Artificial Intelligence of Things (AIoT) is the combination of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies with the Internet of things (IoT) infrastructure to create systems capable of sensing, learning, and acting on data without continuous human intervention. While IoT focuses on connectivity and sensor data collection, AI enables IoT devices to analyse data in real time and produce actionable outputs, including automated decisions at the edge. == Applications == === Manufacturing and predictive maintenance === Manufacturing accounts for the largest share of AIoT adoption by industry vertical. A common application is predictive maintenance, where sensors measuring vibration, temperature, current draw, and acoustic emissions feed machine learning models trained to detect signatures that precede equipment failure. These systems can flag developing faults weeks or months in advance, and in more advanced deployments can autonomously adjust machine parameters such as motor speed or cooling cycles to delay or prevent failure. === Other industries === In healthcare, AIoT enables remote patient monitoring through wearable devices that collect vital signs and apply AI models to detect anomalies or predict deterioration. In logistics, GPS and telematics sensors combined with AI models support real-time route optimisation, vehicle maintenance prediction, and fuel cost forecasting. Smart building systems use occupancy, temperature, and energy sensors with AI to dynamically adjust HVAC and lighting, reducing energy consumption. == Architecture == AIoT systems typically operate across three layers: a device layer of sensors and actuators that collect data, a connectivity layer that transmits data via protocols such as MQTT or HTTP, and a compute layer where AI models process the data either in the cloud or at the edge. The trend toward edge-based processing, where inference runs on low-cost processors near the data source rather than in a centralised cloud, has accelerated as hardware costs have fallen and applications increasingly require sub-second response times. == Market == Market sizing estimates for AIoT vary significantly depending on scope and definition. Fortune Business Insights valued the AIoT market at USD 35.65 billion in 2023, projecting growth to USD 253.86 billion by 2030 at a compound annual growth rate of 32.4%. Grand View Research estimated the broader market at USD 171.4 billion in 2024 with a CAGR of 31.7% through 2030, reflecting a wider definition that includes AI-integrated hardware components. North America accounted for approximately 40% of global market share in 2024, with the Asia-Pacific region projected as the fastest-growing market.
Is an AI Headshot Generator Worth It in 2026?
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The 2028 Global Intelligence Crisis
The 2028 Global Intelligence Crisis is a report authored by James van Geelen and Alap Shah and published by Citrini Research in February 2026, on the impact of artificial intelligence on humanity's future. Written in the form of a scenario analysis, it was viewed millions of times online and reportedly caused a fall in the stock market prices of major tech and financial firms. It also received criticism among others, for its allegedly flawed economic logic. The 'thought exercise', as the authors called it, painted a gloomy picture for the near future, where outputs keep growing while consumer's ability to spend collapses. "...driven by ai agents that don’t sleep, take sick days or require health insurance”, "outputs that are shown in national accounts increases, "but never circulates through the real economy"(which the report calls 'Ghost GDP'), the authors argued. In other words, the authors predict a scenario where the owners of the AI firms will accumulate a vast fortune but there will be scant demand from consumers as AI would cause massive unemployment. The authors caution the reader that what they make is a scenario and not a prediction. In the scenario they visualise, any service whose value proposition is “I will navigate complexity that you find tedious” is getting disrupted. The reports argues that the unique ability of human beings to analyse, decide, create, persuade, and coordinate was “the thing that could not be replicated at scale,” and call the historical scarcity of this precious entity 'friction'. When this friction becomes zero, a gamut of changes occur which then triggers a cascading of changes across the economy. ”Travel booking platforms are an early casualty; Financial advice. tax prep., and routine legal work follow suit. National unemployment rate go as high 10.2% and the S&P 500 goes for a massive 38% peak-to-trough crash. In contrast to the previous technological revolutions the high-earning professionals suffers more and get forced to take up roles in the gig economy. Labour supply becomes abundant and this cuts wages all across the economy. The dent in income for the employees then affects other sectors of the economy such as the residential mortgage market. The losses for the software companies triggers loan defaults and heralds peril for the private credit sector.
