Adversarial machine learning

Adversarial machine learning

Adversarial machine learning is the study of the attacks on machine learning algorithms, and of the defenses against such attacks. Machine learning techniques are mostly designed to work on specific problem sets, under the assumption that the training and test data are generated from the same statistical distribution (IID). However, this assumption is often violated in practical high-stake applications, where users may intentionally supply fabricated data that violates the statistical assumption. Most common attacks in adversarial machine learning include evasion attacks, data poisoning attacks, Byzantine attacks and model extraction. == History == At the MIT Spam Conference in January 2004, John Graham-Cumming showed that a machine-learning spam filter could be used to defeat another machine-learning spam filter by automatically learning which words to add to a spam email to get the email classified as not spam. In 2004, Nilesh Dalvi and others noted that linear classifiers used in spam filters could be defeated by simple "evasion attacks" as spammers inserted "good words" into their spam emails. (Around 2007, some spammers added random noise to fuzz words within "image spam" in order to defeat OCR-based filters.) In 2006, Marco Barreno and others published "Can Machine Learning Be Secure?", outlining a broad taxonomy of attacks. As late as 2013 many researchers continued to hope that non-linear classifiers (such as support vector machines and neural networks) might be robust to adversaries, until Battista Biggio and others demonstrated the first gradient-based attacks on such machine-learning models (2012–2013). In 2012, deep neural networks began to dominate computer vision problems; starting in 2014, Christian Szegedy and others demonstrated that deep neural networks could be fooled by adversaries, again using a gradient-based attack to craft adversarial perturbations. Further work would show that adversarial attacks are harder to produce in uncontrolled environments, due to the different environmental constraints that cancel out the effect of noise. For example, any small rotation or slight illumination on an adversarial image can destroy the adversariality. In addition, researchers such as Google Brain's Nick Frosst point out that it is much easier to make self-driving cars miss stop signs by physically removing the sign itself, rather than creating adversarial examples. Frosst also believes that the adversarial machine learning community incorrectly assumes models trained on a certain data distribution will also perform well on a completely different data distribution. He suggests that a new approach to machine learning should be explored, and is currently working on a unique neural network that has characteristics more similar to human perception than state-of-the-art approaches. While adversarial machine learning continues to be heavily rooted in academia, large tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, and IBM have begun curating documentation and open source code bases to allow others to concretely assess the robustness of machine learning models and minimize the risk of adversarial attacks. === Examples === Examples include attacks in spam filtering, where spam messages are obfuscated through the misspelling of "bad" words or the insertion of "good" words; attacks in computer security, such as obfuscating malware code within network packets or modifying the characteristics of a network flow to mislead intrusion detection; attacks in biometric recognition where fake biometric traits may be exploited to impersonate a legitimate user; or to compromise users' template galleries that adapt to updated traits over time. Researchers showed that by changing only one-pixel it was possible to fool deep learning algorithms. Others 3-D printed a toy turtle with a texture engineered to make Google's object detection AI classify it as a rifle regardless of the angle from which the turtle was viewed. Creating the turtle required only low-cost commercially available 3-D printing technology. A machine-tweaked image of a dog was shown to look like a cat to both computers and humans. A 2019 study reported that humans can guess how machines will classify adversarial images. Researchers discovered methods for perturbing the appearance of a stop sign such that an autonomous vehicle classified it as a merge or speed limit sign. A data poisoning filter called Nightshade was released in 2023 by researchers at the University of Chicago. It was created for use by visual artists to put on their artwork to corrupt the data set of text-to-image models, which usually scrape their data from the internet without the consent of the image creator. McAfee attacked Tesla's former Mobileye system, fooling it into driving 50 mph over the speed limit, simply by adding a two-inch strip of black tape to a speed limit sign. Adversarial patterns on glasses or clothing designed to deceive facial-recognition systems or license-plate readers, have led to a niche industry of "stealth streetwear". An adversarial attack on a neural network can allow an attacker to inject algorithms into the target system. Researchers can also create adversarial audio inputs to disguise commands to intelligent assistants in benign-seeming audio; a parallel literature explores human perception of such stimuli. Clustering algorithms are used in security applications. Malware and computer virus analysis aims to identify malware families, and to generate specific detection signatures. In the context of malware detection, researchers have proposed methods for adversarial malware generation that automatically craft binaries to evade learning-based detectors while preserving malicious functionality. Optimization-based attacks such as GAMMA use genetic algorithms to inject benign content (for example, padding or new PE sections) into Windows executables, framing evasion as a constrained optimization problem that balances misclassification success with the size of the injected payload and showing transferability to commercial antivirus products. Complementary work uses generative adversarial networks (GANs) to learn feature-space perturbations that cause malware to be classified as benign; Mal-LSGAN, for instance, replaces the standard GAN loss with a least-squares objective and modified activation functions to improve training stability and produce adversarial malware examples that substantially reduce true positive rates across multiple detectors. == Challenges in applying machine learning to security == Researchers have observed that the constraints under which machine-learning techniques function in the security domain are different from those of common benchmark domains. Security data may change over time, include mislabeled samples, or reflect adversarial behavior, which complicates evaluation and reproducibility. === Data collection issues === Security datasets vary across formats, including binaries, network traces, and log files. Studies have reported that the process of converting these sources into features can introduce bias or inconsistencies. In addition, time-based leakage can occur when related malware samples are not properly separated across training and testing splits, which may lead to overly optimistic results. === Labeling and ground truth challenges === Malware labels are often unstable because different antivirus engines may classify the same sample in conflicting ways. Ceschin et al. note that families may be renamed or reorganized over time, causing further discrepancies in ground truth and reducing the reliability of benchmarks. === Concept drift === Because malware creators continuously adapt their techniques, the statistical properties of malicious samples also change. This form of concept drift has been widely documented and may reduce model performance unless systems are updated regularly or incorporate mechanisms for incremental learning. === Feature robustness === Researchers differentiate between features that can be easily manipulated and those that are more resistant to modification. For example, simple static attributes, such as header fields, may be altered by attackers, while structural features, such as control-flow graphs, are generally more stable but computationally expensive to extract. === Class imbalance === In realistic deployment environments, the proportion of malicious samples can be extremely low, ranging from 0.01% to 2% of total data. This unbalanced distribution causes models to develop a bias towards the majority class, achieving high accuracy but failing to identify malicious samples. Prior approaches to this problem have included both data-level solutions and sequence-specific models. Methods like n-gram and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks can model sequential data, but their performance has been shown to decline significantly when malware samples are realistically proportioned in the training set, demonstrating the limitations in

