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  • RIPAC (microprocessor)

    RIPAC (microprocessor)

    RIPAC was a VLSI single-chip microprocessor designed for automatic recognition of the connected speech, one of the first of this use. The project of the microprocessor RIPAC started in 1984. RIPAC was aimed to provide efficient real-time speech recognition services to the italian telephone system provided by SIP. The microprocessor was presented in September 1986 at The Hague (Netherlands) at EUSPICO conference. It was composed of 70.000 transistors and structured as Harvard architecture. The name RIPAC is the acronym for "Riconoscimento del PArlato Connesso", that means "Recognition of the connected speech" in Italian. The microprocessor was designed by the Italian companies CSELT and ELSAG and was produced by SGS: a combination of Hidden Markov Model and Dynamic Time Warping algorithms was used for processing speech signals. It was able to do real-time speech recognition of Italian and many languages with a good affordability. The chip, issued by U.S. Patent No. 4,907,278, worked at first run.

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  • Signals intelligence

    Signals intelligence

    Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the act and field of intelligence-gathering by interception of signals, whether communications between people (communications intelligence—abbreviated to COMINT) or from electronic signals not directly used in communication (electronic intelligence—abbreviated to ELINT). As classified and sensitive information is usually encrypted, signals intelligence may necessarily involve cryptanalysis (to decipher the messages). Traffic analysis—the study of who is signaling to whom and in what quantity—is also used to integrate information, and it may complement cryptanalysis. == History == === Origins === Electronic interceptions appeared as early as 1900, during the Boer War of 1899–1902. The British Royal Navy had installed wireless sets produced by Marconi on board their ships in the late 1890s, and the British Army used some limited wireless signalling. The Boers captured some wireless sets and used them to make vital transmissions. Since the British were the only people transmitting at the time, the British did not need special interpretation of the signals that they were. The birth of signals intelligence in a modern sense dates from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. As the Russian fleet prepared for conflict with Japan in 1904, the British ship HMS Diana stationed in the Suez Canal intercepted Russian naval wireless signals being sent out for the mobilization of the fleet, for the first time in history. === Development in World War I === Over the course of the First World War, a new method of signals intelligence reached maturity. Russia's failure to properly protect its communications fatally compromised the Russian Army's advance early in World War I and led to their disastrous defeat by the Germans under Ludendorff and Hindenburg at the Battle of Tannenberg. In 1918, French intercept personnel captured a message written in the new ADFGVX cipher, which was cryptanalyzed by Georges Painvin. This gave the Allies advance warning of the German 1918 Spring Offensive. The British in particular, built up great expertise in the newly emerging field of signals intelligence and codebreaking (synonymous with cryptanalysis). On the declaration of war, Britain cut all German undersea cables. This forced the Germans to communicate exclusively via either (A) a telegraph line that connected through the British network and thus could be tapped; or (B) through radio which the British could then intercept. Rear Admiral Henry Oliver appointed Sir Alfred Ewing to establish an interception and decryption service at the Admiralty; Room 40. An interception service known as 'Y' service, together with the post office and Marconi stations, grew rapidly to the point where the British could intercept almost all official German messages. The German fleet was in the habit each day of wirelessing the exact position of each ship and giving regular position reports when at sea. It was possible to build up a precise picture of the normal operation of the High Seas Fleet, to infer from the routes they chose where defensive minefields had been placed and where it was safe for ships to operate. Whenever a change to the normal pattern was seen, it immediately signalled that some operation was about to take place, and a warning could be given. Detailed information about submarine movements was also available. The use of radio-receiving equipment to pinpoint the location of any single transmitter was also developed during the war. Captain H.J. Round, working for Marconi, began carrying out experiments with direction-finding radio equipment for the army in France in 1915. By May 1915, the Admiralty was able to track German submarines crossing the North Sea. Some of these stations also acted as 'Y' stations to collect German messages, but a new section was created within Room 40 to plot the positions of ships from the directional reports. Room 40 played an important role in several naval engagements during the war, notably in detecting major German sorties into the North Sea. The battle of Dogger Bank was won in no small part due to the intercepts that allowed the Navy to position its ships in the right place. It played a vital role in subsequent naval clashes, including at the Battle of Jutland as the British fleet was sent out to intercept them. The direction-finding capability allowed for the tracking and location of German ships, submarines, and Zeppelins. The system was so successful that by the end of the war, over 80 million words, comprising the totality of German wireless transmission over the course of the war, had been intercepted by the operators of the Y-stations and decrypted. However, its most astonishing success was in decrypting the Zimmermann Telegram, a telegram from the German Foreign Office sent via Washington to its ambassador Heinrich von Eckardt in Mexico. === Postwar consolidation === With the importance of interception and decryption firmly established by the wartime experience, countries established permanent agencies dedicated to this task in the interwar period. In 1919, the British Cabinet's Secret Service Committee, chaired by Lord Curzon, recommended that a peace-time codebreaking agency should be created. The Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) was the first peace-time codebreaking agency, with a public function "to advise as to the security of codes and cyphers used by all Government departments and to assist in their provision", but also with a secret directive to "study the methods of cypher communications used by foreign powers". GC&CS officially formed on 1 November 1919, and produced its first decrypt on 19 October. By 1940, GC&CS was working on the diplomatic codes and ciphers of 26 countries, tackling over 150 diplomatic cryptosystems. The US Cipher Bureau was established in 1919 and achieved some success at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921, through cryptanalysis by Herbert Yardley. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson closed the US Cipher Bureau in 1929 with the words "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." === World War II === The use of SIGINT had even greater implications during World War II. The combined effort of intercepts and cryptanalysis for the whole of the British forces in World War II came under the code name "Ultra", managed from Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. Properly used, the German Enigma and Lorenz ciphers should have been virtually unbreakable, but flaws in German cryptographic procedures, and poor discipline among the personnel carrying them out, created vulnerabilities which made Bletchley's attacks feasible. Bletchley's work was essential to defeating the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic, and to the British naval victories in the Battle of Cape Matapan and the Battle of North Cape. In 1941, Ultra exerted a powerful effect on the North African desert campaign against German forces under General Erwin Rommel. General Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote that were it not for Ultra, "Rommel would have certainly got through to Cairo". Ultra decrypts featured prominently in the story of Operation SALAM, László Almásy's mission across the desert behind Allied lines in 1942. Prior to the Normandy landings on D-Day in June 1944, the Allies knew the locations of all but two of Germany's fifty-eight Western Front divisions. Winston Churchill was reported to have told King George VI: "It is thanks to the secret weapon of General Menzies, put into use on all the fronts, that we won the war!" Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at the end of the war, described Ultra as having been "decisive" to Allied victory. Official historian of British Intelligence in World War II Sir Harry Hinsley argued that Ultra shortened the war "by not less than two years and probably by four years"; and that, in the absence of Ultra, it is uncertain how the war would have ended. At a lower level, German cryptanalysis, direction finding, and traffic analysis were vital to Rommel's early successes in the Western Desert Campaign until British forces tightened their communications discipline and Australian raiders destroyed his principal SIGINT Company. == Technical definitions == The United States Department of Defense has defined the term "signals intelligence" as: A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), however transmitted. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Being a broad field, SIGINT has many sub-disciplines. The two main ones are communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). == Disciplines shared across the branches == === Targeting === A collection system has to know to look for a particular signal. "System", in this context, has several nuances. Targeting is the process of developing collection requirements: "1. A