Human–AI interaction
Human–AI interaction is a developing field of research and a sub-field of human–computer interaction (HCI). HCI is a field of research that explores the interactions between humans and computer-based technology, focusing on design implementation, user experience, and psychological factors. With the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI), there has developed a sub-section of HCI research dedicated specifically to artificial intelligence and how people interact with and are impacted by it. This is human–AI interaction, abbreviated either as HAX or HAII. == Introduction == Artificial intelligence (AI), in general, has fluid definitions and varied research applications, but in brief can be applied to mechanizing tasks that would require human intelligence to complete. AI are tools designed to replicate the human abilities of navigating uncertainty, active learning, and processing information in different contexts. Within the context of HCI and HAX research, artificial intelligence can be broken into two sub-fields, natural language processing (NLP) and computer vision (CV). AI technologies notably include machine-learning, deep-learning and neural networks, and large-language models (LLMs). As a new and rapidly developing technology, AI is changing how computers work and therefore changing how humans interact with computers. Unlike the traditional human-computer interaction, where a human directs a machine, human-AI interaction is characterized by a more collaborative relationship between the computer program (the AI) and the human user, as AI is perceived as an active agent rather than a tool. This changing dynamic creates new questions and necessitates new research methods that are not present in traditional HCI research. According to a scoping review on the state of the discipline, the HAX field comprises research on the "design, development, and evaluation of AI systems" and encompasses the themes of human-AI collaboration, human-AI competition, human-AI conflict, and human-AI symbiosis. == Design == Machine learning and artificial intelligence have been used for decades in targeted advertising and to recommend content in social media. Ethical Guidelines (Framework for ethical AI development) == User Experience (UX) == This section should handle research on how users interact with tools. What techniques do they use, do they develop habits, what types of programs and devices are they using to access these tools, what do they use these tools to do exactly. === Cognitive Frameworks in AI Tool Users === AI has been viewed with various expectations, attributions, and often misconceptions. Many people exclusively understand AI as the LLM chatbots they interact with, like ChatGPT or Claude, or other generative AI programs. [Insert section: discuss how people interact with these specific AI tools as a connection to the following paragraphs] Most fundamentally, humans have a mental model of understanding AI's reasoning and motivation for its decision recommendations, and building a holistic and precise mental model of AI helps people create prompts to receive more valuable responses from AI. However, these mental models are not whole because people can only gain more information about AI through their limited interaction with it; more interaction with AI builds a better mental model that a person may build to produce better prompt outcomes. Research on human-AI interaction has emphasized that users develop mental models of AI systems and revise those models through repeated use, feedback, and explanation, while design research has stressed the importance of communicating capabilities and limitations early and supporting trust calibration through explanation and correction. In a 2025 SSRN working paper, John DeVadoss proposed "Hypothetico-Deductive Interaction" (HDI), a framework that describes human-AI interaction as a mutual process of conjecture and refutation in which users test assumptions about an AI system's capabilities while the system infers and updates assumptions about user goals through its responses and clarifying questions. DeVadoss argued that this framing helps explain prompt iteration, weak capability awareness, and trust miscalibration, and suggested design responses such as clearer communication of uncertainty, easier correction, actionable explanations, and safer failure modes. == Research themes == === Human-AI collaboration === Human-AI collaboration occurs when the human and AI supervise the task on the same level and extent to achieve the same goal. Some collaboration occurs in the form of augmenting human capability. AI may help human ability in analysis and decision-making through providing and weighing a volume of information, and learning to defer to the human decision when it recognizes its unreliability. It is especially beneficial when the human can detect a task that AI can be trusted to make few errors so that there is not a lot of excessive checking process required on the human's end. Some findings show signs of human-AI augmentation, or human–AI symbiosis, in which AI enhances human ability in a way that co-working on a task with AI produces better outcomes than a human working alone. For example: the quality and speed of customer service tasks increase when a human agent collaborates with AI, training on specific models allows AI to improve diagnoses in clinical settings, and AI with human-intervention can improve creativity of artwork while fully AI-generated haikus were rated negatively. Human-AI synergy, a concept in which human-AI collaboration would produce more optimal outcomes than either human or AI working alone could explain why AI does not always help with