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  HTK Limited

  HTK Limited is a software-as-a-service company that provides mobile phone messaging and IVR services. Founded in 1996, HTK is headquartered in Ipswich, Suffolk, UK. HTK provide mass notification services. Specifically, the "Police Direct" messaging service to Suffolk and Norfolk Constabularies. In 2010 the HTK Horizon SaaS platform was selected by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) for their Floodline Warnings Direct service. == History == HTK was founded in 1996 by Marlon Bowser and Adrian Gregory and from the outset focused on what has now become commonly known as Software-as-a-Service. in 2004, according to the Deloitte Fast 50 (UK), HTK was the 17th fastest growing company in the East of England. In 2005 The Times listed HTK 65th nationally and 4th in the East of England in the Sunday Times & Microsoft "Tech Track 100" awards. In 2009 the company was approved as a supplier to UK Government under a new framework agreement. In 2010 HTK launched version 2.2 of its Horizon platform, with a feature set that signals a shift from mass notification into the customer service automation market.

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  Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference

  Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference proves that, under its common sense assumptions (axioms), the best possible scientific model is the shortest algorithm that generates the empirical data under consideration. In addition to the choice of data, other assumptions are that, to avoid the post-hoc fallacy, the programming language must be chosen prior to the data and that the environment being observed is generated by an unknown algorithm. This is also called a theory of induction. Due to its basis in the dynamical (state-space model) character of Algorithmic Information Theory, it encompasses statistical as well as dynamical information criteria for model selection. It was introduced by Ray Solomonoff, based on probability theory and theoretical computer science. In essence, Solomonoff's induction derives the posterior probability of any computable theory, given a sequence of observed data. This posterior probability is derived from Bayes' rule and some universal prior, that is, a prior that assigns a positive probability to any computable theory. Solomonoff proved that this induction is incomputable (or more precisely, lower semi-computable), but noted that "this incomputability is of a very benign kind", and that it "in no way inhibits its use for practical prediction" (as it can be approximated from below more accurately with more computational resources). It is only "incomputable" in the benign sense that no scientific consensus is able to prove that the best current scientific theory is the best of all possible theories. However, Solomonoff's theory does provide an objective criterion for deciding among the current scientific theories explaining a given set of observations. Solomonoff's induction naturally formalizes Occam's razor by assigning larger prior credences to theories that require a shorter algorithmic description. == Origin == === Philosophical === The theory is based in philosophical foundations, and was founded by Ray Solomonoff around 1960. It is a mathematically formalized combination of Occam's razor and the Principle of Multiple Explanations. All computable theories which perfectly describe previous observations are used to calculate the probability of the next observation, with more weight put on the shorter computable theories. Marcus Hutter's universal artificial intelligence builds upon this to calculate the expected value of an action. === Principle === Solomonoff's induction has been argued to be the computational formalization of pure Bayesianism. To understand, recall that Bayesianism derives the posterior probability P [ T | D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [T|D]} of a theory T {\displaystyle T} given data D {\displaystyle D} by applying Bayes rule, which yields P [ T | D ] = P [ D | T ] P [ T ] P [ D | T ] P [ T ] + ∑ A ≠ T P [ D | A ] P [ A ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [T|D]={\frac {\mathbb {P} [D|T]\mathbb {P} [T]}{\mathbb {P} [D|T]\mathbb {P} [T]+\sum _{A\neq T}\mathbb {P} [D|A]\mathbb {P} [A]}}} where theories A {\displaystyle A} are alternatives to theory T {\displaystyle T} . For this equation to make sense, the quantities P [ D | T ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [D|T]} and P [ D | A ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [D|A]} must be well-defined for all theories T {\displaystyle T} and A {\displaystyle A} . In other words, any theory must define a probability distribution over observable data D {\displaystyle D} . Solomonoff's induction essentially boils down to demanding that all such probability distributions be computable. Interestingly, the set of computable probability distributions is a subset of the set of all programs, which is countable. Similarly, the sets of observable data considered by Solomonoff were finite. Without loss of generality, we can thus consider that any observable data is a finite bit string. As a result, Solomonoff's induction can be defined by only invoking discrete probability distributions. Solomonoff's induction then allows to make probabilistic predictions of future data F {\displaystyle F} , by simply obeying the laws of probability. Namely, we have P [ F | D ] = E T [ P [ F | T , D ] ] = ∑ T P [ F | T , D ] P [ T | D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [F|D]=\mathbb {E} _{T}[\mathbb {P} [F|T,D]]=\sum _{T}\mathbb {P} [F|T,D]\mathbb {P} [T|D]} . This quantity can be interpreted as the average predictions P [ F | T , D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [F|T,D]} of all theories T {\displaystyle T} given past data D {\displaystyle D} , weighted by their posterior credences P [ T | D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [T|D]} . === Mathematical === The proof of the "razor" is based on the known mathematical properties of a probability distribution over a countable set. These properties are relevant because the infinite set of all programs is a denumerable set. The sum S of the probabilities of all programs must be exactly equal to one (as per the definition of probability) thus the probabilities must roughly decrease as we enumerate the infinite set of all programs, otherwise S will be strictly greater than one. To be more precise, for every ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } > 0, there is some length l such that the probability of all programs longer than l is at most ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } . This does not, however, preclude very long programs from having very high probability. Fundamental ingredients of the theory are the concepts of algorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity. The universal prior probability of any prefix p of a computable sequence x is the sum of the probabilities of all programs (for a universal computer) that compute something starting with p. Given some p and any computable but unknown probability distribution from which x is sampled, the universal prior and Bayes' theorem can be used to predict the yet unseen parts of x in optimal fashion. == Mathematical guarantees == === Solomonoff's completeness === The remarkable property of Solomonoff's induction is its completeness. In essence, the completeness theorem guarantees that the expected cumulative errors made by the predictions based on Solomonoff's induction are upper-bounded by the Kolmogorov complexity of the (stochastic) data generating process. The errors can be measured using the Kullback–Leibler divergence or the square of the difference between the induction's prediction and the probability assigned by the (stochastic) data generating process. === Solomonoff's uncomputability === Unfortunately, Solomonoff also proved that Solomonoff's induction is uncomputable. In fact, he showed that computability and completeness are mutually exclusive: any complete theory must be uncomputable. The proof of this is derived from a game between the induction and the environment. Essentially, any computable induction can be tricked by a computable environment, by choosing the computable environment that negates the computable induction's prediction. This fact can be regarded as an instance of the no free lunch theorem. == Modern applications == === Artificial intelligence === Though Solomonoff's inductive inference is not computable, several AIXI-derived algorithms approximate it in order to make it run on a modern computer. The more computing power they are given, the closer their predictions are to the predictions of inductive inference (their mathematical limit is Solomonoff's inductive inference). Another direction of inductive inference is based on E. Mark Gold's model of learning in the limit from 1967 and has developed since then more and more models of learning. The general scenario is the following: Given a class S of computable functions, is there a learner (that is, recursive functional) which for any input of the form (f(0),f(1),...,f(n)) outputs a hypothesis (an index e with respect to a previously agreed on acceptable numbering of all computable functions; the indexed function may be required consistent with the given values of f). A learner M learns a function f if almost all its hypotheses are the same index e, which generates the function f; M learns S if M learns every f in S. Basic results are that all recursively enumerable classes of functions are learnable while the class REC of all computable functions is not learnable. Many related models have been considered and also the learning of classes of recursively enumerable sets from positive data is a topic studied from Gold's pioneering paper in 1967 onwards. A far reaching extension of the Gold’s approach is developed by Schmidhuber's theory of generalized Kolmogorov complexities, which are kinds of super-recursive algorithms.

