The Interim Measures for the Management of Generative AI Services (Chinese: 生成式人工智能服务管理暂行办法; pinyin: Shēngchéng shì réngōng zhìnéng fúwù guǎnlǐ zànxíng bànfǎ) are a set of regulations governing public-facing generative artificial intelligence services in China. Issued on 10 July 2023 and effective from 15 August 2023, they were China's first binding regulation specifically targeting generative AI. They have been described as among the earliest such regulations adopted by any country. The measures were jointly issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and six other national bodies: the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, and the National Radio and Television Administration. Among the measures' most prominent requirements is that generative AI services must uphold Core Socialist Values and must not generate content that could subvert state power, harm national security, or undermine social stability. The measures also require providers of public-facing generative AI services to undergo security assessments and register their algorithms with the CAC. As of December 2025, 748 generative AI services had completed the filing process at the national level. == Background == The Interim Measures build on two earlier sets of regulations targeting specific algorithm applications. The Administrative Provisions on Algorithm Recommendation for Internet Information Services, effective from March 2022, established China's algorithm registry and required providers of recommendation algorithms with "public opinion properties or social mobilization capabilities" to file with the CAC and undergo security assessments. The Administrative Provisions on Deep Synthesis of Internet Information Services, effective from January 2023, extended similar requirements to algorithms used for generating synthetic media such as deepfakes. In April 2023, the CAC released a draft of the generative AI regulation for public comment. The draft included several requirements that attracted attention, including that generated content should "embody Core Socialist Values" and that training data should be "true and accurate". The public consultation period ran until May 2023. The final version, published in July 2023, was substantially revised from the draft. According to an analysis by the Future of Privacy Forum, changes appeared to reflect feedback from industry stakeholders including Baidu, Xiaomi, SenseTime, and others, as well as input from government-affiliated research institutes. The final measures adopted a more permissive tone, with the CAC describing its approach as "inclusive and prudent" (包容审慎) and emphasising "classified and graded" (分类分级) supervision. == Scope == The measures apply to services that use generative AI technology to provide text, images, audio, video, or other content to the public within mainland China (Article 2). They do not apply to organisations that develop or use generative AI internally without offering services to the domestic public, such as industry associations, enterprises, and research institutions. Overseas providers whose services are accessible to users in China are also subject to the measures. == Key provisions == === Content requirements === Article 4 sets out the core content obligations. Providers and users of generative AI services must uphold the Core Socialist Values. The measures prohibit generating content that incites subversion of national sovereignty or the socialist system, endangers national security or the nation's image, incites separatism, promotes terrorism or extremism, promotes ethnic hatred or discrimination, or contains violence, obscenity, or false information prohibited by law. These content prohibitions largely mirror those in Article 12 of the Cybersecurity Law and in prior regulations governing online content. Article 4 also requires that models be designed and trained to avoid discrimination, that services respect intellectual property rights, and that providers take effective measures to improve the transparency and accuracy of generated content. === Training data and labelling === Article 7 requires providers to ensure that training data is of high quality and legitimately sourced, and that it does not infringe upon intellectual property rights. Where personal information is used, consent must be obtained. The final version of this provision removed language from the draft that would have held providers responsible for the "legitimacy" of all pretraining data, replacing it with a requirement to "employ effective measures to improve the quality of training data". Article 8 requires providers to establish labelling rules for training data and to conduct quality assessments of data annotations. Article 12 requires that generated images, videos, and other synthetic content be labelled as AI-generated. === User rights and privacy === Article 11 requires providers to protect user privacy, to minimise the collection and retention of personal data, and to refrain from unlawfully sharing user information. Users have the right to request review, correction, or deletion of their personal information. Article 10 requires providers to take measures to prevent excessive dependence on or addiction to generative AI services by minors. === Security assessment and algorithm filing === Article 17 requires that providers of generative AI services with "public opinion properties or the capacity for social mobilization" (具有舆论属性或者社会动员能力) carry out security assessments and complete algorithm filing procedures in accordance with the Administrative Provisions on Algorithm Recommendation for Internet Information Services. == Implementation == === Algorithm filing process === In practice, the filing requirements under the Interim Measures have developed into a two-tier process. The first