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  • SFINKS

    SFINKS

    Sfinks (Polish for "Sphynx") was also the initial name of the Janusz A. Zajdel Award In cryptography, SFINKS is a stream cypher algorithm developed by An Braeken, Joseph Lano, Nele Mentens, Bart Preneel, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. It includes a message authentication code. It has been submitted to the eSTREAM Project of the eCRYPT network. In 2005, Nicolas T. Courtois noted that, while the cipher is elegant and secure against some simple algebraic attacks, it is vulnerable to more elaborate known attacks.

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  • SPKAC

    SPKAC

    SPKAC (Signed Public Key and Challenge, also known as Netscape SPKI) is a format for sending a certificate signing request (CSR): it encodes a public key, that can be manipulated using OpenSSL. It is created using the little documented HTML keygen element inside a number of Netscape compatible browsers. == Standardisation == There exists an ongoing effort to standardise SPKAC through an Internet Draft in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The purpose of this work has been to formally define what has existed prior as a de facto standard, and to address security deficiencies, particular with respect to historic insecure use of MD5 that has since been declared unsafe for use with digital signatures. == Implementations == HTML5 originally specified the element to support SPKAC in the browser to make it easier to create client side certificates through a web service for protocols such as WebID; however, subsequent work for HTML 5.1 placed the keygen element "at-risk", and the first public working draft of HTML 5.2 removes the keygen element entirely. The removal of the keygen element is due to non-interoperability and non-conformity from a standards perspective in addition to security concerns. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Web Authentication Working Group developed the WebAuthn (Web Authentication) API to replace the keygen element. Bouncy Castle provides a Java class. An implementation for Erlang/OTP exists too. An implementation for Python is named pyspkac. PHP OpenSSL extension as of version 5.6.0. Node.js implementation. === Deficiencies === The user interface needs to be improved in browsers, to make it more obvious to users when a server is asking for the client certificate.

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  • SAP Cloud Infrastructure