Top 10 AI Clip Makers Compared (2026)

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Symbolic artificial intelligence

In artificial intelligence, symbolic artificial intelligence (also known as classical artificial intelligence or logic-based artificial intelligence) is the term for the collection of all methods in artificial intelligence research that are based on high-level symbolic (human-readable) representations of problems, logic, and search. Symbolic AI used tools such as logic programming, production rules, semantic nets and frames, and it developed applications such as knowledge-based systems (in particular, expert systems), symbolic mathematics, automated theorem provers, ontologies, the semantic web, and automated planning and scheduling systems. The Symbolic AI paradigm led to important ideas in search, symbolic programming languages, agents, multi-agent systems, the semantic web, and the strengths and limitations of formal knowledge and reasoning systems. Symbolic AI was the dominant paradigm of AI research from the mid-1950s until the mid-1990s. Researchers in the 1960s and the 1970s were convinced that symbolic approaches would eventually succeed in creating a machine with artificial general intelligence and considered this the ultimate goal of their field. An early boom, with early successes such as the Logic Theorist and Samuel's Checkers Playing Program, led to unrealistic expectations and promises and was followed by the first AI Winter as funding dried up. A second boom (1969–1986) occurred with the rise of expert systems, their promise of capturing corporate expertise, and an enthusiastic corporate embrace. That boom, and some early successes, e.g., with XCON at DEC, was followed again by later disappointment. Problems with difficulties in knowledge acquisition, maintaining large knowledge bases, and brittleness in handling out-of-domain problems arose. Another, second, AI Winter (1988–2011) followed. Subsequently, AI researchers focused on addressing underlying problems in handling uncertainty and in knowledge acquisition. Uncertainty was addressed with formal methods such as hidden Markov models, Bayesian reasoning, and statistical relational learning. Symbolic machine learning addressed the knowledge acquisition problem with contributions including Version Space, Valiant's PAC learning, Quinlan's ID3 decision-tree learning, case-based learning, and inductive logic programming to learn relations. Neural networks, a subsymbolic approach, had been pursued from early days and reemerged strongly in 2012. Early examples are Rosenblatt's perceptron learning work, the backpropagation work of Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams, and work in convolutional neural networks by LeCun et al. in 1989. However, neural networks were not viewed as successful until about 2012: "Until Big Data became commonplace, the general consensus in the Al community was that the so-called neural-network approach was hopeless. Systems just didn't work that well, compared to other methods. ... A revolution came in 2012, when a number of people, including a team of researchers working with Hinton, worked out a way to use the power of GPUs to enormously increase the power of neural networks." Over the next several years, deep learning had spectacular success in handling vision, speech recognition, speech synthesis, image generation, and machine translation, though symbolic approaches continue to be useful in a few domains such as computer algebra systems and proof assistants. == History == A short history of symbolic AI to the present day follows below. Time periods and titles are drawn from Henry Kautz's 2020 AAAI Robert S. Engelmore Memorial Lecture and the longer Wikipedia article on the History of AI, with dates and titles differing slightly for increased clarity. === The first AI summer: irrational exuberance, 1948–1966 === Success at early attempts in AI occurred in three main areas: artificial neural networks, knowledge representation, and heuristic search, contributing to high expectations. This section summarizes Kautz's reprise of early AI history. ==== Approaches inspired by human or animal cognition or behavior ==== Cybernetic approaches attempted to replicate the feedback loops between animals and their environments. A robotic turtle, with sensors, motors for driving and steering, and seven vacuum tubes for control, based on a preprogrammed neural net, was built as early as 1948. This work can be seen as an early precursor to later work in neural networks, reinforcement learning, and