tier is the standard algorithm filing (算法备案) under the pre-existing Algorithm Recommendation Provisions, which involves submitting information about an algorithm's design, purpose, and data sources to the CAC. This process is primarily a registration mechanism. For public-facing generative AI products, there is an additional, more rigorous process commonly referred to as the "large model filing" (大模型备案). This involves submitting a security self-assessment report, data annotation rules, a keyword blocking list, and evaluation test question sets. The process includes technical testing at the provincial level, followed by review at the national CAC level. The algorithm filing targets specific algorithms, while the large model filing evaluates the broader system architecture, training data, model parameters, and potential social impact. The CAC publishes lists of generative AI services that have successfully completed the filing process. The first such list was published on 2 April 2024. According to the CAC's year-end announcements, 302 generative AI services had completed national-level filing by the end of 2024 (of which 238 were new that year), alongside 105 applications that completed local-level registration. By the end of 2025, the cumulative total had risen to 748 national-level filings and 435 local-level registrations. === Content compliance and testing === According to the Carnegie Endowment, the CAC has conducted compliance audits of generative AI services with a particular focus on ensuring appropriate responses to queries about politically sensitive topics. The large model filing process requires providers to pass both provincial-level and national-level technical testing before their services can be made available to the public. On 1 March 2024, the National Technical Committee 260 on Cybersecurity (TC260) published TC260-003, the Basic Security Requirements for Generative AI Services (生成式人工智能服务安全基本要求), a technical standard that provides detailed guidance on the security assessments required under the Interim Measures. The standard covers requirements for training data safety, model security, and content safety evaluation, and is used as a reference for the filing process. == Analysis == === Relationship to broader Chinese internet regulation === The content requirements in the Interim Measures extend China's existing framework for online information control to generative AI. Legal scholars have noted that the "Core Socialist Values" provision and the specific content prohibitions are consistent with longstanding requirements imposed on internet platforms under the Cybersecurity Law and related regulations. The Asia Society Policy Institute has described the Chinese government's highest regulatory priority in this area as retaining control of information, noting that content-related obligations receive stricter enforcement than other provisions. === Nature of the filing system === The character of the filing system has been debated by scholars. Angela Huyue Zh
Comparison of machine learning software
The following tables are a comparison of machine learning software such as software frameworks, libraries, and computer programs used for machine learning. == Machine learning software == == Other comparisons == == Machine learning helper libraries and platforms == Apache OpenNLP — natural language processing toolkit CUDA — GPU computing platform used to accelerate machine learning and deep learning workloads Horovod — distributed training framework for deep learning Hugging Face Transformers — library of pretrained transformer models built on other machine learning frameworks Kubeflow — machine learning platform for Kubernetes Mallet — toolkit for natural language processing and text analysis NumPy — numerical computing library used in machine learning OpenCV — computer vision library with machine learning functions ONNX — open format for representing machine learning models pandas — data analysis and data preparation library used in machine learning PlaidML — tensor compiler and backend for machine learning frameworks Polars — Dataframe library used for machine learning data preparation and analysis PyArrow — columnar data library used in machine learning data processing ROOT (TMVA) — data analysis framework with machine learning tools SciPy — scientific computing and optimization library used in machine learning == Online development environments for machine learning == Google Colab — hosted Jupyter Notebook environment commonly used for machine learning and deep learning JupyterLab — notebook-based development environment for machine learning and data science Jupyter Notebook — interactive notebook environment used for machine learning and data science Kaggle — online data science and machine learning platform
Artificial intelligence and elections
As artificial intelligence (AI) has become more mainstream, there is growing concern about how this will influence elections. Potential targets of AI include election processes, election offices, election officials and election vendors. There are also global efforts to improve elections using AI. == Tactics == Generative AI capabilities allow creation of misleading content. Examples of this include text-to-video, deepfake videos, text-to-image, AI-altered images, text-to-speech, voice cloning, and text-to-text. In the context of an election, a deepfake video of a candidate may propagate information that the candidate does not endorse. Chatbots could spread misinformation related to election locations, times or voting methods. In contrast to malicious actors in the past, these techniques require little technical skill and can spread rapidly. LLM-generated messages have the capacity to persuade humans on political issues. Researchers have begun to investigate how people rate