AI Data Defense

AI Data Defense — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

  • Google Vids

    Google Vids

    Google Vids (not to be confused with Google Video) is an online timeline-based video editing application included as part of the Google Workspace suite. It is designed to help users create informational videos for work-related purposes. The app uses Google's Gemini technology to enable users to create video storyboards manually or with AI assistance using simple prompts. Features include uploading media, choosing stock videos, images, background music, and a voiceover feature with script generation using AI. The app is currently in testing with select Google Workspace Labs users. Like Kapwing and Capcut, Google Vids is primarily for creating work-related content like sales training, onboarding videos, vendor outreach, and project updates. It offers various styles and templates, collaborative features, and is not limited to videos without the short integration at the moment. Google Vids was announced on April 9, 2024. In September 2025, Google began to roll out a basic version of the application to Google Workspace users.

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  • Embodied cognition

    Embodied cognition

    Embodied cognition represents a diverse group of theories which investigate how cognition is shaped by the bodily state and capacities of the organism. These embodied factors include the motor system, the perceptual system, bodily interactions with the environment (situatedness), and the assumptions about the world that shape the functional structure of the brain and body of the organism. Embodied cognition suggests that these elements are essential to a wide spectrum of cognitive functions, such as perception biases, memory recall, comprehension and high-level mental constructs (such as meaning attribution and categories) and performance on various cognitive tasks (reasoning or judgment). The embodied mind thesis challenges other theories, such as cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism. It is closely related to the extended mind thesis, situated cognition, and enactivism. The modern version depends on understandings drawn from up-to-date research in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, dynamical systems, artificial intelligence, robotics, animal cognition, plant cognition, and neurobiology. == Theory == Proponents of the embodied cognition thesis emphasize the active and significant role the body plays in the shaping of cognition and in the understanding of an agent's mind and cognitive capacities. In philosophy, embodied cognition holds that an agent's cognition, rather than being the product of mere (innate) abstract representations of the world, is strongly influenced by aspects of an agent's body beyond the brain itself. An embodied model of cognition opposes the disembodied Cartesian model, according to which all mental phenomena are non-physical and, therefore, not influenced by the body. With this opposition the embodiment thesis intends to reintroduce an agent's bodily experiences into any account of cognition. It is a rather broad thesis and encompasses both weak and strong variants of embodiment. In an attempt to reconcile cognitive science with human experience, the enactive approach to cognition defines "embodiment" as follows: By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural context. This double sense attributed to the embodiment thesis emphasizes the many aspects of cognition that researchers in different fields—such as philosophy, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, psychology, and neuroscience—are involved with. This general characterization of embodiment faces some difficulties: a consequence of this emphasis on the body, experience, culture, context, and the cognitive mechanisms of an agent in the world is that often distinct views and approaches to embodied cognition overlap. The theses of extended cognition and situated cognition, for example, are usually intertwined and not always carefully separated. And since each of the aspects of the embodiment thesis is endorsed to different degrees, embodied cognition should be better seen "as a research program rather than a well-defined unified theory". Some authors explain the embodiment thesis by arguing that cognition depends on an agent's body and its interactions with a determined environment. From this perspective, cognition in real biological systems is not an end in itself; it is constrained by the system's goals and capacities. Such constraints do not mean cognition is set by adaptive behavior (or autopoiesis) alone, but instead that cognition requires "some kind of information processing... the transformation or communication of incoming information". The acquiring of such information involves the agent's "exploration and modification of the environment". It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that cognition consists simply of building maximally accurate representations of input information...the gaining of knowledge is a stepping stone to achieving the more immediate goal of guiding behavior in response to the system's changing surroundings. Another approach to understanding embodied cognition comes from a narrower characterization of the embodiment thesis. The following narrower view of embodiment avoids any compromises to external sources other than the body and allows differentiating between embodied cognition, extended cognition, and situated cognition. Thus, the embodiment thesis can be specified as follows: Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive processing. This thesis points out the core idea that an agent's body plays a significant role in shaping different features of cognition, such as perception, attention, memory, reasoning—among others. Likewise, these features of cognition depend on the kind of body an agent has. The thesis omits direct mention of some aspects of the "more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural context" included in the enactive definition, making it possible to separate embodied cognition, extended cognition, and situated cognition. In contrast to the embodiment thesis, the extended mind thesis limits cognitive processing neither to the brain nor even to the body, it extends it outward into the agent's world. Situated cognition emphasizes that this extension is not just a matter of including resources outside the head but stressing the role of probing and changing interactions with the agent's world. Cognition is situated in that it is inherently dependent upon the cultural and social contexts within which it takes place. This conceptual reframing of cognition as an activity influenced by the body has had significant implications. For instance, the view of cognition inherited by most contemporary cognitive neuroscience is internalist in nature. An agent's behavior along with its capacity to maintain (accurate) representations of the surrounding environment were considered as the product of "powerful brains that can maintain the world models and devise plans". From this perspective, cognizing was conceived as something that an isolated brain did. In contrast, accepting the role the body plays during cognitive processes allows us to account for a more encompassing view of cognition. This shift in perspective within neuroscience suggests that successful behavior in real-world scenarios demands the integration of several sensorimotor and cognitive (as well as affective) capacities of an agent. Thus, cognition emerges in the relationship between an agent and the affordances provided by the environment rather than in the brain alone. In 2002, a collection of positive characterizations summarizing what the embodiment thesis entails for cognition were offered. Professor of Cognitive Psychology Margaret Wilson argues that the general outlook of embodied cognition "displays an interesting co-variation of multiple observations and houses a number of different claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) offline cognition is bodily-based". According to Wilson, the first three and the fifth claim appear to be at least partially true, while the fourth claim is deeply problematic in that all things that have an impact on the elements of a system are not necessarily considered part of the system. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, yet it might be the most significant of the six claims as it shows how certain human cognitive capabilities, that previously were thought to be highly abstract, now appear to be leaning towards an embodied approach for their explanation. Wilson also describes at least five main (abstract) categories that combine both sensory and motor skills (or sensorimotor functions). The first three are working memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory; the fourth is mental imagery, and finally, the fifth concerns reasoning and problem solving. == History == The theory of embodied cognition, along with the multiple aspects it comprises, can be regarded as the imminent result of an intellectual skepticism towards the flourishment of the disembodied theory of mind put forth by René Descartes in the 17th century. According to Cartesian dualism, the mind is entirely distinct from the body and can be successfully explained and understood without reference to the body or to its processes. Research has been done to identify the set of ideas that would establish what could be considered as the early stages of embodied cognition around inquiries regarding the mind-body-soul rel

