AI Chatbot Addiction Reddit

AI Chatbot Addiction Reddit — independent reviews, comparisons, pricing and step-by-step guides on Aizhi.

  • Attensity

    Attensity

    Attensity was an American company that provided social analytics and engagement applications for social customer relationship management (social CRM). Attensity's text analytics software applications extracted facts, relationships and sentiment from unstructured data. == History == Attensity was founded in 2000. An early investor in Attensity was In-Q-Tel, which funds technology to support the missions of the US Government and the broader DOD. InTTENSITY, an independent company that has combined Inxight with Attensity Software (the only joint development project that combines two InQTel funded software packages), was the exclusive distributor and outlet for Attensity in the Federal Market. In 2009, Attensity Corp., then based in Palo Alto, merged with Germany's Empolis and Living-e AG to form Attensity Group. In 2010, Attensity Group acquired Biz360, a provider of social media monitoring and market intelligence solutions. In early 2012, Attensity Group divested itself of the Empolis business unit via a management buyout; that unit currently conducts business under its pre-merger name. Attensity Group was a closely held private company. Its majority shareholder was Aeris Capital, a private Swiss investment office advising a high-net-worth individual and his charitable foundation. Foundation Capital, Granite Ventures, and Scale Venture Partners were among Biz360's investors and thus became shareholders in Attensity Group. In February 2016, Attensity's IP assets were acquired by InContact, and Attensity closed.

    Read more →
  • Symbolic regression

    Symbolic regression

    Symbolic regression (SR) is a type of regression analysis that searches the space of mathematical expressions to find the model that best fits a given dataset, both in terms of accuracy and simplicity. No particular model is provided as a starting point for symbolic regression. Instead, initial expressions are formed by randomly combining mathematical building blocks such as mathematical operators, analytic functions, constants, and state variables. Usually, a subset of these primitives will be specified by the person operating it, but that's not a requirement of the technique. The symbolic regression problem for mathematical functions has been tackled with a variety of methods, including recombining equations most commonly using genetic programming, as well as more recent methods utilizing Bayesian methods and neural networks. Another non-classical alternative method to SR is called Universal Functions Originator (UFO), which has a different mechanism, search-space, and building strategy. Further methods such as Exact Learning attempt to transform the fitting problem into a moments problem in a natural function space, usually built around generalizations of the Meijer-G function. By not requiring a priori specification of a model, symbolic regression isn't affected by human bias, or unknown gaps in domain knowledge. It attempts to uncover the intrinsic relationships of the dataset, by letting the patterns in the data itself reveal the appropriate models, rather than imposing a model structure that is deemed mathematically tractable from a human perspective. The fitness function that drives the evolution of the models takes into account not only error metrics (to ensure the models accurately predict the data), but also special complexity measures, thus ensuring that the resulting models reveal the data's underlying structure in a way that's understandable from a human perspective. This facilitates reasoning and favors the odds of getting insights about the data-generating system, as well as improving generalisability and extrapolation behaviour by preventing overfitting. Accuracy and simplicity may be left as two separate objectives of the regression—in which case the optimum solutions form a Pareto front—or they may be combined into a single objective by means of a model selection principle such as minimum description length. It has been proven that symbolic regression is an NP-hard problem. Nevertheless, if the sought-for equation is not too complex it is possible to solve the symbolic regression problem exactly by generating every possible function (built from some predefined set of operators) and evaluating them on the dataset in question. == Difference from classical regression == While conventional regression techniques seek to optimize the parameters for a pre-specified model structure, symbolic regression avoids imposing prior assumptions, and instead infers the model from the data. In other words, it attempts to discover both model structures and model parameters. This approach has the disadvantage of having a much larger space to search, because not only the search space in symbolic regression is infinite, but there are an infinite number of models which will perfectly fit a finite data set (provided that the model complexity isn't artificially limited). This means that it will possibly take a symbolic regression algorithm longer to find an appropriate model and parametrization, than traditional regression techniques. This can be attenuated by limiting the set of building blocks provided to the algorithm, based on existing knowledge of the system that produced the data; but in the end, using symbolic regression is a decision that has to be balanced with how much is known about the underlying system. Nevertheless, this characteristic of symbolic regression also has advantages: because the evolutionary algorithm requires diversity in order to effectively explore the search space, the result is likely to be a selection of high-scoring models (and their corresponding set of parameters). Examining this collection could provide better insight into the underlying process, and allows the user to identify an approximation that better fits their needs in terms of accuracy and simplicity. == Benchmarking == === SRBench === In 2021, SRBench was proposed as a large benchmark for symbolic regression. In its inception, SRBench featured 14 symbolic regression methods, 7 other ML methods, and 252 datasets from PMLB. The benchmark intends to be a living project: it encourages the submission of improvements, new datasets, and new methods, to keep track of the state of the art in SR. === SRBench Competition 2022 === In 2022, SRBench announced the competition Interpretable Symbolic Regression for Data Science, which was held at the GECCO conference in Boston, MA. The competition pitted nine leading symbolic regression algorithms against each other on a novel set of data problems and considered different evaluation criteria. The competition was organized in two tracks, a synthetic track and a real-world data track. ==== Synthetic Track ==== In the synthetic track, methods were compared according to five properties: re-discovery of exact expressions; feature selection; resistance to local optima; extrapolation; and sensitivity to noise. Rankings of the methods were: QLattice PySR (Python Symbolic Regression) uDSR (Deep Symbolic Optimization) ==== Real-world Track ==== In the real-world track, methods were trained to build interpretable predictive models for 14-day forecast counts of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths in New York State. These models were reviewed by a subject expert and assigned trust ratings and evaluated for accuracy and simplicity. The ranking of the methods was: uDSR (Deep Symbolic Optimization) QLattice geneticengine (Genetic Engine) == Non-standard methods == Most symbolic regression algorithms prevent combinatorial explosion by implementing evolutionary algorithms that iteratively improve the best-fit expression over many generations. Recently, researchers have proposed algorithms utilizing other tactics in AI. Silviu-Marian Udrescu and Max Tegmark developed the "AI Feynman" algorithm, which attempts symbolic regression by training a neural network to represent the mystery function, then runs tests against the neural network to attempt to break up the problem into smaller parts. For example, if f ( x 1 , . . . , x i , x i + 1 , . . . , x n ) = g ( x 1 , . . . , x i ) + h ( x i + 1 , . . . , x n ) {\displaystyle f(x_{1},...,x_{i},x_{i+1},...,x_{n})=g(x_{1},...,x_{i})+h(x_{i+1},...,x_{n})} , tests against the neural network can recognize the separation and proceed to solve for g {\displaystyle g} and h {\displaystyle h} separately and with different variables as inputs. This is an example of divide and conquer, which reduces the size of the problem to be more manageable. AI Feynman also transforms the inputs and outputs of the mystery function in order to produce a new function which can be solved with other techniques, and performs dimensional analysis to reduce the number of independent variables involved. The algorithm was able to "discover" 100 equations from The Feynman Lectures on Physics, while a leading software using evolutionary algorithms, Eureqa, solved only 71. AI Feynman, in contrast to classic symbolic regression methods, requires a very large dataset in order to first train the neural network and is naturally biased towards equations that are common in elementary physics.

