AI Generator Sora

AI Generator Sora — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

  • Blanking (video)

    Blanking (video)

    In analog video, blanking occurs between horizontal lines and between frames. In raster scan equipment, an image is built up by scanning an electron beam from left to right across a screen to produce a visible trace of one scan line, reducing the brightness of the beam to zero (horizontal blanking), moving it back as fast as possible to the left of the screen at a slightly lower position (the next scan line), restoring the brightness, and continuing until all the lines have been displayed and the beam is at the bottom right of the screen. Its intensity is then reduced to zero again (vertical blanking), and it is rapidly moved to the top left to start again, creating the next frame. In television, in particular, the vertical blanking interval is long to accommodate the slow equipment available at the time the standard was set. Fast modern electronics allows digital information to be encoded into the signal during the vertical blanking interval; it is not displayed on screen as the beam is blanked, but can be processed by appropriate circuitry.

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  • Social media newsroom

    Social media newsroom

    A social media newsroom is a company resource, set up to increase the functionality and usability of the traditional online newsroom. Social media newsrooms (SMNs) are intended to encourage dialogue and information sharing. Unlike online newsrooms, content is accessible to more than just journalists, but to all those with whom the company engages such as bloggers, their prospects, customers, business partners and investors. It gives these stakeholders access to news, public relations announcements, images, audio, video and other multimedia files. In addition to posting press releases and corporate news, companies can integrate other social content from sites such as YouTube, Flickr and Slideshow as well as streams from corporate Twitter accounts. Traditional tools for journalists such as corporate fast facts, leadership information, a multimedia library, financial information, awards and other recent media coverage are also included in an SMN. Examples of companies effectively using social media newsrooms include Opel Group, Pressat, First Direct, MyNewsdesk, Scania and Newport Beach.

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  • Social Media Working Group Act of 2014

    Social Media Working Group Act of 2014

    The Social Media Working Group Act of 2014 (H.R. 4263) is a bill that would direct the United States Secretary of Homeland Security to establish within the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a social media working group (the Group) to provide guidance and best practices to the emergency preparedness and response community on the use of social media technologies before, during, and after a terrorist attack. The bill was introduced into the United States House of Representatives during the 113th United States Congress. == Background == === Social media === Social media is the social interaction among people in which they create, share or exchange information and ideas in virtual communities and networks. Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein define social media as "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content." Furthermore, social media depend on mobile and web-based technologies to create highly interactive platforms through which individuals and communities share, co-create, discuss, and modify user-generated content. They introduce substantial and pervasive changes to communication between organizations, communities, and individuals. Social media differ from traditional or industrial media in many ways, including quality, reach, frequency, usability, immediacy, and permanence. === Virtual Social Media Working Group === First responders have increasingly used social media in emergency response and recovery operations. Social media tools are used to connect with citizens after a disaster and share information. The Virtual Social Media Working group (VSMWG) is an online platform that gives advice to first responders on how to safely and effectively use social media in emergency response operations. The working group is made up of subject matter experts from across the U.S. It was created by DHS in December 2010 and gives first responders guidance and best practices regarding the use of social media during emergencies. The DHS S&T and the VSMWG work with local and state governments, academics and nonprofits. Meetings of the VSMWG are chaired by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology. == Provisions of the bill == This summary is based largely on the summary provided by the Congressional Research Service, a public domain source. The Social Media Working Group Act of 2014 would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to direct the United States Secretary of Homeland Security to establish within the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a social media working group (the Group) to provide guidance and best practices to the emergency preparedness and response community on the use of social media technologies before, during, and after a terrorist attack. The bill would require the Group to submit an annual report that includes: (1) a review of current and emerging social media technologies being used to support preparedness and response activities related to terrorist attacks, of best practices and lessons learned on the use of social media during the response to terrorist attacks that occurred during the period covered by the report, and of available training for government officials on the use of social media in response to a terrorist attack; (2) recommendations to improve DHS's use of social media and to improve information sharing among DHS and its components and among state and local governments; and (3) a summary of coordination efforts with the private sector to discuss and resolve legal, operational, technical, privacy, and security concerns. == Congressional Budget Office report == This summary is based largely on the summary provided by the Congressional Budget Office, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security on June 11, 2014. This is a public domain source. H.R. 4263 would direct the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a working group to provide guidance and best practices on the use of social media technologies, specifically during a terrorist attack or other emergency. The group would prepare guidance for the emergency preparedness and response community. The bill would define the membership of the working group, which would include more than 20 experts from federal, state, local, and tribal governments along with nongovernmental organizations. The working group would be exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act and would be authorized to hold virtual meetings to fulfill the requirement to meet twice a year. The working group would be required to submit an annual report on emerging trends and best practices for emergency response through social media. Based on the cost of similar activities carried out under the DHS Acquisition and Accountability Efficiency Act and the Critical Infrastructure Research and Development Advancement Act of 2013, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the new DHS responsibilities and the annual report required by H.R. 4263 would cost a total of less than $500,000 annually, assuming the availability of appropriated funds. Enacting the legislation would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. H.R. 4263 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. == Procedural history == The Social Media Working Group Act of 2014 was introduced into the United States House of Representatives on March 14, 2014, by Rep. Susan W. Brooks (R, IN-5). It was referred to the United States House Committee on Homeland Security and the United States House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. On June 19, 2014, it was reported (amended) alongside House Report 113-480. On July 8, 2014, the House voted in Roll Call Vote 369 to pass the bill 375–19. == Debate and discussion == Nate Elliott, a social media expert at Forrester Research, explains that "the hope is when government or another authority tweets something, people will share it for them," but that this often doesn't happen. This problem, that "messages wash away very quickly," is the reason that the federal government is trying to formulate a better social media strategy. Rep. Steven Palazzo (R-MS), who co-sponsored the bill, stated that "social media has played a crucial role in emergency preparedness and response in Mississippi, including during disasters like Hurricane Isaac and the tornadoes that hit the Hattiesburg area a little over a year ago." He said that their goal with the bill was to "build upon existing public-private partnerships and use social media in a more strategic way in order to help save lives and property."