    SAP Cloud Infrastructure

    SAP Cloud Infrastructure is an SAP-operated IaaS cloud platform, used to run SAP’s cloud business and customer-facing deployments for SAP and non-SAP workloads. It is developed and operated with open-source technologies within SAP’s data center network, based on OpenStack and Kubernetes and supporting SAP S/4HANA and general-purpose applications. It offers compute, storage, and platform services that are accessible to SAP customers. == History == In 2012, SAP promoted aspects of cloud computing. In October 2012, SAP announced a platform as a service called the SAP Cloud Platform. In May 2013, a managed private cloud called the S/4HANA Enterprise Cloud service was announced. SAP Converged Cloud was announced in January 2015. SAP Converged Cloud was originally developed as SAP's internal standardized Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offering to support SAP’s cloud solutions. Originating from SAP Converged Cloud, SAP Cloud Infrastructure was developed and announced as SAP’s cloud computing offering that is provided for both SAP and customer workloads. In 2025, it had a global footprint of 15 regions and 29 data centers, encompassing more than 200,000 active VMs and over 6,000 hypervisors. In September 2025, SAP announced an expansion of its European “SAP Sovereign Cloud” portfolio, explicitly naming SAP Cloud Infrastructure (alongside SAP Sovereign Cloud On-Site) as part of the stack positioned for public sector and regulated environments. == Services and Features == SAP Cloud Infrastructure (SCI) is an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) offering by SAP that provides virtual compute, storage, and networking services, together with identity, key management, and operational services. SCI follows a self-service model and is managed via APIs and a web-based user interface. === Compute === SCI provides virtual machine instances that can be provisioned from operating system images and selected in predefined sizes (“flavors”). It supports lifecycle operations such as create/modify/resize/delete, power control, and snapshots; instances can be organized into server groups to influence placement policies. === Storage === SCI provides persistent storage services including: Block storage (virtual volumes) with attach/detach to instances, online expansion, cloning, snapshots, and provisioning volumes from images or snapshots. Object storage (containers and objects) managed via API/CLI with access control lists (ACLs) and configurable redundancy options. File storage (shared file systems) with access controls, online resize, snapshots/restore, and replication across availability zones. === Networking === SCI provides software-defined networking (SDN) for tenant networks (networks, subnets, routers) and connectivity features such as floating IPs for public reachability. Network security controls include security groups and firewall policies; connectivity options include BGP-based VPN networking. === Load balancing and DNS === SCI includes managed load balancing for distributing traffic across backend instances and an authoritative DNS service (DNSaaS) with API-based management of DNS zones and records, including options for zone sharing/transfer across projects/tenants and service integrations for automated record creation. === Identity, access, and key management === SCI includes identity and access management for authentication/authorization in projects/tenants (for example token handling, role assignment, and credential management) and key/secrets management for storing and controlling access to secret material such as keys and certificates, including support for different backends (depending on configuration). === Cloud-native services === SCI includes a container image registry (image push/pull, access policies, and lifecycle controls) and an auto-scaling capability for file shares based on configurable rules. === Observability and audit === SCI includes metrics and audit logging capabilities for operational monitoring and for listing/filtering audit-relevant events across services. === Availability and service levels === SCI documentation describes availability-related features such as load balancing, storage redundancy options, and replication for file shares across availability zones. SAP cloud services are governed by contractual service-level agreements (SLA); SAP Cloud Infrastructure references an SLA supplement defining infrastructure-specific terms when referenced in order forms. === SAP cloud services === SAP cloud services can run on different underlying infrastructures, including SAP Cloud Infrastructure in addition to SAP NS2 or hyperscalers. SAP cloud solutions available on SAP Cloud Infrastructure include SAP Cloud ERP, SAP HCM, SAP Solutions for Spend Management, Supply Chain Management, Business Transformation Management, and SAP Business Technology Platform (including related analytics and business data solutions). For example, SAP HANA Cloud documentation lists SAP Cloud Infrastructure as one of the supported infrastructures alongside hyperscalers. === Sustainability === SAP describes sustainability initiatives for its data centers, including energy-efficient infrastructure (for example, advanced cooling systems and power management), renewable electricity usage where feasible, and operational practices such as recycling electronic waste and minimizing water usage. SAP also references environmental management and energy management standards such as ISO 14001 and ISO 50001 for its data center operations. SAP-owned data centers run with 100% renewable electricity and that renewable electricity has been used since 2014 to power SAP facilities including owned data centers and co-locations. == SAP Cloud Infrastructure for SAP Sovereign Cloud == SAP Sovereign Cloud is a portfolio of SAP solutions designed to help organizations adopt SAP cloud solutions such as the SAP Cloud ERP while maintaining control over data, infrastructure, and compliance in line with local laws and regulations. The portfolio offers multiple deployment options, including SAP Cloud Infrastructure and SAP Sovereign Cloud On-Site, alongside sovereign hyperscaler-based options such as via SAP NS2, and targets customers such as public-sector bodies and other highly regulated organizations. In Europe, SAP Cloud Infrastructure is an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) deployment option within SAP Sovereign Cloud for SAP and customer / third party workloads, operated on SAP’s data center network and developed using open-source technologies, with customer data stored within the European Union. Sovereignty-related characteristics for the SAP Cloud Infrastructure include: EU footprint and ownership model: SAP-operated data centers in Germany include sites in St. Leon-Rot and Walldorf, and co-location sites in Frankfurt. EU AI Cloud: EU AI Cloud is a sovereign AI offering for Europe that provides secure, compliant environments for building and running AI, including governed access to auditable large language models from SAP and partners. It offers AI models on the SAP Cloud Infrastructure and SAP Business Technology Platform (SAP BTP), enabling deployment of AI applications and models on high-performance European infrastructure (including accelerator/GPU-based compute for AI workloads). Availability zones and secure interconnect: Three availability zones in three independent data centers in Germany, connected via SAP-owned fiber on SAP-owned property. Facility and security standards: ISO/IEC 27001 governance of delivery and operations of SAP cloud services and SAP-owned data centers. Additional facility and availability standards: EN 50600 availability class 3 (European data centre standard) and/or ISO/IEC 22237 availability class 3 (international equivalent). Technology foundation: Based on open-source cloud infrastructure framework (OpenStack) and Kubernetes, without dependencies on hyperscaler technologies. Sovereignty controls: Data sovereignty (data residency), operational sovereignty (administration and maintenance restricted to approved, security-cleared personnel), technical sovereignty (locally hosted control planes with separation via encryption or dedicated infrastructure), and legal sovereignty (use of locally based legal entities or those in approved countries). Classified information processing: Roadmap to meet high and very high requirements for handling classified or sensitive information under European regulatory and security regimes. Public-sector readiness and EU sovereignty assurance levels: Implemented to meet SEAL-3 (Digital Resilience) and SEAL-4 (Full Digital Sovereignty) of the European Commission’s Cloud Sovereignty Framework. Staffing constraints: Operations model selectable to restrict sensitive operations to vetted personnel from EU or NATO countries.

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  • Cryptographic nonce

    Cryptographic nonce

    In cryptography, a nonce is an arbitrary number that can be used just once in a cryptographic communication. It is often a random or pseudo-random number issued in an authentication protocol to ensure that each communication session is unique, and therefore that old communications cannot be reused in replay attacks. Nonces can also be useful as initialization vectors and in cryptographic hash functions. == Definition == A nonce is an arbitrary number used only once in a cryptographic communication, in the spirit of a nonce word. They are often random or pseudo-random numbers. Many nonces also include a timestamp to ensure exact timeliness, though this requires clock synchronisation between organisations. The addition of a client nonce ("cnonce") helps to improve the security in some ways as implemented in digest access authentication. To ensure that a nonce is used only once, it should be time-variant (including a suitably fine-grained timestamp in its value), or generated with enough random bits to ensure an insignificantly low chance of repeating a previously generated value. Some authors define pseudo-randomness (or unpredictability) as a requirement for a nonce. Nonce is a word dating back to Middle English for something only used once or temporarily (often with the construction "for the nonce"). It descends from the construction "then anes" ("the one [purpose]"). A false etymology claiming it to stand for "number used once" or similar is incorrect. == Usage == === Authentication === Authentication protocols may use nonces to ensure that old communications cannot be reused in replay attacks. For instance, nonces are used in HTTP digest access authentication to calculate an MD5 digest of the password. The nonces are different each time the 401 authentication challenge response code is presented, thus making replay attacks virtually impossible. The scenario of ordering products over the Internet can provide an example of the usefulness of nonces in replay attacks. An attacker could take the encrypted information and—without needing to decrypt—could continue to send a particular order to the supplier, thereby ordering products over and over again under the same name and purchase information. The nonce is used to give 'originality' to a given message so that if the company receives any other orders from the same person with the same nonce, it will discard those as invalid orders. A nonce may be used to ensure security for a stream cipher. Where the same key is used for more than one message and then a different nonce is used to ensure that the keystream is different for different messages encrypted with that key; often the message number is used. Secret nonce values are used by the Lamport signature scheme as a signer-side secret which can be selectively revealed for comparison to public hashes for signature creation and verification. === Hashing === Nonces are used in proof-of-work systems to vary the input to a cryptographic hash function so as to obtain a hash for a certain input that fulfils certain arbitrary conditions. In doing so, it becomes far more difficult to create a "desirable" hash than to verify it, shifting the burden of work onto one side of a transaction or system. For example, proof of work, using hash functions, was considered as a means to combat email spam by forcing email senders to find a hash value for the email (which included a timestamp to prevent pre-computation of useful hashes for later use) that had an arbitrary number of leading zeroes, by hashing the same input with a large number of values until a "desirable" hash was obtained. Similarly, the Bitcoin blockchain hashing algorithm can be tuned to an arbitrary difficulty by changing the required minimum/maximum value of the hash so that the number of bitcoins awarded for new blocks does not increase linearly with increased network computation power as new users join. This is likewise achieved by forcing Bitcoin miners to add nonce values to the value being hashed to change the hash algorithm output. As cryptographic hash algorithms cannot easily be predicted based on their inputs, this makes the act of blockchain hashing and the possibility of being awarded bitcoins something of a lottery, where the first "miner" to find a nonce that delivers a desirable hash is awarded bitcoins.