    Read more →
  • EM algorithm and GMM model

    EM algorithm and GMM model

    In statistics, EM (expectation maximization) algorithm handles latent variables, while GMM is the Gaussian mixture model. == Background == In the picture below, are shown the red blood cell hemoglobin concentration and the red blood cell volume data of two groups of people, the Anemia group and the control group (i.e. the group of people without Anemia). As expected, people with Anemia have lower red blood cell volume and lower red blood cell hemoglobin concentration than those without Anemia. x {\displaystyle x} is a random vector such as x := ( red blood cell volume , red blood cell hemoglobin concentration ) {\displaystyle x:={\big (}{\text{red blood cell volume}},{\text{red blood cell hemoglobin concentration}}{\big )}} , and from medical studies it is known that x {\displaystyle x} are normally distributed in each group, i.e. x ∼ N ( μ , Σ ) {\displaystyle x\sim {\mathcal {N}}(\mu ,\Sigma )} . z {\displaystyle z} is denoted as the group where x {\displaystyle x} belongs, with z i = 0 {\displaystyle z_{i}=0} when x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} belongs to the Anemia group and z i = 1 {\displaystyle z_{i}=1} when x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} belongs to the control group. Also z ∼ Categorical ⁡ ( k , ϕ ) {\displaystyle z\sim \operatorname {Categorical} (k,\phi )} where k = 2 {\displaystyle k=2} , ϕ j ≥ 0 , {\displaystyle \phi _{j}\geq 0,} and ∑ j = 1 k ϕ j = 1 {\displaystyle \sum _{j=1}^{k}\phi _{j}=1} . See Categorical distribution. The following procedure can be used to estimate ϕ , μ , Σ {\displaystyle \phi ,\mu ,\Sigma } . A maximum likelihood estimation can be applied: ℓ ( ϕ , μ , Σ ) = ∑ i = 1 m log ⁡ ( p ( x ( i ) ; ϕ , μ , Σ ) ) = ∑ i = 1 m log ⁡ ∑ z ( i ) = 1 k p ( x ( i ) ∣ z ( i ) ; μ , Σ ) p ( z ( i ) ; ϕ ) {\displaystyle \ell (\phi ,\mu ,\Sigma )=\sum _{i=1}^{m}\log(p(x^{(i)};\phi ,\mu ,\Sigma ))=\sum _{i=1}^{m}\log \sum _{z^{(i)}=1}^{k}p\left(x^{(i)}\mid z^{(i)};\mu ,\Sigma \right)p(z^{(i)};\phi )} As the z i {\displaystyle z_{i}} for each x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} are known, the log likelihood function can be simplified as below: ℓ ( ϕ , μ , Σ ) = ∑ i = 1 m log ⁡ p ( x ( i ) ∣ z ( i ) ; μ , Σ ) + log ⁡ p ( z ( i ) ; ϕ ) {\displaystyle \ell (\phi ,\mu ,\Sigma )=\sum _{i=1}^{m}\log p\left(x^{(i)}\mid z^{(i)};\mu ,\Sigma \right)+\log p\left(z^{(i)};\phi \right)} Now the likelihood function can be maximized by making partial derivative over μ , Σ , ϕ {\displaystyle \mu ,\Sigma ,\phi } , obtaining: ϕ j = 1 m ∑ i = 1 m 1 { z ( i ) = j } {\displaystyle \phi _{j}={\frac {1}{m}}\sum _{i=1}^{m}1\{z^{(i)}=j\}} μ j = ∑ i = 1 m 1 { z ( i ) = j } x ( i ) ∑ i = 1 m 1 { z ( i ) = j } {\displaystyle \mu _{j}={\frac {\sum _{i=1}^{m}1\{z^{(i)}=j\}x^{(i)}}{\sum _{i=1}^{m}1\left\{z^{(i)}=j\right\}}}} Σ j = ∑ i = 1 m 1 { z ( i ) = j } ( x ( i ) − μ j ) ( x ( i ) − μ j ) T ∑ i = 1 m 1 { z ( i ) = j } {\displaystyle \Sigma _{j}={\frac {\sum _{i=1}^{m}1\{z^{(i)}=j\}(x^{(i)}-\mu _{j})(x^{(i)}-\mu _{j})^{T}}{\sum _{i=1}^{m}1\{z^{(i)}=j\}}}} If z i {\displaystyle z_{i}} is known, the estimation of the parameters results to be quite simple with maximum likelihood estimation. But if z i {\displaystyle z_{i}} is unknown it is much more complicated. Being z {\displaystyle z} a latent variable (i.e. not observed), with unlabeled scenario, the expectation maximization algorithm is needed to estimate z {\displaystyle z} as well as other parameters. Generally, this problem is set as a GMM since the data in each group is normally distributed. In machine learning, the latent variable z {\displaystyle z} is considered as a latent pattern lying under the data, which the observer is not able to see very directly. x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} is the known data, while ϕ , μ , Σ {\displaystyle \phi ,\mu ,\Sigma } are the parameter of the model. With the EM algorithm, some underlying pattern z {\displaystyle z} in the data x i {\displaystyle x_{i}} can be found, along with the estimation of the parameters. The wide application of this circumstance in machine learning is what makes EM algorithm so important. == EM algorithm in GMM == The EM algorithm consists of two steps: the E-step and the M-step. Firstly, the model parameters and the z ( i ) {\displaystyle z^{(i)}} can be randomly initialized. In the E-step, the algorithm tries to guess the value of z ( i ) {\displaystyle z^{(i)}} based on the parameters, while in the M-step, the algorithm updates the value of the model parameters based on the guess of z ( i ) {\displaystyle z^{(i)}} of the E-step. These two steps are repeated until convergence is reached. The algorithm in GMM is: Repeat until convergence: 1. (E-step) For each i , j {\displaystyle i,j} , set w j ( i ) := p ( z ( i ) = j | x ( i ) ; ϕ , μ , Σ ) {\displaystyle w_{j}^{(i)}:=p\left(z^{(i)}=j|x^{(i)};\phi ,\mu ,\Sigma \right)} 2. (M-step) Update the parameters ϕ j := 1 m ∑ i = 1 m w j ( i ) {\displaystyle \phi _{j}:={\frac {1}{m}}\sum _{i=1}^{m}w_{j}^{(i)}} μ j := ∑ i = 1 m w j ( i ) x ( i ) ∑ i = 1 m w j ( i ) {\displaystyle \mu _{j}:={\frac {\sum _{i=1}^{m}w_{j}^{(i)}x^{(i)}}{\sum _{i=1}^{m}w_{j}^{(i)}}}} Σ j := ∑ i = 1 m w j ( i ) ( x ( i ) − μ j ) ( x ( i ) − μ j ) T ∑ i = 1 m w j ( i ) {\displaystyle \Sigma _{j}:={\frac {\sum _{i=1}^{m}w_{j}^{(i)}\left(x^{(i)}-\mu _{j}\right)\left(x^{(i)}-\mu _{j}\right)^{T}}{\sum _{i=1}^{m}w_{j}^{(i)}}}} With Bayes' rule, the following result is obtained by the E-step: p ( z ( i ) = j | x ( i ) ; ϕ , μ , Σ ) = p ( x ( i ) | z ( i ) = j ; μ , Σ ) p ( z ( i ) = j ; ϕ ) ∑ l = 1 k p ( x ( i ) | z ( i ) = l ; μ , Σ ) p ( z ( i ) = l ; ϕ ) {\displaystyle p\left(z^{(i)}=j|x^{(i)};\phi ,\mu ,\Sigma \right)={\frac {p\left(x^{(i)}|z^{(i)}=j;\mu ,\Sigma \right)p\left(z^{(i)}=j;\phi \right)}{\sum _{l=1}^{k}p\left(x^{(i)}|z^{(i)}=l;\mu ,\Sigma \right)p\left(z^{(i)}=l;\phi \right)}}} According to GMM setting, these following formulas are obtained: p ( x ( i ) | z ( i ) = j ; μ , Σ ) = 1 ( 2 π ) n / 2 | Σ j | 1 / 2 exp ⁡ ( − 1 2 ( x ( i ) − μ j ) T Σ j − 1 ( x ( i ) − μ j ) ) {\displaystyle p\left(x^{(i)}|z^{(i)}=j;\mu ,\Sigma \right)={\frac {1}{(2\pi )^{n/2}\left|\Sigma _{j}\right|^{1/2}}}\exp \left(-{\frac {1}{2}}\left(x^{(i)}-\mu _{j}\right)^{T}\Sigma _{j}^{-1}\left(x^{(i)}-\mu _{j}\right)\right)} p ( z ( i ) = j ; ϕ ) = ϕ j {\displaystyle p\left(z^{(i)}=j;\phi \right)=\phi _{j}} In this way, a switch between the E-step and the M-step is possible, according to the randomly initialized parameters.