messages that LLMs generate for how persuasive they are. When it came to policy issues, the LLM-generated messages received a 2.91 compared to a 2.80 when it came to smartness between the AI and humans. The LLM-generated messages were often more technical and analytical than human-generated messages. Generative AI has been used to micro-target people during tight political elections. The generation of targeted large language models has triggered concern that they will be used to leverage readily scale microtargeting. Rephrasing inputs have been used to generate fraudulent emails and phishing websites. Rephrasing inputs in a microtargeting does not violate the terms of OpenAI usage. There are no safeguards to prevent the use of rephrasing and creation of fraudulent emails. Political campaign managers have access to this allowing for them to create targeted content. == Usage by country == === Argentina === ==== 2023 elections ==== During the 2023 Argentine primary elections, Javier Milei's team distributed AI generated images including a fabricated image of his rival Sergio Massa and drew 3 million views. The team also created an unofficial Instagram account entitled "AI for the Homeland." Sergio Massa's team also distributed AI generated images and videos. === Bangladesh === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the run up to the 2024 Bangladeshi general election, deepfake videos of female opposition politicians appeared. Rumin Farhana was pictured in a bikini while Nipun Ray was shown in a swimming pool. === Canada === ==== 2025 elections ==== In the run up to the 2025 Canadian federal election, the use of AI tools is likely to figure prominently. India, Pakistan and Iran are all expected to make efforts to subvert the national vote using disinformation campaigns to deceive voters and sway diaspora communities. In a report by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security called "Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process: 2025 Update", it states that malicious actors including China and Russia: "are most likely to use generative AI as a means of creating and spreading disinformation, designed to sow division among Canadians and push narratives conducive to the interests of foreign states". === France === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 French legislative election, deepfake videos appeared claiming: i) That they showed the family of Marine le Pen. In the videos, young women, supposedly Le Pen's nieces, are seen skiing, dancing and at the beach "while making fun of France’s racial minorities": However, the family members don't exist. On social media there were over 2 million views. ii) In a video seen on social media, a deepfake video of a France24 broadcast appeared to report that the Ukrainian leadership had "tried to lure French president Emmanuel Macron to Ukraine to assassinate him and then blame his death on Russia". === Ghana === ==== 2024 elections ==== During the months before the December 2024 Ghanaian general election, a network of at least 171 fake accounts has been used to spam social media. Posts have been used by a group identified as "@TheTPatriots" to promote the New Patriotic Party, although it is not known whether the two are connected. All the networks' posts were "highly likely" to have been generated by ChatGPT and appear to be the "first secretly partisan network using AI to influence elections in Ghana". The opposition National Democratic Congress was also criticized with its leader John Mahama being called a drunkard. === India === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 Indian general election, politicians used deepfakes in their campaign materials. These deepfakes included politicians who had died prior to the election. Mathuvel Karunanidhi's party posted with his likeness even though he had died 2018. A video The All-India Anna Dravidian Progressive Federation party posted showed an audio clip of Jayaram Jayalalithaa even though she had died in 2016. The Deepfakes Analysis Unit (DAU) is an open source platform created in March 2024 for the public to share misleading content and assess if it had been AI-generated. AI was also used to translate political speeches in real time. This translating ability was widely used to reach more voters. === Indonesia === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, Prabowo Subianto made extensive use of AI-generated art in his campaign, which ranged from images of himself as an adorable child to various child portrayals in his advertisements. The Indonesian Children's Protection Commission condemned these ads, labeling them as a form of misuse. Other candidates, Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo, also incorporated AI art into their campaigns. Throughout the election period, all presidential candidates faced attacks from deepfakes, both in video and audio formats. === Ireland === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the last weeks of the 2024 Irish general election a spoof election poster appeared in Dublin featuring "an AI-generated candidate with three arms". The candidate is called Aidan Irwin, but no-one stood in the election with that name. A slogan on the poster says "put matters into artificial intelligence’s hands". The convincing election poster shows a man that "has six fingers on one hand, three arms, and a distorted thumb". === New Zealand === ==== 2023 elections ==== In May 2023, ahead of the 2023 New Zealand general election in October 2023, the New Zealand National Party published a "series of AI-generated political advertisements" on its Instagram account. After confirming that the images were faked, a party spokesperson said that it was "an innovative way to drive our social media". === Pakistan === ==== 2024 elections ==== AI