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  • Honey encryption

    Honey encryption

    Honey encryption is a type of data encryption that "produces a ciphertext, which, when decrypted with an incorrect key as guessed by the attacker, presents a plausible-looking yet incorrect plaintext." == Creators == Ari Juels and Thomas Ristenpart of the University of Wisconsin, the developers of the encryption system, presented a paper on honey encryption at the 2014 Eurocrypt cryptography conference. == Method of protection == A brute-force attack involves repeated decryption with random keys; this is equivalent to picking random plaintexts from the space of all possible plaintexts with a uniform distribution. This is effective because even though the attacker is equally likely to see any given plaintext, most plaintexts are extremely unlikely to be legitimate i.e. the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is non-uniform. Honey encryption defeats such attacks by first transforming the plaintext into a space such that the distribution of legitimate plaintexts is uniform. Thus an attacker guessing keys will see legitimate-looking plaintexts frequently and random-looking plaintexts infrequently. This makes it difficult to determine when the correct key has been guessed. In effect, honey encryption "[serves] up fake data in response to every incorrect guess of the password or encryption key." The security of honey encryption relies on the fact that the probability of an attacker judging a plaintext to be legitimate can be calculated (by the encrypting party) at the time of encryption. This makes honey encryption difficult to apply in certain applications e.g. where the space of plaintexts is very large or the distribution of plaintexts is unknown. It also means that honey encryption can be vulnerable to brute-force attacks if this probability is miscalculated. For example, it is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks: if the attacker has a crib that a plaintext must match to be legitimate, they will be able to brute-force even Honey Encrypted data if the encryption did not take the crib into account. == Example == An encrypted credit card number is susceptible to brute-force attacks because not every string of digits is equally likely. The number of digits can range from 13 to 19, though 16 is the most common. Additionally, it must have a valid IIN and the last digit must match the checksum. An attacker can also take into account the popularity of various services: an IIN from MasterCard is probably more likely than an IIN from Diners Club Carte Blanche. Honey encryption can protect against these attacks by first mapping credit card numbers to a larger space where they match their likelihood of legitimacy. Numbers with invalid IINs and checksums are not mapped at all (i.e. have probability 0 of legitimacy). Numbers from large brands like MasterCard and Visa map to large regions of this space, while less popular brands map to smaller regions, etc. An attacker brute-forcing such an encryption scheme would only see legitimate-looking credit card numbers when they brute-force, and the numbers would appear with the frequency the attacker would expect from the real world. == Application == Juels and Ristenpart aim to use honey encryption to protect data stored on password manager services. Juels stated that "password managers are a tasty target for criminals," and worries that "if criminals get a hold of a large collection of encrypted password vaults they could probably unlock many of them without too much trouble." Hristo Bojinov, CEO and founder of Anfacto, noted that "Honey Encryption could help reduce their vulnerability. But he notes that not every type of data will be easy to protect this way. … Not all authentication or encryption system yield themselves to being honeyed."

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  • Sumazi

    Sumazi

    Sumazi is a social media and social intelligence platform for enterprises, brands, and celebrities. Its technology performs social data analysis across social networking services including Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn, to identify key people in his/her network who are experts, influencers or are located in a specific area for marketing, advertising or sales campaigns. The technology company was founded in 2011 by former Sun Microsystems employee Sumaya Kazi. The company was headquartered in San Francisco, California. The company was out of business by 2017. == Reception == Sumazi was one of 25 startups selected out of more than 1,200 to compete at TechCrunch Disrupt Startup Battlefield, where it won the Omidyar Network award for the startup "Most Likely to Change the World." Sumazi, which was based out of San Francisco, California, had been profiled in The New York Times as well as USA Today, which commented the advantages of the startup's location in the Silicon Valley. American Express OPEN Forum also featured Sumazi as a "Startup of the Week". Sumazi has additionally been mentioned in articles by Mashable, The Wall Street Journal, Current Editorials, Harvard Business Review, Smashing Magazine, and TechCrunch.

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  • Video renderer

    Video renderer

    A video renderer is software that processes a video file and sends it sequentially to the video display controller card for display on a computer screen. An example of a video renderer, is the VMR-7 that was used by Microsoft's DirectShow. An example of a UNIX video renderer is the one container within GStreamer. Commonly used video renderers are: Enhanced Video Renderer VMR9 Renderless Haali's Video Renderer Madvr Video Renderer JRVR, a part of JRiver Media Center

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  • Majal (organization)

    Majal (organization)