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  • Software token

    Software token

    A software token (a.k.a. soft token) is a piece of a two-factor authentication security device that may be used to authorize the use of computer services. Software tokens are stored on a general-purpose electronic device such as a desktop computer, laptop, PDA, or mobile phone and can be duplicated. (Contrast hardware tokens, where the credentials are stored on a dedicated hardware device and therefore cannot be duplicated — absent physical invasion of the device) Because software tokens are something one does not physically possess, they are exposed to unique threats based on duplication of the underlying cryptographic material - for example, computer viruses and software attacks. Both hardware and software tokens are vulnerable to bot-based man-in-the-middle attacks, or to simple phishing attacks in which the one-time password provided by the token is solicited, and then supplied to the genuine website in a timely manner. Software tokens do have benefits: there is no physical token to carry, they do not contain batteries that will run out, and they are cheaper than hardware tokens. == Security architecture == There are two primary architectures for software tokens: shared secret and public-key cryptography. For a shared secret, an administrator will typically generate a configuration file for each end-user. The file will contain a username, a personal identification number, and the secret. This configuration file is given to the user. The shared secret architecture is potentially vulnerable in a number of areas. The configuration file can be compromised if it is stolen and the token is copied. With time-based software tokens, it is possible to borrow an individual's PDA or laptop, set the clock forward, and generate codes that will be valid in the future. Any software token that uses shared secrets and stores the PIN alongside the shared secret in a software client can be stolen and subjected to offline attacks. Shared secret tokens can be difficult to distribute, since each token is essentially a different piece of software. Each user must receive a copy of the secret, which can create time constraints. Some newer software tokens rely on public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography. This architecture eliminates some of the traditional weaknesses of software tokens, but does not affect their primary weakness (ability to duplicate). A PIN can be stored on a remote authentication server instead of with the token client, making a stolen software token no good unless the PIN is known as well. However, in the case of a virus infection, the cryptographic material can be duplicated and then the PIN can be captured (via keylogging or similar) the next time the user authenticates. If there are attempts made to guess the PIN, it can be detected and logged on the authentication server, which can disable the token. Using asymmetric cryptography also simplifies implementation, since the token client can generate its own key pair and exchange public keys with the server.

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  • Immuni

    Immuni

    Immuni was an open-source COVID-19 contact tracing app used for digital contact tracing in Italy, dismissed on 31 December 2022, after a long and debated criticism for having been a failure due to the lack of trust placed by citizens. Immuni COVID-19 contact-tracing app had in fact been downloaded only by 12% of Italians between 14 and 75 years old (the government had previously stated that, in order for the app to work properly, it should have been downloaded by at least 60% of Italians). It makes use of the Apple/Google Exposure Notification system. == Development == It was developed by Bending Spoons and released by the Italian Ministry of Health on 1 June 2020. After a testing phase in 4 Italian regions (Abruzzo, Apulia, Liguria, Marche), the app started being active in the whole country on 15 June 2020. The app was initially released on App Store and Google Play, and since 1 February 2021 it is available on the Huawei AppGallery as well. === Source code === The source code was published on GitHub on the 25 May. The app only works in Italy, but compatibility with other European contact tracing apps was a goal. Since 19 October 2020 the app supports key-exchanges with the EU Interoperability Gateway and is therefore able to communicate with contact tracing apps of other EU countries. == Shutdown == As of 16 December 2020, the app was downloaded more than 10 million times, a number which increased to 21.882.502 downloads the day before the app's shutdown. On 27 December 2022 the Italian Ministry of Health announced that the app and its infrastructures will be dismissed on the 31 December of the same year.

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  • NYSERNet

    NYSERNet

    NYSERNet, Inc. (New York State Education and Research Network), is a non-profit Internet service provider in New York State. It mainly provides Internet access to universities, colleges, museums, health care facilities, primary and secondary schools, and research institutions. == History == NYSERNet was founded in 1986 in Troy, New York. Its founders compared NYSERNet's network with the Erie Canal and considered it the next step in two centuries to draw the country together. NYSERNet's network reaches from Buffalo to New York City. Completed in 1987, it was the first statewide regional IP network in the United States.[1] Initial speed of 56 kbps was upgraded to T1 in 1989 and T3 in 1994. It was the original assignee of AS174 according to RFC1117. This ASN is used today by Cogent Communications for their global network.