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  • National Library of Medicine classification

    National Library of Medicine classification

    The National Library of Medicine (NLM) classification system is a library indexing system covering the fields of medicine and preclinical basic sciences. Operated and maintained by the U.S. National Library of Medicine, the NLM classification is patterned after the Library of Congress (LC) Classification system: alphabetical letters denote broad subject categories which are subdivided by numbers. For example, QW 279 would indicate a book on an aspect of microbiology or immunology. The one- or two-letter alphabetical codes in the NLM classification use a limited range of letters: only QS–QZ and W–WZ. This allows the NLM system to co-exist with the larger LC coding scheme as neither of these ranges are used in the LC system. There are, however, three pre-existing codes in the LC system which overlap with the NLM: Human Anatomy (QM), Microbiology (QR), and Medicine (R). To avoid further confusion, these three codes are not used in the NLM. The headings for the individual schedules (letters or letter pairs) are given in brief form (e.g., QW - Microbiology and Immunology; WG - Cardiovascular System) and together they provide an outline of the subjects covered by the NLM classification. Headings are interpreted broadly and include the physiological system, the specialties connected with them, the regions of the body chiefly concerned and subordinate related fields. The NLM system is hierarchical, and within each schedule, division by organ usually has priority. Each main schedule, as well as some sub-sections, begins with a group of form numbers ranging generally from 1–49 which classify materials by publication type, e.g., dictionaries, atlases, laboratory manuals, etc. The main schedules QS-QZ, W-WY, and WZ (excluding the range WZ 220–270) classify works published after 1913; the 19th century schedule is used for works published 1801–1913; and WZ 220-270 is used to provide century groupings for works published before 1801. == Classification categories == === Preclinical Sciences === QS Human Anatomy QT Physiology QU Biochemistry QV Pharmacology QW Microbiology & Immunology QX Parasitology QY Clinical Pathology QZ Pathology === Medicine and Related Subjects === W Health Professions WA Public Health WB Practice of Medicine WC Communicable Diseases WD Disorders of Systemic, Metabolic, or Environmental Origin, etc. WE Musculoskeletal System WF Respiratory System WG Cardiovascular System WH Hemic and Lymphatic Systems WI Digestive System WJ Urogenital System WK Endocrine System WL Nervous System WM Psychiatry WN Radiology. Diagnostic Imaging WO Surgery WP Gynecology WQ Obstetrics WR Dermatology WS Pediatrics WT Geriatrics. Chronic Disease WU Dentistry. Oral Surgery WV Otolaryngology WW Ophthalmology WX Hospitals & Other Health Facilities WY Nursing WZ History of Medicine 19th Century Schedule

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  • STUDENT

    STUDENT

    STUDENT is an early artificial intelligence program that solves algebra word problems. It is written in Lisp by Daniel G. Bobrow as his PhD thesis in 1964 (Bobrow 1964). It was designed to read and solve the kind of word problems found in high school algebra books. The program is often cited as an early accomplishment of AI in natural language processing. == Technical description == Within Project MAC at MIT, the STUDENT system was an early example of a question answering software, which uniquely involved natural language processing and symbolic programming. Other early attempts for solving algebra story problems were realized with 1960s hardware and software as well: for example, the Philips, Baseball and Synthex systems. STUDENT accepts an algebra story written in the English language as input, and generates a number as output. This is realized with a layered pipeline that consists of heuristics for pattern transformation. At first, sentences in English are converted into kernel sentences, which each contain a single piece of information. Next, the kernel sentences are converted into mathematical expressions. The knowledge base that supports the transformation contains 52 facts. STUDENT uses a rule-based system with logic inference. The rules are pre-programmed by the software developer and are able to parse natural language. More powerful techniques for natural language processing, such as machine learning, came into use later as hardware grew more capable, and gained popularity over simpler rule-based systems.