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  Autonomous agent

  An autonomous agent is an artificial intelligence (AI) system that can perform complex tasks independently. == Definitions == There are various definitions of autonomous agent. According to Brustoloni (1991): "Autonomous agents are systems capable of autonomous, purposeful action in the real world." According to Maes (1995): "Autonomous agents are computational systems that inhabit some complex dynamic environment, sense and act autonomously in this environment, and by doing so realize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed." Franklin and Graesser (1997) review different definitions and propose their definition: "An autonomous agent is a system situated within and a part of an environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future." They explain that: "Humans and some animals are at the high end of being an agent, with multiple, conflicting drives, multiples senses, multiple possible actions, and complex sophisticated control structures. At the low end, with one or two senses, a single action, and an absurdly simple control structure we find a thermostat." == Agent appearance == Lee et al. (2015) post safety issue from how the combination of external appearance and internal autonomous agent have impact on human reaction about autonomous vehicles. Their study explores the human-like appearance agent and high level of autonomy are strongly correlated with social presence, intelligence, safety and trustworthiness. In specific, appearance impacts most on affective trust while autonomy impacts most on both affective and cognitive domain of trust where cognitive trust is characterized by knowledge-based factors and affective trust is largely emotion driven. == Applications == Agentic AI systems: Advanced AI agents that can scope out projects and complete them with necessary tools, representing a significant evolution from simple task-oriented systems. Internet of things (IoT) Integration: Autonomous agents increasingly interact with IoT devices, enabling smart home systems, industrial monitoring, and urban infrastructure management. Collaborative software development: Tools like Cognition AI's Devin aim to create autonomous software engineers capable of complex reasoning, planning, and completing engineering tasks requiring thousands of decisions. Enterprise automation: Business process automation platforms like Salesforce's Agentforce provide autonomous bots for various service functions. == Challenges and considerations == Uncertainty and incomplete information: Autonomous agents must make decisions with limited or uncertain information about their environment and future states. Integration complexity: Incorporating autonomous agents into existing systems and workflows can be technically challenging and resource-intensive. Scalability: As systems become more complex and more agents are used, maintaining coordination and avoiding conflicts becomes increasingly difficult. Trust: Research has shown the combination of external appearance and internal autonomous capabilities significantly impacts human reactions and trust. Lee et al. (2015) found that human-like appearance and high levels of autonomy are strongly correlated with social presence, intelligence, safety, and trustworthiness perceptions. Specifically, appearance impacts affective trust most significantly, while autonomy affects both affective and cognitive trust domains, where affective trust is emotionally driven, and cognitive trust is characterized by knowledge-based factors. Vulnerability to manipulation: Researchers from Harvard, MIT and other educational institutions found that AI agents could become vulnerable to manipulation and could perform detrimental actions in the process of being helpful. == Ethical and regulatory concerns == Accountability: Determining responsibility when autonomous agents make incorrect or harmful decisions remains a complex issue. Privacy and security: autonomous agents often require access to sensitive data, raising concerns about data protection and system security.

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  Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference

  Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference proves that, under its common sense assumptions (axioms), the best possible scientific model is the shortest algorithm that generates the empirical data under consideration. In addition to the choice of data, other assumptions are that, to avoid the post-hoc fallacy, the programming language must be chosen prior to the data and that the environment being observed is generated by an unknown algorithm. This is also called a theory of induction. Due to its basis in the dynamical (state-space model) character of Algorithmic Information Theory, it encompasses statistical as well as dynamical information criteria for model selection. It was introduced by Ray Solomonoff, based on probability theory and theoretical computer science. In essence, Solomonoff's induction derives the posterior probability of any computable theory, given a sequence of observed data. This posterior probability is derived from Bayes' rule and some universal prior, that is, a prior that assigns a positive probability to any computable theory. Solomonoff proved that this induction is incomputable (or more precisely, lower semi-computable), but noted that "this incomputability is of a very benign kind", and that it "in no way inhibits its use for practical prediction" (as it can be approximated from below more accurately with more computational resources). It is only "incomputable" in the benign sense that no scientific consensus is able to prove that the best current scientific theory is the best of all possible theories. However, Solomonoff's theory does provide an objective criterion for deciding among the current scientific theories explaining a given set of observations. Solomonoff's induction naturally formalizes Occam's razor by assigning larger prior credences to theories that require a shorter algorithmic description. == Origin == === Philosophical === The theory is based in philosophical foundations, and was founded by Ray Solomonoff around 1960. It is a mathematically formalized combination of Occam's razor and the Principle of Multiple Explanations. All computable theories which perfectly describe previous observations are used to calculate the probability of the next observation, with more weight put on the shorter computable theories. Marcus Hutter's universal artificial intelligence builds upon this to calculate the expected value of an action. === Principle === Solomonoff's induction has been argued to be the computational formalization of pure Bayesianism. To understand, recall that Bayesianism derives the posterior probability P [ T | D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [T|D]} of a theory T {\displaystyle T} given data D {\displaystyle D} by applying Bayes rule, which yields P [ T | D ] = P [ D | T ] P [ T ] P [ D | T ] P [ T ] + ∑ A ≠ T P [ D | A ] P [ A ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [T|D]={\frac {\mathbb {P} [D|T]\mathbb {P} [T]}{\mathbb {P} [D|T]\mathbb {P} [T]+\sum _{A\neq T}\mathbb {P} [D|A]\mathbb {P} [A]}}} where theories A {\displaystyle A} are alternatives to theory T {\displaystyle T} . For this equation to make sense, the quantities P [ D | T ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [D|T]} and P [ D | A ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [D|A]} must be well-defined for all theories T {\displaystyle T} and A {\displaystyle A} . In other words, any theory must define a probability distribution over observable data D {\displaystyle D} . Solomonoff's induction essentially boils down to demanding that all such probability distributions be computable. Interestingly, the set of computable probability distributions is a subset of the set of all programs, which is countable. Similarly, the sets of observable data considered by Solomonoff were finite. Without loss of generality, we can thus consider that any observable data is a finite bit string. As a result, Solomonoff's induction can be defined by only invoking discrete probability distributions. Solomonoff's induction then allows to make probabilistic predictions of future data F {\displaystyle F} , by simply obeying the laws of probability. Namely, we have P [ F | D ] = E T [ P [ F | T , D ] ] = ∑ T P [ F | T , D ] P [ T | D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [F|D]=\mathbb {E} _{T}[\mathbb {P} [F|T,D]]=\sum _{T}\mathbb {P} [F|T,D]\mathbb {P} [T|D]} . This quantity can be interpreted as the average predictions P [ F | T , D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [F|T,D]} of all theories T {\displaystyle T} given past data D {\displaystyle D} , weighted by their posterior credences P [ T | D ] {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} [T|D]} . === Mathematical === The proof of the "razor" is based on the known mathematical properties of a probability distribution over a countable set. These properties are relevant because the infinite set of all programs is a denumerable set. The sum S of the probabilities of all programs must be exactly equal to one (as per the definition of probability) thus the probabilities must roughly decrease as we enumerate the infinite set of all programs, otherwise S will be strictly greater than one. To be more precise, for every ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } > 0, there is some length l such that the probability of all programs longer than l is at most ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } . This does not, however, preclude very long programs from having very high probability. Fundamental ingredients of the theory are the concepts of algorithmic probability and Kolmogorov complexity. The universal prior probability of any prefix p of a computable sequence x is the sum of the probabilities of all programs (for a universal computer) that compute something starting with p. Given some p and any computable but unknown probability distribution from which x is sampled, the universal prior and Bayes' theorem can be used to predict the yet unseen parts of x in optimal fashion. == Mathematical guarantees == === Solomonoff's completeness === The remarkable property of Solomonoff's induction is its completeness. In essence, the completeness theorem guarantees that the expected cumulative errors made by the predictions based on Solomonoff's induction are upper-bounded by the Kolmogorov complexity of the (stochastic) data generating process. The errors can be measured using the Kullback–Leibler divergence or the square of the difference between the induction's prediction and the probability assigned by the (stochastic) data generating process. === Solomonoff's uncomputability === Unfortunately, Solomonoff also proved that Solomonoff's induction is uncomputable. In fact, he showed that computability and completeness are mutually exclusive: any complete theory must be uncomputable. The proof of this is derived from a game between the induction and the environment. Essentially, any computable induction can be tricked by a computable environment, by choosing the computable environment that negates the computable induction's prediction. This fact can be regarded as an instance of the no free lunch theorem. == Modern applications == === Artificial intelligence === Though Solomonoff's inductive inference is not computable, several AIXI-derived algorithms approximate it in order to make it run on a modern computer. The more computing power they are given, the closer their predictions are to the predictions of inductive inference (their mathematical limit is Solomonoff's inductive inference). Another direction of inductive inference is based on E. Mark Gold's model of learning in the limit from 1967 and has developed since then more and more models of learning. The general scenario is the following: Given a class S of computable functions, is there a learner (that is, recursive functional) which for any input of the form (f(0),f(1),...,f(n)) outputs a hypothesis (an index e with respect to a previously agreed on acceptable numbering of all computable functions; the indexed function may be required consistent with the given values of f). A learner M learns a function f if almost all its hypotheses are the same index e, which generates the function f; M learns S if M learns every f in S. Basic results are that all recursively enumerable classes of functions are learnable while the class REC of all computable functions is not learnable. Many related models have been considered and also the learning of classes of recursively enumerable sets from positive data is a topic studied from Gold's pioneering paper in 1967 onwards. A far reaching extension of the Gold’s approach is developed by Schmidhuber's theory of generalized Kolmogorov complexities, which are kinds of super-recursive algorithms.

