ESdat is a data management, analysis and reporting software for environmental and groundwater data, developed by EarthScience Information Systems (EScIS). It is used to manage many types of environmental data including laboratory chemistry (analytical results, QA data, lab sample planning, and electronic Chain of Custody), field chemistry (water, gas, and soil), hydrogeological data (groundwater, borehole and well construction, lithological, geotechnical and stratigraphic, and LNAPL), meteorological data (rain, wind, and temperature), emission data (dust deposition, HiVol, air quality, and noise) and logger data. Data can be compared against environmental standards or site-specific trigger levels to generate exceedence tables, time series graphs, maps, statistics, and other outputs. ESdat integrates with Power BI and ArcGIS and data can also be exported in a range of other database formats, including USEPA Regions 2,4 & 5, and NYS DEC. ESdat is used by environmental consultants, government, mining and industry for validation, interrogation, and reporting of data derived from complex environmental programs, such as contaminated sites, groundwater investigations, and regulatory compliance for landfills or mining operations.
DataScene
DataScene is a scientific graphing, animation, data analysis, and real-time data monitoring software package. It was developed with the Common Language Infrastructure technology and the GDI+ graphics library. With the two Common Language Runtime engines - the .Net and Mono frameworks - DataScene runs on all major operating systems. With DataScene, the user can plot 39 types 2D & 3D graphs (e.g., Area graph, Bar graph, Boxplot graph, Pie graph, Line graph, Histogram graph, Surface graph, Polar graph, Water Fall graph, etc.), manipulate, print, and export graphs to various formats (e.g., Bitmap, WMF/EMF, JPEG, PNG, GIF, TIFF, PostScript, and PDF), analyze data with different mathematical methods (fitting curves, calculating statics, FFT, etc.), create chart animations for presentations (e.g. with PowerPoint), classes, and web pages, and monitor and chart real-time data. == History == DataScene was first released (version 1.0) in March 2009 for the Windows platform and the .Net 2.0 framework. Since version 2.0, DataScene has been ported to the Mono framework 2.6 and all Linux and Unix/X11 operating systems. Cyberwit offers free licensing for the Express edition of DataScene.
Representational harm
Systems cause representational harm when they misrepresent a group of people in a negative manner. Representational harms include perpetuating harmful stereotypes about or minimizing the existence of a social group, such as a racial, ethnic, gender, or religious group. Machine learning algorithms often commit representational harm when they learn patterns from data that have algorithmic bias, and this has been shown to be the case with large language models. While preventing representational harm in models is essential to prevent harmful biases, researchers often lack precise definitions of representational harm and conflate it with allocative harm, an unequal distribution of resources among social groups, which is more widely studied and easier to measure. However, recognition of representational harms is growing and preventing them has become an active research area. Researchers have recently developed methods to effectively quantify representational harm in algorithms, making progress on preventing this harm in the future. == Types == Three prominent types of representational harm include stereotyping, denigration, and misrecognition. These subcategories present many dangers to individuals and groups. Stereotypes are oversimplified and usually undesirable representations of a specific group of people, usually by race and gender. This often leads to the denial of educational, employment, housing, and other opportunities. For example, the model minority stereotype of Asian Americans as highly intelligent and good at mathematics can be damaging professionally and academically. Representational harm happens when the representation of details teams improves damaging stereotypes, developing social exclusion and prejudice. This experience is particularly noticeable in the depiction of marginalised groups, containing people of color, women, LGBTQ+ people, and people with handicaps. Media depictions of these groups generally stop working to catch their array and intricacy. Instead, they are typically reduced to one-dimensional caricatures, which ultimately continue social prejudices. These organised depictions contribute to the help of hazardous stereotypes and the marginalisation of these locations. Denigration is the action of unfairly criticizing individuals. This frequently happens when the demeaning of social groups occurs. For example, when searching for "Black-sounding" names versus "white-sounding" ones, some retrieval systems bolster the false perception of criminality by displaying ads for bail-bonding businesses. A system may shift the representation of a group to be of lower social status, often resulting in a disregard from society. Research shows that hazardous depictions in the media can have substantial emotional and social impacts on both individuals and areas. Lawrence Bobo examined the issue of Ethnic stereotype in film, tv, and marketing. African Americans are commonly received duties specified by features such as "violent tendencies," "laziness," or being "merely for contentment features." While these representations might appear varied externally, they stay to boost underlying frameworks of white prominence and racial