has been used by the imprisoned ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan and his media team in the 2024 Pakistani general election: i) An AI generated audio of his voice was added to a video clip and was broadcast at a virtual rally. ii) An op-ed in The Economist written by Khan was later claimed by himself to have been written by AI which was later denied by his team. The article was liked and shared on social media by thousands of users. === South Africa === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 South African general election, there were several uses of AI content: i) A deepfaked video of Joe Biden emerged on social media showing him saying that "The U.S. would place sanctions on SA and declare it an enemy state if the African National Congress (ANC) won". ii) In a deepfake video, Donald Trump was shown endorsing the uMkhonto weSizwe party. It was posted to social media and was viewed more than 158,000 times. iii) Less than 3 months before the elections, a deepfake video showed U.S. rapper Eminem endorsing the Economic Freedom Fighters party while criticizing the ANC. The deepfake was viewed on social media more than 173,000 times. === South Korea === ==== 2022 elections ==== In the 2022 South Korean presidential election, a committee for one presidential candidate Yoon Suk Yeol released an AI avatar 'Al Yoon Seok-yeol' that would campaign in places the candidate could not go. The other presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung introduced a chatbot that provided information about the candidate's pledges. ==== 2024 elections ==== Deepfakes were used to spread misinformation before the 2024 South Korean legislative election with one source reporting 129 deepfake violations of election laws within a two week period. Seoul hosted the 2024 Summit for Democracy, a virtual gathering of world leaders initiated by US President Joe Biden in 2021. The focus of the summit was on digital threats to democracy including artificial intelligence and deepfakes. === Taiwan === ==== 2024 elections ==== AI-generated content was used during the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. Among the media were: i) A deepfake video of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping which showed him supporting the presidential elections. Created on social media, the video was "widely circulated
Autonomic networking
Autonomic networking follows the concept of Autonomic Computing, an initiative started by IBM in 2001. Its ultimate aim is to create self-managing networks to overcome the rapidly growing complexity of the Internet and other networks and to enable their further growth, far beyond the size of today. == Increasing size and complexity == The ever-growing management complexity of the Internet caused by its rapid growth is seen by some experts as a major problem that limits its usability in the future. What's more, increasingly popular smartphones, PDAs, networked audio and video equipment, and game consoles need to be interconnected. Pervasive Computing not only adds features, but also burdens existing networking infrastructure with more and more tasks that sooner or later will not be manageable by human intervention alone. Another important aspect is the price of manually controlling huge numbers of vitally important devices of current network infrastructures. == Autonomic nervous system == The autonomic nervous system (ANS) is the part of complex biological nervous systems that is not consciously controlled. It regulates bodily functions and the activity of specific organs. As proposed by IBM, future communication systems might be designed in a similar way to the ANS. == Components of autonomic networking == As autonomics conceptually derives from biological entities such as the human autonomic nervous system, each of the areas can be metaphorically related to functional and structural aspects of a living being. In the human body, the autonomic system facilitates and regulates a variety of functions including respiration, blood pressure and circulation, and emotive response. The autonomic nervous system is the interconnecting fabric that supports feedback loops between internal states and various sources by which internal and external conditions are monitored. === Autognostics === Autognostics includes a range of self-discovery, awareness, and analysis capabilities that provide the autonomic system with a view on high-level state. In metaphor, this represents the perceptual sub-systems that gather, analyze, and report on internal and external states and conditions – for example, this might be viewed as the eyes, visual cortex and perceptual organs of the system. Autognostics, or literally "self-knowledge", provides the autonomic system with a basis for response and validation. A rich autognostic capability may include many different "perceptual senses". For example, the human body gathers information via the usual five senses, the so-called sixth sense of proprioception (sense of body position and orientation), and through emotive states that represent the gross wellness of the body. As conditions and states change, they are detected by the sensory monitors and provide the basis for adaptation of related systems. Implicit in such a system are imbedded models of both internal and external environments such that relative value can be assigned to any perceived state - perceived physical threat (e.g. a snake) can result in rapid shallow breathing related to fight-flight response, a phylogenetically effective model of interaction with recognizable threats. In the case of autonomic networking, the state of the network may be defined by inputs from: individual network elements such as switches and network interfaces including specification and configuration historical records and