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  • Cryptographic Module Testing Laboratory

    Cryptographic Module Testing Laboratory

    Cryptographic Module Testing Laboratory (CMTL) is an information technology (IT) computer security testing laboratory that is accredited to conduct cryptographic module evaluations for conformance to the FIPS 140-2 U.S. Government standard. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredits CMTLs to meet Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) standards and procedures. This has been replaced by FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). == CMTL requirements == These laboratories must meet the following requirements: NIST Handbook 150, NVLAP Procedures and General Requirements NIST Handbook 150-17 Information Technology Security Testing - Cryptographic Module Testing NVLAP Specific Operations Checklist for Cryptographic Module Testing == FIPS 140-2 in relation to the Common Criteria == A CMTL can also be a Common Criteria (CC) Testing Laboratory (CCTL). The CC and FIPS 140-2 are different in the abstractness and focus of evaluation. FIPS 140-2 testing is against a defined cryptographic module and provides a suite of conformance tests to four FIPS 140 security levels. FIPS 140-2 describes the requirements for cryptographic modules and includes such areas as physical security, key management, self tests, roles and services, etc. The standard was initially developed in 1994 - prior to the development of the CC. The CC is an evaluation against a Protection Profile (PP), or security target (ST). Typically, a PP covers a broad range of products. A CC evaluation does not supersede or replace a validation to either FIPS 140-1, FIPS140-2 or FIPS 140-3. The four security levels in FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 do not map directly to specific CC EALs or to CC functional requirements. A CC certificate cannot be a substitute for a FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2 certificate. If the operational environment is a modifiable operational environment, the operating system requirements of the Common Criteria are applicable at FIPS Security Levels 2 and above. FIPS 140-1 required evaluated operating systems that referenced the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) classes C2, B1 and B2. However, TCSEC is no longer in use and has been replaced by the Common Criteria. Consequently, FIPS 140-2 now references the Common Criteria. FIPS 140-2 or FIPS 140-3 validation efforts can be in some parts reused in Common Criteria evaluations, specifically in areas related to entropy source and cryptographic algorithms.

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  • Codebook

    Codebook

    A codebook is a type of document used for gathering and storing cryptography codes. Originally, codebooks were often literally books, but today "codebook" is a byword for the complete record of a series of codes, regardless of physical format. == Cryptography == In cryptography, a codebook is a document used for implementing a code. A codebook contains a lookup table for coding and decoding; each word or phrase has one or more strings which replace it. To decipher messages written in code, corresponding copies of the codebook must be available at either end. The distribution and physical security of codebooks presents a special difficulty in the use of codes compared to the secret information used in ciphers, the key, which is typically much shorter. The United States National Security Agency documents sometimes use codebook to refer to block ciphers; compare their use of combiner-type algorithm to refer to stream ciphers. Codebooks come in two forms, one-part or two-part: In one-part codes, the plaintext words and phrases and the corresponding code words are in the same alphabetical order. They are organized similar to a standard dictionary. Such codes are half the size of two-part codes but are more vulnerable since an attacker who recovers some code word meanings can often infer the meaning of nearby code words. One-part codes may be used simply to shorten messages for transmission or have their security enhanced with superencryption methods, such as adding a secret number to numeric code words. In two-part codes, one part is for converting plaintext to ciphertext, the other for the opposite purpose. They are usually organized similarly to a language translation dictionary, with plaintext words (in the first part) and ciphertext words (in the second part) presented like dictionary headwords. The earliest known use of a codebook system was by Gabriele de Lavinde in 1379 working for the Antipope Clement VII. Two-part codebooks go back as least as far as Antoine Rossignol in the 1800s. From the 15th century until the middle of the 19th century, nomenclators (named after nomenclator) were the most used cryptographic method. Codebooks with superencryption were the most used cryptographic method of World War I. The JN-25 code used in World War II used a codebook of 30,000 code groups superencrypted with 30,000 random additives. The book used in a book cipher or the book used in a running key cipher can be any book shared by sender and receiver and is different from a cryptographic codebook. == Social sciences == In social sciences, a codebook is a document containing a list of the codes used in a set of data to refer to variables and their values, for example locations, occupations, or clinical diagnoses. == Data compression == Codebooks were also used in 19th- and 20th-century commercial codes for the non-cryptographic purpose of data compression. Codebooks are used in relation to precoding and beamforming in mobile networks such as 5G and LTE. The usage is standardized by 3GPP, for example in the document TS 38.331, NR; Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification.

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  • Data item

    Data item

    A data item describes an atomic state of a particular object concerning a specific property at a certain time point. A collection of data items for the same object at the same time forms an object instance (or table row). Any type of complex information can be broken down to elementary data items (atomic state). Data items are identified by object (o), property (p) and time (t), while the value (v) is a function of o, p and t: v = F(o,p,t). Values typically are represented by symbols like numbers, texts, images, sounds or videos. Values are not necessarily atomic. A value's complexity depends on the complexity of the property and time component. When looking at databases or XML files, the object is usually identified by an object name or other type of object identifier, which is part of the "data". Properties are defined as columns (table row), properties (object instance) or tags (XML). Often, time is not explicitly expressed and is an attribute applying to the complete data set. Other data collections provide time on the instance level (time series), column level, or even attribute/property level.

