timeout=180;PWD=ashiknoor Users of Oracle databases can specify connection strings: on the command line (as in: sqlplus scott/tiger@connection_string ) via environment variables ($TWO_TASK in Unix-like environments; %TWO_TASK% in Microsoft Windows environments) in local configuration files (such as the default $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin.tnsnames.ora) in LDAP-capable directory services
Security type system
In computer science, a type system can be described as a syntactic framework which contains a set of rules that are used to assign a type property (int, boolean, char etc.) to various components of a computer program, such as variables or functions. A security type system works in a similar way, only with a main focus on the security of the computer program, through information flow control. Thus, the various components of the program are assigned security types, or labels. The aim of a such system is to ultimately be able to verify that a given program conforms to the type system rules and satisfies non-interference. Security type systems is one of many security techniques used in the field of language-based security, and is tightly connected to information flow and information flow policies. In simple terms, a security type system can be used to detect if there exists any kind of violation of confidentiality or integrity in a program, i.e. the programmer wants to detect if the program is in line with the information flow policy or not. == A simple information flow policy == Suppose there are two users, A and B. In a program, the following security classes (SC) are introduced: SC = {∅, {A}, {B}, {A,B}}, where ∅ is the empty set. The information flow policy should define the direction that information is allowed to flow, which is dependent on whether the policy allows read or write operations. This example considers read operations (confidentiality). The following flows are allowed: → = {({A}, {A}), ({B}, {B}), ({A,B}, {A,B}), ({A,B}, {A}), ({A,B}, {B}), ({A}, ∅), ({B}, ∅), ({A,B}, ∅)} This can also be described as a superset (⊇). In words: information is allowed to flow towards stricter levels of confidentiality. The combination operator (⊕) can express how security classes can perform read operations with respect to other security classes. For example: {A} ⊕ {A,B} = {A} — the only security class that can read from both {A} and {A,B} is {A}. {A} ⊕ {B} = ∅ — neither {A} nor {B} are allowed to read from both {A} and {B}. This can also be described as an intersection (∩) between security classes. An information flow policy can be illustrated as a Hasse diagram. The policy should also be a lattice, that is, it has a greatest lower-bound and least upper-bound (there always exists a combination between security classes). In the case of integrity, information will flow in the opposite direction, thus the policy will be inverted. == Information flow policy in security type systems == Once the policy is in place, the software developer can apply the security classes to the program components. Use of a security type system is usually combined with a compiler that can perform the verification of the information flow according to the type system rules. For the sake of simplicity, a very simple computer program, together with the information flow policy as described in the previous section, can be used as a demonstration. The simple program is given in the following pseudocode: if y{A} = 1 then x{A,B} := 0 else x{A,B} := 1 Here, an equality check is made on a variable y that is assigned the security class {A}. A variable x with a lower security class ({A,B}) is influenced by this check. This means that information is leaking from class {A} to class {A,B}, which is a violation of the confidentiality policy. This leak should be detected by the security type system. === Example === Designing a security type system requires a function (also known as a security environment) that creates a mapping from variables to security types, or classes. This function can be called Γ, such that Γ(x) = τ, where x is a variable and τ is the security class, or type. Security classes are assigned (also called "judgement") to program components, using the following notation: Types are assigned to read operations by: Γ ⊢ e : τ. Types are assigned to write operations by: Γ ⊢ S : τ cmd. Constants can be assigned any type. The following bottom-up notation can be used to decompose the program: assumption1 ... assumptionn/conclusion. Once the program is decomposed into trivial judgements, by which the type can easily be determined, the types for the less trivial parts of the program can be derived. Each "numerator" is considered in isolation, looking at the type of each statement to see if an allowed type can be derived for the "denominator", based on the defined type system "rules". ==== Rules ==== The main part of the security type system is the rules. They say how the program should be decomposed and how type verification should be performed. This toy program consists of a conditional test and two possible variable assignments. Rules for these two events are defined as follows: Applying this to the simple program introduced above yields: The type system detects the policy violation in line 2, where a read operation of security class {A} is performed, followed by two write operations of a less strict security class {A,B}. In more formalized terms, {A} ⋢ {A,B}, {A,B} (from the rule of the conditional test). Thus, the program is classified as "not typeable". === Soundness === The soundness of a security type system can be informally defined as: If program P is well typed, P satisfies non-interference. Volpano, Smith and Irvine were the first to prove soundness of a security type system for a deterministic imperative programming language with a standard (non-instrumented) semantics using the notion of non-interference.