    Majal is a regional not-for-profit organization focused on "amplifying voices of dissent" throughout the Middle East and North Africa via digital media. Founded in Bahrain, the organization "creates platforms and web applications that promote freedom of expression and social justice." Majal, which relies on open source platforms, like WordPress and Ruby on Rails, was launched in 2006 by Esra'a Al Shafei as a simple group-blogging idea. However, it has changed course to focus on the development of unique applications and tools. == Objectives and means == Majal's content, in addition to its projects and applications, is free open source content to ensure right to access information for everyone. The organization uses a broad spectrum of social media tools, ranging from written blogs, podcasts, vlogs, comics, video animation and pictures to live broadcasting through radio. == Projects and applications == Majal runs various active projects that include Alliance for Kurdish Rights, The Muslim Network for Baháʼí Rights, a discussion tool for Arab LGBT youth and various Mobile apps. == Funding == Majal is funded through private donations and grants from non-governmental organizations, as well as any potential revenues earned through freelance development. Its primary funders are the Shuttleworth Foundation and the Omidyar Network. In 2008, Majal won the Berkman Award from the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University in the Human Rights/Global Advocacy category. This $10,000 award was Majal’s first source of funding. This award is presented to “people or institutions that have made a significant contribution to the Internet and its impact on society over the past decade.” In 2009, the March 18 Movement, a project of Majal, received the Think Social Award, which demonstrates how social media can be used to solve the world’s problems. Esra'a Al-Shafei was named a 2009 Echoing Green Fellow for Civil and Human Rights, a seed funding award for young entrepreneurs engaged in social change. Financially, the fellowship consists of a $60,000 stipend paid over two years. Most recently, MEY has received a grant from the Arab Fund for Arts and Culture for its Mideast Tunes website. == Awards == Winner of Human Rights Tulip 2014 Human Rights Tulip - Human rights - Government.nl Ashoka Changemakers Citizen Media competition in 2011 for their CrowdVoice project. Monaco Media Prize 2011 for Majal founder and director Esra'a Al Shafei in 2011. The BOBS Special Topic Human Rights award in 2011 for the Majal website Migrant Rights. ThinkSocial Award in 2009, as powerful model for how social media can be used to address global problems. Echoing Green, 2009 Fellowship. TEDGlobal 2009 Fellowship. Berkman Award for Internet Innovation from Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School in 2008 for the outstanding contributions to the internet and its impact on society. The Global Journal selected Majal as one of the Top 100 NGOs in 2013. 2013-2014 Shuttleworth Foundation Fellowship. == Leadership == Majal team is led primarily by women. The organization was founded by Esra'a Al Shafei, a blogger from Bahrain in 2006. Ahmed Zidan of Egypt has served for over three years as the Editor-in-Chief of Majal Arabic, and is the co-founder of Ahwaa, and is also a podcaster. Other team members include Mona Kareem, Rima Kalush, Abir Ghattas, Namita Malhotra, and Vani Saraswathi. == 2011 Middle East and North Africa protests == Blogs and video played a role in the documentation of protests throughout the Middle East and North Africa during 2010-2011, also known as the Arab Spring. During this period, MEY's project, CrowdVoice (launched in 2010) helped curate and archive the large amounts of videos, images, and eye-witness reports being aggregated and crowdsourced from across the region. As a result, it had been censored temporarily in Yemen and is still censored in Bahrain. == Media coverage == Majal claims to have received various coverage from news agencies, TV satellite channels, radio stations, newspapers, magazines. For instance, Sky News, CNN, New York Times, BBC, The Guardian, NPR, Time, MTV political blog "Act", VH1, Daily Telegraph, Die Zeit, Frankfurter Rundschau FR-online, Toronto Star, TechCrunch, Rolling Stone Middle East, Abu Dhabi TV, Gulf News, Al-Hasnaa' magazine, ReadWriteWeb, Mashable, The Next Web, Radio Sawt Beirut International, Radio Farda among many others.

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  • Information leakage

    Information leakage

    Information leakage happens whenever a system that is designed to be closed to an eavesdropper reveals some information to unauthorized parties nonetheless. In other words: Information leakage occurs when secret information correlates with, or can be correlated with, observable information. For example, when designing an encrypted instant messaging network, a network engineer without the capacity to crack encryption codes could see when messages are transmitted, even if he could not read them. == Risk vectors == A modern example of information leakage is the leakage of secret information via data compression, by using variations in data compression ratio to reveal correlations between known (or deliberately injected) plaintext and secret data combined in a single compressed stream. Another example is the key leakage that can occur when using some public-key systems when cryptographic nonce values used in signing operations are insufficiently random. Bad randomness cannot protect proper functioning of a cryptographic system, even in a benign circumstance, it can easily produce crackable keys that cause key leakage. Information leakage can sometimes be deliberate: for example, an algorithmic converter may be shipped that intentionally leaks small amounts of information, in order to provide its creator with the ability to intercept the users' messages, while still allowing the user to maintain an illusion that the system is secure. This sort of deliberate leakage is sometimes known as a subliminal channel. Generally, only very advanced systems employ defenses against information leakage. Following are the commonly implemented countermeasures : Use steganography to hide the fact that a message is transmitted at all. Use chaffing to make it unclear to whom messages are transmitted (but this does not hide from others the fact that messages are transmitted). For busy re-transmitting proxies, such as a Mixmaster node: randomly delay and shuffle the order of outbound packets - this will assist in disguising a given message's path, especially if there are multiple, popular forwarding nodes, such as are employed with Mixmaster mail forwarding. When a data value is no longer going to be used, erase it from the memory.

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  • List of network buses

    List of network buses

    List of electrical characteristics of single collision domain segment "slow speed" network buses: The number of nodes can be limited by either number of available addresses or bus capacitance. None of the above use any analog domain modulation techniques like MLT-3 encoding, PAM-5 etc. PSI5 designed with automation applications in mind is a bit unusual in that it uses Manchester code.