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  • Harvest now, decrypt later

    Harvest now, decrypt later

    Harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) is a surveillance strategy that relies on the acquisition and long-term storage of currently unreadable encrypted data awaiting possible breakthroughs in decryption technology that would render it readable in the future—a hypothetical date referred to as Y2Q (a reference to Y2K), or Q-Day. The most common concern is the prospect of developments in quantum computing which would allow current strong encryption algorithms to be broken at some time in the future, making it possible to decrypt any stored material that had been encrypted using those algorithms. However, the improvement in decryption technology need not be due to a quantum-cryptographic advance; any other form of attack capable of enabling decryption would be sufficient. The existence of this strategy has led to concerns about the need to urgently deploy post-quantum cryptography; even though no practical quantum attacks yet exist, some data stored now may still remain sensitive even decades into the future. As of 2022, the U.S. federal government has proposed a roadmap for organizations to start migrating toward quantum-cryptography-resistant algorithms to mitigate these threats. This new version of Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite uses publicly-available algorithms and is allowed for government use up to the TOP SECRET level. == Terminology and scope == The term “harvest now, decrypt later” encompasses various surveillance or espionage operations in which ciphertext or encrypted communications are collected today with the view that they may one day be decrypted, given sufficient advances in computing power or cryptanalysis. The abbreviation HNDL is sometimes used in technical and policy documents. The “Y2Q” (or “Q-Day”) label draws an analogy to the Y2K date-change issue, emphasising a potential future point at which current cryptography may collapse. The strategy is particularly relevant for data with long confidentiality lifetimes, such as diplomatic communications, personal health records, critical infrastructure logs, or intellectual property. == Mitigation strategies == The primary defense against HNDL attacks is the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which utilizes algorithms believed to be secure against quantum computer attacks. However, because PQC protects the data payload digitally, rather than the transmission itself, the encrypted data can still be harvested and stored. A complementary approach involves physical layer security (also known as optical layer encryption or photonic shielding). Unlike algorithmic encryption, this method modifies the optical waveform itself—often by burying the signal within optical noise or using spectral phase encoding—to render the transmission unrecordable by standard receivers. By preventing the attacker from capturing a valid signal in the first place, this approach aims to eliminate the "harvest" phase of the threat. Commercial implementations of harvest-proof optical encryption have been developed by firms such as CyberRidge to secure long-haul fiber networks. Field trials have demonstrated 100 Gbps throughput over legacy DWDM networks using this method.

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  • Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act

    Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act

    Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act also known as California SB 976 is a law that was enacted in September 2024 that is meant to address problematic social media usage among minors. The law prohibitions minors to have "addictive feeds" unless they have verifiable parental consent, minor's notifications are also restricted between 12 am to 6 am and during school hours between 8 am and 3 pm it also well requires minors to have default privacies settings and have social media companies to publicly disclose certain metrics about their users. The law was set to take effect in two steps the first being the restrictions on social media feeds, notifications, disclosures from social media companies and default settings which would have taken effect on January 1, 2025, and the age verification provision which would have taken effect on January 1, 2027. However, has faced legal challenges since its enactment delaying its enactment. == Legal Challenges == In November 2024 NetChoice a trade association representing many of the biggest social media companies such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram sued the attorney general of California Rob Bonta hoping to get an injunction before the first set of the law's provisions would take effect in January of the next year. However, judge Edward Davila would only grant Netchoice's request as to the restrictions on notifications and public disclosures and would deny their request as to the rest of the law. The law was later fully enjoined temporarily by the District Court and Appellant Court pending appeal, and the case is now in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and is pending a decision. === Social media platforms challenges to law === In November 2025 Meta, Google and TikTok filed lawsuits against the law arguing it violates the first amendment.