inequality. As a circumstances, Black individuals are frequently represented as law offenders or in secondary roles, which adds to the support of Ethnic stereotype and Institutional racism. Misrecognition, or incorrect recognition, can display in many forms, including, but not limited to, erasing and alienating social groups, and denying people the right to self-identify. Erasing and alienating social groups involves the unequal visibility of certain social groups; specifically, systematic ineligibility in algorithmic systems perpetuates inequality by contributing to the underrepresentation of social groups. Not allowing people to self-identify is closely related as people's identities can be 'erased' or 'alienated' in these algorithms. Misrecognition causes more than surface-level harm to individuals: psychological harm, social isolation, and emotional insecurity can emerge from this subcategory of representational harm. == Quantification == As the dangers of representational harm have become better understood, some researchers have developed methods to measure representational harm in algorithms. Modeling stereotyping is one way to identify representational harm. Representational stereotyping can be quantified by comparing the predicted outcomes for one social group with the ground-truth outcomes for that group observed in real data. For example, if individuals from group A achieve an outcome with a probability of 60%, stereotyping would be observed if it predicted individuals to achieve that outcome with a probability greater than 60%. The group modeled stereotyping in the context of classification, regression, and clustering problems, and developed a set of rules to quantitatively determine if the model predictions exhibit stereotyping in each of these cases. Other attempts to measure representational harms have focused on applications of algorithms in specific domains such as image captioning, the act of an algorithm generating a short description of an image. In a study on image captioning, researchers measured five types of representational harm. To quantify stereotyping, they measured the number of incorrect words included in the model-generated image caption when compared to a gold-standard caption. They manually reviewed each of the incorrectly included words, determining whether the incorrect word reflected a stereotype associated with the image or whether it was an unrelated error, which allowed them to have a proxy measure of the amount of stereotyping occurring in this caption generation. These researchers also attempted to measure demeaning representational harm. To measure this, they analyzed the frequency with which humans in the image were mentioned in the generated caption. It was hypothesized that if the individuals were not mentioned in the caption, then this was a form of dehumanization. == Examples == One of the most notorious examples of representational harm was committed by Google in 2015 when an algorithm in Google Photos classified Black people as gorillas. Developers at Google said that the problem was caused because there were not enough faces of Black people in the training dataset for the algorithm to learn the difference between Black people and gorillas. Google issued an apology and fixed the issue by blocking its algorithms from classifying anything as a primate. In 2023, Google's photos algorithm was still blocked from identifying gorillas in photos. Another prevalent example of representational harm is the possibility of stereotypes being encoded in word embeddings, which are trained using a wide range of text. These word embeddings are the representation of a word as an array of numbers in vector space, which allows an individual to calculate the relationships and similarities between words. However, recent studies have shown that these word embeddings may commonly encode harmful stereotypes, such as the common example that the phrase "computer programmer" is oftentimes more closely related to "man" than it is to "women" in vector space. This could be interpreted as a misrepresentation of computer programming as a profession that is better performed by men, which would be an example of representational harm. == Addressing representational harm == Initiatives to minimise representational harm include advertising for even more inclusive and accurate portrayals of marginalised teams in the media. Scholars and protestors recommend that the method to reducing representational injury depends on raising the selection of voices both behind and before the digital video camera. When marginalized groups are provided the chance to represent themselves, they can check traditional stereotypes and present their experiences additional authentically. Over the last few years, efforts to increase representation of people of color, women, and LGBTQ+ people in conventional media have made some progression. Films such as Selma, routed by Ava DuVernay, and tv series like Pose, developed by Ryan Murphy, have actually been extensively applauded for their nuanced and respectful representations of marginalised communities. These tasks existing complex individualities and stories that move past streamlined stereotypes. Self-representation is one more crucial method to addressing representational harm. By equipping marginalised locations to create their really own tales, media designers can effectively reduce the perpetuation of hazardous stereotypes. This procedure consists of both the manufacturing of media product by participants of these communities and proactively difficult typical media structures that have actually historically omitted them.