situated robotics. An important early symbolic AI program was the Logic theorist, written by Allen Newell, Herbert Simon and Cliff Shaw in 1955–56, as it was able to prove 38 elementary theorems from Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica. Newell, Simon, and Shaw later generalized this work to create a domain-independent problem solver, GPS (General Problem Solver). GPS solved problems represented with formal operators via state-space search using means-ends analysis. During the 1960s, symbolic approaches achieved great success at simulating intelligent behavior in structured environments such as game-playing, symbolic mathematics, and theorem-proving. AI research was concentrated in four institutions in the 1960s: Carnegie Mellon University, Stanford, MIT and (later) University of Edinburgh. Each one developed its own style of research. Earlier approaches based on cybernetics or artificial neural networks were abandoned or pushed into the background. Herbert Simon and Allen Newell studied human problem-solving skills and attempted to formalize them, and their work laid the foundations of the field of artificial intelligence, as well as cognitive science, operations research and management science. Their research team used the results of psychological experiments to develop programs that simulated the techniques that people used to solve problems. This tradition, centered at Carnegie Mellon University would eventually culminate in the development of the Soar architecture in the middle 1980s. ==== Heuristic search ==== In addition to the highly specialized domain-specific kinds of knowledge that we will see later used in expert systems, early symbolic AI researchers discovered another more general application of knowledge. These were called heuristics, rules of thumb that guide a search in promising directions: "How can non-enumerative search be practical when the underlying problem is exponentially hard? The approach advocated by Simon and Newell is to employ heuristics: fast algorithms that may fail on some inputs or output suboptimal solutions." Another important advance was to find a way to apply these heuristics that guarantees a solution will be found, if there is one, not withstanding the occasional fallibility of heuristics: "The A algorithm provided a general frame for complete and optimal heuristically guided search. A is used as a subroutine within practically every AI algorithm today but is still no magic bullet; its guarantee of completeness is bought at the cost of worst-case exponential time. ==== Early work on knowledge representation and reasoning ==== Early work covered both applications of formal reasoning emphasizing first-order logic, along with attempts to handle common-sense reasoning in a less formal manner. ===== Modeling formal reasoning with logic: the "neats" ===== Unlike Simon and Newell, John McCarthy felt that machines did not need to simulate the exact mechanisms of human thought, but could instead try to find the essence of abstract reasoning and problem-solving with logic, regardless of whether people used the same algorithms. His laboratory at Stanford (SAIL) focused on using formal logic to solve a wide variety of problems, including knowledge representation, planning and learning. Logic was also the focus of the work at the University of Edinburgh and elsewhere in Europe which led to the development of the programming language Prolog and the science of logic programming. ===== Modeling implicit common-sense knowledge with frames and scripts: the "scruffies" ===== Researchers at MIT (such as Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert) found that solving difficult problems in vision and natural language processing required ad hoc solutions—they argued that no simple and general principle (like logic) would capture all the aspects of intelligent behavior. Roger Schank described their "anti-logic" approaches as "scruffy" (as opposed to the "neat" paradigms at CMU and Stanford). Commonsense knowledge bases (such as Doug Lenat's Cyc) are an example of "scruffy" AI, since they must be built by hand, one complicated concept at a time. === The first AI winter: crushed dreams, 1967–1977 === The first AI winter was a shock: During the first AI summer, many people thought that machine intelligence could be achieved in just a few years. The Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched programs to support AI research to use AI to solve problems of national security; in particular, to automate the translation of Russian to English for inte