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  • Trusted Computing

    Trusted Computing

    Trusted Computing (TC) is a technology developed and promoted by the Trusted Computing Group. The term is taken from the field of trusted systems and has a specialized meaning that is distinct from the field of confidential computing. With Trusted Computing, the computer will consistently behave in expected ways, and those behaviors will be enforced by computer hardware and software. Enforcing this behavior is achieved by loading the hardware with a unique encryption key that is inaccessible to the rest of the system and the owner. TC is controversial as the hardware is not only secured for its owner, but also against its owner, leading opponents of the technology like free software activist Richard Stallman to deride it as "treacherous computing", and certain scholarly articles to use scare quotes when referring to the technology. Trusted Computing proponents such as International Data Corporation, the Enterprise Strategy Group and Endpoint Technologies Associates state that the technology will make computers safer, less prone to viruses and malware, and thus more reliable from an end-user perspective. They also state that Trusted Computing will allow computers and servers to offer improved computer security over that which is currently available. Opponents often state that this technology will be used primarily to enforce digital rights management policies (imposed restrictions to the owner) and not to increase computer security. Chip manufacturers Intel and AMD, hardware manufacturers such as HP and Dell, and operating system providers such as Microsoft include Trusted Computing in their products if enabled. The U.S. Army requires that every new PC it purchases comes with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). As of July 3, 2007, so does virtually the entire United States Department of Defense. == Key concepts == Trusted Computing encompasses six key technology concepts, of which all are required for a fully Trusted system, that is, a system compliant to the TCG specifications: Endorsement key Secure input and output Memory curtaining / protected execution Sealed storage Remote attestation Trusted Third Party (TTP) === Endorsement key === The endorsement key is a 2048-bit RSA public and private key pair that is created randomly on the chip at manufacture time and cannot be changed. The private key never leaves the chip, while the public key is used for attestation and for encryption of sensitive data sent to the chip, as occurs during the TPM_TakeOwnership command. This key is used to allow the execution of secure transactions: every Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is required to be able to sign a random number (in order to allow the owner to show that he has a genuine trusted computer), using a particular protocol created by the Trusted Computing Group (the direct anonymous attestation protocol) in order to ensure its compliance of the TCG standard and to prove its identity; this makes it impossible for a software TPM emulator with an untrusted endorsement key (for example, a self-generated one) to start a secure transaction with a trusted entity. The TPM should be designed to make the extraction of this key by hardware analysis hard, but tamper resistance is not a strong requirement. === Memory curtaining === Memory curtaining extends common memory protection techniques to provide full isolation of sensitive areas of memory—for example, locations containing cryptographic keys. Even the operating system does not have full access to curtained memory. The exact implementation details are vendor specific. === Sealed storage === Sealed storage protects private information by binding it to platform configuration information including the software and hardware being used. This means the data can be released only to a particular combination of software and hardware. Sealed storage can be used for DRM enforcing. For example, users who keep a song on their computer that has not been licensed to be listened will not be able to play it. Currently, a user can locate the song, listen to it, and send it to someone else, play it in the software of their choice, or back it up (and in some cases, use circumvention software to decrypt it). Alternatively, the user may use software to modify the operating system's DRM routines to have it leak the song data once, say, a temporary license was acquired. Using sealed storage, the song is securely encrypted using a key bound to the trusted platform module so that only the unmodified and untampered music player on his or her computer can play it. In this DRM architecture, this might also prevent people from listening to the song after buying a new computer, or upgrading parts of their current one, except after explicit permission of the vendor of the song. === Remote attestation === Remote attestation allows changes to the user's computer to be detected by authorized parties. For example, software companies can identify unauthorized changes to software, including users modifying their software to circumvent commercial digital rights restrictions. It works by having the hardware generate a certificate stating what software is currently running. The computer can then present this certificate to a remote party to show that unaltered software is currently executing. Numerous remote attestation schemes have been proposed for various computer architectures, including Intel, RISC-V, and ARM. Remote attestation is usually combined with public-key encryption so that the information sent can only be read by the programs that requested the attestation, and not by an eavesdropper. To take the song example again, the user's music player software could send the song to other machines, but only if they could attest that they were running an authorized copy of the music player software. Combined with the other technologies, this provides a more restricted path for the music: encrypted I/O prevents the user from recording it as it is transmitted to the audio subsystem, memory locking prevents it from being dumped to regular disk files as it is being worked on, sealed storage curtails unauthorized access to it when saved to the hard drive, and remote attestation prevents unauthorized software from accessing the song even when it is used on other computers. To preserve the privacy of attestation responders, Direct Anonymous Attestation has been proposed as a solution, which uses a group signature scheme to prevent revealing the identity of individual signers. Proof of space (PoS) have been proposed to be used for malware detection, by determining whether the L1 cache of a processor is empty (e.g., has enough space to evaluate the PoSpace routine without cache misses) or contains a routine that resisted being evicted. === Trusted third party === == Known applications == The Microsoft products Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8 and Windows RT make use of a Trusted Platform Module to facilitate BitLocker Drive Encryption. Other known applications with runtime encryption and the use of secure enclaves include the Signal messenger and the e-prescription service ("E-Rezept") by the German government. == Possible applications == === Digital rights management === Trusted Computing would allow companies to create a digital rights management (DRM) system which would be very hard to circumvent, though not impossible. An example is downloading a music file. Sealed storage could be used to prevent the user from opening the file with an unauthorized player or computer. Remote attestation could be used to authorize play only by music players that enforce the record company's rules. The music would be played from curtained memory, which would prevent the user from making an unrestricted copy of the file while it is playing, and secure I/O would prevent capturing what is being sent to the sound system. Circumventing such a system would require either manipulation of the computer's hardware, capturing the analogue (and thus degraded) signal using a recording device or a microphone, or breaking the security of the system. New business models for use of software (services) over Internet may be boosted by the technology. By strengthening the DRM system, one could base a business model on renting programs for a specific time periods or "pay as you go" models. For instance, one could download a music file which could only be played a certain number of times before it becomes unusable, or the music file could be used only within a certain time period. === Preventing cheating in online games === Trusted Computing could be used to combat cheating in online games. Some players modify their game copy in order to gain unfair advantages in the game; remote attestation, secure I/O and memory curtaining could be used to determine that all players connected to a server were running an unmodified copy of the software. === Verification of remote computation for grid computing === Trusted Computing could be used to guarantee participants in a grid computing sys