    Read more →
  • Reciprocal human machine learning

    Reciprocal human machine learning

    Reciprocal Human Machine Learning (RHML) is an interdisciplinary approach to designing human-AI interaction systems. RHML aims to enable continual learning between humans and machine learning models by having them learn from each other. This approach keeps the human expert "in the loop" to oversee and enhance machine learning performance and simultaneously support the human expert continue learning. == Background == RHML emerged in the context of the rise of big data analytics and artificial intelligence for intelligent tasks like sense-making and decision-making. As machine learning advanced to take on more roles, researchers realized fully autonomous systems had limitations and needed human guidance. RHML extends the concept of human-in-the-loop systems by promoting reciprocal learning. Humans learn from their interactions with machine learning models, staying up-to-date on evolving technology. The models also learn from human feedback and oversight. This amplification of learning on both sides is a key focus of RHML. The approach draws on theories of learning in dyads from education and psychology. It also builds on human-computer interaction and human-centered design principles. Implementing RHML requires developing specialized tools and interfaces tailored to the application == Applications == RHML has been explored across diverse domains including: Cybersecurity - Software to enable reciprocal learning between experts and AI models for social media threat detection. Organizational decision-making - RHML to structure collaboration between humans and AI systems. Workplace training - Using RHML for workers to learn from AI technologies on the job. Open science - Using human and AI collaboration to promote open science. Production and logistics - turning workers and intelligent machines into teammates. RHML maintains human oversight and control over AI systems, while enabling cutting-edge machine learning performance. This collaborative approach highlights the importance of keeping the human expert involved in the loop. An example of RHML in application is Free Spirit (AFSFCV), an open-source architecture first published in early 2025 as a whitepaper, proposing a visually structured approach to intent-based human–AI interaction.

    Read more →
  • WomanStats Project

    WomanStats Project

    The WomanStats Project is a donor-funded research and database project housed at Brigham Young University that "seeks to collect detailed statistical data on the status of women around the world, and to connect that data with data on the security of states." The WomanStats Database aims to provide a comprehensive compilation of information on the status of women in the world. Coders comb the extant literature and conduct expert interviews to find qualitative and quantitative information on over 300 indicators of women's status in 174 countries with populations of at least 200,000. Access to the online database is free. == History and structure == WomanStats began as an outgrowth of a paper Dr. Valerie M. Hudson (of the Brigham Young University Political Science department) and one of her graduate students, Andrea den Boer, published in International Security on the association between national security and the abnormal sex ratio in Asia. After the success and influence of their first article, (later added as one of their top twenty national security articles of that journal of all time), Hudson and den Boer did further research on the connection between the status of women and national security, but found that there was no single database that covered the range of topics that they needed for their research. Consequently, they began compiling information on variables regarding the status of women around the world. The database was officially formed in 2001 and grew exponentially as it later added more variables. The Project went live on the Internet in July 2007. The principal investigators are: Valerie M. Hudson (International Relations), Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill (Psychology, emeritus), and Chad F. Emmett (Geography) all from Brigham Young University, Mary Caprioli from the University of Minnesota, Duluth (International Relations), Rose McDermott from Brown University (International Relations), Andrea Den Boer from the University of Kent at Canterbury in the United Kingdom (International Relations) and S. Matthew Stearmer from the Ohio State University (Sociology; doctoral student). Approximately a dozen undergraduate and graduate students at Brigham Young University and Texas A&M University work at any one time as coders for the project. The coders take the raw quantitative and qualitative data collected in government reports, news articles, research papers, etc. and sort the applicable information on women into categories. They may also implement scales developed by the principal investigators, or that they (the students) themselves have developed. == Database == As of February 2011, the database has 307 variables, covers 174 nations with populations over 200,000, uses 18,015 sources and contains over 111,000 individual data points. All data is referenced to original sources. Not every variable has information for each country; similarly, not all countries have information for each variable: overall, about 70% of country-variable combinations have information. These database coding gaps exist where information is not available or is incomplete, or variables are not collected and reported by governments or international organizations. At times, information from different sources may be contradictory, and the WomanStats Database records this discrepant information for triangulation purposes. == Users and role of the database == The database is meant to help fill a hole in the extant data on the situation of women around the world. WomanStats data and research has been vetted and/or used by the United Nations, the United States Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the World Bank. Their data and research were also used by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in crafting the International Violence Against Women’s Act. The Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE) of the United Nations has stated that the WomanStats project "filled a major gap in the availability of data on women" (2007). Victor Asal and Mitchell Brown, researchers not affiliated with WomanStats, stated in an article published in Politics and Policy that "one of the most significant challenges of cross-national empirical studies of the prevalence of interpersonal violence is the paucity of available data, particularly reliable data," and that "WomanStats has allowed for an important first glimpse at analyzing the factors related to interpersonal violence." They conclude by stating that "Our findings suggest that, in the same way that larger disciplinary resources have invested in interstate and intrastate war, disciplinary resources need to be expended in creating a data set exploring interpersonal violence. Until the rights and the lives of women and children are taken as seriously as the survival of states by more proactively collaborating on projects like WomanStats, we will continue to only have a small lens through which to understand problems like this." Princeton University professor Evan S. Liberman wrote, "Although data on political regimes and group conflict have been in far greater demand by political scientists than data on gender politics and policies, two gender-related databases provide...examples of innovative HIRDs. Both the Womanstats database project (Hudson et al. 2009) and the Research Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS) project (McBride et al. 2008) are well-integrated presentations of quantitative and qualitative data characterizing the quality of gender relations around the world and, in particular, analytic descriptions of the treatment of women."." == Research == The research component of WomanStats focuses on exploring the relationship between the situation of women and the behavior and security of states. Current research initiatives include: Exploring the relationship between violent instability and inequity and family law. Examining the effect of polygyny and marriage market dislocations on the rise of suicide terrorism. Documenting discrepancies between laws on the books and cultural practices on the ground concerning gender issues. Investigating how well the situation of women predicts the peacefulness of nations-states, compared to their variables such as democracy, wealth, and civilization. The Project has published articles in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Peace and Conflict, Journal of Peace Research, Political Psychology, Cumberland Law Review, and World Political Review, and has a forthcoming book from Columbia University Press.