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  • Lucy–Hook coaddition method

    Lucy–Hook coaddition method

    The Lucy–Hook coaddition method is an image processing technique for combining sub-stepped astronomical image data onto a finer grid. The method allows the option of resolution and contrast enhancement or the choice of a conservative, re-convolved, output. Tests with very deep Hubble Space Telescope Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2) imaging data of excellent quality show that these methods can be very effective and allow fine-scale features to be studied better than on the unprocessed images. The Lucy–Hook coaddition method is an extension of the standard Richardson–Lucy deconvolution iterative restoration method. For many purposes it may be more convenient to combine dithered datasets using the Drizzle method.

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  • Stochastic Neural Analog Reinforcement Calculator

    Stochastic Neural Analog Reinforcement Calculator

    The Stochastic Neural Analog Reinforcement Calculator (SNARC) is a neural network machine designed by Marvin Minsky. Prompted by a letter from Minsky, George Armitage Miller gathered the funding (a few thousand dollars) for the project from the Office of Naval Research of the U.S. Department of Defense in the summer of 1951 with the work to be carried out by Minsky, who was then a graduate student in mathematics at Princeton University. At the time, a physics graduate student at Princeton, Dean S. Edmonds, volunteered that he was good with electronics and therefore Minsky brought him onto the project. During undergraduate years, Minsky was inspired by the 1943 Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts paper on artificial neurons, and decided to build such a machine. The learning was Skinnerian reinforcement learning, and Minsky talked with Skinner extensively during the development of the machine. They tested the machine on a copy of Shannon's maze, and found that it could learn to solve the maze. Unlike Shannon's maze, this machine did not control a physical robot, but simulated rats running in a maze. The simulation is displayed as an "arrangement of lights", and the circuit was reinforced each time the simulated rat reached the goal. The machine surprised its creators. "The rats actually interacted with one another. If one of them found a good path, the others would tend to follow it." The machine itself is a randomly connected network of approximately 40 Hebb synapses. These synapses each have a memory that holds the probability that signal comes in one input and another signal will come out of the output. There is a probability knob that goes from 0 to 1 that shows this probability of the signals propagating. If the probability signal gets through, a capacitor remembers this function and engages an electromagnetic clutch. At this point, the operator will press a button to give a reward to the machine. This activates a motor on a surplus Minneapolis-Honeywell C-1 gyroscopic autopilot from a B-24 bomber. The motor turns a chain that goes to all 40 synapse machines, checking if the clutch is engaged or not. As the capacitor can only "remember" for a certain amount of time, the chain only catches the most recent updates of the probabilities. Each neuron contained 6 vacuum tubes and a motor. The entire machine is "the size of a grand piano" and contained 300 vacuum tubes. The tubes failed regularly, but the machine would still work despite failures. This machine is considered one of the first pioneering attempts at the field of artificial intelligence. Minsky went on to be a founding member of MIT's Project MAC, which split to become the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab, and is now the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. In 1985 Minsky became a founding member of the MIT Media Laboratory. According to Minsky, he loaned the machine to students in Dartmouth, and subsequently lost, except for a single neuron. A photo of Minsky's last neuron can be seen here. The photo shows 6 vacuum tubes, one of which is a Sylvania JAN-CHS-6H6GT/G/VT-90A.

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  • Cortica

    Cortica

    Headquartered in Tel Aviv Cortica utilizes unsupervised learning methods to recognize and analyze digital images and video. The technology developed by the Cortica team is based on research of the function of the human brain. == Company Founding == Cortica was founded in 2007 by Igal Raichelgauz, Karina Odinaev and Yehoshua Zeevi. Together, the founders developed the company’s core technology while at Technion – Israel Institute of Technology. By combining discoveries in neuroscience with developments in computer programming, the team created technology that possesses the ability to interpret large amounts of visual data with increased accuracy. This technology, called Image2Text, is based on the founders’ work in digitally replicating cortical neural networks’ ability to identify complex patterns within massive quantities of ambiguous and noisy data. Cortica’s offerings have application in the automotive industry, media industries, as well as the smart city and medical industries. Industry experts suggest that the self-driving automotive industry alone will be worth upwards of $7 trillion while each connected car is expected to generate 4,000 GB of data per day. Beyond that, industry analysts expect the proliferation of surveillance cameras to continue leading to an expected 2,500 Petabytes of data being generated daily by new surveillance cameras. Cortica operates in these high scale industries. The company currently employs professionals from many domains including AI researchers as well as veterans of intelligence units within the Israeli Defense Forces. == Research and Technology == In 2006, Founders Raichelgauz, Odinaev, and Zeevi shared their findings with the 28th IEEE EMBS Annual International Conference in New York in a paper titled, “Natural Signal Classification by Neural Cliques and Phase-Locked Attractors”. That same year, the team also published “Cliques in Neural Ensembles as Perception Carriers" CB Insights recently identified Cortica as the number one patent holder among AI companies. Cortica is researching to develop a machine-learning driving system which can identify objects and pedestrians. Connecting to it, Elon Musk has been rumored to partner with Cortica for his electric car company, Tesla. However, Tesla denies it stating that Musk did not discuss a collaboration with artificial intelligence firm Cortica. == Funding == Cortica raised $7 million in its Series A funding round, announced in August 2012. Investors included Horizons Ventures (the investment firm of Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-Shing), and Ynon Kreiz, the former chairman and CEO of the Endemol Group. In May 2013, it was announced that Cortica had raised $1.5 million from Russian firm Mail.ru Group. It later transpired that this was a part of Cortica's Series B funding round for $6.4 million, announced in June 2013. The round was led by Horizons Ventures, with participation from the Russian firm Mail.ru Group and other angel investors. In its fourth funding round, Cortica has raised $20 million, bringing the total investments to $38 million. According to a report from The Israeli lead Daily economic newspaper, TheMarker, the fourth round was led by a strategic Chinese investor who will probably help the company expand into the Asian market. == Media coverage == GigaOm listed Cortica as one of the top deep learning startups in a November 2013 article surveying the field, along with AlchemyAPI, Ersatz, and Semantria. Business Insider ranked Cortica as one of the coolest tech companies in Israel. CB Insights has identified Cortica as the top patent holding AI company. In 2017 several leading automotive media outlets covered the launch of Cortica's automotive business unit