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  • Audio inpainting

    Audio inpainting

    Audio inpainting (also known as audio interpolation) is an audio restoration task which deals with the reconstruction of missing or corrupted portions of a digital audio signal. Inpainting techniques are employed when parts of the audio have been lost due to various factors such as transmission errors, data corruption or errors during recording. The goal of audio inpainting is to fill in the gaps (i.e., the missing portions) in the audio signal seamlessly, making the reconstructed portions indistinguishable from the original content and avoiding the introduction of audible distortions or alterations. Many techniques have been proposed to solve the audio inpainting problem and this is usually achieved by analyzing the temporal and spectral information surrounding each missing portion of the considered audio signal. Classic methods employ statistical models or digital signal processing algorithms to predict and synthesize the missing or damaged sections. Recent solutions, instead, take advantage of deep learning models, thanks to the growing trend of exploiting data-driven methods in the context of audio restoration. Depending on the extent of the lost information, the inpainting task can be divided in three categories. Short inpainting refers to the reconstruction of few milliseconds (approximately less than 10) of missing signal, that occurs in the case of short distortions such as clicks or clipping. In this case, the goal of the reconstruction is to recover the lost information exactly. In long inpainting instead, with gaps in the order of hundreds of milliseconds or even seconds, this goal becomes unrealistic, since restoration techniques cannot rely on local information. Therefore, besides providing a coherent reconstruction, the algorithms need to generate new information that has to be semantically compatible with the surrounding context (i.e., the audio signal surrounding the gaps). The case of medium duration gaps lays between short and long inpainting. It refers to the reconstruction of tens of millisecond of missing data, a scale where the non-stationary characteristic of audio already becomes important. == Definition == Consider a digital audio signal x {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} } . A corrupted version of x {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} } , which is the audio signal presenting missing gaps to be reconstructed, can be defined as x ~ = m ∘ x {\displaystyle \mathbf {\tilde {x}} =\mathbf {m} \circ \mathbf {x} } , where m {\displaystyle \mathbf {m} } is a binary mask encoding the reliable or missing samples of x {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} } , and ∘ {\displaystyle \circ } represents the element-wise product. Audio inpainting aims at finding x ^ {\displaystyle \mathbf {\hat {x}} } (i.e., the reconstruction), which is an estimation of x {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} } . This is an ill-posed inverse problem, which is characterized by a non-unique set of solutions. For this reason, similarly to the formulation used for the inpainting problem in other domains, the reconstructed audio signal can be found through an optimization problem that is formally expressed as x ^ ∗ = argmin X ^ L ( m ∘ x ^ , x ~ ) + R ( x ^ ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {\hat {x}} ^{}={\underset {\hat {\mathbf {X} }}{\text{argmin}}}~L(\mathbf {m} \circ \mathbf {\hat {x}} ,\mathbf {\tilde {x}} )+R(\mathbf {\hat {x}} )} . In particular, x ^ ∗ {\displaystyle \mathbf {\hat {x}} ^{}} is the optimal reconstructed audio signal and L {\displaystyle L} is a distance measure term that computes the reconstruction accuracy between the corrupted audio signal and the estimated one. For example, this term can be expressed with a mean squared error or similar metrics. Since L {\displaystyle L} is computed only on the reliable frames, there are many solutions that can minimize L ( m ∘ x ^ , x ~ ) {\displaystyle L(\mathbf {m} \circ \mathbf {\hat {x}} ,\mathbf {\tilde {x}} )} . It is thus necessary to add a constraint to the minimization, in order to restrict the results only to the valid solutions. This is expressed through the regularization term R {\displaystyle R} that is computed on the reconstructed audio signal x ^ {\displaystyle \mathbf {\hat {x}} } . This term encodes some kind of a-priori information on the audio data. For example, R {\displaystyle R} can express assumptions on the stationarity of the signal, on the sparsity of its representation or can be learned from data. == Techniques == There exist various techniques to perform audio inpainting. These can vary significantly, influenced by factors such as the specific application requirements, the length of the gaps and the available data. In the literature, these techniques are broadly divided in model-based techniques (sometimes also referred as signal processing techniques) and data-driven techniques. === Model-based techniques === Model-based techniques involve the exploitation of mathematical models or assumptions about the underlying structure of the audio signal. These models can be based on prior knowledge of the audio content or statistical properties observed in the data. By leveraging these models, missing or corrupted portions of the audio signal can be inferred or estimated. An example of a model-based techniques are autoregressive models. These methods interpolate or extrapolate the missing samples based on the neighboring values, by using mathematical functions to approximate the missing data. In particular, in autoregressive models the missing samples are completed through linear prediction. The autoregressive coefficients necessary for this prediction are learned from the surrounding audio data, specifically from the data adjacent to each gap. Some more recent techniques approach audio inpainting by representing audio signals as sparse linear combinations of a limited number of basis functions (as for example in the Short Time Fourier Transform). In this context, the aim is to find the sparse representation of the missing section of the signal that most accurately matches the surrounding, unaffected signal. The aforementioned methods exhibit optimal performance when applied to filling in relatively short gaps, lasting only a few tens of milliseconds, and thus they can be included in the context of short inpainting. However, these signal-processing techniques tend to struggle when dealing with longer gaps. The reason behind this limitation lies in the violation of the stationarity condition, as the signal often undergoes significant changes after the gap, making it substantially different from the signal preceding the gap. As a way to overcome these limitations, some approaches add strong assumptions also about the fundamental structure of the gap itself, exploiting sinusoidal modeling or similarity graphs to perform inpainting of longer missing portions of audio signals. === Data-driven techniques === Data-driven techniques rely on the analysis and exploitation of the available audio data. These techniques often employ deep learning algorithms that learn patterns and relationships directly from the provided data. They involve training models on large datasets of audio examples, allowing them to capture the statistical regularities present in the audio signals. Once trained, these models can be used to generate missing portions of the audio signal based on the learned representations, without being restricted by stationarity assumptions. Data-driven techniques also offer the advantage of adaptability and flexibility, as they can learn from diverse audio datasets and potentially handle complex inpainting scenarios. As of today, such techniques constitute the state-of-the-art of audio inpainting, being able to reconstruct gaps of hundreds of milliseconds or even seconds. These performances are made possible by the use of generative models that have the capability to generate novel content to fill in the missing portions. For example, generative adversarial networks, which are the state-of-the-art of generative models in many areas, rely on two competing neural networks trained simultaneously in a two-player minmax game: the generator produces new data from samples of a random variable, the discriminator attempts to distinguish between generated and real data. During the training, the generator's objective is to fool the discriminator, while the discriminator attempts to learn to better classify real and fake data. In GAN-based inpainting methods the generator acts as a context encoder and produces a plausible completion for the gap only given the available information surrounding it. The discriminator is used to train the generator and tests the consistency of the produced inpainted audio. Recently, also diffusion models have established themselves as the state-of-the-art of generative models in many fields, often beating even GAN-based solutions. For this reason they have also been used to solve the audio inpainting problem, obtaining valid results. These models generate new data instances by inverting the