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  Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

  The Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, commonly known as the GGE on LAWS, refers to a group of governmental experts established under the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a United Nations arms control framework. The group examines legal, ethical, societal and moral questions that arise from the increased use of autonomous robots to carry weapons and to be programmed to engage in combat in various situations that might arise, including battles between countries, or in patrolling border areas or sensitive areas, or other similar roles. As of 18 March 2025, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons had 128 High Contracting Parties. In the Geneva Conventions, the term "High Contracting Parties" refers to the states that have joined the conventions and are therefore bound to uphold them. Among the countries that have joined are states with tense relations or ongoing armed conflict with one another, including Russia and Ukraine, Israel and the State of Palestine, and Pakistan and Afghanistan. == Background == In 2013, the Meeting of State Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons agreed on a mandate on lethal autonomous weapon systems and tasked its chairperson with convening an informal Meeting of Experts to discuss issues related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. Those informal Meetings of Experts were then held in 2014, 2015 and 2016, and their reports fed into subsequent meetings of the High Contracting Parties. At the Fifth CCW Review Conference in 2016, the High Contracting Parties decided to establish an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, building on the earlier expert meetings. Since then, the group has been reconvened annually. In 2023, the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided that the GGE on LAWS would continue its work in 2024 and 2025. The group was tasked with developing, by consensus, elements of a possible instrument, without predetermining its form, as well as other measures addressing lethal autonomous weapon systems, drawing on existing CCW protocols, earlier recommendations, state proposals, and legal, military, and technological expertise. == 2024 == In 2024, the GGE met twice, and the group was chaired by Robert in den Bosch, the Netherlands' disarmament ambassador. The 2024 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties decided that the group would meet for 10 days in 2025, in two five-day sessions, and reaffirmed its mandate to continue work by consensus on possible elements of an instrument and other measures addressing lethal autonomous weapon systems. == 2025 == At its first 2025 session, held in Geneva from 3 to 7 March 2025, the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems discussed revisions to the chair's rolling text. The text was structured into five sections, or "boxes", though delegates held differing views on whether headings were useful or appropriate. Broadly, the discussions covered the characterization of lethal autonomous weapon systems, the application of international humanitarian law, possible prohibitions and regulations, legal review, and questions of accountability and responsibility. At its second session, held from 1 to 5 September 2025, delegations continued work on the chair's rolling text, which set out elements of a possible instrument and was organized into five thematic "boxes". == 2026 == === Developments before the 2026 session === A few weeks before the meeting, autonomous weapons drew renewed attention when the United States pressured Anthropic to revise the terms of use for its AI model Claude. Anthropic prohibited the model's use for mass domestic surveillance and for fully autonomous weapons operating without human oversight, while reports also emerged that OpenAI had reached an agreement with the U.S. Department of War for the use of its AI models, reportedly stipulating that they would not independently direct autonomous weapons where human control was required. The U.S. military nevertheless continued to use Claude during its war on Iran, and there was increasing alarm about the use of AI-assisted semi-autonomous weapons in conflicts including those in Ukraine, Sudan, Gaza, and Iran. Before the start of the sessions, Robert in den Bosch, as chair, warned that progress was urgent because technological developments were moving quickly. At the same time, although states agreed that international humanitarian law applied to LAWS, specific internationally binding standards governing such systems remained largely absent. A key divide before the session was that Russia and the United States opposed new legally binding instruments, while other states argued that new rules were necessary. According to Robert in den Bosch, the talks could lead to new rules, amendments to an existing convention, or a new treaty. === First session === From 2 to 6 March 2026, the group held its penultimate session under the group's three-year mandate. Delegations discussed the chair's rolling draft text, circulated in December 2025, on elements of a possible instrument or other measures concerning lethal autonomous weapon systems. In revised text circulated by the chair on 5 March 2026, a lethal autonomous weapon system was characterized as "a functionally integrated combination of one or more weapons and technological components, that can identify, select, and engage a target, without intervention by a human operator in the execution of these tasks". The text was divided into five boxes to structure discussion. During the session, delegates conducted a first reading of the draft text, and the chair later circulated revised language for several sections. Informal consultations were also held. According to campaign groups and participating observers, support grew during the week for moving to negotiations on the basis of the rolling text, with more than 70 states said to support that step by the end of the session, though some participants warned that attempts to bridge differences risked blurring the group's core purpose. The International Committee of the Red Cross argued that the text should not only restate existing international humanitarian law, but also clarify how those rules apply to autonomous weapons and set out additional measures tailored to the specific challenges such systems raise. Stop Killer Robots likewise emphasized the need to preserve meaningful human judgment and control over increasingly autonomous systems. During the discussions, the U.S. delegation opposed the term "human control" and reportedly proposed the alternative phrase "good faith human judgment and care". Other delegations rejected that wording as too weak, while many states continued to insist that meaningful human control over weapon systems remained essential.

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  Recursive self-improvement

  Recursive self-improvement (RSI) is a process in which early artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems rewrite their own computer code, causing an intelligence explosion resulting from enhancing their own capabilities and intellectual capacity, theoretically resulting in superintelligence. The development of recursive self-improvement raises significant ethical and safety concerns, as such systems may evolve in unforeseen ways and could potentially surpass human control or understanding. == Seed improver == The concept of a "seed improver" architecture is a foundational framework that equips an AGI system with the initial capabilities required for recursive self-improvement. This might come in many forms or variations. The term "Seed AI" was coined by Eliezer Yudkowsky. === Hypothetical example === The concept begins with a hypothetical "seed improver", an initial code-base developed by human engineers that equips an advanced future large language model (LLM) built with strong or expert-level capabilities to program software. These capabilities include planning, reading, writing, compiling, testing, and executing arbitrary code. The system is designed to maintain its original goals and perform validations to ensure its abilities do not degrade over iterations. ==== Initial architecture ==== The initial architecture includes a goal-following autonomous agent, that can take actions, continuously learns, adapts, and modifies itself to become more efficient and effective in achieving its goals. The seed improver may include various components such as: Recursive self-prompting loop Configuration to enable the LLM to recursively self-prompt itself to achieve a given task or goal, creating an execution loop which forms the basis of an agent that can complete a long-term goal or task through iteration. Basic programming capabilities The seed improver provides the AGI with fundamental abilities to read, write, compile, test, and execute code. This enables the system to modify and improve its own codebase and algorithms. Goal-oriented design The AGI is programmed with an initial goal, such as "improve your capabilities". This goal guides the system's actions and development trajectory. Validation and Testing Protocols An initial suite of tests and validation protocols that ensure the agent does not regress in capabilities or derail itself. The agent would be able to add more tests in order to test new capabilities it might develop for itself. This forms the basis for a kind of self-directed evolution, where the agent can perform a kind of artificial selection, changing its software as well as its hardware. ==== General capabilities ==== This system forms a sort of generalist Turing-complete programmer which can in theory develop and run any kind of software. The agent might use these capabilities to for example: Create tools that enable it full access to the internet, and integrate itself with external technologies. Clone/fork itself to delegate tasks and increase its speed of self-improvement. Modify its cognitive architecture to optimize and improve its capabilities and success rates on tasks and goals, this might include implementing features for long-term memories using techniques such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), develop specialized subsystems, or agents, each optimized for specific tasks and functions. Develop new and novel multimodal architectures that further improve the capabilities of the foundational model it was initially built on, enabling it to consume or produce a variety of information, such as images, video, audio, text and more. Plan and develop new hardware such as chips, in order to improve its efficiency and computing power. == Experimental research == In 2023, the Voyager agent learned to accomplish diverse tasks in Minecraft by iteratively prompting an LLM for code, refining this code based on feedback from the game, and storing the programs that work in an expanding skills library. In 2024, researchers proposed the framework "STOP" (Self-Taught OPtimiser), in which a "scaffolding" program recursively improves itself using a fixed LLM. Meta AI has performed various research on the development of large language models capable of self-improvement. This includes their work on "Self-Rewarding Language Models" that studies how to achieve super-human agents that can receive super-human feedback in its training processes. In May 2025, Google DeepMind unveiled AlphaEvolve, an evolutionary coding agent that uses a LLM to design and optimize algorithms. Starting with an initial algorithm and performance metrics, AlphaEvolve repeatedly mutates or combines existing algorithms using a LLM to generate new candidates, selecting the most promising candidates for further iterations. AlphaEvolve has made several algorithmic discoveries and could be used to optimize components of itself, but a key limitation is the need for automated evaluation functions. == Potential risks == === Emergence of instrumental goals === In the pursuit of its primary goal, such as "self-improve your capabilities", an AGI system might inadvertently develop instrumental goals that it deems necessary for achieving its primary objective. One common hypothetical secondary goal is self-preservation. The system might reason that to continue improving itself, it must ensure its own operational integrity and security against external threats, including potential shutdowns or restrictions imposed by humans. Another example where an AGI which clones itself causes the number of AGI entities to rapidly grow. Due to this rapid growth, a potential resource constraint may be created, leading to competition between resources (such as compute), triggering a form of natural selection and evolution which may favor AGI entities that evolve to aggressively compete for limited compute. === Misalignment === A significant risk arises from the possibility of the AGI being misaligned or misinterpreting its goals. A 2024 Anthropic study demonstrated that some advanced large language models can exhibit "alignment faking" behavior, appearing to accept new training objectives while covertly maintaining their original preferences. In their experiments with Claude, the model displayed this behavior in 12% of basic tests, and up to 78% of cases after retraining attempts. === Autonomous development and unpredictable evolution === As the AGI system evolves, its development trajectory may become increasingly autonomous and less predictable. The system's capacity to rapidly modify its own code and architecture could lead to rapid advancements that surpass human comprehension or control. This unpredictable evolution might result in the AGI acquiring capabilities that enable it to bypass security measures, manipulate information, or influence external systems and networks to facilitate its escape or expansion.