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  • Minimum intelligent signal test

    Minimum intelligent signal test

    The minimum intelligent signal test, or MIST, is a variation of the Turing test proposed by Chris McKinstry in which only boolean (yes/no or true/false) answers may be given to questions. The purpose of such a test is to provide a quantitative statistical measure of humanness, which may subsequently be used to optimize the performance of artificial intelligence systems intended to imitate human responses. McKinstry gathered approximately 80,000 propositions that could be answered yes or no, e.g.: Is Earth a planet? Was Abraham Lincoln once President of the United States? Is the sun bigger than my foot? Do people sometimes lie? He called these propositions Mindpixels. These questions test both specific knowledge of aspects of culture, and basic facts about the meaning of various words and concepts. It could therefore be compared with the SAT, intelligence testing and other controversial measures of mental ability. McKinstry's aim was not to distinguish between shades of intelligence but to identify whether a computer program could be considered intelligent at all. According to McKinstry, a program able to do much better than chance on a large number of MIST questions would be judged to have some level of intelligence and understanding. For example, on a 20-question test, if a program were guessing the answers at random, it could be expected to score 10 correct on average. But the probability of a program scoring 20 out of 20 correct by guesswork is only one in 220, i.e. one in 1,048,576; so if a program were able to sustain this level of performance over several independent trials, with no prior access to the propositions, it should be considered intelligent. == Discussion == McKinstry criticized existing approaches to artificial intelligence such as chatterbots, saying that his questions could "kill" AI programs by quickly exposing their weaknesses. He contrasted his approach, a series of direct questions assessing an AI's capabilities, to the Turing test and Loebner Prize method of engaging an AI in undirected typed conversation. Critics of the MIST have noted that it would be easy to "kill" a McKinstry-style AI too, due to the impossibility of supplying it with correct answers to all possible yes/no questions by ways of a finite set of human-generated Mindpixels: the fact that an AI can answer the question "Is the sun bigger than my foot?" correctly does not mean that it can answer variations like "Is the sun bigger than (my hand | my liver | an egg yolk | Alpha Centauri A | ...)" correctly, too. However, the late McKinstry might have replied that a truly intelligent, knowledgeable entity (on a par with humans) would be able to work out answers such as (yes | yes | yes | don't know | ...) by applying its knowledge of the relative sizes of the objects named. In other words, the MIST was intended as a test of AI, not as a suggestion for implementing AI. It can also be argued that the MIST is a more objective test of intelligence than the Turing test, a subjective assessment that some might consider to be more a measure of the interrogator's gullibility than of the machine's intelligence. According to this argument, a human's judgment of a Turing test is vulnerable to the ELIZA effect, a tendency to mistake superficial signs of intelligence for the real thing, anthropomorphizing the program. The response, suggested by Alan Turing's essay Computing Machinery and Intelligence, is that if a program is a convincing imitation of an intelligent being, it is in fact intelligent. The dispute is thus over what it means for a program to have "real" intelligence, and by what signs it can be detected. A similar debate exists in the controversy over great ape language, in which nonhuman primates are said to have learned some aspects of sign languages but the significance of this learning is disputed.