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  • CANaerospace

    CANaerospace

    CANaerospace is a higher layer protocol based on Controller Area Network (CAN) which has been developed by Stock Flight Systems in 1998 for aeronautical applications. == Background == CANaerospace supports airborne systems employing the Line-replaceable unit (LRU) concept to share data across CAN and ensures interoperability between CAN LRUs by defining CAN physical layer characteristics, network layers, communication mechanisms, data types and aeronautical axis systems. CANaerospace is an open source project, was initiated to standardize the interface between CAN LRUs on the system level. CANaerospace is continuously being developed further and has also been published by NASA as the Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments Databus Standard in 2001. It found widespread use in aeronautical research worldwide. A major research aircraft that employs several CANaerospace networks for real-time computer interconnection is the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA), a Boeing 747SP with a 2.5m astronomic telescope. CANaerospace is also frequently used in flight simulation and connects entire aircraft cockpits (i.e. in Eurofighter Typhoon simulators) to the simulation host computers. In Italy CANaerospace is used as UAV data bus technology. Furthermore, CANaerospace serves as communication network in several general aviation avionics systems. The CANaerospace interface definition closes the gap between the ISO/OSI layer 1 and 2 CAN protocol (which is implemented in the CAN controller itself) and the specific requirements of distributed systems in aircraft. It may be used as a primary or ancillary avionics network and was designed to meet the following requirements: Democratic network: CANaerospace does not require any master/slave relationships between LRUs or a "bus controller", thereby avoiding a potential single source of failure. Every node in the network has the same rights for participation in the bus traffic. Self-identifying message format: Each CANaerospace message contains information about the type of the data and the transmitting node. This allows the data to be unambiguously recognized at each receiving node. Continuous Message Numbering: Each CANaerospace message contains a continuously incremented number which allows coherent processing of messages in the receiving stations. Message Status Code: Each CANaerospace message contains information about the integrity of the data is conveying. This allows receiving stations to evaluate the quality of the received data and to react accordingly. Emergency Event Signaling: CANaerospace defines a mechanism that allows each node to transmit information about exception or error situations. This information can be used by other stations to determine the network health. Node Service Interface: As an enhancement to CAN, CANaerospace provides a means for individual stations on the network to communicate with each other using connection-oriented and connectionless services. Predefined CAN Identifier Assignment: CANaerospace offers a predefined identifier assignment list for normal operation data. In addition to the predefined list, user-defined identifier assignment lists may be used. Ease of Implementation: The amount of code to implement CANaerospace is very little by design in order to minimize the effort for testing and certification of flight safety critical systems. Openness to Extensions: All CANaerospace definitions are extendable to provide flexibility for future enhancements and to allow adaptions to the requirements of specific applications. Free Availability: No cost whatsoever apply for the use of CANaerospace. The specification can be downloaded from the Internet == Physical interface == To ensure interoperability and reliable communication, CANaerospace specifies the electrical characteristics, bus transceiver requirements and data rates with the corresponding tolerances based on ISO 11898. The bit timing calculation (baud rate accuracy, sample point definition) and robustness to electromagnetic interference are given special emphasis. Also addressed are CAN connector, wiring considerations and design guidelines to maximize electromagnetic compatibility. == Communication layers == The Bosch CAN specification itself allows messages being transmitted both periodically and aperiodically but does not cover issues like data representation, node addressing or connection-oriented protocols. CAN is entirely based on Anyone-to-Many (ATM) communication which means that CAN messages are always received by all stations in the network. The advantage of the CAN concept is inherent data consistency between all stations, the drawback is that it does not allow node addressing which is the basis for Peer-to-Peer (PTP) communication. Using CAN networks in aeronautical applications, however, demands a standard targeted to the specific requirements of airborne systems which implies that communication between individual stations in the network must be possible to enable the required degree of system monitoring. Consequently, CANaerospace defines additional ISO/OSI layer 3, 4 and 6 functions to support node addressing and unified ATM/PTP communication mechanisms. PTP communication allows to set up client/server interactions between individual stations in the network either temporarily or permanently. More than one of these interactions may be in effect at any given time and each node may be client for one operation and server for another at the same time. This CANaerospace mechanism is called "Node Service Concept" and allows i.e. to distribute system functions over several stations in the network or to control dynamic system reconfiguration in case of failure. The Node Service concept supports both connection-oriented and connectionless interactions like with TCP/IP and UDP/IP for Ethernet. Enabling both ATM and PTP communication for CAN requires the introduction of independent network layers to isolate the different types of communication. This is realized for CANaerospace by forming CAN identifier groups as shown in Figure 1. The resulting structure creates Logical Communication Channels (LCCs) and assigns a specific communication type (ATM, PTP) to each of the LCCs. User-defined LCCs provide the necessary freedom for designers and allow the implementation of CANaerospace according to the needs of specific applications. Figure 1: Logical Communication Channels for CANaerospace As a side effect, the CAN identifier groups in Figure 1 affect the priority of the message transmission in case of bus arbitration. The communication channels are therefore arranged according to their relative importance: Emergency Event Data Channel (EED): This communication channel is used for messages which require immediate action (i.e. system degradation or reconfiguration) and have to be transmitted with very high priority. Emergency Event Data uses ATM communication exclusively. High/Low Priority Node Service Data Channel (NSH/NSL): These communication channels are used for client/server interactions using PTP communication. The corresponding services may be of the connection-oriented as well as the connectionless type. NSH/NSL may also be used to support test and maintenance functions. Normal Operation Data Channel (NOD): This communication channel is used for the transmission of the data which is generated during normal system operation and described in the CANaerospace identifier assignment list. These messages may be transmitted periodically or aperiodically as well as synchronously or asynchronously. All messages which cannot be assigned to other communication channels shall use this channel. High/Low Priority User-Defined Data Channel (UDH/UDL): This channel is dedicated to communication which cannot, due to their specific characteristics, be assigned other channels without violating the CANaerospace specification. As long as the defined identifier range is used, the message content and the communication type (ATM, PTP) for these channels may be specified by the system designer. To ensure interoperability it is highly recommended that the use of these channels is minimized. Debug Service Data Channel (DSD): This channel is dedicated to messages which are used temporarily for development and test purposes only and are not transmitted during normal operation. As long as the defined identifier range is used, the message content and the communication type (ATM, PTP) for these channels may be specified by the system designer. == Data representation == The majority of the real-time control systems used in aeronautics employ "big endian" processor architectures. This data representation was therefore specified for CANaerospace as well. With big endian data representation, the most significant bit of any datum is arranged leftmost and transmitted first on CANaerospace as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2: "Big Endian" Data Representation for CANaerospace CANaerospace uses a self-identifying message

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  • Tokenization (data security)