    Read more →
  • Labeled data

    Labeled data

    Labeled data is a group of samples that have been tagged with one or more labels. Labeling typically takes a set of unlabeled data and augments each piece of it with informative tags called judgments. For example, a data label might indicate whether a photo contains a horse or a cow, which words were uttered in an audio recording, what type of action is being performed in a video, what the topic of a news article is, what the overall sentiment of a tweet is, or whether a dot in an X-ray is a tumor. Labels can be obtained by having humans make judgments about a given piece of unlabeled data. Labeled data is significantly more expensive to obtain than the raw unlabeled data. The quality of labeled data directly influences the performance of supervised machine learning models in operation, as these models learn from the provided labels. == Crowdsourced labeled data == In 2006, Fei-Fei Li, the co-director of the Stanford Human-Centered AI Institute, initiated research to improve the artificial intelligence models and algorithms for image recognition by significantly enlarging the training data. The researchers downloaded millions of images from the World Wide Web and a team of undergraduates started to apply labels for objects to each image. In 2007, Li outsourced the data labeling work on Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online marketplace for digital piece work. The 3.2 million images that were labeled by more than 49,000 workers formed the basis for ImageNet, one of the largest hand-labeled database for outline of object recognition. == Automated data labelling == After obtaining a labeled dataset, machine learning models can be applied to the data so that new unlabeled data can be presented to the model and a likely label can be guessed or predicted for that piece of unlabeled data. == Challenges == === Data-driven bias === Algorithmic decision-making is subject to programmer-driven bias as well as data-driven bias. Training data that relies on bias labeled data will result in prejudices and omissions in a predictive model, despite the machine learning algorithm being legitimate. The labeled data used to train a specific machine learning algorithm needs to be a statistically representative sample to not bias the results. For example, in facial recognition systems underrepresented groups are subsequently often misclassified if the labeled data available to train has not been representative of the population,. In 2018, a study by Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru demonstrated that two facial analysis datasets that have been used to train facial recognition algorithms, IJB-A and Adience, are composed of 79.6% and 86.2% lighter skinned humans respectively. === Human error and inconsistency === Human annotators are prone to errors and biases when labeling data. This can lead to inconsistent labels and affect the quality of the data set. The inconsistency can affect the machine learning model's ability to generalize well. === Domain expertise === Certain fields, such as legal document analysis or medical imaging, require annotators with specialized domain knowledge. Without the expertise, the annotations or labeled data may be inaccurate, negatively impacting the machine learning model's performance in a real-world scenario.

    Read more →
  • Intelligent database

    Intelligent database

    Until the 1980s, databases were viewed as computer systems that stored record-oriented and business data such as manufacturing inventories, bank records, and sales transactions. A database system was not expected to merge numeric data with text, images, or multimedia information, nor was it expected to automatically notice patterns in the data it stored. In the late 1980s the concept of an intelligent database was put forward as a system that manages information (rather than data) in a way that appears natural to users and which goes beyond simple record keeping. The term was introduced in 1989 by the book Intelligent Databases by Kamran Parsaye, Mark Chignell, Setrag Khoshafian and Harry Wong. The concept postulated three levels of intelligence for such systems: high level tools, the user interface and the database engine. The high level tools manage data quality and automatically discover relevant patterns in the data with a process called data mining. This layer often relies on the use of artificial intelligence techniques. The user interface uses hypermedia in a form that uniformly manages text, images and numeric data. The intelligent database engine supports the other two layers, often merging relational database techniques with object orientation. In the twenty-first century, intelligent databases have now become widespread, e.g. hospital databases can now call up patient histories consisting of charts, text and x-ray images just with a few mouse clicks, and many corporate databases include decision support tools based on sales pattern analysis.

    Read more →
  • Environmental impact of AI

    Environmental impact of AI

    The environmental impact of the design, training, deployment and use of artificial intelligence includes the greenhouse gas emissions from generating electricity for data centres and computing hardware, operational and upstream water use, and material impacts from hardware manufacturing, mining and electronic waste. Estimating AI's environmental effects can be difficult because results depend on how impacts are measured, including whether accounting includes only model computation or also data-centre overhead, idle capacity, hardware manufacture, and local electricity supply. As these issues have received greater attention, governments and regulators have increasingly considered data-centre reporting requirements, energy-efficiency standards, and broader transparency measures for AI-related resource use. == Carbon footprint and energy use == AI-related energy use arises at multiple stages, including model training, fine-tuning, inference, storage, networking, and supporting infrastructure such as cooling and power conversion. === Individual level === Published estimates of energy use per AI request vary widely across models, tasks and measurement methods. A benchmark study presented at the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency found substantial differences between task types, with lower energy use for some text tasks and much higher energy use for image generation in the study's test conditions. In that benchmark, simple classification tasks consumed about 0.002–0.007 Wh per prompt on average (about 9% of a smartphone charge for 1,000 prompts), while text generation and text summarisation each used about 0.05 Wh per prompt; image generation averaged 2.91 Wh per prompt, and the least efficient image model in the study used 11.49 Wh per image (roughly equivalent to half a smartphone charge). First-party measurements in production environments have also been published. A 2025 Google study on Gemini assistant serving reported median per-prompt energy, emissions, and water-use estimates under the authors' accounting framework, while noting that different system boundaries can produce substantially different results. The study reported a median text-prompt estimate of about 0.24 Wh, which is roughly as much energy as watching nine seconds of television. The study also stated that software and infrastructure improvements reduced energy use by a factor of 33 and carbon emissions by a factor of 44 for a typical prompt over one year within the authors' framework. Researchers at the University of Michigan measured the energy consumption of various Meta Llama 3.1 models released in 2024 and found that smaller language models (8 billion parameters) use about 114 joules (0.03167 Wh) per response, while larger models (405 billion parameters) require up to 6,700 joules (1.861 Wh) per response. This corresponds to the energy needed to run a microwave oven for roughly one-tenth of a second and eight seconds, respectively. Comparisons between AI systems and human labour for specific tasks have produced mixed results and remain sensitive to assumptions about output quality, workload and system boundaries. A 2024 study in Scientific Reports reported 130 to 2900 times lower estimated carbon emissions for selected AI systems than for human writers and illustrators under its assumptions. A later Scientific Reports paper reported a counterexample for programming tasks under its assumptions, finding 5 to 19 times higher estimated emissions for the evaluated AI system than for human programmers on the benchmark used in that study. === System level === ==== Energy use and efficiency ==== AI electricity intensity depends not only on model architecture but also on hardware and facility efficiency. Data-centre operators commonly report Power usage effectiveness (PUE), which measures the ratio of total facility energy to IT equipment energy; a lower PUE indicates less overhead energy for cooling and other supporting infrastructure. Operators may also publish metrics and case studies on hardware efficiency, cooling systems and power sourcing. In its 2024 environmental report, Google stated that its 2023 total greenhouse gas emissions increased 13% year over year, primarily because of increased data-centre energy consumption and supply-chain emissions, while also reporting lower PUE than industry averages for its own facilities. The International Energy Agency has also reported that data centres remain a relatively small share of global electricity use overall, but that their local effects can be much more pronounced because demand is geographically concentrated. ==== Carbon footprint ==== At system level, AI contributes to rising electricity demand in data centres and related infrastructure. The International Energy Agency estimated that data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, or around 1.5% of global electricity consumption, and projected that data-centre electricity use could rise to about 945 TWh by 2030, with AI identified as the main driver of that growth alongside other digital services. The carbon footprint of AI systems depends strongly on electricity sources, hardware efficiency, utilisation rates, and what stages are included in the accounting. Training large models can require substantial electricity, while total lifecycle impacts also depend on deployment scale and the amount of inference performed after training. Early analyses of frontier-model development reported rapid historical growth in training compute for selected systems, although later trends have depended on changes in model design, hardware and efficiency gains. Accounting methods that include upstream or embodied impacts, such as hardware manufacture and facilities construction, can materially affect estimates of AI-related emissions. === Decisions and strategies by individual companies === Large technology companies have reported that the expansion of AI and cloud infrastructure affects their sustainability targets, electricity demand, and resource use. Google, for example, attributed part of its emissions growth in 2023 to increased data-centre energy consumption and supply-chain emissions in its 2024 environmental report. Cloud and AI companies have also announced measures intended to reduce environmental impacts, including investment in more efficient hardware, low-carbon electricity procurement, alternative cooling systems, and water stewardship programmes. The extent, comparability, and third-party verification of such disclosures vary between firms and jurisdictions. == Water usage == Data centres can use water directly for cooling and indirectly through the water used in electricity generation, depending on the local energy mix. Public reporting on data-centre water use has often been inconsistent, making comparisons between operators and regions difficult. To standardise operational reporting, The Green Grid proposed the metric water usage effectiveness (WUE), defined as annual site water use divided by IT equipment energy use. WUE does not by itself measure local water stress, source sustainability, or all upstream water impacts. Studies of AI water use also distinguish between water withdrawal and water consumption. Research on AI-specific water use has argued that the water footprint of AI systems can be difficult to observe and may vary substantially by location, cooling design, and electricity source. A 2025 Communications of the ACM article summarised methods for estimating AI water footprints and emphasised the distinction between water withdrawal and water consumption. Li and colleagues estimated that global AI water withdrawal could reach 4.2–6.6 billion cubic metres in 2027 under the scenarios examined in their article. Using GPT-3, released by OpenAI in 2020, as an example, they estimated that training the model in Microsoft's U.S. data centres could consume about 700,000 litres of onsite water and about 5.4 million litres in total when offsite electricity-related water use was included; they also estimated that 10–50 medium-length GPT-3 responses could consume about 500 mL of water, depending on when and where the model was deployed. Published prompt-level estimates have also varied by system and accounting framework: the 2025 Google study on Gemini assistant serving reported a median text-prompt estimate of about 0.26 mL under its framework. Location can materially affect the significance of data-centre water use. Research on U.S. data centres found that one-fifth of servers' direct water footprint came from moderately to highly water-stressed watersheds, while nearly half of servers were fully or partially powered by plants located in water-stressed regions. A 2025 Reuters report, citing data from Verisk Maplecroft and NatureFinance, said that an average mid-sized data centre uses about 1.4 million litres of water per day for cooling and that Phoenix would experience a 32% increase in annual water stress if currently pl