current state traffic flows end-hosts application performance data logical diagrams and design specifications Most of these sources represent relatively raw and unprocessed views that have limited relevance. Post-processing and various forms of analysis must be applied to generate meaningful measurements and assessments against which current state can be derived. The autognostic system interoperates with: configuration management - to control network elements and interfaces policy management - to define performance objectives and constraints autodefense - to identify attacks and accommodate the impact of defensive responses === Configuration management === Configuration management is responsible for the interaction with network elements and interfaces. It includes an accounting capability with historical perspective that provides for the tracking of configurations over time, with respect to various circumstances. In the biological metaphor, these are the hands and, to some degree, the memory of the autonomic system. On a network, remediation and provisioning are applied via configuration setting of specific devices. Implementation affecting access and selective performance with respect to role and relationship are also applied. Almost all the "actions" that are currently taken by human engineers fall under this area. With only a few exceptions, interfaces are set by hand, or by extension of the hand, through automated scripts. Implicit in the configuration process is the maintenance of a dynamic population of devices under management, a historical record of changes and the directives which invoked change. Typical to many accounting functions, configuration management should be capable of operating on devices and then rolling back changes to recover previous configurations. Where change may lead to unrecoverable states, the sub-system should be able to qualify the consequences of changes prior to issuing them. As directives for change must originate from other sub-systems, the shared language for such directives must be abstracted from the details of the devices involved. The configuration management sub-system must be able to translate unambiguously between directives and hard actions or to be able to signal the need for further detail on a directive. An inferential capacity may be appropriate to support sufficient flexibility (i.e. configuration never takes place because there is no unique one-to-one mapping between directive and configuration settings). Where standards are not sufficient, a learning capacity may also be required to acquire new knowledge of devices and their configuration. Configuration management interoperates with all of the other sub-systems including: autognostics - receives direction for and validation of changes policy management - implements policy models through mapping to underlying resources security - applies access and authorization constraints for particular policy targets autodefense - receives direction for changes === Policy management === Policy management includes policy specification, deployment, reasoning over policies, updating and maintaining policies, and enforcement. Policy-based management is required for: constraining different kinds of behavior including security, privacy, resource access, and collaboration configuration management describing business processes and defining performance defining role and relationship, and establishing trust and reputation It provides the models of environment and behavior that represent effective interaction according to specific goals. In the human nervous system metaphor, these models are implicit in the evolutionary "design" of biological entities and specific to the goals of survival and procreation. Definition of what constitutes a policy is necessary to consider what is involved in managing it. A relatively flexible and abstract framework of values, relationships, roles, interactions, resources, and other components of the network environment is required. This sub-system extends far beyond the physical network to the applications in use and the processes and end-users that employ the network to achieve specific goals. It must express the relative values of various resources, outcomes, and processes and include a basis for assessing states and conditions. Unless embodied in some system outside the autonomic network or implicit to the specific policy implementation, the framework must also accommodate the definition of process, objectives and goals. Business process definitions and descriptions are then an integral part of the policy implementation. Further, as policy management represents the ultimate basis for the operation of the autonomic system, it must be able to report on its operation with respect to the details of its implementation. The policy management sub-system interoperates (at least) indirectly with all other sub-systems but primarily interacts with: autognostics - providing the definition of performance and accepting reports on conditions configuration management - providing constraints on device configuration security - providing definitions of roles, access and permissions === Autodefense === Autodefense represents a dynamic and adaptive mechanism that responds to malicious and intentional attacks on the network infrastructure, or use of the network infrastructure to attack IT resources. As defensive measures tend to impede the operation of IT, it is optimally capable of balancing performance objectives with typically over-riding threat management actions. In the
Empowerment (artificial intelligence)