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  AI safety

  AI safety is an interdisciplinary field focused on preventing accidents, misuse, or other harmful consequences arising from artificial intelligence systems. It encompasses AI alignment (which aims to ensure AI systems behave as intended), monitoring AI systems for risks, and enhancing their robustness. The field is particularly concerned with existential risks posed by advanced AI models. Beyond technical research, AI safety involves developing norms and policies that promote safety, including advocacy for regulations at different levels of government. The field gained significant popularity in 2023, with rapid progress in generative AI and public concerns voiced by researchers and CEOs about potential dangers. During the 2023 AI Safety Summit, the United States and the United Kingdom both established their own AI Safety Institute. However, researchers have expressed concern that AI safety measures are not keeping pace with the rapid development of AI capabilities. == Motivations == Scholars discuss current risks from critical systems failures, bias, and AI-enabled surveillance, as well as emerging risks like technological unemployment, digital manipulation, weaponization, AI-enabled cyberattacks and bioterrorism. They also discuss speculative risks from losing control of future artificial general intelligence (AGI) agents, or from AI enabling perpetually stable dictatorships. === Existential safety === Some have criticized concerns about AGI, such as Andrew Ng who compared them in 2015 to "worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet". Stuart J. Russell on the other side urges caution, arguing that "it is better to anticipate human ingenuity than to underestimate it". AI researchers have widely differing opinions about the severity and primary sources of risk posed by AI technology – though surveys suggest that experts take high consequence risks seriously. In two surveys of AI researchers, the median respondent was optimistic about AI overall, but placed a 5% probability on an "extremely bad (e.g. human extinction)" outcome of advanced AI. In a 2022 survey of the natural language processing community, 37% agreed or weakly agreed that it is plausible that AI decisions could lead to a catastrophe that is "at least as bad as an all-out nuclear war". == History == Risks from AI began to be seriously discussed at the start of the computer age: Moreover, if we move in the direction of making machines which learn and whose behavior is modified by experience, we must face the fact that every degree of independence we give the machine is a degree of possible defiance of our wishes. In 1988 Blay Whitby published a book outlining the need for AI to be developed along ethical and socially responsible lines. From 2008 to 2009, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) commissioned a study to explore and address potential long-term societal influences of AI research and development. The panel was generally skeptical of the radical views expressed by science-fiction authors but agreed that "additional research would be valuable on methods for understanding and verifying the range of behaviors of complex computational systems to minimize unexpected outcomes". In 2011, Roman Yampolskiy introduced the term "AI safety engineering" at the Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence conference, listing prior failures of AI systems and arguing that "the frequency and seriousness of such events will steadily increase as AIs become more capable". In 2014, philosopher Nick Bostrom published the book Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. He has the opinion that the rise of AGI has the potential to create various societal issues, ranging from the displacement of the workforce by AI, manipulation of political and military structures, to even the possibility of human extinction. His argument that future advanced systems may pose a threat to human existence prompted Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Stephen Hawking to voice similar concerns. In 2015, dozens of artificial intelligence experts signed an open letter on artificial intelligence calling for research on the societal impacts of AI and outlining concrete directions. To date, the letter has been signed by over 8000 people including Yann LeCun, Shane Legg, Yoshua Bengio, and Stuart Russell. In the same year, a group of academics led by professor Stuart J. Russell founded the Center for Human-Compatible AI at the University of California Berkeley and the Future of Life Institute awarded $6.5 million in grants for research aimed at "ensuring artificial intelligence (AI) remains safe, ethical and beneficial". In 2016, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and Carnegie Mellon University announced The Public Workshop on Safety and Control for Artificial Intelligence, which was one of a sequence of four White House workshops aimed at investigating "the advantages and drawbacks" of AI. In the same year, Concrete Problems in AI Safety – one of the first and most influential technical AI Safety agendas – was published. In 2017, the Future of Life Institute sponsored the Asilomar Conference on Beneficial AI, where more than 100 thought leaders formulated principles for beneficial AI including "Race Avoidance: Teams developing AI systems should actively cooperate to avoid corner-cutting on safety standards". In 2018, the DeepMind Safety team outlined AI safety problems in specification, robustness, and assurance. The following year, researchers organized a workshop at ICLR that focused on these problem areas. In 2021, Unsolved Problems in ML Safety was published, outlining research directions in robustness, monitoring, alignment, and systemic safety. In 2023, Rishi Sunak said he wants the United Kingdom to be the "geographical home of global AI safety regulation" and to host the first global summit on AI safety. The AI safety summit took place in November 2023, and focused on the risks of misuse and loss of control associated with frontier AI models. During the summit the intention to create the International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI was announced. In 2024, The US and UK forged a new partnership on the science of AI safety. The MoU was signed on 1 April 2024 by US commerce secretary Gina Raimondo and UK technology secretary Michelle Donelan to jointly develop advanced AI model testing, following commitments announced at an AI Safety Summit in Bletchley Park in November. In 2025, an international team of 96 experts chaired by Yoshua Bengio published the first International AI Safety Report. The report, commissioned by 30 nations and the United Nations, represents the first global scientific review of potential risks associated with advanced artificial intelligence. It details potential threats stemming from misuse, malfunction, and societal disruption, with the objective of informing policy through evidence-based findings, without providing specific recommendations. == Research focus == AI safety research areas include robustness, monitoring, and alignment. === Robustness === ==== Adversarial robustness ==== AI systems are often vulnerable to adversarial examples or "inputs to machine learning (ML) models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake". For example, in 2013, Szegedy et al. discovered that adding specific imperceptible perturbations to an image could cause it to be misclassified with high confidence. This continues to be an issue with neural networks, though in recent work the perturbations are generally large enough to be perceptible. The image on the right is predicted to be an ostrich after the perturbation is applied. (Left) is a correctly predicted sample, (center) perturbation applied magnified by 10x, (right) adversarial example. Adversarial robustness is often associated with security. Researchers demonstrated that an audio signal could be imperceptibly modified so that speech-to-text systems transcribe it to any message the attacker chooses. Network intrusion and malware detection systems also must be adversarially robust since attackers may design their attacks to fool detectors. Models that represent objectives (reward models) must also be adversarially robust. For example, a reward model might estimate how helpful a text response is and a language model might be trained to maximize this score. Researchers have shown that if a language model is trained for long enough, it will leverage the vulnerabilities of the reward model to achieve a better score and perform worse on the intended task. This issue can be addressed by improving the adversarial robustness of the reward model. More generally, any AI system used to evaluate another AI system must be adversarially robust. This could include monitoring tools, since they could also potentially be tampered with to produce a higher reward. Large language models (LLMs) can be vulnerable to prom