    Read more →
  • Digital Michelangelo Project

    Digital Michelangelo Project

    The Digital Michelangelo Project was a pioneering initiative undertaken during the 1998–1999 academic year to digitize the sculptures and architecture of Michelangelo using advanced laser scanning technology. The project was led by a team of 30 faculty, staff, and students from Stanford University and the University of Washington, with the aim of creating high-resolution 3D models of Michelangelo's works for scholarly, educational, and preservation purposes. == Objectives == The primary goals of the Digital Michelangelo Project were: To apply recent advancements in laser rangefinder technology for digitizing large cultural artifacts. To create detailed digital archives of Michelangelo's sculptures and architectural spaces for future study and analysis. To explore potential educational and curatorial applications for 3D scanned data. === Artworks digitized === The project involved scanning several iconic works by Michelangelo, including: David The Unfinished Slaves (Atlas, Awakening, Bearded, and Youthful) St. Matthew The allegorical statues from the Medici tombs (Night, Day, Dawn, and Dusk) The architectural interiors of the Tribuna del David at the Galleria dell'Accademia and the New Sacristy in the Medici Chapels. == Technology and methodology == === 3D scanning === The project's primary scanner was a laser triangulation rangefinder mounted on a motorized gantry, custom-built by Cyberware Inc. The scanner used a laser sheet to project onto an object, capturing its shape through triangulation. Multiple scans were taken from various angles and combined into a single, detailed 3D mesh. The resolution achieved was fine enough to capture even Michelangelo's chisel marks, with triangles approximately 0.25 mm on each side. In addition to shape data, color data was captured using a spotlight and a secondary camera, enabling the creation of textured 3D models. === Data processing === The project developed a software suite for processing the scanned data. This included: Aligning and merging multiple scans into a seamless 3D model. Filling holes in the geometry caused by inaccessible areas. Correcting color data for lighting inconsistencies and shadowing. Non-photorealistic rendering techniques were also applied, highlighting surface features such as Michelangelo’s chisel marks for enhanced visualization. == Logistical challenges == The scale and complexity of the project presented several challenges: Data size: The dataset for David alone comprised 2 billion polygons and 7,000 color images, occupying 60 GB of storage. Artifact safety: Ensuring the safety of the statues during scanning required extensive crew training, foam-encased equipment, and collision-prevention mechanisms. == Applications and impact == The digitized models have numerous potential applications: Art history: Allowing precise measurements and geometric analysis, such as determining chisel types or evaluating structural balance. Education: Providing new ways to study art, including interactive viewing from unconventional angles and with custom lighting. Museum curation: Enhancing visitor experiences through interactive kiosks and virtual models. The project demonstrated the potential for 3D technology to preserve and disseminate cultural heritage. == Data distribution == The project's models are available through Stanford University for scholarly purposes, under strict licensing due to Italian intellectual property laws. === ScanView === To provide public access to the 3D models while respecting usage restrictions, the project developed ScanView, a client/server rendering system. ScanView allows users to view and interact with high-resolution 3D models without downloading the data. The client component consists of a freely available viewer program and simplified 3D models. Users can navigate these models locally, adjusting position, orientation, lighting, and surface appearance. When a user finalizes a view, the client queries a remote server for a high-resolution rendering of the model, which is sent back to overwrite the simplified version on the user’s screen. A typical query-response cycle takes 1–2 seconds, depending on network conditions. To protect the models from unauthorized reconstruction, the system employs several security measures, including: Encrypting queries Perturbing viewpoint and lighting parameters Adding noise and warping rendered images Compressing images before transmission ScanView operates on Windows-based PCs and provides access to selected models, including David and St. Matthew, as well as other artifacts such as fragments of the Forma Urbis Romae and items from the Stanford 3D Scanning Repository. == Sponsors == The Digital Michelangelo Project was supported by Stanford University, Interval Research Corporation, and the Paul G. Allen Foundation for the Arts.