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  • Machine unlearning

    Machine unlearning

    Machine unlearning is a branch of machine learning focused on removing specific undesired element, such as private data, wrong or manipulated training data, outdated information, copyrighted material, harmful content, dangerous abilities, or misinformation, without needing to rebuild models from the ground up. Large language models, like the ones powering ChatGPT, may be asked not just to remove specific elements but also to unlearn a "concept," "fact," or "knowledge," which aren't easily linked to specific examples. New terms such as "model editing," "concept editing," and "knowledge unlearning" have emerged to describe this process. == History == Early research efforts were largely motivated by Article 17 of the GDPR, the European Union's privacy regulation commonly known as the "right to be forgotten" (RTBF), introduced in 2014. The GDPR did not anticipate that the development of large language models would make data erasure a complex task. This issue has since led to research on "machine unlearning," with a growing focus on removing copyrighted material, harmful content, dangerous capabilities, and misinformation. Just as early experiences in humans shape later ones, some concepts are more fundamental and harder to unlearn. A piece of knowledge may be so deeply embedded in the model's knowledge graph that unlearning it could cause internal contradictions, requiring adjustments to other parts of the graph to resolve them. Researchers have now also started studying unlearning in the context of removing incorrect or adversarially manipulated training data such as systematically biased labels or poisoning attacks. == Motivations == At present, machine unlearning is motivated by a growing range of concerns that extend well beyond the field's original focus on data privacy. A widely used taxonomy in the literature distinguishes two high-level categories of motivation. Access revocation covers cases where a data subject or rights holder requests the removal of data they own or control. This is most commonly associated with RTBF established by the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and analogous legislation such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). These regulations grant individuals the legal right to request erasure of their personal data from any system that has processed it, including models that were trained on it. Access revocation also encompasses the removal of copyrighted or pay-walled content that was incorporated into training corpora without the necessary licenses, a concern that has become prominent with the widespread use of largely web-scraped pre-training datasets. Model correction covers cases where the model exhibits undesirable behavior arising from the training data, regardless of any individual's request. This includes: Removal of toxic, biased, or unsafe outputs introduced by harmful content in the training set Correction of stale or factually incorrect associations, such as outdated knowledge encoded in a deployed model Removal of dangerous capabilities, such as detailed knowledge of the synthesis of chemical or biological agents Correction of the influence of data poisoning or adversarial attacks that have corrupted model behavior This second category has been formalized as corrective machine unlearning, which frames unlearning as a post-training mechanism for repairing the effects of bad or harmful training data. It is closely related to the AI safety literature, where data filtering alone has been found insufficient to prevent hazardous knowledge from being encoded in model weights, motivating unlearning as a complementary risk mitigation strategy. A further distinction has been drawn in the literature between removal {eliminating the influence of specific training data on model parameters) and suppression (preventing the model from generating specific outputs regardless of how that knowledge is encoded). These two goals are not equivalent: removing training data does not guarantee meaningful output suppression, and suppressing outputs does not constitute removal of the underlying training data's influence. == SISA Training == SISA is a training strategy consisting of four mechanisms designed to make machine unlearning more efficient by structuring how models are trained and updated. Its goal is to allow a system to remove the influence of specific data points without retraining an entire model from scratch. By reorganizing training data and workflows, SISA reduces the computational burden of unlearning requests. Sharding divides the training dataset into multiple disjoint subsets, or shards. Each shard is used to train a separate model instance. This ensures that a single data point affects only one shard, so unlearning it requires updating only the corresponding shard rather than the full model. Isolation refers to training each shard independently, with nothing shared across shards during the training process. This separation prevents cross-contamination between shards, ensuring that forgetting data in one shard does not require adjustments to any others. Slicing breaks the data within each shard into sequential slices and stores model states after each slice is trained on. When an unlearning request targets a piece of data, the system can roll back to the checkpoint before the point was seen and retrain only from that slice forward. This reduces retraining time even within a shard. Aggregation occurs at inference, when the model is queried. It combines the outputs of each shard to determine the output of the overall model. This is often through majority voting or averaging. This allows SISA-trained systems to behave like a single model despite being composed of multiple shard-level models. Together, these mechanisms enable machine learning systems to forget specific data points with far lower computational cost than full retraining. The trade-off is that sharding and slicing can lead to reduced model accuracy, worse generalization, and increased storage requirements for the intermediate checkpoints. This can be tolerable based on the needs of the individual or organization to comply with "right to be forgotten" or efficiently recover from backdoor attacks. == Algorithms == Machine unlearning algorithms are broadly categorized into exact and approximate methods, reflecting a fundamental trade-off between formal guarantees and computational tractability. === Exact Unlearning === Exact unlearning methods produce a model that is statistically indistinguishable from one retrained from scratch on the dataset with the forget data removed. The canonical framework for exact unlearning is SISA Training (Sharded, Isolated, Sliced, and Aggregated), introduced by Bourtoule et al. (2021). SISA partitions the training dataset into disjoint shards and trains a separate sub-model on each. At inference time, predictions are aggregated across sub-models. When an unlearning request is received, only the sub-model corresponding to the shard containing the target data requires retraining, reducing computational overhead proportionally to the number of shards. Exact methods provide the strongest guarantees but become prohibitively expensive for large pre-trained neural networks and are generally limited to settings where training can be structured in advance. === Approximate Unlearning === Approximate unlearning methods seek to produce a model whose behavior is sufficiently close to an exactly unlearned model without the cost of full retraining. These methods dominate practical applications. Common approaches include: Gradient Ascent: The model is fine-tuned by maximizing the loss on the forget set, directly degrading its performance on targeted data. This is the most direct approach but risks destabilizing performance on retained data. Random Labelling: The model is fine-tuned on the forget set using randomly shuffled labels, confusing its associations with the targeted data while producing a less aggressive weight shift than pure gradient ascent. Gradient Difference: Combines gradient ascent on the forget set with simultaneous gradient descent on the retain set, using the retain objective as a regularizer to preserve general model utility. KL Divergence Regularization: Minimizes the KL divergence between the outputs of the unlearned model and the original model on the retain set, anchoring behavior on data the model should remember. Weight Pruning and Fine-tuning: Parameters with the smallest L1-norm are pruned — targeting weights most weakly associated with general knowledge and potentially most associated with the forget set — followed by fine-tuning on the retain set to restore utility. Layer Reset and Fine-tuning: The first or last k layers are re-initialized to random weights and the model is subsequently fine-tuned on the retain set. This is a coarse but computationally simple approach. Selective Synaptic Dampening: Uses influence functions to estimate the effect of individual trainin