    Tokenization (data security)

    Tokenization, when applied to data security, is the process of substituting a sensitive data element with a non-sensitive equivalent, referred to as a token, that has no intrinsic or exploitable meaning or value. The token is a reference (i.e. identifier) that maps back to the sensitive data through a tokenization system. The mapping from original data to a token uses methods that render tokens infeasible to reverse in the absence of the tokenization system, for example using tokens created from random numbers. A one-way cryptographic function is used to convert the original data into tokens, making it difficult to recreate the original data without obtaining entry to the tokenization system's resources. To deliver such services, the system maintains a vault database of tokens that are connected to the corresponding sensitive data. Protecting the system vault is vital to the system, and improved processes must be put in place to offer database integrity and physical security. The tokenization system must be secured and validated using security best practices applicable to sensitive data protection, secure storage, audit, authentication and authorization. The tokenization system provides data processing applications with the authority and interfaces to request tokens, or detokenize back to sensitive data. The security and risk reduction benefits of tokenization require that the tokenization system is logically isolated and segmented from data processing systems and applications that previously processed or stored sensitive data replaced by tokens. Only the tokenization system can tokenize data to create tokens, or detokenize back to redeem sensitive data under strict security controls. The token generation method must be proven to have the property that there is no feasible means through direct attack, cryptanalysis, side channel analysis, token mapping table exposure or brute force techniques to reverse tokens back to live data. Replacing live data with tokens in systems is intended to minimize exposure of sensitive data to those applications, stores, people and processes, reducing risk of compromise or accidental exposure and unauthorized access to sensitive data. Applications can operate using tokens instead of live data, with the exception of a small number of trusted applications explicitly permitted to detokenize when strictly necessary for an approved business purpose. Tokenization systems may be operated in-house within a secure isolated segment of the data center, or as a service from a secure service provider. Tokenization may be used to safeguard sensitive data involving, for example, bank accounts, financial statements, medical records, criminal records, driver's licenses, loan applications, stock trades, voter registrations, and other types of personally identifiable information (PII). Tokenization is often used in credit card processing. The PCI Council defines tokenization as "a process by which the primary account number (PAN) is replaced with a surrogate value called a token. A PAN may be linked to a reference number through the tokenization process. In this case, the merchant simply has to retain the token and a reliable third party controls the relationship and holds the PAN. The token may be created independently of the PAN, or the PAN can be used as part of the data input to the tokenization technique. The communication between the merchant and the third-party supplier must be secure to prevent an attacker from intercepting to gain the PAN and the token. De-tokenization is the reverse process of redeeming a token for its associated PAN value. The security of an individual token relies predominantly on the infeasibility of determining the original PAN knowing only the surrogate value". The choice of tokenization as an alternative to other techniques such as encryption will depend on varying regulatory requirements, interpretation, and acceptance by respective auditing or assessment entities. This is in addition to any technical, architectural or operational constraint that tokenization imposes in practical use. == Concepts and origins == The concept of tokenization, as adopted by the industry today, has existed since the first currency systems emerged centuries ago as a means to reduce risk in handling high value financial instruments by replacing them with surrogate equivalents. In the physical world, coin tokens have a long history of use replacing the financial instrument of minted coins and banknotes. In more recent history, subway tokens and casino chips found adoption for their respective systems to replace physical currency and cash handling risks such as theft. Exonumia and scrip are terms synonymous with such tokens. In the digital world, similar substitution techniques have been used since the 1970s as a means to isolate real data elements from exposure to other data systems. In databases for example, surrogate key values have been used since 1976 to isolate data associated with the internal mechanisms of databases and their external equivalents for a variety of uses in data processing. More recently, these concepts have been extended to consider this isolation tactic to provide a security mechanism for the purposes of data protection. In the payment card industry, tokenization is one means of protecting sensitive cardholder data in order to comply with industry standards and government regulations. Tokenization was applied to payment card data by Shift4 Corporation and released to the public during an industry Security Summit in Las Vegas, Nevada in 2005. The technology is meant to prevent the theft of the credit card information in storage. Shift4 defines tokenization as: "The concept of using a non-decryptable piece of data to represent, by reference, sensitive or secret data. In payment card industry (PCI) context, tokens are used to reference cardholder data that is managed in a tokenization system, application or off-site secure facility." To protect data over its full lifecycle, tokenization is often combined with end-to-end encryption to secure data in transit to the tokenization system or service, with a token replacing the original data on return. For example, to avoid the risks of malware stealing data from low-trust systems such as point of sale (POS) systems, as in the Target breach of 2013, cardholder data encryption must take place prior to card data entering the POS and not after. Encryption takes place within the confines of a security hardened and validated card reading device and data remains encrypted until received by the processing host, an approach pioneered by Heartland Payment Systems as a means to secure payment data from advanced threats, now widely adopted by industry payment processing companies and technology companies. The PCI Council has also specified end-to-end encryption (certified point-to-point encryption—P2PE) for various service implementations in various PCI Council Point-to-point Encryption documents. == The tokenization process == The process of tokenization consists of the following steps: The application sends the tokenization data and authentication information to the tokenization system. It is stopped if authentication fails and the data is delivered to an event management system. As a result, administrators can discover problems and effectively manage the system. The system moves on to the next phase if authentication is successful. Using one-way cryptographic or random generation techniques, a token is generated and kept in a highly secure data vault. The new token is provided to the application for further use, replacing the sensitive data for processing and storage. Tokenization systems share several components according to established standards. Token generation is the process of producing a token using any means, such as one-way nonreversible cryptographic functions (e.g., a hash function with a strong, secret salt) or assignment via a randomly generated number. Random number generator (RNG) techniques are often the best choice for generating token values. Token mapping – this is the process of assigning the created token value to its original value. To enable permitted look-ups of the original value using the token as the index, a secure cross-reference database must be constructed. Token data store – this is a central repository for the token mapping process that holds the original sensitive values and their related token values. Sensitive data and token values must be securely kept in an encrypted format. Management of cryptographic keys. Strong key management procedures are required for sensitive data encryption on token data stores. == Difference from encryption == Tokenization and "classic" encryption effectively protect data if implemented properly, and a computer security system may use both. While similar in certain regards, tokenization and classic encryption differ in a few key aspects. Both are cryptographic data security methods and the

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