    Read more →
  • Resisting AI

    Resisting AI

    Resisting AI: An Anti-fascist Approach to Artificial Intelligence is a book on artificial intelligence (AI) by Dan McQuillan, published in 2022 by Bristol University Press. == Content == Resisting AI takes the form of an extended essay, which contrasts optimistic visions about AI's potential by arguing that AI may best be seen as a continuation and reinforcement of bureaucratic forms of discrimination and violence, ultimately fostering authoritarian outcomes. For McQuillan, AI's promise of objective calculability is antithetical to an egalitarian and just society. McQuillan uses the expression "AI violence" to describe how – based on opaque algorithms – various actors can discriminate against categories of people in accessing jobs, loans, medical care, and other benefits. The book suggests that AI has a political resonance with soft eugenic approaches to the valuation of life by modern welfare states, and that AI exhibits eugenic features in its underlying logic, as well as in its technical operations. The parallel is with historical eugenicists achieving saving to the state by sterilizing defectives so the state would not have to care for their offspring. The analysis of McQuillan goes beyond the known critique of AI systems fostering precarious labour markets, addressing "necropolitics", the politics of who is entitled to live, and who to die. Although McQuillan offers a brief history of machine learning at the beginning of the book – with its need for "hidden and undercompensated labour", he is concerned more with the social impacts of AI rather than with its technical aspects. McQuillan sees AI as the continuation of existing bureaucratic systems that already marginalize vulnerable groups – aggravated by the fact that AI systems trained on existing data are likely to reinforce existing discriminations, e.g. in attempting to optimize welfare distribution based on existing data patterns, ultimately creating a system of "self-reinforcing social profiling". In elaborating on the continuation between existing bureaucratic violence and AI, McQuillan connects to Hannah Arendt's concept of the thoughtless bureaucrat in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, which now becomes the algorithm that, lacking intent, cannot be accountable, and is thus endowed with an "algorithmic thoughtlessness". McQuillan defends the "fascist" in the title of the work by arguing that while not all AI is fascist, this emerging technology of control may end up being deployed by fascist or authoritarian regimes. For McQuillan, AI can support the diffusion of states of exception, as a technology impossible to properly regulate and a mechanism for multiplying exceptions more widely. An example of a scenario where AI systems of surveillance could bring discrimination to a new high is the initiative to create LGBT-free zones in Poland. Skeptical of ethical regulations to control the technology, McQuillan suggests people's councils and workers' councils, and other forms of citizens' agency to resist AI. A chapter titled "Post-Machine Learning" makes an appeal for resistance via currents of thought from feminist science (standpoint theory), post-normal science (extended peer communities), and new materialism; McQuillan encourages the reader to question the meaning of "objectivity" and calls for the necessity of alternative ways of knowing. Among the virtuous examples of resistance – possibly to be adopted by the AI workers themselves – McQuillan notes the Lucas Plan of the workers of Lucas Aerospace Corporation, in which a workforce declared redundant took control, reorienting the enterprise toward useful products. McQuillan advocates for what he calls decomputing, an opposition to the sweeping application and expansion of artificial intelligence. Similar to degrowth, the approach criticizes AI as an outgrowth of the systemic issues within capitalist systems. McQuillan argues that a different future is possible, in which distance between people is reduced rather than increased through AI intermediaries. The work of McQuillan warns against "watered-down forms of engagement" with AI, such as citizen juries, which superficially look like democratic deliberation but may actually obscure important decisions about AI that are outside the purview of the engagement situation (McQuillan 2022, 128). In an interview about the book, McQuillan describes himself as an "AI abolitionist". == Reception == The book has been praised for how it "masterfully disassembles AI as an epistemological, social, and political paradigm". On the critical side, a review in the academic journal Justice, Power and Resistance took exception to the "nightmarish visions of Big Brother" offered by McQuillan, and argued that while many elements of AI may pose concern, a critique should not be based on a caricature of what AI is, concluding that McQuillan's work is "less of a theory and more of a Manifesto". Another review notes "a disconnect between the technical aspects of AI and the socio-political analysis McQuillan provides." Although the book was published before the ChatGPT and large language model debate heated up, the book has not lost relevance to the AI discussion. It is noted for suggesting a link between beliefs in artificial intelligence and beliefs in a racialised and gendered visions of intelligence overall, whereby a certain type of rational, measurable intelligence is privileged, leading to "historical notions of hierarchies of being". The blog Reboot praised McQuillan for offering a theory of harm of AI (why AI could end up hurting people and society) that does not just encourage tackling in isolation specific predicted problems with AI-centric systems: bias, non-inclusiveness, exploitativeness, environmental destructiveness, opacity, and non-contestability. For educational policies could also look at AI following the reading of McQuillan: In his book Resisting AI, Dan McQuillan argues that "When we're thinking about the actuality of AI, we can't separate the calculations in the code from the social context of its application" .... McQuillan's particular concern is how many contemporary applications of AI are amplifying existing inequalities and injustices as well as deepening social divisions and instabilities. His book makes a powerful case for anticipating these effects and actively resisting them for the good of societies. Videos and podcasts with an interest in AI and emerging technology have discussed the book.

    Read more →
  • Timeline of artificial intelligence risks in global finance

    Timeline of artificial intelligence risks in global finance

    The following article is a broad timeline of the course of events related to artificial intelligence risks in global finance. The AI boom has led to concerns including the existential risk from artificial intelligence, as the uptake on applications of artificial intelligence increases. By late 2025, global finance and artificial intelligence were "deeply intertwined". A June 2025 Menlo Ventures report raised concerns about the sustainability of future revenue and long-term profitability of AI, given the relatively low rate of consumer monetization. == 2017 == 30 NovemberThe New York Times said that new AI reports by McKinsey & Company, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and an AI Index created by university researchers, indicated an early AI boom. The Index built on a project—"The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence" launched in 2014. == 2018 == 2018 was a year of incremental AI growth in finance. == 2022 == The release of ChatGPT by OpenAI became the catalyst for an artificial intelligence boom that continues to remake the global economy. According to a European Central Bank report, public interest in AI increased rapidly as evidenced with rising Google searches, AI jobs, models, patents, and innovations since late 2022. At that time Europe led the US in the size of its AI workforce. == 2023 == The regulatory body, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), published their report, "Generative Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Risk Considerations", drawing attention to oversight gaps and the need for regulations. The report explores the risks posed by using generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) systems in the financial sector including "broader risks to financial stability." == 2024 == January 12 In January 2024 Bloomberg's published its list of the "Magnificent Seven" Big Tech companies on the stock market based on their strength, size and market capitalization:Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Meta Platforms (Facebook), Nvidia, and Tesla. 21 June During the AI boom, Nvidia became the world's most valuable company, surpassing Microsoft, as its value increased to over US$4 trillion. In 2023 and 2024, the "Magnificent Seven" stocks were the primary drivers behind the increase in equity indexes, according to Reuters. == 2025 == === January === 23 January President Donald Trump's AI policy was announced calling for United States global leadership in artificial intelligence. The Economist noted that this politic shift in which the United States seeks "global dominance" in AI includes trimming regulations and assisting in expansion of infrastructure and increase in number of AI workers. Governments of Gulf nations were also investing trillions of dollars in AI. 27 January Against the backdrop of a tech war between China and the United States over AI dominance, within days of the launch of China's free DeepSeek App, it was the most downloaded app in the United States, rising to the first place in the Apple app store. President Trump responded immediately, saying this "sudden rise" should be a "wake-up" call to the United States, and called on US companies to be more competitive. === June === 26 June In their June 2025 report, Menlo Ventures estimated that only about 3% of consumers paid for artificial intelligence-related services, representing about $USD12 billion in annual spending. This is relatively low in contrast to the massive capital expenditure by AI infrastructure companies, which raises concerns about revenue sustainability and long-term profitability. === July === 23 July The Trump administration launched the US AI Action Plan, positioning the United States in a high-stakes technological race with China for global dominance in artificial intelligence, emphasizing that neither nation can afford to fall behind due to the exponential nature of AI advancement. The plan, a new government website and policy speech called for accelerated AI adoption across federal agencies, and a number of initiatives to make is easier for AI infrastructure expansion, and other measures to ensure American leadership in AI standards. Some leading experts warned that the administration failed to provide sufficient regulations and safeguards for AI safety. Concerns were raised about the negative impacts of cuts to research funding and tightened visa policies for scientists, potentially undermining public trust and America's ability to compete internationally. === September === 7 September The Economist cautioned that AI revenues are relatively modest compared to the high cost and investments in the creation of new data centers. Even Sam Altman, OpenAI CEO and one of the leading figures of the AI boom,, raised concerns about investors' outsized hopes for financial returns. At the same time, history has shown that new technologies, like railways and electricity, endured and spread after the initial hype faded. 12 September Economists warn that U.S. households' direct and indirect investments—mutual funds or retirement plans—in the stock market reached an unprecedented historically high level, now representing 45% of all financial assets, or about $USD51.2 trillion. Compared to the Dot-com bubble this represents a sharp increase in exposure. This makes U.S. households vulnerable to market downturns which in turn would result in decreasing consumer spending. U.S. household net worth rose to a record $176.3 trillion in the second quarter, an increase of $7.3 trillion since early 2025 and about $46 trillion higher than before the pandemic. Federal Reserve data attribute the surge primarily to gains in stock markets and housing values. However, the rise in wealth on paper coincided with increased household borrowing and growing government debt. 18 September Questions were being raised about how quickly the data centers, chips, servers, and GPUs assets of major AI companies will depreciate in value. Comparisons have been made to the Railway Mania in the aftermath of the stock market bubble where a valuable physical infrastructure remained standing, and the telecoms crash after the dot-com bubble which left fiber networks. 28 September There were warnings that record-high American stock ownership during the AI-fueled market boom is a red flag for systemic risk, as the current concentration in equities exceeds levels seen before the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, and could amplify the impact of any future stock market correction. === October === 3 October In 2025 alone, venture capitalists invested almost $USD200 billion in the artificial intelligence sector. 29 October Nvidia was the first company in the world to be valued at US$5 trillion, largely due to AI demand and strategic partnerships with leading technology and AI firms. Nvidia's increase in value was "meteoric". === November === 2 November Forbes reported that, since April, the 'Magnificent Seven' tech giants together contributed over 40% of the S&P 500's return, highlighting their outsized influence and the growing impact of AI on market valuations. CNN warned that while there is a current benefit to investors, with such a high concentration in the S&P 500, they are highly exposed to the fate of the Mag Seven. 2 November Globally there are 11,000 datacentres—huge campuses for AI infrastructure, including thousands of chips, GPUS, and servers. This represents a 500% increase over the last two decades. It is anticipated that $3USDtn more will be spent on increasing that number over the next two or three years. 5 November Concerns about the potential for a market bubble were raised as six of the AI-related Big Tech "Magnificent Seven"—that contribute to the AI boom—reported losing ground in the stock market. Global markets and artificial intelligence have become "deeply intertwined", according to a Reuters report. As of November 2025, more than 50% of the 20 largest S&P firms were deeply exposed to AI. In contrast, in 2000, the 20 S&P 500 firms represented 39% of its total value only 11 of these companies were exposed to the internet. If AI fails to deliver strong returns on their investments, these top S&P firms would be significantly impacted, according to the Economist. Analysts suggest that the AI market in 2025 may not behave like a traditional one, as investors are simultaneously aware of the risks and driven by the potential for outsized rewards. Leading AI labs may believe that the first company to achieve artificial general intelligence (AGI), when an AI system surpasses all human cognitive abilities and becomes capable of self-improvement—could dominate the future of technology and finance. While some have estimated that the potential value of such a breakthrough could be as high as $1.46 quadrillion, this figure is speculative and widely debated. 5 November Bloomberg described Nvidia's H100 Hopper-Blackwell AI chips as the "King of AI chips". Nvidia dominates the AI chip market with over 78% of the market share because of both speed and cost. According to B