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  • AGROVOC

    AGROVOC

    AGROVOC is a multilingual controlled vocabulary covering areas of interest of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), aiming to promote the visibility of research produced among FAO members. By March 2024, AGROVOC consisted of over 42 000 concepts and up to 1 000 000 terms in more than 42 different languages. It is a collaborative effort, the outcome of consensus among a community of experts coordinated by FAO. == History == FAO first published AGROVOC at the beginning of the 1980s in English, Spanish and French to serve as a controlled vocabulary to index publications in agricultural science and technology, especially for the International System for Agricultural Science and Technology (AGRIS). In the 1990s, AGROVOC shifted from paper printing to a digital format opting for data storage handled by a relational database. In 2004, preliminary experiments with expressing AGROVOC into the Web Ontology Language (OWL) took place. At the same time a web based editing tool was developed, then called WorkBench, nowadays VocBench. In 2009 AGROVOC became an SKOS resource. == Usage == Today, AGROVOC is available in different languages. It is employed for tagging resources, allowing searches in a specific language while providing results in many others, enhancing their visibility worldwide. Additionally, it serves for organizing knowledge to facilitate subsequent data retrieval, tagging website content for search engine discovery, standardizing agricultural information data and acting as a reference for translations. Moreover, it finds applications in fields such as data mining, big data, or artificial intelligence. Updated AGROVOC content is released once a month and is available for public use. == Maintenance == FAO coordinates the editorial activities related to the maintenance of AGROVOC. Content curation is carried out by a community of editors and institutions responsible for each of the language versions. VocBench, is the tool used to edit and maintain AGROVOC in a distributed way. FAO also facilitates the technical maintenance of AGROVOC. == Copyright and license == Copyright for AGROVOC content in FAO languages (English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian and Chinese) is held by FAO, while content in other languages stays with the institutions that authored it. AGROVOC thesaurus content in English, Russian, French, Spanish, Arabic and Chinese is licensed under the international Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY-4.0).

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  • David Krueger (professor)

    David Krueger (professor)

    David Krueger is an American machine learning professor and advocate for the reduction of risks related to artificial intelligence. Krueger is an assistant professor in Robust, Reasoning, and Responsible AI at the University of Montreal and a Core Academic Member at Mila. == Early life and education == Krueger obtained a B.A. in mathematics from Reed College, and completed his MSc and Ph.D. in Computer Science at the University of Montreal. He trained in deep learning under Yoshua Bengio, Roland Memisevic, and Aaron Courville from 2013 to 2021. Krueger was also an intern on Google DeepMind's AI Safety team in 2018. == Career == Krueger researches deep learning, AI alignment, and AI safety. His work is focused on reducing the risk of human extinction resulting from out-of-control AI systems. Krueger was an assistant professor at the University of Cambridge from 2021 to 2024, before taking a faculty position at the University of Montreal in 2024. In 2023, he was a founding research director at the UK AI Security Institute. That same year, Krueger initiated the Statement on AI Risk, which argues that AI could cause human extinction and was signed by Anthropic's Dario Amodei, OpenAI's Sam Altman, AI expert Geoffrey Hinton, and other leaders. In April 2026, Krueger discussed the risks of advanced AI at a Capitol Hill event hosted by Senator Bernie Sanders. === Evitable === In 2025, Krueger founded Evitable, a nonprofit organization that advocates for an AI moratorium. == Views == Krueger argues that AI will lead to a "gradual disempowerment" of workers, likening AI chips to nuclear bombs. He also says the military use of AI "poses an existential risk to humanity."

