Agentive logic (also called the logic of action or logic of agency) is the field of philosophical logic and logic in computer science that studies formal representations of agents, their actions, and their abilities. An agentive logic in the narrower sense is a formal system whose primitive operators express that an agent does something, can do something, or sees to it that something is the case. Agentive logics generalise modal logic by adding modalities indexed to agents and to actions. Typical examples include: STIT logics (from sees to it that) with operators of the form [ i s t i t : φ ] {\displaystyle [i\ {\mathsf {stit}}:\varphi ]} meaning that agent i {\displaystyle i} sees to it that φ {\displaystyle \varphi } holds; dynamic logics of action with program-like modalities [ α ] φ {\displaystyle [\alpha ]\varphi } and ⟨ α ⟩ φ {\displaystyle \langle \alpha \rangle \varphi } meaning, roughly, that after every (respectively, some) execution(s) of action α {\displaystyle \alpha } , φ {\displaystyle \varphi } holds; logics with explicit agentive operators such as "can do", "brings about", or "is able to ensure". Agentive logics are used in action theory in philosophy, in the semantics of natural language, in the theory of program verification, and in artificial intelligence, where they underpin formalisms for reasoning about actions, planning, and intelligent agents. == Terminology and scope == The adjective agentive derives from the Latin agens ("one who acts") and originally referred to the grammatical agent of a verb. In logical contexts it designates operators or predicates whose primary argument position is an agent rather than a proposition alone, for example A i φ {\displaystyle A_{i}\varphi } ("agent i {\displaystyle i} does φ {\displaystyle \varphi } ") or C i φ {\displaystyle C_{i}\varphi } ("agent i {\displaystyle i} can bring about φ {\displaystyle \varphi } "). In contemporary literature, agentive logic is sometimes used narrowly for formal reconstructions of St. Anselm's modal account of facere ("to do"). More broadly, the term is used interchangeably with logic of action or logic of agency to cover a family of modal and dynamic logics designed to capture the structure of action and choice. == Historical background == === Medieval and early modern roots === Medieval logicians already explored analogies between modalities of action and alethic modalities such as possibility and necessity, for instance, in discussions of obligation and power. An influential early agentive analysis is due to St. Anselm (11th century), who treated "doing φ {\displaystyle \varphi } " as a kind of modal operator on propositions, anticipating later modal logics of agency. Modern reconstructions of Anselm's theory show that the resulting "agentive logic" can be modelled with neighbourhood semantics and satisfies a recognisable square of opposition. === Modern logic of action === Modern study of the logic of action began in the mid-20th century, parallel to developments in deontic logic and tense logic. Early systems were proposed by Georg Henrik von Wright, Stig Kanger, and others, often motivated by questions about norms and responsibility. From the 1960s onward, two largely independent but eventually converging traditions emerged: a branching-time tradition, culminating in STIT logics, emphasising agents' choices among possible futures; and dynamic logics of programs and actions, developed within computer science to reason about program execution. In the 1990s and 2000s, action logics were further developed in connection with knowledge representation, planning, and multi-agent systems in AI, and with dynamic and update semantics in linguistics. == Core ideas == Despite their diversity, most agentive logics share some general themes: Agents are treated as explicit indices of modal operators, as in [ i d o e s ] φ {\displaystyle [i\ {\mathsf {does}}]\varphi } or C i φ {\displaystyle C_{i}\varphi } . Actions are represented either implicitly, via changes between possible worlds along an accessibility relation, or explicitly, as terms denoting primitive and composite actions. Choice and ability are captured by modalities describing what an agent can ensure, usually relative to assumptions about the environment and other agents. Formal properties such as closure under composition, interaction between different agents, and connections to obligation (what an agent ought to do) and knowledge (what an agent knows how to do) are investigated. == STIT logics == STIT ("sees to it that") logics, originating in work by Nuel Belnap and collaborators, treat agency in a branching-time framework. A STIT model consists of a partially ordered set of moments with a tree-like structure, sets of histories (maximal branches through the tree), and for each agent at each moment, a partition of the histories through that moment representing the choices available to the agent. Intuitively, an agent's action at a moment determines which equivalence class (choice cell) of histories becomes actual; a formula [ i s t i t : φ ] {\displaystyle [i\ {\mathsf {stit}}:\varphi ]} is true at a history–moment pair if φ {\displaystyle \varphi } holds on all histories in the choice cell corresponding to the agent's current action. Different STIT operators have been distinguished, notably: the Chellas STIT operator, often written [ i c s t i t : φ ] {\displaystyle [i\ {\mathsf {cstit}}:\varphi ]} , which requires only that the agent's choice guarantees φ {\displaystyle \varphi } ; and the deliberative STIT operator, [ i d s t i t : φ ] {\displaystyle [i\ {\mathsf {dstit}}:\varphi ]} , which additionally requires that φ {\displaystyle \varphi } is not already historically necessary. STIT frameworks have been extended with group agency operators, temporal modalities, epistemic operators, and deontic operators to study responsibility, collective action, and obligations under indeterminism. == Dynamic logics of action == Dynamic logic was originally developed to reason about the behaviour of computer programs, treating program execution as a kind of action. In propositional dynamic logic (PDL), action terms α , β , … {\displaystyle \alpha ,\beta ,\dots } denote abstract programs or actions, and formulas of the form [ α ] φ {\displaystyle [\alpha ]\varphi } and ⟨ α ⟩ φ {\displaystyle \langle \alpha \rangle \varphi } express that all, respectively some, terminating executions of α {\displaystyle \alpha } lead to states where φ {\displaystyle \varphi } holds. From the standpoint of agentive logic, dynamic logic provides: a language for building complex actions from primitives via sequencing, choice, and iteration (e.g., α ; β {\displaystyle \alpha ;\beta } , α ∪ β {\displaystyle \alpha \cup \beta } , α ∗ {\displaystyle \alpha ^{}} ); a Kripke semantics in which actions correspond to labelled accessibility relations; and proof systems (such as Hoare logic and weakest precondition calculi) for reasoning about the correctness of action sequences. Extensions such as concurrent dynamic logic add operators for parallel composition, allowing reasoning about interacting processes and concurrent actions. John-Jules Ch. Meyer and others have argued that dynamic logic is a natural base for logics of agents, by adding modalities for knowledge, belief, and ability on top of the action modalities. Dynamic logics have also been applied to normative reasoning, yielding dynamic deontic logics where actions are related to obligations and permissions, and to dynamic epistemic logics in which information-changing actions such as announcements are modelled as programs. == Situation calculus and other action formalisms == In artificial intelligence, reasoning about action and change is often based on first-order languages that explicitly represent situations, events, and fluents (time-varying properties). The best known is situation calculus, introduced by John McCarthy and developed extensively by Raymond Reiter. In such formalisms: action terms name primitive actions; a function symbol (often d o {\displaystyle {\mathsf {do}}} ) maps an action and a situation to a successor situation; and axioms describe which fluents hold in which situations and how actions change them. Reiter's successor state axioms give compact specifications of how each fluent changes under all actions, and precondition axioms specify when actions are possible. Related formalisms include the event calculus and fluent calculus, which provide alternative ways of representing events and their effects. While these systems are often first-order rather than modal, they are closely related to agentive logics: their action terms and transition structures can be seen as providing models for dynamic or STIT-style modalities, and conversely, dynamic logics can be used as abstract specification languages for such AI formalisms. == Ability, agency, and related modalities == Many agentive logics introduce explicit operators for ability or "can-do"
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