Halite AI Programming Competition

Halite is an open-source computer programming contest developed by the hedge fund/tech firm Two Sigma in partnership with a team at Cornell Tech. Programmers can see the game environment and learn everything they need to know about the game. Participants are asked to build bots in whichever language they choose to compete on a two-dimensional virtual battle field. == History == Benjamin Spector and Michael Truell created the first Halite competition in 2016, before partnering with Two Sigma later that year. === Halite I === Halite I asked participants to conquer territory on a grid. It launched in November 2016 and ended in February 2017. Halite I attracted about 1,500 players. === Halite II === Halite II was similar to Halite I, but with a space-war theme. It ran from October 2017 until January 2018. The second installment of the competition attracted about 6,000 individual players from more than 100 countries. Among the participants were professors, physicists and NASA engineers, as well as high school and university students. === Halite III === Halite III launched in mid-October 2018. It ran from October 2018 to January 2019, with an ocean themed playing field. Players were asked to collect and manage Halite, an energy resource. By the end of the competition, Halite III included more than 4000 players and 460 organizations. === Halite IV === Halite IV was hosted by Kaggle, and launched in mid-June 2020.

Coupled pattern learner

Coupled Pattern Learner (CPL) is a machine learning algorithm which couples the semi-supervised learning of categories and relations to forestall the problem of semantic drift associated with boot-strap learning methods. == Coupled Pattern Learner == Semi-supervised learning approaches using a small number of labeled examples with many unlabeled examples are usually unreliable as they produce an internally consistent, but incorrect set of extractions. CPL solves this problem by simultaneously learning classifiers for many different categories and relations in the presence of an ontology defining constraints that couple the training of these classifiers. It was introduced by Andrew Carlson, Justin Betteridge, Estevam R. Hruschka Jr. and Tom M. Mitchell in 2009. == CPL overview == CPL is an approach to semi-supervised learning that yields more accurate results by coupling the training of many information extractors. Basic idea behind CPL is that semi-supervised training of a single type of extractor such as ‘coach’ is much more difficult than simultaneously training many extractors that cover a variety of inter-related entity and relation types. Using prior knowledge about the relationships between these different entities and relations CPL makes unlabeled data as a useful constraint during training. For e.g., ‘coach(x)’ implies ‘person(x)’ and ‘not sport(x)’. == CPL description == === Coupling of predicates === CPL primarily relies on the notion of coupling the learning of multiple functions so as to constrain the semi-supervised learning problem. CPL constrains the learned function in two ways. Sharing among same-arity predicates according to logical relations Relation argument type-checking === Sharing among same-arity predicates === Each predicate P in the ontology has a list of other same-arity predicates with which P is mutually exclusive. If A is mutually exclusive with predicate B, A’s positive instances and patterns become negative instances and negative patterns for B. For example, if ‘city’, having an instance ‘Boston’ and a pattern ‘mayor of arg1’, is mutually exclusive with ‘scientist’, then ‘Boston’ and ‘mayor of arg1’ will become a negative instance and a negative pattern respectively for ‘scientist.’ Further, Some categories are declared to be a subset of another category. For e.g., ‘athlete’ is a subset of ‘person’. === Relation argument type-checking === This is a type checking information used to couple the learning of relations and categories. For example, the arguments of the ‘ceoOf’ relation are declared to be of the categories ‘person’ and ‘company’. CPL does not promote a pair of noun phrases as an instance of a relation unless the two noun phrases are classified as belonging to the correct argument types. === Algorithm description === Following is a quick summary of the CPL algorithm. Input: An ontology O, and a text corpus C Output: Trusted instances/patterns for each predicate for i=1,2,...,∞ do foreach predicate p in O do EXTRACT candidate instances/contextual patterns using recently promoted patterns/instances; FILTER candidates that violate coupling; RANK candidate instances/patterns; PROMOTE top candidates; end end ==== Inputs ==== A large corpus of Part-Of-Speech tagged sentences and an initial ontology with predefined categories, relations, mutually exclusive relationships between same-arity predicates, subset relationships between some categories, seed instances for all predicates, and seed patterns for the categories. ==== Candidate extraction ==== CPL finds new candidate instances by using newly promoted patterns to extract the noun phrases that co-occur with those patterns in the text corpus. CPL extracts, Category Instances Category Patterns Relation Instances Relation Patterns ==== Candidate filtering ==== Candidate instances and patterns are filtered to maintain high precision, and to avoid extremely specific patterns. An instance is only considered for assessment if it co-occurs with at least two promoted patterns in the text corpus, and if its co-occurrence count with all promoted patterns is at least three times greater than its co-occurrence count with negative patterns. ==== Candidate ranking ==== CPL ranks candidate instances using the number of promoted patterns that they co-occur with so that candidates that occur with more patterns are ranked higher. Patterns are ranked using an estimate of the precision of each pattern. ==== Candidate promotion ==== CPL ranks the candidates according to their assessment scores and promotes at most 100 instances and 5 patterns for each predicate. Instances and patterns are only promoted if they co-occur with at least two promoted patterns or instances, respectively. == Meta-Bootstrap Learner == Meta-Bootstrap Learner (MBL) was also proposed by the authors of CPL. Meta-Bootstrap learner couples the training of multiple extraction techniques with a multi-view constraint, which requires the extractors to agree. It makes addition of coupling constraints on top of existing extraction algorithms, while treating them as black boxes, feasible. MBL assumes that the errors made by different extraction techniques are independent. Following is a quick summary of MBL. Input: An ontology O, a set of extractors ε Output: Trusted instances for each predicate for i=1,2,...,∞ do foreach predicate p in O do foreach extractor e in ε do Extract new candidates for p using e with recently promoted instances; end FILTER candidates that violate mutual-exclusion or type-checking constraints; PROMOTE candidates that were extracted by all extractors; end end Subordinate algorithms used with MBL do not promote any instance on their own, they report the evidence about each candidate to MBL and MBL is responsible for promoting instances. == Applications == In their paper authors have presented results showing the potential of CPL to contribute new facts to existing repository of semantic knowledge, Freebase