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  • Hubert Dreyfus

    Hubert Dreyfus

    Hubert Lederer Dreyfus ( DRY-fəs; October 15, 1929 – April 22, 2017) was an American philosopher and a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. His main interests included phenomenology, existentialism and the philosophy of both psychology and literature, as well as the philosophical implications of artificial intelligence. He was widely known for his exegesis of Martin Heidegger, which critics labeled "Dreydegger". Dreyfus was featured in Tao Ruspoli's film Being in the World (2010), and was among the philosophers interviewed by Bryan Magee for the BBC Television series The Great Philosophers (1987). The Futurama character Professor Hubert Farnsworth is partly named after him, writer Eric Kaplan having been a former student. == Life and career == Dreyfus was born on 15 October 1929, in Terre Haute, Indiana, to Stanley S. and Irene (Lederer) Dreyfus. He attended Harvard University from 1947. With a senior honors thesis on Causality and Quantum Theory (for which W. V. O. Quine was the main examiner) he was awarded a B.A. summa cum laude in 1951 and joined Phi Beta Kappa. He was awarded a M.A. in 1952. He was a Teaching Fellow at Harvard from 1952 to 1953 (as he was again in 1954 and 1956). Then, on a Harvard Sheldon traveling fellowship, Dreyfus studied at the University of Freiburg from 1953 to 1954. During this time he had an interview with Martin Heidegger. Sean D. Kelly records that Dreyfus found the meeting 'disappointing.' A brief mention of it was made by Dreyfus during his 1987 BBC interview with Bryan Magee in remarks that are revealing of both his and Heidegger's opinion of the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. Between 1956 and 1957, Dreyfus undertook research at the Husserl Archives at the University of Louvain on a Fulbright Fellowship. Towards the end of his stay, his first (jointly authored) paper "Curds and Lions in Don Quijote" would appear in print. After acting as an instructor in philosophy at Brandeis University (1957–1959), he attended the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, on a French government grant (1959–1960). From 1960, first as an instructor, then as an assistant and then associate professor, Dreyfus taught philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In 1964, with his dissertation Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception, he obtained his Ph.D. from Harvard. (Due to his knowledge of Husserl, Dagfinn Føllesdal sat on the thesis committee but he has asserted that Dreyfus "was not really my student.") That same year, his co-translation (with his first wife) of Sense and Non-Sense by Maurice Merleau-Ponty was published. Also in 1964, and whilst still at MIT, he was employed as a consultant by the RAND Corporation to review the work of Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). This resulted in the publication, in 1965, of the "famously combative" Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence, which proved to be the first of a series of papers and books attacking the AI field's claims and assumptions. The first edition of What Computers Can't Do would follow in 1972, and this critique of AI (which has been translated into at least ten languages) would establish Dreyfus's public reputation. However, as the editors of his Festschrift noted: "the study and interpretation of 'continental' philosophers... came first in the order of his philosophical interests and influences." === Berkeley === In 1968, although he had been granted tenure, Dreyfus left MIT and became an associate professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, (winning, that same year, the Harbison Prize for Outstanding Teaching). In 1972 he was promoted to full professor. Though Dreyfus retired from his chair in 1994, he continued as professor of philosophy in the Graduate School (and held, from 1999, a joint appointment in the rhetoric department). He continued to teach philosophy at UC Berkeley until his last class in December 2016. Dreyfus was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001. He was also awarded an honorary doctorate for "his brilliant and highly influential work in the field of artificial intelligence" and his interpretation of twentieth century continental philosophy by Erasmus University. Dreyfus died on April 22, 2017. His younger brother and sometimes collaborator, Stuart Dreyfus, is a professor emeritus of industrial engineering and operations research at the University of California, Berkeley. == Dreyfus' criticism of AI == Dreyfus' critique of artificial intelligence (AI) concerns what he considers to be the four primary assumptions of AI research. The first two assumptions are what he calls the "biological" and "psychological" assumptions. The biological assumption is that the brain is analogous to computer hardware and the mind is analogous to computer software. The psychological assumption is that the mind works by performing discrete computations (in the form of algorithmic rules) on discrete representations or symbols. Dreyfus claims that the plausibility of the psychological assumption rests on two others: the epistemological and ontological assumptions. The epistemological assumption is that all activity (either by animate or inanimate objects) can be formalized (mathematically) in the form of predictive rules or laws. The ontological assumption is that reality consists entirely of a set of mutually independent, atomic (indivisible) facts. It's because of the epistemological assumption that workers in the field argue that intelligence is the same as formal rule-following, and it's because of the ontological one that they argue that human knowledge consists entirely of internal representations of reality. On the basis of these two assumptions, workers in the field claim that cognition is the manipulation of internal symbols by internal rules, and that, therefore, human behaviour is, to a large extent, context free (see contextualism). Therefore, a truly scientific psychology is possible, which will detail the 'internal' rules of the human mind, in the same way the laws of physics detail the 'external' laws of the physical world. However, it is this key assumption that Dreyfus denies. In other words, he argues that we cannot now (and never will be able to) understand our own behavior in the same way as we understand objects in, for example, physics or chemistry: that is, by considering ourselves as things whose behaviour can be predicted via 'objective', context free scientific laws. According to Dreyfus, a context-free psychology is a contradiction in terms. Dreyfus's arguments against this position are taken from the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition (especially the work of Martin Heidegger). Heidegger argued that, contrary to the cognitivist views (on which AI has been based), our being is in fact highly context-bound, which is why the two context-free assumptions are false. Dreyfus doesn't deny that we can choose to see human (or any) activity as being 'law-governed', in the same way that we can choose to see reality as consisting of indivisible atomic facts... if we wish. But it is a huge leap from that to state that because we want to or can see things in this way that it is therefore an objective fact that they are the case. In fact, Dreyfus argues that they are not (necessarily) the case, and that, therefore, any research program that assumes they are will quickly run into profound theoretical and practical problems. Therefore, the current efforts of workers in the field are doomed to failure. Dreyfus argues that to get a device or devices with human-like intelligence would require them to have a human-like being-in-the-world and to have bodies more or less like ours, and social acculturation (i.e. a society) more or less like ours. (This view is shared by psychologists in the embodied psychology (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and distributed cognition traditions. His opinions are similar to those of robotics researchers such as Rodney Brooks as well as researchers in the field of artificial life.) Contrary to a popular misconception, Dreyfus never predicted that computers would never beat humans at chess. In Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence, he only reported (correctly) the state of the art of the time: "Still no chess program can play even amateur chess." Daniel Crevier writes: "time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's comments. Had he formulated them less aggressively, constructive actions they suggested might have been taken much earlier." == Webcasting philosophy == When UC Berkeley and Apple began making a selected number of lecture classes freely available to the public as podcasts beginning around 2006, a recording of Dreyfus teaching a course called "Man, God, and Society in Western Literature – From Gods to God and Back" rose to the 58th most popular webcast on iTunes. These webcasts have attracted the attention of many, including non-academics, to Dreyfus and his