    Read more →
  • Moral outsourcing

    Moral outsourcing

    Moral outsourcing is the placing of responsibility for ethical decision-making onto external entities, often algorithms. The term is often used in discussions of computer science and algorithmic fairness, but it can apply to any situation in which one appeals to outside agents in order to absolve themselves of responsibility for their actions. In this context, moral outsourcing specifically refers to the tendency of society to blame technology, rather than its creators or users, for any harm it may cause. == Definition == The term "moral outsourcing" was first coined by Dr. Rumman Chowdhury, a data scientist concerned with the overlap between artificial intelligence and social issues. Chowdhury used the term to describe looming fears of a so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution” following the rise of artificial intelligence. Moral outsourcing is often applied by technologists to shrink away from their part in building offensive products. In her TED Talk, Chowdhury gives the example of a creator excusing their work by saying they were simply doing their job. This is a case of moral outsourcing and not taking ownership for the consequences of creation. When it comes to AI, moral outsourcing allows for creators to decide when the machine is human and when it is a computer - shifting the blame and responsibility of moral plights off of the technologists and onto the technology. Conversations around AI and bias and its impacts require accountability to bring change. It is difficult to address these biased systems if their creators use moral outsourcing to avoid taking any responsibility for the issue. One example of moral outsourcing is the anger that is directed at machines for “taking jobs away from humans” rather than companies for employing that technology and jeopardizing jobs in the first place. The term "moral outsourcing" refers to the concept of outsourcing, or enlisting an external operation to complete specific work for another organization. In the case of moral outsourcing, the work of resolving moral dilemmas or making choices according to an ethical code is supposed to be conducted by another entity. == Real-world applications == In the medical field, AI is increasingly involved in decision-making processes about which patients to treat, and how to treat them. The responsibility of the doctor to make informed decisions about what is best for their patients is outsourced to an algorithm. Sympathy is also noted to be an important part of medical practice; an aspect that artificial intelligence, glaringly, is missing. This form of moral outsourcing is a major concern in the medical community. Another field of technology in which moral outsourcing is frequently brought up is autonomous vehicles. California Polytechnic State University professor Keith Abney proposed an example scenario: "Suppose we have some [troublemaking] teenagers, and they see an autonomous vehicle, they drive right at it. They know the autonomous vehicle will swerve off the road and go off a cliff, but should it?" The decision of whether to sacrifice the autonomous vehicle (and any passengers inside) or the vehicle coming at it will be written into the algorithms defining the car's behavior. In the case of moral outsourcing, the responsibility of any damage caused by an accident may be attributed to the autonomous vehicle itself, rather than the creators who wrote the protocol the vehicle will use to "decide" what to do. Moral outsourcing is also used to delegate the consequences of predictive policing algorithms to technology, rather than the creators or the police. There are many ethical concerns with predictive policing due to the fact that it results in the over-policing of low income and minority communities. In the context of moral outsourcing, the positive feedback loop of sending disproportionate police forces into minority communities is attributed to the algorithm and the data being fed into this system--rather than the users and creators of the predictive policing technology. == Outside of technology == === Religion === Moral outsourcing is also commonly seen in appeals to religion to justify discrimination or harm. In his book What It Means to be Moral, sociologist Phil Zuckerman contradicts the popular religious notion that morality comes from God. Religion is oftentimes cited as a foundation for a moral stance without any tangible relation between the religious beliefs and personal stance. In these cases, religious individuals will "outsource" their personal beliefs and opinions by claiming that they are a result of their religious identification. This is seen where religion is cited as a factor for political beliefs, medical beliefs, and in extreme cases an excuse for violence. === Manufacturing === Moral outsourcing can also be seen in the business world in terms of manufacturing goods and avoiding environmental responsibility. Some companies in the United States will move their production process to foreign countries with more relaxed environmental policies to avoid the pollution laws that exist in the US. A study by the Harvard Business Review found that "in countries with tight environmental regulation, companies have 29% lower domestic emissions on average. On the other hand, such a tightening in regulation results in 43% higher emissions abroad." The consequences of higher pollution rates are then attributed to the loose regulations in these countries, rather than on the companies themselves who purposefully moved into these areas to avoid strict pollution policy.