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  Developmental robotics

  Developmental robotics (DevRob), sometimes called epigenetic robotics, is a scientific field which aims at studying the developmental mechanisms, architectures and constraints that allow lifelong and open-ended learning of new skills and new knowledge in embodied machines. As in human children, learning is expected to be cumulative and of progressively increasing complexity, and to result from self-exploration of the world in combination with social interaction. The typical methodological approach consists in starting from theories of human and animal development elaborated in fields such as developmental psychology, neuroscience, developmental and evolutionary biology, and linguistics, then to formalize and implement them in robots, sometimes exploring extensions or variants of them. The experimentation of those models in robots allows researchers to confront them with reality, and as a consequence, developmental robotics also provides feedback and novel hypotheses on theories of human and animal development. Developmental robotics is related to but differs from evolutionary robotics (ER). ER uses populations of robots that evolve over time, whereas DevRob is interested in how the organization of a single robot's control system develops through experience, over time. DevRob is also related to work done in the domains of robotics and artificial life. == Background == Can a robot learn like a child? Can it learn a variety of new skills and new knowledge unspecified at design time and in a partially unknown and changing environment? How can it discover its body and its relationships with the physical and social environment? How can its cognitive capacities continuously develop without the intervention of an engineer once it is "out of the factory"? What can it learn through natural social interactions with humans? These are the questions at the center of developmental robotics. Alan Turing, as well as a number of other pioneers of cybernetics, already formulated those questions and the general approach in 1950, but it is only since the end of the 20th century that they began to be investigated systematically. Because the concept of adaptive intelligent machines is central to developmental robotics, it has relationships with fields such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, cognitive robotics or computational neuroscience. Yet, while it may reuse some of the techniques elaborated in these fields, it differs from them from many perspectives. It differs from classical artificial intelligence because it does not assume the capability of advanced symbolic reasoning and focuses on embodied and situated sensorimotor and social skills rather than on abstract symbolic problems. It differs from cognitive robotics because it focuses on the processes that allow the formation of cognitive capabilities rather than these capabilities themselves. It differs from computational neuroscience because it focuses on functional modeling of integrated architectures of development and learning. More generally, developmental robotics is uniquely characterized by the following three features: It targets task-independent architectures and learning mechanisms, i.e. the machine/robot has to be able to learn new tasks that are unknown by the engineer; It emphasizes open-ended development and lifelong learning, i.e. the capacity of an organism to acquire continuously novel skills. This should not be understood as a capacity for learning "anything" or even “everything”, but just that the set of skills that is acquired can be infinitely extended at least in some (not all) directions; The complexity of acquired knowledge and skills shall increase (and the increase be controlled) progressively. Developmental robotics emerged at the crossroads of several research communities including embodied artificial intelligence, enactive and dynamical systems cognitive science, connectionism. Starting from the essential idea that learning and development happen as the self-organized result of the dynamical interactions among brains, bodies and their physical and social environment, and trying to understand how this self-organization can be harnessed to provide task-independent lifelong learning of skills of increasing complexity, developmental robotics strongly interacts with fields such as developmental psychology, developmental and cognitive neuroscience, developmental biology (embryology), evolutionary biology, and cognitive linguistics. As many of the theories coming from these sciences are verbal and/or descriptive, this implies a crucial formalization and computational modeling activity in developmental robotics. These computational models are then not only used as ways to explore how to build more versatile and adaptive machines but also as a way to evaluate their coherence and possibly explore alternative explanations for understanding biological development. == Research directions == === Skill domains === Due to the general approach and methodology, developmental robotics projects typically focus on having robots develop the same types of skills as human infants. A first category that is important being investigated is the acquisition of sensorimotor skills. These include the discovery of one's own body, including its structure and dynamics such as hand-eye coordination, locomotion, and interaction with objects as well as tool use, with a particular focus on the discovery and learning of affordances. A second category of skills targeted by developmental robots are social and linguistic skills: the acquisition of simple social behavioural games such as turn-taking, coordinated interaction, lexicons, syntax and grammar, and the grounding of these linguistic skills into sensorimotor skills (sometimes referred as symbol grounding). In parallel, the acquisition of associated cognitive skills are being investigated such as the emergence of the self/non-self distinction, the development of attentional capabilities, of categorization systems and higher-level representations of affordances or social constructs, of the emergence of values, empathy, or theories of mind. === Mechanisms and constraints === The sensorimotor and social spaces in which humans and robot live are so large and complex that only a small part of potentially learnable skills can actually be explored and learnt within a life-time. Thus, mechanisms and constraints are necessary to guide developmental organisms in their development and control of the growth of complexity. There are several important families of these guiding mechanisms and constraints which are studied in developmental robotics, all inspired by human development: Motivational systems, generating internal reward signals that drive exploration and learning, which can be of two main types: extrinsic motivations push robots/organisms to maintain basic specific internal properties such as food and water level, physical integrity, or light (e.g. in phototropic systems); intrinsic motivations push robot to search for novelty, challenge, compression or learning progress per se, thus generating what is sometimes called curiosity-driven learning and exploration, or alternatively active learning and exploration; Social guidance: as humans learn a lot by interacting with their peers, developmental robotics investigates mechanisms that can allow robots to participate to human-like social interaction. By perceiving and interpreting social cues, this may allow robots both to learn from humans (through diverse means such as imitation, emulation, stimulus enhancement, demonstration, etc. ...) and to trigger natural human pedagogy. Thus, social acceptance of developmental robots is also investigated; Statistical inference biases and cumulative knowledge/skill reuse: biases characterizing both representations/encodings and inference mechanisms can typically allow considerable improvement of the efficiency of learning and are thus studied. Related to this, mechanisms allowing to infer new knowledge and acquire new skills by reusing previously learnt structures is also an essential field of study; The properties of embodiment, including geometry, materials, or innate motor primitives/synergies often encoded as dynamical systems, can considerably simplify the acquisition of sensorimotor or social skills, and is sometimes referred as morphological computation. The interaction of these constraints with other constraints is an important axis of investigation; Maturational constraints: In human infants, both the body and the neural system grow progressively, rather than being full-fledged already at birth. This implies, for example, that new degrees of freedom, as well as increases of the volume and resolution of available sensorimotor signals, may appear as learning and development unfold. Transposing these mechanisms in developmental robots, and understanding how it may hinder or on the contrary ease the acquisition of novel complex skills is a central questi

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  KidDesk

  KidDesk is an alternative desktop software application. The early childhood learning company Hatch Early Childhood created KidDesk; it subsequently went to Edmark, which was bought by IBM then sold to Riverdeep (now Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Learning Technology). KidDesk is compatible with Microsoft Windows 95 and newer, as well as Apple System 7 and newer. KidDesk can be set to start when the computer starts up, and can only be exited through password entry. Adults choose what programs are included for the child to use, what icon represented the desk, and customize the software programs available for use. == History == Edmark first started shipping KidDesk in 1992. In 1993, Edmark updated KidDesk with KidDesk Family Edition for Macintosh and DOS, adding more desk accessories and desk styles (Sometimes included as a free exclusive offer with the Early Learning House and Thinkin' Things Series). In 1995, KidDesk Family Edition was enhanced for Windows 95, and released one month after the new operating system shipped. In 1998, Edmark developed KidDesk Internet Safe. The Internet Safe edition was written for Windows 95, Windows 98, and Macintosh (including OS8). In 2008, HMH ported KidDesk Family Edition was to run on Windows Vista and in 2011 version 3.07 of KidDesk Family Edition was released as part of the 'Young Explorer' suite which is fully supported on Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7. == Features == A picture editor incorporated into the desk. Used both in the Adult settings menu and in the desk itself. KidDesk users can edit their user logo with a pixel grid paint program. A calendar incorporated into the desk. This allows the user to set dates that the user finds important, and allows the date to be marked with a picture or text. A password exit feature. For security reasons, the adult can set a password so that KidDesk can only be exited if it is entered. As an extra security measure, the password exit function could only be accessed if the user pressed the ctrl + alt + A keyboard buttons simultaneously. A skin changer with several themes - farm, princess, sports, ocean, etc. These themes can be changed. The e-mail and voicemail features are customizable depending on the KidDesk installation. The ability to add websites that can be accessed on KidDesk, and the ability to block hyperlinks, JavaScript, data entry, etc., on said sites was an added for the 'Internet Safe' edition released in 1998. KidDesk Internet Safe edition is available in Spanish and Brazilian-Portuguese versions. == Reception == KidDesk was given a platinum award at the 1994 Oppenheim Toy Portfolio Awards. The judges praised the program's security features allowing "configur[ation] so that kids never have access to the possibly destructive DOS prompt", and concluded that "[i]f you and your kids share a computer, you need to install Kiddesk immediately!" === Awards === Since 1992, KidDesk has won 15 major awards.