Model compression

Model compression is a machine learning technique for reducing the size of trained models. Large models can achieve high accuracy, but often at the cost of significant resource requirements. Compression techniques aim to compress models without significant performance reduction. Smaller models require less storage space, and consume less memory and compute during inference. Compressed models enable deployment on resource-constrained devices such as smartphones, embedded systems, edge computing devices, and consumer electronics computers. Efficient inference is also valuable for large corporations that serve large model inference over an API, allowing them to reduce computational costs and improve response times for users. Model compression is not to be confused with knowledge distillation, in which a smaller "student" model is trained to imitate the input-output behavior of a larger "teacher" model (as opposed to using the "teacher"'s trained parameters or the "teacher"'s training targets). == Techniques == Several techniques are employed for model compression. === Pruning === Pruning sparsifies a large model by setting some parameters to exactly zero. This effectively reduces the number of parameters. This allows the use of sparse matrix operations, which are faster than dense matrix operations. Pruning criteria can be based on magnitudes of parameters, the statistical pattern of neural activations, Hessian values, etc. === Quantization === Quantization reduces the numerical precision of weights and activations. For example, instead of storing weights as 32-bit floating-point numbers, they can be represented using 8-bit integers. Low-precision parameters take up less space, and takes less compute to perform arithmetic with. It is also possible to quantize some parameters more aggressively than others, so for example, a less important parameter can have 8-bit precision while another, more important parameter, can have 16-bit precision. Inference with such models requires mixed-precision arithmetic. Quantized models can also be used during training (rather than after training). PyTorch implements automatic mixed-precision (AMP), which performs autocasting, gradient scaling, and loss scaling. === Low-rank factorization === Weight matrices can be approximated by low-rank matrices. Let W {\displaystyle W} be a weight matrix of shape m × n {\displaystyle m\times n} . A low-rank approximation is W ≈ U V T {\displaystyle W\approx UV^{T}} , where U {\displaystyle U} and V {\displaystyle V} are matrices of shapes m × k , n × k {\displaystyle m\times k,n\times k} . When k {\displaystyle k} is small, this both reduces the number of parameters needed to represent W {\displaystyle W} approximately, and accelerates matrix multiplication by W {\displaystyle W} . Low-rank approximations can be found by singular value decomposition (SVD). The choice of rank for each weight matrix is a hyperparameter, and jointly optimized as a mixed discrete-continuous optimization problem. The rank of weight matrices may also be pruned after training, taking into account the effect of activation functions like ReLU on the implicit rank of the weight matrices. == Training == Model compression may be decoupled from training, that is, a model is first trained without regard for how it might be compressed, then it is compressed. However, it may also be combined with training. The "train big, then compress" method trains a large model for a small number of training steps (less than it would be if it were trained to convergence), then heavily compress the model. It is found that at the same compute budget, this method results in a better model than lightly compressed, small models. In Deep Compression, the compression has three steps. First loop (pruning): prune all weights lower than a threshold, then finetune the network, then prune again, etc. Second loop (quantization): cluster weights, then enforce weight sharing among all weights in each cluster, then finetune the network, then cluster again, etc. Third step: Use Huffman coding to losslessly compress the model. The SqueezeNet paper reported that Deep Compression achieved a compression ratio of 35 on AlexNet, and a ratio of ~10 on SqueezeNets.