Empowerment in the field of artificial intelligence formalises and quantifies (via information theory) the potential an agent perceives that it has to influence its environment. An agent which follows an empowerment maximising policy, acts to maximise future options (typically up to some limited horizon). Empowerment can be used as a (pseudo) utility function that depends only on information gathered from the local environment to guide action, rather than seeking an externally imposed goal, thus is a form of intrinsic motivation. The empowerment formalism depends on a probabilistic model commonly used in artificial intelligence. An autonomous agent operates in the world by taking in sensory information and acting to change its state, or that of the environment, in a cycle of perceiving and acting known as the perception-action loop. Agent state and actions are modelled by random variables ( S : s ∈ S , A : a ∈ A {\displaystyle S:s\in {\mathcal {S}},A:a\in {\mathcal {A}}} ) and time ( t {\displaystyle t} ). The choice of action depends on the current state, and the future state depends on the choice of action, thus the perception-action loop unrolled in time forms a causal bayesian network. == Definition == Empowerment ( E {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}} ) is defined as the channel capacity ( C {\displaystyle C} ) of the actuation channel of the agent, and is formalised as the maximal possible information flow between the actions of the agent and the effect of those actions some time later. Empowerment can be thought of as the future potential of the agent to affect its environment, as measured by its sensors. E := C ( A t ⟶ S t + 1 ) ≡ max p ( a t ) I ( A t ; S t + 1 ) {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}:=C(A_{t}\longrightarrow S_{t+1})\equiv \max _{p(a_{t})}I(A_{t};S_{t+1})} In a discrete time model, Empowerment can be computed for a given number of cycles into the future, which is referred to in the literature as 'n-step' empowerment. E ( A t n ⟶ S t + n ) = max p ( a t , . . . , a t + n − 1 ) I ( A t , . . . , A t + n − 1 ; S t + n ) {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}(A_{t}^{n}\longrightarrow S_{t+n})=\max _{p(a_{t},...,a_{t+n-1})}I(A_{t},...,A_{t+n-1};S_{t+n})} The unit of empowerment depends on the logarithm base. Base 2 is commonly used in which case the unit is bits. === Contextual Empowerment === In general the choice of action (action distribution) that maximises empowerment varies from state to state. Knowing the empowerment of an agent in a specific state is useful, for example to construct an empowerment maximising policy. State-specific empowerment can be found using the more general formalism for 'contextual empowerment'. C {\displaystyle C} is a random variable describing the context (e.g. state). E ( A t n ⟶ S t + n ∣ C ) = ∑ c ∈ C p ( c ) E ( A t n ⟶ S t + n ∣ C = c ) {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {E}}(A_{t}^{n}\longrightarrow S_{t+n}{\mid }C)=\sum _{c{\in }C}p(c){\mathfrak {E}}(A_{t}^{n}\longrightarrow S_{t+n}{\mid }C=c)} == Application == Empowerment maximisation can be used as a pseudo-utility function to enable agents to exhibit intelligent behaviour without requiring the definition of external goals, for example balancing a pole in a cart-pole balancing scenario where no indication of the task is provided to the agent. Empowerment has been applied in studies of collective behaviour and in continuous domains. As is the case with Bayesian methods in general, computation of empowerment becomes computationally expensive as the number of actions and time horizon extends, but approaches to improve efficiency have led to usage in real-time control. Empowerment has been used for intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning agents playing video games, and in the control of underwater vehicles.
Sayre's paradox
Sayre's paradox is a dilemma encountered in the design of automated handwriting recognition systems. A standard statement of the paradox is that a cursively written word cannot be recognized without being segmented and cannot be segmented without being recognized. The paradox was first articulated in a 1973 publication by Kenneth M. Sayre, after whom it was named. == Nature of the problem == It is relatively easy to design automated systems capable of recognizing words inscribed in a printed format. Such words are segmented into letters by the very act of writing them on the page. Given templates matching typical letter shapes in a given language, individual letters can be identified with a high degree of probability. In cases of ambiguity, probable letter sequences can be compared with a selection of properly spelled words in that language (called a lexicon). If necessary, syntactic features of the language can be applied to render a generally accurate identification of the words in question. Printed-character recognition systems of this sort are commonly used in processing standardized government forms, in sorting mail by zip code, and so forth. In cursive writing, however, letters comprising a given word typically flow sequentially without gaps between them. Unlike a sequence of printed letters, cursively connected letters are not segmented in advance. Here is where Sayre's Paradox comes into play. Unless the word is already segmented into letters, template-matching techniques like those described above cannot be applied. That is, segmentation is a prerequisite for word recognition. But there are no reliable techniques for segmenting a word into letters unless the word itself has been identified. Word recognition requires letter segmentation, and letter segmentation requires word recognition. There is no way a cursive writing recognition system employing standard template-matching techniques can do both simultaneously. Advantages to be gained by use of automated cursive writing recognition systems include routing mail with handwritten addresses, reading handwritten bank checks, and automated digitalization of hand-written