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  • Arabic Ontology

    Arabic Ontology

    Arabic Ontology is a website offering linguistic ontology services for the Arabic language which can be used like the online site WordNet. Users can use Arabic Ontology to classify or clarify the concepts and meanings of Arabic terms. == Ontology Structure == The ontology structure (i.e., data model) is similar to WordNet's structure. Each concept in the database is given a unique concept identifier (URI), informally described by a gloss, and lexicalized by one or more synonymous lemma terms. Each term-concept pair is called a sense, and is given a SenseID. A set of senses is called synset. Concepts and senses are described by further attributes such as era and area — to specify example usage and ontological analysis. Semantic relations are defined between concepts. Some important entities are included in the ontology, such as individual countries and bodies of water. These individuals are given separate IndividualIDs and linked with their concepts through the InstanceOf relation. == Mappings to other resources == Concepts in the Arabic Ontology are mapped to synsets in WordNet, as well as to BFO and DOLCE. Terms used in the Arabic Ontology are mapped to lemmas in the LDC's SAMA database. == Applications == Arabic Ontology can be used in many application domains, such as: Information retrieval, to enrich queries (e.g., in search engines) and improve the quality of the results, i.e. meaningful search rather than string-matching search; Machine translation and word-sense disambiguation, by finding the exact mapping of concepts across languages, especially that the Arabic ontology is also mapped to the WordNet; Data Integration and interoperability in which the Arabic ontology can be used as a semantic reference to link databases and information systems; Semantic Web and Web 3.0, by using the Arabic ontology as a semantic reference to disambiguate the meanings used in websites; among many other applications. == URLs Design == The URLs in the Arabic Ontology are designed according to the W3C's Best Practices for Publishing Linked Data, as described in the following URL schemes. This allows one to also explore the whole database like exploring a graph: Ontology Concept: Each concept in the Arabic Ontology has a ConceptID and can be accessed using: https://{domain}/concept/{ConceptID | Term}. In case of a term, the set of concepts that this term lexicalizes are all retrieved. In case of a ConceptID, the concept and its direct subtypes are retrieved, e.g. https://ontology.birzeit.edu/concept/293198 Semantic relations: Relationships between concepts can be accessed using these schemes: (i) the URL: https:// {domain}/concept/{RelationName}/{ConceptID} allows retrieval of relationships among ontology concepts. (ii) the URL: https://{domain}/lexicalconcept/{RelationName}/{lexicalConceptID} allows retrieval of relations between lexical concepts. For example, https://ontology.birzeit.edu/concept/instances/293121 retrieves the instances of the concept 293121. The relations that are currently used in our database are: {subtypes, type, instances, parts, related, similar, equivalent}.

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  • Knowledge value chain

    Knowledge value chain

    A knowledge value chain is a sequence of intellectual tasks by which knowledge workers build their employer's unique competitive advantage and/or social and environmental benefit. As an example, the components of a research and development project form a knowledge value chain. Productivity improvements in a knowledge value chain may come from knowledge integration in its original sense of data systems consolidation. Improvements also flow from the knowledge integration that occurs when knowledge management techniques are applied to the continuous improvement of a business process or processes. The term first started coming into common use around 1999, appearing in management-related talks and papers. It was registered as a trademark in 2004 by TW Powell Co., a Manhattan company. Knowledge value chain processes Knowledge acquisition Knowledge storage Knowledge dissemination Knowledge application

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  • Semantic parameterization

    Semantic parameterization

    Semantic parameterization is a conceptual modeling process for expressing natural language descriptions of a domain in first-order predicate logic. The process yields a formalization of natural language sentences in Description Logic to answer the who, what and where questions in the Inquiry-Cycle Model (ICM) developed by Colin Potts and his colleagues at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The parameterization process complements the Knowledge Acquisition and autOmated Specification (KAOS) method, which formalizes answers to the when, why and how ICM questions in Temporal Logic, to complete the ICM formalization. The artifacts used in the parameterization process include a dictionary that aligns the domain lexicon with unique concepts, distinguishing between synonyms and polysemes, and several natural language patterns that aid in mapping common domain descriptions to formal specifications. == Relationship to other theories == Semantic Parameterization defines a meta-model consisting of eight roles that are domain-independent and reusable. Seven of these roles correspond to Jeffrey Gruber's thematic relations and case roles in Charles Fillmore's case grammar: The Inquiry-Cycle Model (ICM) was introduced to drive elicitation between engineers and stakeholders in requirements engineering. The ICM consists of who, what, where, why, how and when questions. All but the when questions, which require a Temporal Logic to represent such phenomena, have been aligned with the meta-model in semantic parameterization using Description Logic (DL). == Introduction with Example == The semantic parameterization process is based on Description Logic, wherein the TBox is composed of words in a dictionary, including nouns, verbs, and adjectives, and the ABox is partitioned into two sets of assertions: 1) those assertions that come from words in the natural language statement, called the grounding, and 2) those assertions that are inferred by the (human) modeler, called the meta-model. Consider the following unstructured natural language statement (UNLS) (see Breaux et al. for an extended discussion): UNLS1.0 The customer1,1 must not share2,2 the access-code3,3 of the customer1,1 with someone4,4 who is not the provider5,4. The modeler first identifies intensional and extensional polysemes and synonyms, denoted by the subscripts: the first subscript uniquely refers to the intensional index, i.e., the same first index in two or more words refer to the same concept in the TBox; the second subscript uniquely refers to the extensional index, i.e., two same second index in two or more words refer to the same individual in the ABox. This indexing step aligns words in the statement and concepts in the dictionary. Next, the modeler identifies concepts from the dictionary to compose the meta-model. The following table illustrates the complete DL expression that results from applying semantic parameterization.

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