Artificial intelligence and elections

As artificial intelligence (AI) has become more mainstream, there is growing concern about how this will influence elections. Potential targets of AI include election processes, election offices, election officials and election vendors. There are also global efforts to improve elections using AI. == Tactics == Generative AI capabilities allow creation of misleading content. Examples of this include text-to-video, deepfake videos, text-to-image, AI-altered images, text-to-speech, voice cloning, and text-to-text. In the context of an election, a deepfake video of a candidate may propagate information that the candidate does not endorse. Chatbots could spread misinformation related to election locations, times or voting methods. In contrast to malicious actors in the past, these techniques require little technical skill and can spread rapidly. LLM-generated messages have the capacity to persuade humans on political issues. Researchers have begun to investigate how people rate messages that LLMs generate for how persuasive they are. When it came to policy issues, the LLM-generated messages received a 2.91 compared to a 2.80 when it came to smartness between the AI and humans. The LLM-generated messages were often more technical and analytical than human-generated messages. Generative AI has been used to micro-target people during tight political elections. The generation of targeted large language models has triggered concern that they will be used to leverage readily scale microtargeting. Rephrasing inputs have been used to generate fraudulent emails and phishing websites. Rephrasing inputs in a microtargeting does not violate the terms of OpenAI usage. There are no safeguards to prevent the use of rephrasing and creation of fraudulent emails. Political campaign managers have access to this allowing for them to create targeted content. == Usage by country == === Argentina === ==== 2023 elections ==== During the 2023 Argentine primary elections, Javier Milei's team distributed AI generated images including a fabricated image of his rival Sergio Massa and drew 3 million views. The team also created an unofficial Instagram account entitled "AI for the Homeland." Sergio Massa's team also distributed AI generated images and videos. === Bangladesh === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the run up to the 2024 Bangladeshi general election, deepfake videos of female opposition politicians appeared. Rumin Farhana was pictured in a bikini while Nipun Ray was shown in a swimming pool. === Canada === ==== 2025 elections ==== In the run up to the 2025 Canadian federal election, the use of AI tools is likely to figure prominently. India, Pakistan and Iran are all expected to make efforts to subvert the national vote using disinformation campaigns to deceive voters and sway diaspora communities. In a report by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security called "Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process: 2025 Update", it states that malicious actors including China and Russia: "are most likely to use generative AI as a means of creating and spreading disinformation, designed to sow division among Canadians and push narratives conducive to the interests of foreign states". === France === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 French legislative election, deepfake videos appeared claiming: i) That they showed the family of Marine le Pen. In the videos, young women, supposedly Le Pen's nieces, are seen skiing, dancing and at the beach "while making fun of France’s racial minorities": However, the family members don't exist. On social media there were over 2 million views. ii) In a video seen on social media, a deepfake video of a France24 broadcast appeared to report that the Ukrainian leadership had "tried to lure French president Emmanuel Macron to Ukraine to assassinate him and then blame his death on Russia". === Ghana === ==== 2024 elections ==== During the months before the December 2024 Ghanaian general election, a network of at least 171 fake accounts has been used to spam social media. Posts have been used by a group identified as "@TheTPatriots" to promote the New Patriotic Party, although it is not known whether the two are connected. All the networks' posts were "highly likely" to have been generated by ChatGPT and appear to be the "first secretly partisan network using AI to influence elections in Ghana". The opposition National Democratic Congress was also criticized with its leader John Mahama being called a drunkard. === India === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 Indian general election, politicians used deepfakes in their campaign materials. These deepfakes included politicians who had died prior to the election. Mathuvel Karunanidhi's party posted with his likeness even though he had died 2018. A video The All-India Anna Dravidian Progressive Federation party posted showed an audio clip of Jayaram Jayalalithaa even though she had died in 2016. The Deepfakes Analysis Unit (DAU) is an open source platform created in March 2024 for the public to share misleading content and assess if it had been AI-generated. AI was also used to translate political speeches in real time. This translating ability was widely used to reach more voters. === Indonesia === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, Prabowo Subianto made extensive use of AI-generated art in his campaign, which ranged from images of himself as an adorable child to various child portrayals in his advertisements. The Indonesian Children's Protection Commission condemned these ads, labeling them as a form of misuse. Other candidates, Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo, also incorporated AI art into their campaigns. Throughout the election period, all presidential candidates faced attacks from deepfakes, both in video and audio formats. === Ireland === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the last weeks of the 2024 Irish general election a spoof election poster appeared in Dublin featuring "an AI-generated candidate with three arms". The candidate is called Aidan Irwin, but no-one stood in the election with that name. A slogan on the poster says "put matters into artificial intelligence’s hands". The convincing election poster shows a man that "has six fingers on one hand, three arms, and a distorted thumb". === New Zealand === ==== 2023 elections ==== In May 2023, ahead of the 2023 New Zealand general election in October 2023, the New Zealand National Party published a "series of AI-generated political advertisements" on its Instagram account. After confirming that the images were faked, a party spokesperson said that it was "an innovative way to drive our social media". === Pakistan === ==== 2024 elections ==== AI has been used by the imprisoned ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan and his media team in the 2024 Pakistani general election: i) An AI generated audio of his voice was added to a video clip and was broadcast at a virtual rally. ii) An op-ed in The Economist written by Khan was later claimed by himself to have been written by AI which was later denied by his team. The article was liked and shared on social media by thousands of users. === South Africa === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 South African general election, there were several uses of AI content: i) A deepfaked video of Joe Biden emerged on social media showing him saying that "The U.S. would place sanctions on SA and declare it an enemy state if the African National Congress (ANC) won". ii) In a deepfake video, Donald Trump was shown endorsing the uMkhonto weSizwe party. It was posted to social media and was viewed more than 158,000 times. iii) Less than 3 months before the elections, a deepfake video showed U.S. rapper Eminem endorsing the Economic Freedom Fighters party while criticizing the ANC. The deepfake was viewed on social media more than 173,000 times. === South Korea === ==== 2022 elections ==== In the 2022 South Korean presidential election, a committee for one presidential candidate Yoon Suk Yeol released an AI avatar 'Al Yoon Seok-yeol' that would campaign in places the candidate could not go. The other presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung introduced a chatbot that provided information about the candidate's pledges. ==== 2024 elections ==== Deepfakes were used to spread misinformation before the 2024 South Korean legislative election with one source reporting 129 deepfake violations of election laws within a two week period. Seoul hosted the 2024 Summit for Democracy, a virtual gathering of world leaders initiated by US President Joe Biden in 2021. The focus of the summit was on digital threats to democracy including artificial intelligence and deepfakes. === Taiwan === ==== 2024 elections ==== AI-generated content was used during the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. Among the media were: i) A deepfake video of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping which showed him supporting the presidential elections. Created on social media, the video was "widely circulated