    Read more →
  • Fillrate

    Fillrate

    In computer graphics, a video card's pixel fillrate refers to the number of pixels that can be rendered on the screen and written to video memory in one second. Pixel fillrates are given in megapixels per second or in gigapixels per second (in the case of newer cards), and are obtained by multiplying the number of render output units (ROPs) by the clock frequency of the graphics processing unit (GPU) of a video card. A similar concept, texture fillrate, refers to the number of texture map elements (texels) the GPU can map to pixels in one second. Texture fillrate is obtained by multiplying the number of texture mapping units (TMUs) by the clock frequency of the GPU. Texture fillrates are given in mega or gigatexels per second. However, there is no full agreement on how to calculate and report fillrates. Another possible method is to multiply the number of pixel pipelines by the GPU's clock frequency. The results of these multiplications correspond to a theoretical number. The actual fillrate depends on many other factors. In the past, the fillrate has been used as an indicator of performance by video card manufacturers such as ATI and NVIDIA, however, the importance of the fillrate as a measurement of performance has declined as the bottleneck in graphics applications has shifted. For example, today, the number and speed of unified shader processing units has gained attention. Although fillrate doesn't provide a substantial bottleneck in games, it can still provide a bottleneck for certain parts of the game, for example applying a gaussian blur can be bottlenecked by fillrate. Scene complexity can be increased by overdrawing, which happens when an object is drawn to the frame buffer, and another object (such as a wall) is then drawn on top of it, covering it up. The time spent drawing the first object is thus wasted because it is not visible. When a sequence of scenes is extremely complex (many pixels have to be drawn for each scene), the frame rate for the sequence may drop. When designing graphics intensive applications, one can determine whether the application is fillrate-limited (or shader limited) by seeing if the frame rate increases dramatically when the application runs at a lower resolution or in a smaller window. Although this is not a full-proof method, modern videogame engines can dynamically reduce the level-of-detail required and thereby reducing fillrate-limited applications. The best way to find fillrate bottlenecks is to use GPU vendor software like NVIDIA Nsight Graphics, AMD Radeon GPU Profile and the Intel Graphics Performance Analyzers.

    Read more →
  • DABUS

    DABUS

    DABUS (Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience) is an artificial intelligence (AI) system created by Stephen Thaler. It reportedly conceived of two novel products — a food container constructed using fractal geometry, which enables rapid reheating, and a flashing beacon for attracting attention in an emergency. The filing of patent applications designating DABUS as inventor has led to decisions by patent offices and courts on whether a patent can be granted for an invention reportedly made by an AI system. == History in different jurisdictions == === Australia === On 17 September 2019, Thaler filed an application to patent a "Food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention," naming DABUS as the inventor. On 21 September 2020, IP Australia found that section 15(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) is inconsistent with an artificial intelligence machine being treated as an inventor, and Thaler's application had lapsed. Thaler sought judicial review, and on 30 July 2021, the Federal Court set aside IP Australia's decision and ordered IP Australia to reconsider the application. On 13 April 2022, the Full Court of the Federal Court set aside that decision, holding that only a natural person can be an inventor for the purposes of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth), and that such an inventor must be identified for any person to be entitled to a grant of a patent. On 11 November 2022, Thaler was refused special leave to appeal to the High Court. === European Patent Office === On 17 October 2018 and 7 November 2018, Thaler filed two European patent applications with the European Patent Office. The first claimed invention was a "Food Container" and the second was "Devices and Methods for Attracting Enhanced Attention." On 27 January 2020, the EPO rejected the applications on the grounds that the application listed an AI system named DABUS, and not a human, as the inventor, based on Article 81 and Rule 19(1) of the European Patent Convention (EPC). On 21 December 2021, the Board of Appeal of the EPO dismissed Thaler's appeal from the EPO's primary decision. The Board of Appeal confirmed that "under the EPC the designated inventor has to be a person with legal capacity. This is not merely an assumption on which the EPC was drafted. It is the ordinary meaning of the term inventor." === United Kingdom === Similar applications were filed by Thaler to the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office on 17 October and 7 November 2018. The Office asked Thaler to file statements of inventorship and of right of grant to a patent (Patent Form 7) in respect of each invention within 16 months of the filing date. Thaler filed those forms naming DABUS as the inventor and explaining in some detail why he believed that machines should be regarded as inventors in the circumstances. His application was rejected on the grounds that: (1) naming a machine as inventor did not meet the requirements of the Patents Act 1977; and (2) the IPO was not satisfied as to the manner in which Thaler had acquired rights that would otherwise vest in the inventor. Thaler was not satisfied with the decision and asked for a hearing before an official known as the "hearing officer". By a decision dated 4 December 2019 the hearing officer rejected Thaler's appeal. Thaler appealed against the hearing officer's decision to the Patents Court (a specialist court within the Chancery Division of the High Court of England and Wales that determines patent disputes). On 21 September 2020, Mr Justice Marcus Smith upheld the decision of the hearing officer. On 21 September 2021, Thaler's further appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by Arnold LJ and Laing LJ (Birss LJ dissenting). On 20 December 2023, the UK Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal by Thaler. In its judgment, the court held that an "inventor" under the Patents Act 1977 must be a natural person. === United States === The patent applications on the inventions were refused by the USPTO, which held that only natural persons can be named as inventors in a patent application. Thaler first fought this result by filing a complaint under the Administrative Procedure Act alleging that the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law; unsupported by substantial evidence, and in excess of Defendants’ statutory authority." A month later on August 19, 2019, Thaler filed a petition with the USPTO as allowed in 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 stating that DABUS should be the inventor. The judge and Thaler agreed in this case that Thaler himself is unable to receive the patent on behalf of DABUS. In their August 5, 2022, Thaler decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that only a natural person could be an inventor, which means that the AI that invents any other type of invention is not addressed by the "who" mentioned in the legislation. === New Zealand === On January 31, 2022, the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) decided that a patent application (776029) filed by Stephen Thaler was void, on the basis that no inventor was identified on the patent application. IPONZ determined that DABUS could not be "an actual devisor of the invention" as required by the Patents Act 2013, and that this must be a natural person as held by the previous patent offices above. The High Court of New Zealand confirmed the decision in 2023. === South Africa === On 24 June 2021, the South African Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) accepted Dr Thaler's Patent Cooperation Treaty, for a patent in respect of inventions generated by DABUS. In July 2021, the CIPC released a notice of issuance for the patent. It is the first patent granted for an AI invention. === Switzerland === On June 26, 2025, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court ruled that artificial intelligence systems such as DABUS cannot be listed as inventors in patent applications. The court upheld the existing practice of the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property (IPI), which requires that only natural persons can be recognized as inventors under Swiss patent law. The case concerned a patent application, which sought to designate DABUS as the sole inventor of a food container designed with a fractal geometry to enhance heat distribution. The IPI had rejected the application, arguing that both the absence of a human inventor and the attribution of inventorship to an AI system were inadmissible. While the court dismissed Thaler's main request, it accepted a subsidiary request: if a human applicant recognizes and files a patent based on an AI-generated invention, that person may be considered the inventor. As a result, the application may proceed with Thaler listed as the inventor. The decision (B-2532/2024) can still be appealed to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.

    Read more →
  • Halite AI Programming Competition

    Halite AI Programming Competition

    Halite is an open-source computer programming contest developed by the hedge fund/tech firm Two Sigma in partnership with a team at Cornell Tech. Programmers can see the game environment and learn everything they need to know about the game. Participants are asked to build bots in whichever language they choose to compete on a two-dimensional virtual battle field. == History == Benjamin Spector and Michael Truell created the first Halite competition in 2016, before partnering with Two Sigma later that year. === Halite I === Halite I asked participants to conquer territory on a grid. It launched in November 2016 and ended in February 2017. Halite I attracted about 1,500 players. === Halite II === Halite II was similar to Halite I, but with a space-war theme. It ran from October 2017 until January 2018. The second installment of the competition attracted about 6,000 individual players from more than 100 countries. Among the participants were professors, physicists and NASA engineers, as well as high school and university students. === Halite III === Halite III launched in mid-October 2018. It ran from October 2018 to January 2019, with an ocean themed playing field. Players were asked to collect and manage Halite, an energy resource. By the end of the competition, Halite III included more than 4000 players and 460 organizations. === Halite IV === Halite IV was hosted by Kaggle, and launched in mid-June 2020.

    Read more →