performance. Some AI features and development may accelerate human-AI synergy, while others may stagnate it. For example, when AI updates for better performance, it sometimes worsens the team performance with human and AI by reducing the compatibility with the new model and the mental model a user has developed on the previous version. Research has found that AI often supports human capabilities in the form of human-AI augmentation and not human-AI synergy, potentially because people rely too much on AI and stop thinking on their own. Prompting people to actively engage in analysis and think when to follow AI recommendations reduces their over-reliance, especially for individuals with higher need for cognition. === Human-AI competition === Robots and computers have substituted routine tasks historically completed by humans, but agentic AI has made it possible to also replace cognitive tasks including taking phone calls for appointments and driving a car. At the point of 2016, research has estimated that 45% of paid activities could be replaced by AI by 2030. Perceived autonomy of robots is known to increase people's negative attitude toward them, and worry about the technology taking over leads people to reject it. There has been a consistent tendency of algorithm aversion in which people prefer human advice over AI advice. However, people are not always able to tell apart tasks completed by AI or other humans. See AI takeover for more information. It is also notable that this sentiment is more prominent in the Western cultures as Westerners tend to show less positive views about AI compared to East Asians. == Research on the psychological impacts of AI == === Perception on others who use AI === As much as people perceive and make judgment about AI itself, they also form impressions of themselves and others who use AI. In the workplace, employees who disclose the use of AI in their tasks are more likely to receive feedback that they are not as hardworking as those who are in the same job who receive non-AI help to complete the same tasks. AI use disclosure diminishes the perceived legitimacy in the employee's task and decision making which ultimately leads observers to distrust people who use AI. Although these negative effects of AI use disclosure are weakened by the observers who use AI frequently themselves, the effect is still not attenuated by the observers' positive attitude towards AI. === Bias, AI, and human === Although AI provides a wide range of information and suggestions to its users, AI itself is not free of biases and stereotypes, and it does not always help people reduce their cognitive errors and biases. People are prone to such errors by failing to see other potential ideas and cases that are not listed by AI responses and committing to a decision suggested by AI that directly contradicts the correct information and directions that they are already aware of. Gender bias is also reflected as the female gendering of AI technologies which conceptualizes females as a helpful assistant. == Emotional connection with AI == Human-AI interaction has been theorized in the context of interpersonal relationships mainly in social psychology, communications and media studies, and as a technology interface through the lens of hu
CHAOS (chess)
CHAOS (Chess Heuristics and Other Stuff) is a chess playing program that was developed by programmers working at the RCA Systems Programming division in the late 1960s. It played competitively in computer chess competitions in the 1970s and 1980s. It differed from other programs of that era in its look-ahead philosophy, choosing to use chess knowledge to evaluate fewer positions and continuations as opposed to simple evaluations that relied on deep look-ahead to avoid bad moves. == Introduction == CHAOS was originally developed by Ira Ruben, Fred Swartz, Victor Berman, Joe Winograd and William Toikka while working at RCA in Cinnaminson, NJ. Its name is an acronym for 'Chess Heuristics and Other Stuff.' Program development moved to the Computing Center of the University of Michigan when Swartz changed jobs, and Mike Alexander joined the development group. Swartz, Alexander and Berman were continuously group members from that point onward in CHAOS' evolution, as others of the original authors left and new members contributed episodically. Chess Senior Master Jack O'Keefe contributed to CHAOS' development from about 1980 onwards. CHAOS was written in Fortran, except for low-level board representation manipulations written in assembly language or C. Due to this portability, it ran on RCA, Univac and IBM-compatible mainframes in its lifetime. CHAOS heralds from the mainframe computing era when only machines of that capacity were able to play at a high level. Consequently, development and testing could only take place at off-peak times for production use of the machine. In a competition, CHAOS had to run on a dedicated mainframe with a telephone link to the match venue. In its later years, CHAOS ran on computers on the machine assembly floor of Amdahl Corporation on MTS. == Background == === Chess and artificial intelligence === Mathematicians Claude Shannon and Alan Turing, working separately, were the first to view playing chess as a challenge to machines. Working for AT&T / Bell Labs with its access to telephone switching equipment, Shannon built a relay-based machine that learned how to work its way through a two-dimensional, 5x5 cell maze in 1949. Shannon viewed this as an analogue of the way that organisms learn things about their natural environment. There is a random element to searching it, a memory element to benefit from the search outcome, and a reward element that reinforces learning