documents. These are practical incentives for finding ways of circumventing Sayre's Paradox. == Avoiding the paradox == One way of ameliorating the adverse effects of the paradox is to normalize the word inscriptions to be recognized. Normalization amounts to eliminating idiosyncrasies in the penmanship of the writer, such as unusual slope of the letters and unusual slant of the cursive line. This procedure can increase the probability of a correct match with a letter template, resulting in an incremental improvement in the success rate of the system. Since improvement of this sort still depends on accurate segmentation, however, it remains subject to the limitations of Sayre's Paradox. Researchers have come to realize that the only way to circumvent the paradox is by use of procedures that do not rely on accurate segmentation. == Directions of current research == Segmentation is accurate to the extent that it matches distinctions among letters in the actual inscriptions presented to the system for recognition (the input data). This is sometimes referred to as “explicit segmentation”. “Implicit segmentation,” by contrast, is division of the cursive line into more parts than the number of actual letters in the cursive line itself. Processing these “implicit parts” to achieve eventual word identification requires specific statistical procedures involving hidden Markov models (HMM). A Markov model is a statistical representation of a random process, which is to say a process in which future states are independent of states occurring before the present. In such a process, a given state is dependent only on the conditional probability of its following the state immediately before it. An example is a series of outcomes from successive casts of a die. An HMM is a Markov model, individual states of which are not fully known. Conditional probabilities between states are still determinate, but the identities of individual states are not fully disclosed. Recognition proceeds by matching HMMs of words to be recognized with previously prepared HMMs of words in the lexicon. The best match in a given case is taken to indicate the identity of the handwritten word in question. As with systems based on explicit segmentation, automated recognition systems based on implicit segmentation are judged more or less successful according to the percentage of correct identifications they accomplish. Instead of explicit segmentation techniques, most automated handwriting recognition systems today employ implicit segmentation in conjunction with HMM-based matching procedures. The constraints epitomized by Sayre's Paradox are largely responsible for this shift in approach.
AI safety
AI safety is an interdisciplinary field focused on preventing accidents, misuse, or other harmful consequences arising from artificial intelligence systems. It encompasses AI alignment (which aims to ensure AI systems behave as intended), monitoring AI systems for risks, and enhancing their robustness. The field is particularly concerned with existential risks posed by advanced AI models. Beyond technical research, AI safety involves developing norms and policies that promote safety, including advocacy for regulations at different levels of government. The field gained significant popularity in 2023, with rapid progress in generative AI and public concerns voiced by researchers and CEOs about potential dangers. During the 2023 AI Safety Summit, the United States and the United Kingdom both established their own AI Safety Institute. However, researchers have expressed concern that AI safety measures are not keeping pace with the rapid development of AI capabilities. == Motivations == Scholars discuss current risks from critical systems failures, bias, and AI-enabled surveillance, as well as emerging risks like technological unemployment, digital manipulation, weaponization, AI-enabled cyberattacks and bioterrorism. They also discuss speculative risks from losing control of future artificial general intelligence (AGI) agents, or from AI enabling perpetually stable dictatorships. === Existential safety === Some have criticized concerns about AGI, such as Andrew Ng who compared them in 2015 to "worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet". Stuart J. Russell on the other side urges caution, arguing that "it is better to anticipate human ingenuity than to underestimate it". AI researchers have widely differing opinions about the severity and primary sources of risk posed by AI technology – though surveys suggest that experts take high consequence risks seriously. In two surveys of AI researchers, the median respondent was optimistic about AI overall, but placed a 5% probability on an "extremely bad (e.g. human extinction)" outcome of advanced AI. In a 2022 survey of the natural language processing community, 37% agreed or weakly agreed that it is plausible that AI decisions could lead to a catastrophe that is "at least as bad as an all-out nuclear war". == History == Risks from AI began to be seriously discussed at the start of the computer age: Moreover, if we move in the direction of making machines which learn and whose behavior is modified by experience, we must face the fact that every degree of independence we give the machine is a degree of possible defiance of our wishes. In 1988 Blay Whitby published a book outlining the need for AI to be developed along ethical and socially responsible lines. From 2008 to 2009, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) commissioned a study to explore and address potential long-term societal influences of AI research and development. The panel was generally skeptical of the radical views expressed by science-fiction authors but agreed that "additional research would be valuable on methods for understanding and verifying