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  • WIPO GREEN

    WIPO GREEN

    WIPO GREEN is a World Intellectual Property Organization program established in 2013 that supports global efforts to address climate change and food security through sharing of sustainable technology innovations. == WIPO GREEN database == The WIPO GREEN database is the foundation of the platform. The database is a free, solutions-oriented, global innovation catalog that connects needs for solving environmental or climate change problems with sustainable solutions from prototypes to marketable products available for sale, license, collaborations, knowledge transfer, joint ventures, or collaborations. Green technology innovators can promote their products, businesses, organizations, and governments looking for green technologies can explain their needs and seek collaboration with providers. As of July 2022, WIPO GREEN has over 120,000 technologies, needs and experts, more than 2000 users in 110 countries, and has recorded over 1000 connections made between technology providers and seekers. The database utilizes AI-assisted auto-matching, user uploads tracing and alerts, full-text search for solutions based on long need descriptions, and the Patent2Solution search function for finding commercial applications of a patent, which are some of the unique features of the database. Free registration is required for detailed record view and uploading. All technologies uploaded to the WIPO GREEN database remain the property of the rights holder. It is up to the rights holder and the collaborating parties to structure agreements in the manner they feel is most appropriate and effective. WIPO GREEN does not require that technologies or innovations uploaded to the database be patented or in the process of being patented. Therefore, technology providers can upload their technology while related patent applications are pending. Technology providers are encouraged to upload technology solutions on the WIPO GREEN database and connect with other users to explore partnerships, technology transfers, including funding and licensing opportunities. == Acceleration projects == Acceleration projects work with WIPO GREEN partners and local organizations to explore local challenges and green opportunities for particular environmental needs. These projects are organized annually in different countries or regions around and connect providers and seekers of green technologies. For example, the Latin America Acceleration Project explores innovative new technologies in the region and facilitates green technology exchange between providers and seekers in green opportunities in intensified crop rotation, soil re-carbonization, and forest management in Argentina; zero-till or conservation agriculture in Brazil; and wine production in Chile. In October 2021, a project in Indonesia on palm oil mill effluent (POME), a by-product of palm oil production that emits greenhouse gases and reportedly harms flora and fauna in local rivers, identified viable green solutions to turn the high organic content of POME wastewater into biogas and other environmentally friendly uses. Former projects took place in Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines around wastewater treatment, agriculture, and water technologies. == The Green Technology Book == In November 2022 at UNFCCC COP27, WIPO introduced its new Flagship publication the Green Technology Book. This digital-first publication aims to put innovation, technology and intellectual property at the forefront in the fight against climate change. The inaugural edition of this annual publication focused on available solutions for climate-change adaptation to reduce vulnerability as well as to increase resilience to the impacts of climate change. The book was created in cooperation with the Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN) and the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASTR). It features 200 adaptation technologies, which are also available in the WIPO GREEN database of innovative technologies and needs. == Partners Network == WIPO GREEN partners are public or private institutions that wish to collaborate to advance WIPO GREEN’s mission. The network is aimed at helping the implementation and diffusion of green technology innovations around the world. Partners include government institutions, intergovernmental organizations, academia, and businesses – from small and medium-sized enterprises to Fortune 500 companies. As of 2022, WIPO GREEN has a network of over 146 partner organizations involved in green technology.

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  • Key-agreement protocol

    Key-agreement protocol

    In cryptography, a key-agreement protocol is a protocol whereby two (or more) parties generate a cryptographic key as a function of information provided by each honest party so that no party can predetermine the resulting value. In particular, all honest participants influence the outcome. A key-agreement protocol is a specialisation of a key-exchange protocol. At the completion of the protocol, all parties share the same key. A key-agreement protocol precludes undesired third parties from forcing a key choice on the agreeing parties. A secure key agreement can ensure confidentiality and data integrity in communications systems, ranging from simple messaging applications to complex banking transactions. Secure agreement is defined relative to a security model, for example the Universal Model. More generally, when evaluating protocols, it is important to state security goals and the security model. For example, it may be required for the session key to be authenticated. A protocol can be evaluated for success only in the context of its goals and attack model. An example of an adversarial model is the Dolev–Yao model. In many key exchange systems, one party generates the key, and sends that key to the other party; the other party has no influence on the key. == Exponential key exchange == The first publicly known public-key agreement protocol that meets the above criteria was the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, in which two parties jointly exponentiate a generator with random numbers, in such a way that an eavesdropper cannot feasibly determine what the resultant shared key is. Exponential key agreement in and of itself does not specify any prior agreement or subsequent authentication between the participants. It has thus been described as an anonymous key agreement protocol. == Symmetric key agreement == Symmetric key agreement (SKA) is a method of key agreement that uses solely symmetric cryptography and cryptographic hash functions as cryptographic primitives. It is related to symmetric authenticated key exchange. SKA may assume the use of initial shared secrets or a trusted third party with whom the agreeing parties share a secret is assumed. If no third party is present, then achieving SKA can be trivial: we tautologically assume that two parties that share an initial secret and have achieved SKA. SKA contrasts with key-agreement protocols that include techniques from asymmetric cryptography, such as key encapsulation mechanisms. The initial exchange of a shared key must be done in a manner that is private and integrity-assured. Historically, this was achieved by physical means, such as by using a trusted courier. An example of a SKA protocol is the Needham–Schroeder protocol. It establishes a session key between two parties on the same network, using a server as a trusted third party. The original Needham–Schroeder protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Timestamps and nonces are included to fix this attack. It forms the basis for the Kerberos protocol. === Types of key agreement === Boyd et al. classify two-party key agreement protocols according to two criteria as follows: whether a pre-shared key already exists or not the method of generating the session key. The pre-shared key may be shared between the two parties, or each party may share a key with a trusted third party. If there is no secure channel (as may be established via a pre-shared key), it is impossible to create an authenticated session key. The session key may be generated via: key transport, key agreement and hybrid. If there is no trusted third party, then the cases of key transport and hybrid session key generation are indistinguishable. SKA is concerned with protocols in which the session key is established using only symmetric primitives. == Authentication == Anonymous key exchange, like Diffie–Hellman, does not provide authentication of the parties, and is thus vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. A wide variety of cryptographic authentication schemes and protocols have been developed to provide authenticated key agreement to prevent man-in-the-middle and related attacks. These methods generally mathematically bind the agreed key to other agreed-upon data, such as the following: public–private key pairs shared secret keys passwords === Public keys === A widely used mechanism for defeating such attacks is the use of digitally signed keys that must be integrity-assured: if Bob's key is signed by a trusted third party vouching for his identity, Alice can have considerable confidence that a signed key she receives is not an attempt to intercept by Eve. When Alice and Bob have a public-key infrastructure, they may digitally sign an agreed Diffie–Hellman key, or exchanged Diffie–Hellman public keys. Such signed keys, sometimes signed by a certificate authority, are one of the primary mechanisms used for secure web traffic (including HTTPS, SSL or TLS protocols). Other specific examples are MQV, YAK and the ISAKMP component of the IPsec protocol suite for securing Internet Protocol communications. However, these systems require care in endorsing the match between identity information and public keys by certificate authorities in order to work properly. === Hybrid systems === Hybrid systems use public-key cryptography to exchange secret keys, which are then used in a symmetric-key cryptography systems. Most practical applications of cryptography use a combination of cryptographic functions to implement an overall system that provides all of the four desirable features of secure communications (confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation). === Passwords === Password-authenticated key agreement protocols require the separate establishment of a password (which may be smaller than a key) in a manner that is both private and integrity-assured. These are designed to resist man-in-the-middle and other active attacks on the password and the established keys. For example, DH-EKE, SPEKE, and SRP are password-authenticated variations of Diffie–Hellman. === Other tricks === If one has an integrity-assured way to verify a shared key over a public channel, one may engage in a Diffie–Hellman key exchange to derive a short-term shared key, and then subsequently authenticate that the keys match. One way is to use a voice-authenticated read-out of the key, as in PGPfone. Voice authentication, however, presumes that it is infeasible for a man-in-the-middle to spoof one participant's voice to the other in real-time, which may be an undesirable assumption. Such protocols may be designed to work with even a small public value, such as a password. Variations on this theme have been proposed for Bluetooth pairing protocols. In an attempt to avoid using any additional out-of-band authentication factors, Davies and Price proposed the use of the interlock protocol of Ron Rivest and Adi Shamir, which has been subject to both attack and subsequent refinement.