when the global outcome is favorable to the organism. Soon afterward, Shannon wrote a mathematical analysis of the game of chess, published in 1950. Like with the maze, he broke down game play into the necessary elements for reinforcement learning. Associated with each board configuration a move will be made from, there is a numerical score. To decide what move to make, a player wants to maximize their own position's score after the move and to minimize their opponent's score (a minimax view). Since there are about 32 possible moves at each of the early stages of the game, and about 40 moves and responses in each game, then there are about 32 80 {\displaystyle 32^{80}} or about 10 120 {\displaystyle 10^{120}} possible games - an impossibly large set to evaluate completely. Therefore, there must be a way to limit the number of moves to look ahead for to find the best one. Reducing the game to these few key elements provided a way to think about human intelligence in general. Shannon became part of a wider group using computing machines to mimic aspects of human intelligence that grew into the general idea of artificial intelligence. (Other members of this group were John McCarthy, Herbert Simon, Allen Newell, Alan Kotok, Alex Bernstein and Richard Greenblatt.) The paradigm that evolved was that there was a quantification of the position on the board into a score, an evaluation method to find favorable outcomes (minimax, later alpha-beta pruning), and a strategy to manage the combinatorial explosion of the look-ahead possibilities. By the early 1960s, there were computer programs that played chess at a rudimentary level. They used very simple evaluation functions for each position and tried to search as far forward as was practical given the time constraints and available compute power. Naturally, programmers optimized their code to use the available computing resources. This led to a major philosophical divide among chess programs: those that tried to evaluate as many positions as possible, and those that tried to evaluate the most promising move sequences as deeply as possible. CHAOS was firmly in the camp believing only the most promising moves should be evaluated in depth. Said Swartz, "The 'brute force people' ... look at every (possible move) no matter what garbage it is. Most moves are just terrible, terrible moves, and most computing time is being spent on pure garbage." The program spent more time evaluating each board position in the expectation that it would find the most promising lines of play to explore in depth. In 1983, the then-fastest chess program (Belle) evaluated 110,000 positions per second, and typical programs 1000–50,000 per second, whereas CHAOS evaluated about 50-100 per second. === Machine learning and strategies to manage search === From about 1949 onward, Arthur Samuel began work for IBM on machine learning, culminating in a checkers-playing program in 1952 and publications on the topic. Concurrently, Christopher Strachey created Checkers, a program to play the board game of checkers in 1951, but it had no capacity to learn from its play. Checkers was chosen by both authors because it was simpler than chess yet contained the basic characteristics of an intellectual activity, and, in Samuel's view, was a test-bed in which heuristic procedures and learning processes could be evaluated quickly. Checker playing programs introduced the notion of the game tree and evaluating play to various depths to choose the best move. The complexity of chess, however, promoted it to the status of an analogue for human intelligence, and it attracted computer scientists' attention, who referred to it as research into artificial intelligence (AI). Like checkers, it required a numerical assessment of each arrangement of chess pieces on a board. It also required looking ahead to future moves to decide how to play the present position. Due to the enormous number of possible moves, there had to be a way to confine the look-ahead search to the most promising lines of play. From these factors, the notion of minimax score evaluation developed and, later, alpha-beta tree pruning to abandon looking at positions worse than any that have already been examined. === Chess search strategies === The AI community viewed artificial intelligence as comprising two parts: a way to symbolically quantify the knowledge in hand (a chess board position), and a set of heuristics to limit look-ahead to the consequences of a move. The early chess playing programs attempted to look forward as far as possible, perhaps to 3 moves ahead by each player, and to choose the best outcome. This led to the horizon effect, whereby a key move 4 or more moves ahead would be unexamined and therefore missed. Consequently, the programs were quite weak and heuristics to manage the search became important in their development. CHAOS used a selective search strategy with iterative widening. As chess programs evolved, they incorporated books of opening lines of play from historic sources. Nowadays, book moves are catalogued in machine-readable form, but originally programmers had to type them in. CHAOS had an extensive book for its time of around 10,000 moves that O'Keefe helped to develop. A problem with play from an opening book is the behavior of the program when the play leaves the book: the positional advantage may be so subtle that the evaluation scheme may be unable to understand it, leading to very wide and shallow searches to establish a line of play. The horizon effect again plagues move selection after leaving the book. CHAOS mitigated these problems by only using book lines that it could understand, and by relying on cached analyses of continuations out of the book made while the opponent's clock was running. == Game Play History == CHAOS played in twelve ACM computer chess tournaments and four World Computer Chess Championships (WCCC). Its debut was the ACM computer chess tournament in 1973, taking 2nd place. In 1974, it again won 2nd place in the WCCC, defeating the tournament favorite Chess 4.0 but losing to Kaissa. CHAOS was close to winning the 1980 WCCC, but lost to Belle in a playoff. The 1985 ACM computer chess tournament was CHAOS' last competition. One of CHAOS' notable victories was over Chess 4.0 at the 1974 WCCC tournament. Chess 4.0 was unbeaten by any other program up until then. Playing as white, CHAOS made a knight sacrifice (16 Nd4-e6!!) that traded material for open lines of attack and eventually won the game. CHAOS’ authors thought the move was due to a