Historical Thesaurus of English
The Historical Thesaurus of English (HTE) is the largest thesaurus in the world. It is called a historical thesaurus as it arranges the whole vocabulary of English, from the earliest written records in Old English to the present, according to the first documented occurrence of a word in the entire history of the English language. The HTE was conceived and begun in 1965 by the English Language & Linguistics department of the University of Glasgow, who have ever since continued to compile the thesaurus. From the 1980s onwards the project was moved from paper-based records to a computer database. Today, the HTE is available to the public online, but a print version, the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary (HTOED), was published in 2009. == Main project: The Historical Thesaurus of English (HTE) == The Historical Thesaurus of English (HTE) is a complete database of all the words in the Oxford English Dictionary and other dictionaries (including Old English), arranged by semantic field and date. In this way, the HTE arranges the whole vocabulary of English, from the earliest written records in Old English to the present, alongside dates of use. It is the first historical thesaurus to be compiled for any of the world's languages and contains 800,000 meanings for 600,000 words, within 230,000 categories. As the HTE website states, "in addition to providing hitherto unavailable information for linguistic and textual scholars, the Historical Thesaurus online is a rich resource for students of social and cultural history, showing how concepts developed through the words that refer to them." === Structure === The work is divided into three main sections: the External World, the Mind, and Society. These are broken down into successively narrower domains. The text eventually discriminates more than 236,000 categories. The second order categories are: === History === The ambitious project was announced at a 1965 meeting of the Philological Society by its originator, Michael Samuels. Work on the HTE started in the same year. In 2017, the University of Glasgow was awarded the Queen's Anniversary Prize for Higher Education for the HTE. A second edition of the online HTE is currently in progress and is expected to be launched in late 2020. Work is released on the freely-available HTE website when available. == Print edition: Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary (HTOED) == On 22 October 2009, after 44 years of work, version 1.0 of the HTE was published by Oxford University Press in a two-volume slipcased set as the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary (HTOED). The two hardcover volumes together total nearly 4,500 pages.
Reification (knowledge representation)
Reification in knowledge representation is the process of turning a predicate or statement into an addressable object. Reification allows the representation of assertions so that they can be referred to or qualified by other assertions, i.e., meta-knowledge. The message "John is six feet tall" is an assertion involving truth that commits the speaker to its factuality, whereas the reified statement "Mary reports that John is six feet tall" defers such commitment to Mary. In this way, the statements can be incompatible without creating contradictions in reasoning. For example, the statements "John is six feet tall" and "John is five feet tall" are mutually exclusive (and thus incompatible), but the statements "Mary reports that John is six feet tall" and "Paul reports that John is five feet tall" are not incompatible, as they are both governed by a conclusive rationale that either Mary or Paul is (or both are), in fact, incorrect. In linguistics, reporting, telling, and saying are recognized as verbal processes that project a wording (or locution). If a person says that "Paul told x" and "Mary told y", this person stated only that the telling took place. In this case, the person who made these two statements did not represent a person inconsistently. In addition, if two people are talking to each other, let's say Paul and Mary, and Paul tells Mary "John is five feet tall" and Mary rejects Paul's statement by saying "No, he is actually six feet tall", the socially constructed model of John does not become inconsistent. The reason for that is that statements are to be understood as an attempt to convince the addressee of something (Austin's How to do things with words), alternatively as a request to add some attribute to the model of Paul. The response to a statement can be an acknowledgement, in which case the model is changed, or it can be a statement rejection, in which case the model does not get changed. Finally, the example above for which John is said to be "five feet tall" or "six feet tall" is only incompatible because John can only be a single number of feet tall. If the attribute were a possession as in "he has a dog" or "he also has a cat", a model inconsistency would not happen. In other words, the issue of model inconsistency has to do with our model of the domain element (John) and not with the ascription of different range elements (measurements such as "five feet tall" or "six feet tall").