Signal transfer function
The signal transfer function (SiTF) is a measure of the signal output versus the signal input of a system such as an infrared system or sensor. There are many general applications of the SiTF. Specifically, in the field of image analysis, it gives a measure of the noise of an imaging system, and thus yields one assessment of its performance. == SiTF evaluation == In evaluating the SiTF curve, the signal input and signal output are measured differentially; meaning, the differential of the input signal and differential of the output signal are calculated and plotted against each other. An operator, using computer software, defines an arbitrary area, with a given set of data points, within the signal and background regions of the output image of the infrared sensor, i.e. of the unit under test (UUT), (see "Half Moon" image below). The average signal and background are calculated by averaging the data of each arbitrarily defined region. A second order polynomial curve is fitted to the data of each line. Then, the polynomial is subtracted from the average signal and background data to yield the new signal and background. The difference of the new signal and background data is taken to yield the net signal. Finally, the net signal is plotted versus the signal input. The signal input of the UUT is within its own spectral response. (e.g. color-correlated temperature, pixel intensity, etc.). The slope of the linear portion of this curve is then found using the method of least squares. == SiTF curve == The net signal is calculated from the average signal and background, as in signal to noise ratio (imaging)#Calculations. The SiTF curve is then given by the signal output data, (net signal data), plotted against the signal input data (see graph of SiTF to the right). All the data points in the linear region of the SiTF curve can be used in the method of least squares to find a linear approximation. Given n {\displaystyle n\,} data points ( x i , y i ) {\displaystyle (x_{i}\,,y_{i}\,)} a best fit line parameterized as y = m x + b {\displaystyle y=mx+b\,} is given by: m = ∑ x i y i n − ∑ x i n ∑ y i n ∑ x i 2 n − ( ∑ x i n ) 2 b = ∑ y i n − m ∑ x i n {\displaystyle m={\frac {{\frac {\sum x_{i}y_{i}}{n}}-{\frac {\sum x_{i}}{n}}{\frac {\sum y_{i}}{n}}}{{\frac {\sum x_{i}^{2}}{n}}-({\frac {\sum x_{i}}{n}})^{2}}}\qquad \qquad b={\frac {\sum y_{i}}{n}}-m{\frac {\sum x_{i}}{n}}}
Zardoz (computer security)
In computer security, the Security-Digest list, better known as the Zardoz list, was a semi-private full disclosure mailing list run by Neil Gorsuch from 1989 through 1991. It identified weaknesses in systems and gave directions on where to find them. It was a perennial target for computer hackers, who sought archives of the list for information on undisclosed software vulnerabilities. == Membership restrictions == Access to Zardoz was approved on a case-by-case basis by Gorsuch, principally by reference to the user account used to send subscription requests; requests were approved for root users, valid UUCP owners, or system administrators listed at the NIC. The openness of the list to users other than Unix system administrators was a regular topic of conversation, with participants expressing concern that vulnerabilities and exploitation details disclosed on the list were liable to spread to hackers. The circulation of Zardoz postings was an open secret among computer hackers, and mocked in a Phrack parody of an IRC channel populated by security experts. == Notable participants == Keith Bostic discussed BSD Sendmail vulnerabilities Chip Salzenberg discussed Peter Honeyman's posting of a UUCP worm, and shell script security Gene Spafford discussed VMS and Ultrix bugs, and relayed law enforcement enquiries about the Morris Worm Tom Christiansen discussed SUID shell scripts Chris Torek discussed devising exploits from general descriptions of vulnerabilities Henry Spencer discussed Unix security Brendan Kehoe discussed systems security Alec Muffett announced Crack, the Unix password cracker The majority of Zardoz participants were Unix systems administrators and C software developers. Neil Gorsuch and Gene Spafford were the most prolific contributors to the list.