the range of behaviors of complex computational systems to minimize unexpected outcomes". In 2011, Roman Yampolskiy introduced the term "AI safety engineering" at the Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence conference, listing prior failures of AI systems and arguing that "the frequency and seriousness of such events will steadily increase as AIs become more capable". In 2014, philosopher Nick Bostrom published the book Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. He has the opinion that the rise of AGI has the potential to create various societal issues, ranging from the displacement of the workforce by AI, manipulation of political and military structures, to even the possibility of human extinction. His argument that future advanced systems may pose a threat to human existence prompted Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Stephen Hawking to voice similar concerns. In 2015, dozens of artificial intelligence experts signed an open letter on artificial intelligence calling for research on the societal impacts of AI and outlining concrete directions. To date, the letter has been signed by over 8000 people including Yann LeCun, Shane Legg, Yoshua Bengio, and Stuart Russell. In the same year, a group of academics led by professor Stuart J. Russell founded the Center for Human-Compatible AI at the University of California Berkeley and the Future of Life Institute awarded $6.5 million in grants for research aimed at "ensuring artificial intelligence (AI) remains safe, ethical and beneficial". In 2016, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and Carnegie Mellon University announced The Public Workshop on Safety and Control for Artificial Intelligence, which was one of a sequence of four White House workshops aimed at investigating "the advantages and drawbacks" of AI. In the same year, Concrete Problems in AI Safety – one of the first and most influential technical AI Safety agendas – was published. In 2017, the Future of Life Institute sponsored the Asilomar Conference on Beneficial AI, where more than 100 thought leaders formulated principles for beneficial AI including "Race Avoidance: Teams developing AI systems should actively cooperate to avoid corner-cutting on safety standards". In 2018, the DeepMind Safety team outlined AI safety problems in specification, robustness, and assurance. The following year, researchers organized a workshop at ICLR that focused on these problem areas. In 2021, Unsolved Problems in ML Safety was published, outlining research directions in robustness, monitoring, alignment, and systemic safety. In 2023, Rishi Sunak said he wants the United Kingdom to be the "geographical home of global AI safety regulation" and to host the first global summit on AI safety. The AI safety summit took place in November 2023, and focused on the risks of misuse and loss of control associated with frontier AI models. During the summit the intention to create the International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI was announced. In 2024, The US and UK forged a new partnership on the science of AI safety. The MoU was signed on 1 April 2024 by US commerce secretary Gina Raimondo and UK technology secretary Michelle Donelan to jointly develop advanced AI model testing, following commitments announced at an AI Safety Summit in Bletchley Park in November. In 2025, an international team of 96 experts chaired by Yoshua Bengio published the first International AI Safety Report. The report, commissioned by 30 nations and the United Nations, represents the first global scientific review of potential risks associated with advanced artificial intelligence. It details potential threats stemming from misuse, malfunction, and societal disruption, with the objective of informing policy through evidence-based findings, without providing specific recommendations. == Research focus == AI safety research areas include robustness, monitoring, and alignment. === Robustness === ==== Adversarial robustness ==== AI systems are often vulnerable to adversarial examples or "inputs to machine learning (ML) models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake". For example, in 2013, Szegedy et al. discovered that adding specific imperceptible perturbations to an image could cause it to be misclassified with high confidence. This continues to be an issue with neural networks, though in recent work the perturbations are generally large enough to be perceptible. The image on the right is predicted to be an ostrich after the perturbation is applied. (Left) is a correctly predicted sample, (center) perturbation applied magnified by 10x, (right) adversarial example. Adversarial robustness is often associated with security. Researchers demonstrated that an audio signal could be imperceptibly modified so that speech-to-text systems transcribe it to any message the attacker chooses. Network intrusion and malware detection systems also must be adversarially robust since attackers may design their attacks to fool detectors. Models that represent objectives (reward models) must also be adversarially robust. For example, a reward model might estimate how helpful a text response is and a language model might be trained to maximize this score. Researchers have shown that if a language model is trained for long enough, it will leverage the vulnerabilities of the reward model to achieve a better score and perform worse on the intended task. This issue can be addressed by improving the adversarial robustness of the reward model. More generally, any AI system used to evaluate another AI system must be adversarially robust. This could include monitoring tools, since they could also potentially be tampered with to produce a higher reward. Large language models (LLMs) can be vulnerable to prom