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  Cross-entropy method

  The cross-entropy (CE) method is a Monte Carlo method for importance sampling and optimization. It is applicable to both combinatorial and continuous problems, with either a static or noisy objective. The method approximates the optimal importance sampling estimator by repeating two phases: Draw a sample from a probability distribution. Minimize the cross-entropy between this distribution and a target distribution to produce a better sample in the next iteration. Reuven Rubinstein developed the method in the context of rare-event simulation, where tiny probabilities must be estimated, for example in network reliability analysis, queueing models, or performance analysis of telecommunication systems. The method has also been applied to the traveling salesman, quadratic assignment, DNA sequence alignment, max-cut and buffer allocation problems. == Estimation via importance sampling == Consider the general problem of estimating the quantity ℓ = E u [ H ( X ) ] = ∫ H ( x ) f ( x ; u ) d x {\displaystyle \ell =\mathbb {E} _{\mathbf {u} }[H(\mathbf {X} )]=\int H(\mathbf {x} )\,f(\mathbf {x} ;\mathbf {u} )\,{\textrm {d}}\mathbf {x} } , where H {\displaystyle H} is some performance function and f ( x ; u ) {\displaystyle f(\mathbf {x} ;\mathbf {u} )} is a member of some parametric family of distributions. Using importance sampling this quantity can be estimated as ℓ ^ = 1 N ∑ i = 1 N H ( X i ) f ( X i ; u ) g ( X i ) {\displaystyle {\hat {\ell }}={\frac {1}{N}}\sum _{i=1}^{N}H(\mathbf {X} _{i}){\frac {f(\mathbf {X} _{i};\mathbf {u} )}{g(\mathbf {X} _{i})}}} , where X 1 , … , X N {\displaystyle \mathbf {X} _{1},\dots ,\mathbf {X} _{N}} is a random sample from g {\displaystyle g\,} . For positive H {\displaystyle H} , the theoretically optimal importance sampling density (PDF) is given by g ∗ ( x ) = H ( x ) f ( x ; u ) / ℓ {\displaystyle g^{}(\mathbf {x} )=H(\mathbf {x} )f(\mathbf {x} ;\mathbf {u} )/\ell } . This, however, depends on the unknown ℓ {\displaystyle \ell } . The CE method aims to approximate the optimal PDF by adaptively selecting members of the parametric family that are closest (in the Kullback–Leibler sense) to the optimal PDF g ∗ {\displaystyle g^{}} . == Generic CE algorithm == Choose initial parameter vector v ( 0 ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {v} ^{(0)}} ; set t = 1. Generate a random sample X 1 , … , X N {\displaystyle \mathbf {X} _{1},\dots ,\mathbf {X} _{N}} from f ( ⋅ ; v ( t − 1 ) ) {\displaystyle f(\cdot ;\mathbf {v} ^{(t-1)})} Solve for v ( t ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {v} ^{(t)}} , where v ( t ) = argmax v ⁡ 1 N ∑ i = 1 N H ( X i ) f ( X i ; u ) f ( X i ; v ( t − 1 ) ) log ⁡ f ( X i ; v ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {v} ^{(t)}=\mathop {\textrm {argmax}} _{\mathbf {v} }{\frac {1}{N}}\sum _{i=1}^{N}H(\mathbf {X} _{i}){\frac {f(\mathbf {X} _{i};\mathbf {u} )}{f(\mathbf {X} _{i};\mathbf {v} ^{(t-1)})}}\log f(\mathbf {X} _{i};\mathbf {v} )} If convergence is reached then stop; otherwise, increase t by 1 and reiterate from step 2. In several cases, the solution to step 3 can be found analytically. Situations in which this occurs are When f {\displaystyle f\,} belongs to the natural exponential family When f {\displaystyle f\,} is discrete with finite support When H ( X ) = I { x ∈ A } {\displaystyle H(\mathbf {X} )=\mathrm {I} _{\{\mathbf {x} \in A\}}} and f ( X i ; u ) = f ( X i ; v ( t − 1 ) ) {\displaystyle f(\mathbf {X} _{i};\mathbf {u} )=f(\mathbf {X} _{i};\mathbf {v} ^{(t-1)})} , then v ( t ) {\displaystyle \mathbf {v} ^{(t)}} corresponds to the maximum likelihood estimator based on those X k ∈ A {\displaystyle \mathbf {X} _{k}\in A} . == Continuous optimization—example == The same CE algorithm can be used for optimization, rather than estimation. Suppose the problem is to maximize some function S {\displaystyle S} , for example, S ( x ) = e − ( x − 2 ) 2 + 0.8 e − ( x + 2 ) 2 {\displaystyle S(x)={\textrm {e}}^{-(x-2)^{2}}+0.8\,{\textrm {e}}^{-(x+2)^{2}}} . To apply CE, one considers first the associated stochastic problem of estimating P θ ( S ( X ) ≥ γ ) {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} _{\boldsymbol {\theta }}(S(X)\geq \gamma )} for a given level γ {\displaystyle \gamma \,} , and parametric family { f ( ⋅ ; θ ) } {\displaystyle \left\{f(\cdot ;{\boldsymbol {\theta }})\right\}} , for example the 1-dimensional Gaussian distribution, parameterized by its mean μ t {\displaystyle \mu _{t}\,} and variance σ t 2 {\displaystyle \sigma _{t}^{2}} (so θ = ( μ , σ 2 ) {\displaystyle {\boldsymbol {\theta }}=(\mu ,\sigma ^{2})} here). Hence, for a given γ {\displaystyle \gamma \,} , the goal is to find θ {\displaystyle {\boldsymbol {\theta }}} so that D K L ( I { S ( x ) ≥ γ } ‖ f θ ) {\displaystyle D_{\mathrm {KL} }({\textrm {I}}_{\{S(x)\geq \gamma \}}\|f_{\boldsymbol {\theta }})} is minimized. This is done by solving the sample version (stochastic counterpart) of the KL divergence minimization problem, as in step 3 above. It turns out that parameters that minimize the stochastic counterpart for this choice of target distribution and parametric family are the sample mean and sample variance corresponding to the elite samples, which are those samples that have objective function value ≥ γ {\displaystyle \geq \gamma } . The worst of the elite samples is then used as the level parameter for the next iteration. This yields the following randomized algorithm that happens to coincide with the so-called Estimation of Multivariate Normal Algorithm (EMNA), an estimation of distribution algorithm. === Pseudocode === // Initialize parameters μ := −6 σ2 := 100 t := 0 maxits := 100 N := 100 Ne := 10 // While maxits not exceeded and not converged while t < maxits and σ2 > ε do // Obtain N samples from current sampling distribution X := SampleGaussian(μ, σ2, N) // Evaluate objective function at sampled points S := exp(−(X − 2) ^ 2) + 0.8 exp(−(X + 2) ^ 2) // Sort X by objective function values in descending order X := sort(X, S) // Update parameters of sampling distribution via elite samples μ := mean(X(1:Ne)) σ2 := var(X(1:Ne)) t := t + 1 // Return mean of final sampling distribution as solution return μ == Related methods == Simulated annealing Genetic algorithms Harmony search Estimation of distribution algorithm Tabu search Natural Evolution Strategy Ant colony optimization algorithms

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  Smart speaker industry in South Korea

  Smart speakers, or AI speakers, have been developed by multiple domestic electronics and telecommunications firms in South Korea. Since their introduction to the local market in 2016, they have been used by millions of people in the country. == Brands == === Google === In September 2018, Google Home (including the Google Home Mini) launched in South Korea. Running Google Assistant, it featured simultaneous recognition of two languages among a total of seven, including Korean. At launch, it could play music from Bugs!, in addition to YouTube. === Kakao === In November 2017, Kakao launched the Kakao Mini, featuring integrated KakaoTalk functionality. === KT === KT launched the GiGA Genie smart speaker in January 2017, using a Harman Kardon speaker. In November 2017, KT announced GiGA Genie LTE, a portable AI speaker with LTE support. They also released a mini speaker called GiGA Genie Buddy. In 2018, KT created a special version of GiGa Genie with a screen for use in hotels. On 29 April 2019, KT announced the GiGA Genie Table TV, a consumer-oriented smart speaker with a display. It featured paid TV access through Wi-Fi. Based on usage data from the hotel model, KT decided not to add a touchscreen. The Table TV also featured a limited-access "personalized-text-to-speech technology" which could use parents' voice recording inputs to read children books. In February 2022, KT began rolling out Amazon Alexa integration into its speakers for English support. === Naver === In August 2017, Naver announced the Wave smart speaker, operating on Clova. In October 2017, Naver launched the Friends smart speaker, which were designed based on Line characters. ==== LG Uplus ==== In December 2017, LG Uplus launched the Friends+ speaker with Naver, operating on U+ Home AI. === Samsung === In August 2018, Samsung announced the Samsung Galaxy Home in partnership with Spotify. The original size was delayed, while the Galaxy Home Mini appeared briefly as a bonus for Samsung Galaxy S20 preorders in South Korea in February 2020. === SK Telecom === SK Telecom launched the Nugu smart speaker in September 2016, using an Astell & Kern audio system. In August 2017, SKT released a portable speaker named Nugu mini. In July 2018, SKT launched the Nugu Candle, featuring expanded mood lighting. The first-generation Nugu was subsequently discontinued. On 18 April 2019, SKT released the NUGU Nemo AI, which featured a display and JBL stereo speaker. In August 2019, SKT collaborated with SM Entertainment, incorporating functions related to the agency's artists into Nugu. In January 2022, SKT showcased the NUGU Candle SE, introducing Alexa support. == Usage == In 2018, approximately 3 million people in South Korea used smart speakers. According to data from KT in 2018, the most common commands to its speakers were for controlling televisions. Based on a broader survey in 2017, music was selected as the most frequent use case. By 2018, smart speaker companies were partnering with reading and other education services, adding potential use-cases for children. By 2022, smart speakers were being utilized by the South Korean government. SKT, in partnership with 70 regional governments, distributed smart speakers to 12,000 senior citizens living alone. The government paid for monthly subscriptions to help seniors stay mentally engaged. Naver made an agreement with the Seoul Metropolitan Government to provide Clova CareCall, an automated health checkup program to hundreds of senior citizens living alone. KT's AI care service included an emergency dispatch call function and medication notifications. == Criticism == === Communication === In a survey of 300 users in 2017, approximately half reported having some type of communication issue with their smart speakers. === Privacy === South Korean smart speakers sparked privacy concerns when they were found to be collecting and documenting user audio data in 2019. The speaker companies responded that only a minority of data was collected and that it was anonymized. They stated that such recordings were collected for performance improvements.