Artificial consciousness
Artificial consciousness, also known as machine consciousness, synthetic consciousness, or digital consciousness, is consciousness hypothesized to be possible for artificial intelligence. It is also the corresponding field of study, which draws insights from philosophy of mind, philosophy of artificial intelligence, cognitive science and neuroscience. The term "sentience" can be used when specifically designating ethical considerations stemming from a form of phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness, or the ability to feel qualia). Since sentience involves the ability to experience ethically positive or negative (i.e., valenced) mental states, it may justify welfare concerns and legal protection, as with non-human animals. Some scholars believe that consciousness is generated by the interoperation of various parts of the brain; these mechanisms are labeled the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Some further believe that constructing a system (e.g., a computer system) that can emulate this NCC interoperation would result in a system that is conscious. Some scholars reject the possibility of non-biological conscious beings. == Philosophical views == As there are many hypothesized types of consciousness, there are many potential implementations of artificial consciousness. In the philosophical literature, perhaps the most common taxonomy of consciousness is into "access" and "phenomenal" variants. Access consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that can be apprehended, while phenomenal consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that seemingly cannot be apprehended, instead being characterized qualitatively in terms of "raw feels", "what it is like" or qualia. === Plausibility debate === Type-identity theorists and other skeptics hold the view that consciousness can be realized only in particular physical systems because consciousness has properties that necessarily depend on physical constitution. In his 2001 article "Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility," Giorgio Buttazzo says that a common objection to artificial consciousness is that, "Working in a fully automated mode, they [the computers] cannot exhibit creativity, unreprogrammation (which means can 'no longer be reprogrammed', from rethinking), emotions, or free will. A computer, like a washing machine, is a slave operated by its components." For other theorists (e.g., functionalists), who define mental states in terms of causal roles, any system that can instantiate the same pattern of causal roles, regardless of physical constitution, will instantiate the same mental states, including consciousness. ==== Thought experiments ==== David Chalmers proposed two thought experiments intending to demonstrate that "functionally isomorphic" systems (those with the same "fine-grained functional organization", i.e., the same information processing) will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences, regardless of whether they are based on biological neurons or digital hardware. The "fading qualia" is a reductio ad absurdum thought experiment. It involves replacing, one by one, the neurons of a brain with a functionally identical component, for example based on a silicon chip. Chalmers makes the hypothesis, knowing it in advance to be absurd, that "the qualia fade or disappear" when neurons are replaced one-by-one with identical silicon equivalents. Since the original neurons and their silicon counterparts are functionally identical, the brain's information processing should remain unchanged, and the subject's behaviour and introspective reports would stay exactly the same. Chalmers argues that this leads to an absurd conclusion: the subject would continue to report normal conscious experiences even as their actual qualia fade away. He concludes that the subject's qualia actually don't fade, and that the resulting robotic brain, once every neuron is replaced, would remain just as sentient as the original biological brain. Similarly, the "dancing qualia" thought experiment is another reductio ad absurdum argument. It supposes that two functionally isomorphic systems could have different perceptions (for instance, seeing the same object in different colors, like red and blue). It involves a switch that alternates between a chunk of brain that causes the perception of red, and a functionally isomorphic silicon chip, that causes the perception of blue. Since both perform the same function within the brain, the subject would not notice any change during the switch. Chalmers argues that this would be highly implausible if the qualia were truly switching between red and blue, hence the contradiction. Therefore, he concludes that the equivalent digital system would not only experience qualia, but it would perceive the same qualia as the biological system (e.g., seeing the same color). Greg Egan's short story Learning To Be Me (mentioned in §In fiction), illustrates how undetectable duplication of the brain and its functionality could be from a first-person perspective. Critics object that Chalmers' proposal begs the question in assuming that all mental properties and external connections are already sufficiently captured by abstract causal organization. Van Heuveln et al. argue that the dancing qualia argument contains an equivocation fallacy, conflating a "change in experience" between two systems with an "experience of change" within a single system. Mogensen argues that the fading qualia argument can be resisted by appealing to vagueness at the boundaries of consciousness and the holistic structure of conscious neural activity, which suggests consciousness may require specific biological substrates rather than being substrate-independent. Anil Seth argues that the complexity of brain neurons intrinsically matters in addition to their function and that it is not possible to replace any part of the brain with a perfect silicon equivalent. He points out that some of biological neurons exhibit activity aimed at cleaning up metabolic waste products, and writes that a perfect silicon replacement would require a silicon-based metabolism, but silicon is not suitable for creating such artificial metabolism. ==== In large language