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  • Locally recoverable code

    Locally recoverable code

    Locally recoverable codes are a family of error correction codes that were introduced first by D. S. Papailiopoulos and A. G. Dimakis and have been widely studied in information theory due to their applications related to distributive and cloud storage systems. An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} LRC is an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code such that there is a function f i {\displaystyle f_{i}} that takes as input i {\displaystyle i} and a set of r {\displaystyle r} other coordinates of a codeword c = ( c 1 , … , c n ) ∈ C {\displaystyle c=(c_{1},\ldots ,c_{n})\in C} different from c i {\displaystyle c_{i}} , and outputs c i {\displaystyle c_{i}} . == Overview == Erasure-correcting codes, or simply erasure codes, for distributed and cloud storage systems, are becoming more and more popular as a result of the present spike in demand for cloud computing and storage services. This has inspired researchers in the fields of information and coding theory to investigate new facets of codes that are specifically suited for use with storage systems. It is well-known that LRC is a code that needs only a limited set of other symbols to be accessed in order to restore every symbol in a codeword. This idea is very important for distributed and cloud storage systems since the most common error case is when one storage node fails (erasure). The main objective is to recover as much data as possible from the fewest additional storage nodes in order to restore the node. Hence, Locally Recoverable Codes are crucial for such systems. The following definition of the LRC follows from the description above: an [ n , k , r ] {\displaystyle [n,k,r]} -Locally Recoverable Code (LRC) of length n {\displaystyle n} is a code that produces an n {\displaystyle n} -symbol codeword from k {\displaystyle k} information symbols, and for any symbol of the codeword, there exist at most r {\displaystyle r} other symbols such that the value of the symbol can be recovered from them. The locality parameter satisfies 1 ≤ r ≤ k {\displaystyle 1\leq r\leq k} because the entire codeword can be found by accessing k {\displaystyle k} symbols other than the erased symbol. Furthermore, Locally Recoverable Codes, having the minimum distance d {\displaystyle d} , can recover d − 1 {\displaystyle d-1} erasures. == Definition == Let C {\displaystyle C} be a [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code. For i ∈ { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}} , let us denote by r i {\displaystyle r_{i}} the minimum number of other coordinates we have to look at to recover an erasure in coordinate i {\displaystyle i} . The number r i {\displaystyle r_{i}} is said to be the locality of the i {\displaystyle i} -th coordinate of the code. The locality of the code is defined as An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} locally recoverable code (LRC) is an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code C ∈ F q n {\displaystyle C\in \mathbb {F} _{q}^{n}} with locality r {\displaystyle r} . Let C {\displaystyle C} be an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} -locally recoverable code. Then an erased component can be recovered linearly, i.e. for every i ∈ { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}} , the space of linear equations of the code contains elements of the form x i = f ( x i 1 , … , x i r ) {\displaystyle x_{i}=f(x_{i_{1}},\ldots ,x_{i_{r}})} , where i j ≠ i {\displaystyle i_{j}\neq i} . == Optimal locally recoverable codes == Theorem Let n = ( r + 1 ) s {\displaystyle n=(r+1)s} and let C {\displaystyle C} be an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} -locally recoverable code having s {\displaystyle s} disjoint locality sets of size r + 1 {\displaystyle r+1} . Then An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} -LRC C {\displaystyle C} is said to be optimal if the minimum distance of C {\displaystyle C} satisfies == Tamo–Barg codes == Let f ∈ F q [ x ] {\displaystyle f\in \mathbb {F} _{q}[x]} be a polynomial and let ℓ {\displaystyle \ell } be a positive integer. Then f {\displaystyle f} is said to be ( r {\displaystyle r} , ℓ {\displaystyle \ell } )-good if • f {\displaystyle f} has degree r + 1 {\displaystyle r+1} , • there exist distinct subsets A 1 , … , A ℓ {\displaystyle A_{1},\ldots ,A_{\ell }} of F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} such that – for any i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} , f ( A i ) = { t i } {\displaystyle f(A_{i})=\{t_{i}\}} for some t i ∈ F q {\displaystyle t_{i}\in \mathbb {F} _{q}} , i.e., f {\displaystyle f} is constant on A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} , – # A i = r + 1 {\displaystyle \#A_{i}=r+1} , – A