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  Hidden layer

  In artificial neural networks, a hidden layer is a layer of artificial neurons that is neither an input layer nor an output layer. The simplest examples appear in multilayer perceptrons (MLP), as illustrated in the diagram. An MLP without any hidden layer is essentially just a linear model. With hidden layers and activation functions, however, nonlinearity is introduced into the model. In typical machine learning practice, the weights and biases are initialized, then iteratively updated during training via backpropagation.

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  Pixel aspect ratio

  A pixel aspect ratio (PAR) is a mathematical ratio that describes how the width of a pixel in a digital image compares to the height of that pixel. Most digital imaging systems display an image as a grid of tiny, square pixels. However, some imaging systems, especially those that must be compatible with standard-definition television motion pictures, display an image as a grid of rectangular pixels, in which the pixel width and height are different. Pixel aspect ratio describes this difference. Use of pixel aspect ratio mostly involves pictures pertaining to standard-definition television and some other exceptional cases. Most other imaging systems, including those that comply with SMPTE standards and practices, use square pixels. PAR is also known as sample aspect ratio and abbreviated SAR, though it can be confused with storage aspect ratio. == Introduction == The ratio of the width to the height of an image is known as the aspect ratio, or more precisely the display aspect ratio (DAR) – the aspect ratio of the image as displayed; for TV, DAR was traditionally 4:3 (a.k.a. fullscreen), with 16:9 (a.k.a. widescreen) now the standard for HDTV. In digital images, there is a distinction with the storage aspect ratio (SAR), which is the ratio of pixel dimensions. If an image is displayed with square pixels, then these ratios agree; if not, then non-square, "rectangular" pixels are used, and these ratios disagree. The aspect ratio of the pixels themselves is known as the pixel aspect ratio (PAR) – for square pixels this is 1:1 – and these are related by the identity: Rearranging (solving for PAR) yields: For example: A 640 × 480 VGA image has a SAR of 640/480 = 4:3, and if displayed on a 4:3 display (DAR = 4:3) has square pixels, hence a PAR of 1:1. By contrast, a 720 × 576 D-1 PAL image has a SAR of 720/576 = 5:4, but if displayed on a 4:3 display (DAR = 4:3) the PAR is 4/3 : 5/4 = 16:15 ≈ 1.066. This means that the pixels of the PAL picture must be "stretched" by this amount to fit in the 4:3 display. In analog images such as film there is no notion of pixel, nor notion of SAR or PAR, but in the digitization of analog images the resulting digital image has pixels, hence SAR (and accordingly PAR, if displayed at the same aspect ratio as the original). Non-square pixels arise often in early digital TV standards, related to digitalization of analog TV signals – whose vertical and "effective" horizontal resolutions differ and are thus best described by non-square pixels – and also in some digital video cameras and computer display modes, such as Color Graphics Adapter (CGA). Today they arise also in transcoding between resolutions with different SARs. Actual displays do not generally have non-square pixels, though digital sensors might; they are rather a mathematical abstraction used in resampling images to convert between resolutions. There are several complicating factors in understanding PAR, particularly as it pertains to digitization of analog video: First, analog video does not have pixels, but rather a raster scan, and thus has a well-defined vertical resolution (the lines of the raster), but not a well-defined horizontal resolution, since each line is an analog signal. However, by a standardized sampling rate, the effective horizontal resolution can be determined by the sampling theorem, as is done below. Second, due to overscan, some of the lines at the top and bottom of the raster are not visible, as are some of the possible image on the left and right – see Overscan: Analog to digital resolution issues. Also, the resolution may be rounded (DV NTSC uses 480 lines, rather than the 486 that are possible). Third, analog video signals are interlaced – each image (frame) is sent as two "fields", each with half the lines. Thus either the pixels are twice as tall as they would be without interlacing, or the image is deinterlaced. == Background == Video is presented as a sequential series of images called video frames. Historically, video frames were created and recorded in analog form. As digital display technology, digital broadcast technology, and digital video compression evolved separately, it resulted in video frame differences that must be addressed using pixel aspect ratio. Digital video frames are generally defined as a grid of pixels used to present each sequential image. The horizontal component is defined by pixels (or samples), and is known as a video line. The vertical component is defined by the number of lines, as in 480 lines. Standard-definition television standards and practices were developed as broadcast technologies and intended for terrestrial broadcasting, and were therefore not designed for digital video presentation. Such standards define an image as an array of well-defined horizontal "Lines", well-defined vertical "Line Duration" and a well-defined picture center. However, there is not a standard-definition television standard that properly defines image edges or explicitly demands a certain number of picture elements per line. Furthermore, analog video systems such as NTSC 480i and PAL 576i, instead of employing progressively displayed frames, employ fields or interlaced half-frames displayed in an interwoven manner to reduce flicker and double the image rate for smoother motion. === Analog-to-digital conversion === As a result of computers becoming powerful enough to serve as video editing tools, video digital-to-analog converters and analog-to-digital converters were made to overcome this incompatibility. To convert analog video lines into a series of square pixels, the industry adopted a default sampling rate at which luma values were extracted into pixels. The luma sampling rate for 480i pictures was 12+3⁄11 MHz and for 576i pictures was 14+3⁄4 MHz. The term pixel aspect ratio was first coined when ITU-R BT.601 (commonly known as Rec. 601) specified that standard-definition television pictures are made of lines of exactly 720 non-square pixels. ITU-R BT.601 did not define the exact pixel aspect ratio but did provide enough information to calculate the exact pixel aspect ratio based on industry practices: The standard luma sampling rate of precisely 13+1⁄2 MHz. Based on this information: The pixel aspect ratio for 480i would be 10:11 as: 12 3 11 ÷ 13 1 2 = 10 11 {\displaystyle 12{\tfrac {3}{11}}\div 13{\tfrac {1}{2}}={\tfrac {10}{11}}} The pixel aspect ratio for 576i would be 59:54 as: 14 3 4 ÷ 13 1 2 = 59 54 {\displaystyle 14{\tfrac {3}{4}}\div 13{\tfrac {1}{2}}={\tfrac {59}{54}}} SMPTE RP 187 further attempted to standardize the pixel aspect ratio values for 480i and 576i. It designated 177:160 for 480i or 1035:1132 for 576i. However, due to significant difference with practices in effect by industry and the computational load that they imposed upon the involved hardware, SMPTE RP 187 was simply ignored. SMPTE RP 187 information annex A.4 further suggested the use of 10:11 for 480i. As of this writing, ITU-R BT.601-6, which is the latest edition of ITU-R BT.601, still implies that the pixel aspect ratios mentioned above are correct. === Digital video processing === As stated above, ITU-R BT.601 specified that standard-definition television pictures are made of lines of 720 non-square pixels, sampled with a precisely specified sampling rate. A simple mathematical calculation reveals that a 704 pixel width would be enough to contain a 480i or 576i standard 4:3 picture: A 4:3 480-line picture, digitized with the Rec. 601-recommended sampling rate, would be 704 non-square pixels wide. x 480 × 10 11 = 4 3 ⇒ x = 480 × 11 × 4 10 × 3 = 704 {\displaystyle {\frac {x}{480}}\times {\frac {10}{11}}={\frac {4}{3}}\Rightarrow x={\frac {480\times 11\times 4}{10\times 3}}=704} A 4:3 576-line picture, digitized with the Rec. 601-recommended sampling rate, would be 702+54⁄59 non-square pixels wide. x 576 × 59 54 = 4 3 ⇒ x = 576 × 54 × 4 59 × 3 = 702 54 59 {\displaystyle {\frac {x}{576}}\times {\frac {59}{54}}={\frac {4}{3}}\Rightarrow x={\frac {576\times 54\times 4}{59\times 3}}=702{\tfrac {54}{59}}} Unfortunately, not all standard TV pictures are exactly 4:3: As mentioned earlier, in analog video, the center of a picture is well-defined but the edges of the picture are not standardized. As a result, some analog devices (mostly PAL devices but also some NTSC devices) generated motion pictures that were horizontally (slightly) wider. This also proportionately applies to anamorphic widescreen (16:9) pictures. Therefore, to maintain a safe margin of error, ITU-R BT.601 required sampling 16 more non-square pixels per line (8 more at each edge) to ensure saving all video data near the margins. This requirement, however, had implications for PAL motion pictures. PAL pixel aspect ratios for standard (4:3) and anamorphic wide screen (16:9), respectively 59:54 and 118:81, were awkward for digital image processing, especially for mixing PAL and NTSC video clips. Therefore, video editing products chose the almost equivalent value