Representation collapse
Representation collapse is a phenomenon in machine learning and representation learning where a model maps different inputs to the same or very similar embeddings, which means it loses important information about how the data is spread out. It is frequently encountered in self-supervised learning, especially within contrastive and non-contrastive frameworks, when training objectives or model architectures do not maintain variance across representations. Collapse results in degenerate solutions characterized by uninformative learned features, significantly impairing downstream task performance. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate representation collapse, including the use of negative samples, architectural asymmetry, stop-gradient operations, variance regularization, and redundancy reduction objectives, as seen in methods such as SimCLR, BYOL, and VICReg. Comprehending and averting representation collapse is regarded as a fundamental challenge in the advancement of stable and efficient self-supervised learning systems.
The AI Con
The AI Con: How to Fight Big Tech's Hype and Create the Future We Want is a 2025 non-fiction book by linguist Emily M. Bender and sociologist Alex Hanna. It argues that much of what is labeled "artificial intelligence" is a misleading term that obscures ordinary automation while concentrating power in a small number of technology firms. The book was published in May 2025 by Harper in the United States and Bodley Head in the United Kingdom. It was developed alongside the authors' long-running podcast Mystery AI Hype Theater 3000, which critiques exaggerated claims about AI. == Synopsis == The authors present AI as a marketing umbrella that encourages audiences to infer understanding and agency where none exist. They argue readers should treat such language skeptically and to separate specific automated tasks from broad claims of intelligence. The book describes a recurring hype cycle in which corporate narratives justify data and labor extraction, the replacement of human services with cheaper substitutes, and the diversion of attention from present harms to speculative futures. While acknowledging limited uses such as pattern recognition, the authors argue that contemporary systems are best understood as text and media generators shaped by training data and human labor, not as thinking or reasoning entities. A central theme is the social and environmental cost of scaling these systems, including increased energy and water use, the appropriation of creative work for training, and the outsourcing of ghost work to low-paid data workers worldwide. These costs are linked to workplace effects, with the authors arguing that automation rarely eliminates jobs outright and more often degrades them through surveillance, work intensification, and unpaid oversight. As alternatives to passive adoption, the authors propose concrete responses: asking precise questions about what is being automated and why, demanding transparency about data and evaluation, and practicing what they call strategic refusal when deployment conflicts with evidence or values. The book also develops a vocabulary for public debate, rejecting both boosterish and doomerish narratives as grounded in the same assumption that AI is a singular, autonomous force. The authors recommend reading strategies such as favoring trusted human sources over automated summaries and using humor to deflate inflated claims. They describe a link between language to policy and power, arguing that precise terminology can help policymakers and the public resist austerity-driven automation and demand accountability for errors and harms. == Reception == The Guardian praised the book's myth-busting approach and its analysis of how hype erodes cultural and civic life by normalizing synthetic media as a substitute for human judgment. Kirkus Reviews described it as a contrarian account that catalogs concrete risks while cutting through speculative predictions. An interview in Business Insider highlighted the authors' accessible frameworks, including their proposal to describe chatbots as conversation simulators and to evaluate systems in terms of values, labor, and evidence. Coverage in GeekWire emphasized the book's call for resistance through collective bargaining, stronger data rights, and a norm of rejecting deployments that fail basic standards of necessity and evaluation. Some reviews were more critical. A review in LLRX argued that the book's tone could be overly polemical and that it gave limited attention to potential benefits claimed for generative systems. Coverage in the Financial Times, focused on Bender's broader public scholarship, situated the book within her long-standing critique of anthropomorphic narratives about large language models and her advocacy for more democratic oversight of automated systems.