i ∩ A j = ∅ {\displaystyle A_{i}\cap A_{j}=\varnothing } for any i ≠ j {\displaystyle i\neq j} . We say that { A 1 , … , A ℓ {\displaystyle A_{1},\ldots ,A_{\ell }} } is a splitting covering for f {\displaystyle f} . === Tamo–Barg construction === The Tamo–Barg construction utilizes good polynomials. • Suppose that a ( r , ℓ ) {\displaystyle (r,\ell )} -good polynomial f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} over F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} is given with splitting covering i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} . • Let s ≤ ℓ − 1 {\displaystyle s\leq \ell -1} be a positive integer. • Consider the following F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} -vector space of polynomials V = { ∑ i = 0 s g i ( x ) f ( x ) i : deg ⁡ ( g i ( x ) ) ≤ deg ⁡ ( f ( x ) ) − 2 } . {\displaystyle V=\left\{\sum _{i=0}^{s}g_{i}(x)f(x)^{i}:\deg(g_{i}(x))\leq \deg(f(x))-2\right\}.} • Let T = ⋃ i = 1 ℓ A i {\textstyle T=\bigcup _{i=1}^{\ell }A_{i}} . • The code { ev T ⁡ ( g ) : g ∈ V } {\displaystyle \{\operatorname {ev} _{T}(g):g\in V\}} is an ( ( r + 1 ) ℓ , ( s + 1 ) r , d , r ) {\displaystyle ((r+1)\ell ,(s+1)r,d,r)} -optimal locally coverable code, where ev T {\displaystyle \operatorname {ev} _{T}} denotes evaluation of g {\displaystyle g} at all points in the set T {\displaystyle T} . === Parameters of Tamo–Barg codes === • Length. The length is the number of evaluation points. Because the sets A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} are disjoint for i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} , the length of the code is | T | = ( r + 1 ) ℓ {\displaystyle |T|=(r+1)\ell } . • Dimension. The dimension of the code is ( s + 1 ) r {\displaystyle (s+1)r} , for s {\displaystyle s} ≤ ℓ − 1 {\displaystyle \ell -1} , as each g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} has degree at most deg ⁡ ( f ( x ) ) − 2 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2} , covering a vector space of dimension deg ⁡ ( f ( x ) ) − 1 = r {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-1=r} , and by the construction of V {\displaystyle V} , there are s + 1 {\displaystyle s+1} distinct g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} . • Distance. The distance is given by the fact that V ⊆ F q [ x ] ≤ k {\displaystyle V\subseteq \mathbb {F} _{q}[x]_{\leq k}} , where k = r + 1 − 2 + s ( r + 1 ) {\displaystyle k=r+1-2+s(r+1)} , and the obtained code is the Reed-Solomon code of degree at most k {\displaystyle k} , so the minimum distance equals ( r + 1 ) ℓ − ( ( r + 1 ) − 2 + s ( r + 1 ) ) {\displaystyle (r+1)\ell -((r+1)-2+s(r+1))} . • Locality. After the erasure of the single component, the evaluation at a i ∈ A i {\displaystyle a_{i}\in A_{i}} , where | A i | = r + 1 {\displaystyle |A_{i}|=r+1} , is unknown, but the evaluations for all other a ∈ A i {\displaystyle a\in A_{i}} are known, so at most r {\displaystyle r} evaluations are needed to uniquely determine the erased component, which gives us the locality of r {\displaystyle r} . To see this, g {\displaystyle g} restricted to A j {\displaystyle A_{j}} can be described by a polynomial h {\displaystyle h} of degree at most deg ⁡ ( f ( x ) ) − 2 = r + 1 − 2 = r − 1 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2=r+1-2=r-1} thanks to the form of the elements in V {\displaystyle V} (i.e., thanks to the fact that f {\displaystyle f} is constant on A j {\displaystyle A_{j}} , and the g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} 's have degree at most deg ⁡ ( f ( x ) ) − 2 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2} ). On the other hand | A j ∖ { a j } | = r {\displaystyle |A_{j}\backslash \{a_{j}\}|=r} , and r {\displaystyle r} evaluations uniquely determine a polynomial of degree r − 1 {\displaystyle r-1} . Therefore h {\displaystyle h} can be constructed and evaluated at a j {\displaystyle a_{j}} to recover g ( a j ) {\displaystyle g(a_{j})} . === Example of Tamo–Barg construction === We will use x 5 ∈ F 41 [ x ] {\displaystyle x^{5}\in \mathbb {F} _{41}[x]} to construct [ 15 , 8 , 6 , 4 ] {\displaystyle [15,8,6,4]} -LRC. Notice that the degree of this polynomial is 5, and it is constant on A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} for i ∈ { 1 , … , 8 } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,8\}} , where A 1 = { 1 , 10 , 16 , 18 , 37 } {\displaystyle A_{1}=\{1,10,16,18,37\}} , A 2 = 2 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{2}=2A_{1}} , A 3 = 3 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{3}=3A_{1}} , A 4 = 4 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{4}=4A_{1}} , A 5 = 5 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{5}=5A_{1}} , A 6 = 6 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{6}=6A_{1}}

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