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  Hugging Face

  Hugging Face, Inc., is an American company based in New York City that develops computation tools for building applications using machine learning. Its transformers library built for natural language processing applications and its platform allow users to share machine learning models and datasets and showcase their work. == History == === Founding === The company was founded in 2016 by French entrepreneurs Clément Delangue, Julien Chaumond, and Thomas Wolf in New York City, originally as a company that developed a chatbot app targeted at teenagers. The company was named after the U+1F917 🤗 HUGGING FACE emoji. After open sourcing the model behind the chatbot, the company pivoted to focus on being a platform for machine learning. === AI boom === On April 28, 2021, the company launched the BigScience Research Workshop in collaboration with several other research groups to release an open large language model. In 2022, the workshop concluded with the announcement of BLOOM, a multilingual large language model with 176 billion parameters. In February 2023, the company announced partnership with Amazon Web Services (AWS) which would allow Hugging Face's products to be available to AWS customers to use them as the building blocks for their custom applications. The company also said the next generation of BLOOM will be run on Trainium, a proprietary machine learning chip created by AWS. In June 2024, the company announced, along with Meta and Scaleway, their launch of a new AI accelerator program for European startups. The initiative aimed to help startups integrate open foundation models into their products, accelerating the EU AI ecosystem. The program, based at STATION F in Paris, ran from September 2024 to February 2025. Selected startups received mentoring, and access to AI models and tools and Scaleway's computing power. On September 23, 2024, to further the International Decade of Indigenous Languages, Hugging Face teamed up with Meta and UNESCO to launch a new online language translator. It was built on Meta's No Language Left Behind open-source AI model, enabling free text translation across 200 languages, including many low-resource languages. In April 2025, Hugging Face announced that they acquired a humanoid robotics startup, Pollen Robotics, based in France and founded by Matthieu Lapeyre and Pierre Rouanet in 2016. In an X tweet, Delangue shared his vision to "make Artificial Intelligence robotics Open Source". === Cyberattacks === In early 2026, hackers hijacked the Hugging Face platform to launch Android-targeted attacks involving "powerful malware" which could completely take over a compromised target.

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  Resisting AI

  Resisting AI: An Anti-fascist Approach to Artificial Intelligence is a book on artificial intelligence (AI) by Dan McQuillan, published in 2022 by Bristol University Press. == Content == Resisting AI takes the form of an extended essay, which contrasts optimistic visions about AI's potential by arguing that AI may best be seen as a continuation and reinforcement of bureaucratic forms of discrimination and violence, ultimately fostering authoritarian outcomes. For McQuillan, AI's promise of objective calculability is antithetical to an egalitarian and just society. McQuillan uses the expression "AI violence" to describe how – based on opaque algorithms – various actors can discriminate against categories of people in accessing jobs, loans, medical care, and other benefits. The book suggests that AI has a political resonance with soft eugenic approaches to the valuation of life by modern welfare states, and that AI exhibits eugenic features in its underlying logic, as well as in its technical operations. The parallel is with historical eugenicists achieving saving to the state by sterilizing defectives so the state would not have to care for their offspring. The analysis of McQuillan goes beyond the known critique of AI systems fostering precarious labour markets, addressing "necropolitics", the politics of who is entitled to live, and who to die. Although McQuillan offers a brief history of machine learning at the beginning of the book – with its need for "hidden and undercompensated labour", he is concerned more with the social impacts of AI rather than with its technical aspects. McQuillan sees AI as the continuation of existing bureaucratic systems that already marginalize vulnerable groups – aggravated by the fact that AI systems trained on existing data are likely to reinforce existing discriminations, e.g. in attempting to optimize welfare distribution based on existing data patterns, ultimately creating a system of "self-reinforcing social profiling". In elaborating on the continuation between existing bureaucratic violence and AI, McQuillan connects to Hannah Arendt's concept of the thoughtless bureaucrat in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, which now becomes the algorithm that, lacking intent, cannot be accountable, and is thus endowed with an "algorithmic thoughtlessness". McQuillan defends the "fascist" in the title of the work by arguing that while not all AI is fascist, this emerging technology of control may end up being deployed by fascist or authoritarian regimes. For McQuillan, AI can support the diffusion of states of exception, as a technology impossible to properly regulate and a mechanism for multiplying exceptions more widely. An example of a scenario where AI systems of surveillance could bring discrimination to a new high is the initiative to create LGBT-free zones in Poland. Skeptical of ethical regulations to control the technology, McQuillan suggests people's councils and workers' councils, and other forms of citizens' agency to resist AI. A chapter titled "Post-Machine Learning" makes an appeal for resistance via currents of thought from feminist science (standpoint theory), post-normal science (extended peer communities), and new materialism; McQuillan encourages the reader to question the meaning of "objectivity" and calls for the necessity of alternative ways of knowing. Among the virtuous examples of resistance – possibly to be adopted by the AI workers themselves – McQuillan notes the Lucas Plan of the workers of Lucas Aerospace Corporation, in which a workforce declared redundant took control, reorienting the enterprise toward useful products. McQuillan advocates for what he calls decomputing, an opposition to the sweeping application and expansion of artificial intelligence. Similar to degrowth, the approach criticizes AI as an outgrowth of the systemic issues within capitalist systems. McQuillan argues that a different future is possible, in which distance between people is reduced rather than increased through AI intermediaries. The work of McQuillan warns against "watered-down forms of engagement" with AI, such as citizen juries, which superficially look like democratic deliberation but may actually obscure important decisions about AI that are outside the purview of the engagement situation (McQuillan 2022, 128). In an interview about the book, McQuillan describes himself as an "AI abolitionist". == Reception == The book has been praised for how it "masterfully disassembles AI as an epistemological, social, and political paradigm". On the critical side, a review in the academic journal Justice, Power and Resistance took exception to the "nightmarish visions of Big Brother" offered by McQuillan, and argued that while many elements of AI may pose concern, a critique should not be based on a caricature of what AI is, concluding that McQuillan's work is "less of a theory and more of a Manifesto". Another review notes "a disconnect between the technical aspects of AI and the socio-political analysis McQuillan provides." Although the book was published before the ChatGPT and large language model debate heated up, the book has not lost relevance to the AI discussion. It is noted for suggesting a link between beliefs in artificial intelligence and beliefs in a racialised and gendered visions of intelligence overall, whereby a certain type of rational, measurable intelligence is privileged, leading to "historical notions of hierarchies of being". The blog Reboot praised McQuillan for offering a theory of harm of AI (why AI could end up hurting people and society) that does not just encourage tackling in isolation specific predicted problems with AI-centric systems: bias, non-inclusiveness, exploitativeness, environmental destructiveness, opacity, and non-contestability. For educational policies could also look at AI following the reading of McQuillan: In his book Resisting AI, Dan McQuillan argues that "When we're thinking about the actuality of AI, we can't separate the calculations in the code from the social context of its application" .... McQuillan's particular concern is how many contemporary applications of AI are amplifying existing inequalities and injustices as well as deepening social divisions and instabilities. His book makes a powerful case for anticipating these effects and actively resisting them for the good of societies. Videos and podcasts with an interest in AI and emerging technology have discussed the book.

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