models ==== In 2022, Google engineer Blake Lemoine made a viral claim that Google's LaMDA chatbot was sentient. Lemoine supplied as evidence the chatbot's humanlike answers to many of his questions; however, the chatbot's behavior was judged by the scientific community as likely a consequence of mimicry, rather than machine sentience. Lemoine's claim was widely derided for being ridiculous. Moreover, attributing consciousness based solely on the basis of LLM outputs or the immersive experience created by an algorithm is considered a fallacy. However, while philosopher Nick Bostrom states that LaMDA is unlikely to be conscious, he additionally poses the question of "what grounds would a person have for being sure about it?" One would have to have access to unpublished information about LaMDA's architecture, and also would have to understand how consciousness works, and then figure out how to map the philosophy onto the machine: "(In the absence of these steps), it seems like one should be maybe a little bit uncertain. [...] there could well be other systems now, or in the relatively near future, that would start to satisfy the criteria." David Chalmers argued in 2023 that LLMs today display impressive conversational and general intelligence abilities, but are likely not conscious yet, as they lack some features that may be necessary, such as recurrent processing, a global workspace, and unified agency. Nonetheless, he considers that non-biological systems can be conscious, and suggested that future, extended models (LLM+s) incorporating these elements might eventually meet the criteria for consciousness, raising both profound scientific questions and significant ethical challenges. However, the view that consciousness can exist without biological phenomena is controversial and some reject it. Kristina Šekrst cautions that anthropomorphic terms such as "hallucination" can obscure important ontological differences between artificial and human cognition. While LLMs may produce human-like outputs, she argues that it does not justify ascribing mental states or consciousness to them. Instead, she advocates for an epistemological framework (such as reliabilism) that recognizes the distinct nature of AI knowledge production. She suggests that apparent understanding in LLMs may be a sophisticated form of AI hallucination. She also questions what would happen if an LLM were trained without any mention of consciousness. === Testing === Sentience is an inherently first-person phenomenon. Because of that, and due to the lack of an empirical definition of sentience, directly measuring it may be impossible. Although systems may display numerous behaviors correlated with sentience, determining whether a system is sentient is known as the hard pr
PauseAI
PauseAI is a global political movement founded in the Netherlands with the stated aim of achieving global coordination to stop the development of more powerful general artificial intelligence systems, at least until it is known how to build them safely, and keep them under democratic control. The movement was established in Utrecht in May 2023 by software entrepreneur Joep Meindertsma. == Proposal == PauseAI's stated goal is to "implement a temporary pause on the training of the most powerful general AI systems". Their website lists some proposed steps to achieve this goal: Set up an international AI safety agency, similar to the IAEA. Only allow training of general AI systems if their safety can be guaranteed. Only allow deployment of models after no dangerous capabilities are present. == Background == During the late 2010s and early 2020s, a rapid improvement in the capabilities of artificial intelligence models known as the AI boom was underway, which included the release of large language model GPT-3, its more powerful successor GPT-4, and image generation models Midjourney and DALL-E. This led to an increased concern about the risks of advanced AI, causing the Future of Life Institute to release an open letter calling for "all AI labs to immediately pause for at least six months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4". The letter was signed by thousands of AI researchers and industry CEOs such as Yoshua Bengio, Stuart Russell, and Elon Musk. == History == Founder Joep Meindertsma first became worried about the existential risk from artificial intelligence after reading philosopher Nick Bostrom's 2014 book Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. He founded PauseAI in May 2023, putting his job as the CEO of a software firm on hold. Meindertsma claimed the rate of progress in AI alignment research is lagging behind the progress in AI capabilities, and said "there is a chance that we are facing extinction in a short frame of time". As such, he felt an urge to organise people to act. PauseAI's first public action was to protest in front of Microsoft's Brussels lobbying office in May 2023 during an event on artificial intelligence. In November of the same year, they protested outside the inaugural AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park. The Bletchley Declaration that was signed at the summit, which acknowledged the potential for catastrophic risks stemming from AI, was perceived by Meindertsma to be a small first step. But, he argued "binding international treaties" are needed. He mentioned the Montreal Protocol and treaties banning blinding laser weapons as examples of previous successful global agreements. In February 2024, members of PauseAI gathered outside OpenAI's headquarters in San Francisco, in part due to OpenAI changing its usage policy that prohibited the use of its models for military purposes. On 13 May 2024, protests were held across thirteen countries before the AI Seoul Summit, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Germany, Australia, and Norway. Meindertserma said that those attending the summit "need to realize that they are the only ones who have the power to stop this race". Protesters in San Francisco held signs reading "When in doubt, pause", and "Quit your job at OpenAI. Trust your conscience". Jan Leike, head of the "superalignment" team at OpenAI, resigned two days later due to his belief that "safety culture and processes [had] taken a backseat to shiny products".