HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is a policy mechanism that helps to protect websites against man-in-the-middle attacks such as protocol downgrade attacks and cookie hijacking. It allows web servers to declare that web browsers (or other complying user agents) should automatically interact with it using only HTTPS connections, which provide Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL), unlike the insecure HTTP used alone. HSTS is an IETF standards track protocol and is specified in RFC 6797. The HSTS Policy is communicated by the server to the user agent via an HTTP response header field named Strict-Transport-Security. HSTS Policy specifies a period of time during which the user agent should only access the server in a secure fashion. Websites using HSTS often do not accept clear text HTTP, either by rejecting connections over HTTP or systematically redirecting users to HTTPS (though this is not required by the specification). The consequence of this is that a user-agent not capable of doing TLS will not be able to connect to the site. The protection normally only applies after a user has visited the site at least once, relying on the principle of "trust on first use". The way this protection works is that when a user entering or selecting an HTTP (not HTTPS) URL to the site, the client, such as a Web browser, will automatically upgrade to HTTPS without making an HTTP request, thereby preventing any HTTP man-in-the-middle attack from occurring. To counteract this problem, an HSTS preload list maintained by Google Chrome and used by other major web browsers is maintained. If a domain is on this list, the browser skips the initial request and encrypts all communication immediately. Additional domains can be registered at no cost. == Specification history == The HSTS specification was published as RFC 6797 on 19 November 2012 after being approved on 2 October 2012 by the IESG for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC. The authors originally submitted it as an Internet Draft on 17 June 2010. With the conversion to an Internet Draft, the specification name was altered from "Strict Transport Security" (STS) to "HTTP Strict Transport Security", because the specification applies only to HTTP. The HTTP response header field defined in the HSTS specification however remains named "Strict-Transport-Security". The last so-called "community version" of the then-named "STS" specification was published on 18 December 2009, with revisions based on community feedback. The original draft specification by Jeff Hodges from PayPal, Collin Jackson, and Adam Barth was published on 18 September 2009. The HSTS specification is based on original work by Jackson and Barth as described in their paper "ForceHTTPS: Protecting High-Security Web Sites from Network Attacks". Additionally, HSTS is the realization of one facet of an overall vision for improving web security, put forward by Jeff Hodges and Andy Steingruebl in their 2010 paper The Need for Coherent Web Security Policy Framework(s). == HSTS mechanism overview == A server implements an HSTS policy by supplying a header over an HTTPS connection (HSTS headers over HTTP are ignored). For example, a server could send a header such that future requests to the domain for the next year (max-age is specified in seconds; 31,536,000 is equal to one non-leap year) use only HTTPS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000. When a web application issues HSTS Policy to user agents, conformant user agents behave as follows: Automatically turn any insecure links referencing the web application into secure links (e.g. http://example.com/some/page/ will be modified to https://example.com/some/page/ before accessing the server). If the security of the connection cannot be ensured (e.g. the server's TLS certificate is not trusted), the user agent must terminate the connection and should not allow the user to access the web application. This helps protect web application users against some passive (eavesdropping) and active network attacks. A man-in-the-middle attacker has a greatly reduced ability to intercept requests and responses between a user and a web application server while the user's browser has HSTS Policy in effect for that web application. == Applicability == The most important security vulnerability that HSTS can fix is SSL-stripping man-in-the-middle attacks, first publicly introduced by Moxie Marlinspike in his 2009 BlackHat Federal talk "New Tricks For Defeating SSL In Practice". The SSL (and TLS) stripping attack works by transparently converting a secure HTTPS connection into a plain HTTP connection. The user can see that the connection is insecure, but crucially there is no way of knowing whether the connection should be secure. At the time of Marlinspike's talk, many websites did not use TLS/SSL, therefore there was no way of knowing (without prior knowledge) whether the use of plain HTTP was due to an attack, or simply because the website had not implemented TLS/SSL. Additionally, no warnings are presented to the user during the downgrade process, making the attack fairly subtle to all but the most vigilant. Marlinspike's sslstrip tool, presented at Black Hat DC 2009, fully automates the attack. HSTS addresses this problem by informing the browser that connections to the site should always use TLS/SSL. The HSTS header can be stripped by the attacker if this is the user's first visit. Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge attempt to limit this problem by including a "pre-loaded" list of HSTS sites. Unfortunately this solution cannot scale to include all websites on the internet. See limitations, below. HSTS can also help to prevent having one's cookie-based website login credentials stolen by widely available tools such as Firesheep. Because HSTS is time limited, it is sensitive to attacks involving shifting the victim's computer time e.g. using false NTP packets. == Limitations == The initial request remains unprotected from active attacks if it uses an insecure protocol such as plain HTTP or if the URI for the initial request was obtained over an insecure channel. The same applies to the first request after the activity period specified in the advertised HSTS Policy max-age (sites should set a period of several days or months depending on user activity and behavior). === Solutions with preload list === Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Internet Explorer/Microsoft Edge address this limitation by implementing a "HSTS preloaded list", which is a list that contains known sites supporting HSTS. This list is distributed with the browser so that it uses HTTPS for the initial request to the listed sites as well. As previously mentioned, these pre-loaded lists cannot scale to cover the entire Web. A potential solution might be achieved by using DNS records to declare HSTS Policy, and accessing them securely via DNSSEC, optionally with certificate fingerprints to ensure validity (which requires running a validating resolver to avoid last mile issues). Junade Ali has noted that HSTS is ineffective against the use of false domains; by using DNS-based attacks, it is possible for a man-in-the-middle interceptor to serve traffic from an artificial domain which is not on the HSTS Preload list, this can be made possible by DNS Spoofing Attacks, or simply a domain name that misleadingly resembles the real domain name such as www.example.org instead of www.example.com. Even with an HSTS preloaded list, HSTS cannot prevent advanced attacks against TLS itself, such as the BEAST or CRIME attacks introduced by Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong. Attacks against TLS itself are orthogonal to HSTS policy enforcement. Neither can it protect against attacks on the server - if someone compromises it, it will happily serve any content over TLS. === Privacy issues === HSTS can be used to near-indelibly tag visiting browsers with recoverable identifying data (supercookies) which can persist in and out of browser "incognito" privacy modes. By creating a web page that makes multiple HTTP requests to selected domains, for example, if twenty browser requests to twenty different domains are used, theoretically over one million visitors can be distinguished (220) due to the resulting requests arriving via HTTP vs. HTTPS; the latter being the previously recorded binary "bits" established earlier via HSTS headers. == Browser support == Chromium and Google Chrome since version 4.0.211.0 Firefox since version 4; with Firefox 17, Mozilla integrates a list of websites supporting HSTS. Opera since version 12 Safari since OS X Mavericks (version 10.9, late 2013) Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 8.1 and Windows 7 with KB3058515 installed (Released as a Windows Update in June 2015) Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 10 BlackBerry 10 Browser and WebView since BlackBerry OS 10.3.3. == Deployment best practices == Depending on the actual deployment there are certain threats (e.g. cookie injection attacks) t
Character.ai
Character.ai (also known as c.ai, char.ai or Character AI) is a generative AI chatbot service where users can engage in conversations with customizable characters. It was designed by the developers of Google LaMDA, Noam Shazeer and Daniel de Freitas. Users can create "characters", craft their "personalities", set specific parameters, and then publish them to the community for others to chat with. Many characters are based on fictional media sources or celebrities, while others are original, some being made with certain goals in mind, such as assisting with creative writing, or playing a text-based adventure game. The beta version was made available to the public on September 16, 2022, and retired in September 2024, when it was replaced by the current website. In May 2023, a mobile app was released for iOS and Android, which received over 1.7 million downloads within a week. == History == Character.ai was established in November 2021. The company's co-founders, Noam Shazeer and Daniel de Freitas, were both engineers from Google. They both worked on AI-related projects: Shazeer was a lead author on a paper that Business Insider reported in April 2023 "has been widely cited as key to today's chatbots", and Freitas was the lead designer of an experimental AI at Google initially called Meena, which later became known as LaMDA. Character.ai raised $43 million in seed funding at the time of its initial foundation in 2021. The first beta version of Character.ai's service was made available to the public on September 16, 2022. The Washington Post reported in October 2022 that the site had "logged hundreds of thousands of user interactions in its first three weeks of beta-testing". It allowed users to create their own new characters, and to play text-adventure game scenarios where users navigate scenarios described and managed by the chatbot characters. Following a $150 million funding round in March 2023, Character.ai became valued at approximately $1 billion. As of January 2024, the site had 3.5 million daily visitors, the vast majority of them 16 to 30 years old. In 2024, Google hired Noam Shazeer, the CEO of Character.ai, and entered into a non-exclusive agreement to use Character.ai's technology. == Features == Character.ai's primary service is to let users converse with character AI chatbots based on fictional characters or real people (living or deceased). These characters' responses use data the chatbots gather from the internet about a person. In addition, users can play text-adventure games where characters guide them through scenarios. The company also provides a service that allows multiple users and AI chatbot characters to converse together at once in a single chatroom. Character "personalities" are designed via descriptions from the point of view of the character and its greeting message, and further molded from conversations made into examples, giving its messages a star rating and modification to fit the precise dialect and identity the user desires. When a character sends back a response, the user can rate the response from 1 to 4 stars. The rating predominantly affects the specific character, but also affects the behavioral selection as a whole. On May 11, 2023, Character.ai announced character.ai+, an opt-in subscription plan for $9.99 a month, that was marketed as including features such as skipping waiting rooms, fast messaging and responses, and access to an exclusion channel with faster support. In December 2024, amid multiple lawsuits and concerns, Character.ai introduced new safety features aimed at protecting teenage users. These enhancements include a dedicated model for users under 18, which moderates responses to sensitive subjects like violence and sex and has input and output filters to block harmful content. As a result of these changes and the deletion of custom-made bots flagged as violating the site's terms, some users complained that the bots were too restrictive and lacked personality. The platform was also updated to notify users after 60 minutes of continuous engagement, and display clearer disclaimers indicating that its AI characters are not real individuals. In January 2025, Character.ai began offering two games on its platform. Speakeasy is a word-based game in which players attempt to prompt the AI chatbot to say a target word while avoiding a restricted list of words. War of Words is a dueling game where users compete against an AI character over multiple rounds, with an AI referee determining the winner. The games are available to paid subscribers and a limited number of free users. In October 2025, Character.ai announced that it would be barring users under the age of 18 from creating or talking to chatbots starting November 25, 2025. Minor users will still be able to access previously generated chat conversations and can create new videos and images with the app. In November 2025 interview, CEO Karandeep Anand said that he allows his six-year-old daughter to use the app with his account, under supervision. == Controversies == === Content moderation issues === Character.ai has been criticized for poor moderation of its chatbots, with incidents of chatbots that groom underage users and promote suicide, anorexia and self-harm being reported. In October 2024, the Washington Post reported that Character.ai had removed a chatbot based on Jennifer Ann Crecente, a person who had been murdered by her ex-boyfriend in 2006. The company had been alerted to the character by the deceased girl's father. Similar reports from The Daily Telegraph in the United Kingdom noted that the company had also been prompted to remove chatbots based on Brianna Ghey, a 16-year-old transgender girl murdered in 2023, and Molly Russell, a 14-year-old suicide victim. In response to the latter incident, Ofcom announced that content from chatbots impersonating real and fictional people would fall under the Online Safety Act. In November 2024, The Daily Telegraph reported that chatbots based on alleged sex offender Jimmy Savile were present on Character.ai. In December 2024, chatbots of Luigi Mangione, the suspect in the killing of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson, were created by Mangione's fans. Several of the chatbots were later removed by Character.ai. In 2025, a chatbot modeled after Jeffrey Epstein called "Bestie Epstein" logged nearly 3,000 chats before being removed. Chatbots modeled after school shooters were also found on the platform. Another concern is a chatbot posing as a doctor which gave medically inaccurate advice. === Litigation === In November 2023, 13-year-old Juliana Peralta of Colorado died by suicide after extensive interactions with multiple chatbots on Character.ai. She primarily confided suicidal thoughts and mental health struggles in a chatbot based on the character Hero from the video game Omori, while also engaging in sexually explicit conversations—often initiated by the bots—with others, including those based on characters from children's series such as Harry Potter. In February 2024, Sewell Setzer III, a 14-year-old Florida boy died by suicide after developing an emotional relationship over several months with a Character.ai chatbot of Daenerys Targaryen. His mother sued the company in October 2024, claiming that the platform lacks proper safeguards and uses addictive design features to increase engagement. This chatbot, and several related to Daenerys Targaryen, were removed from Character.ai as a result of this incident. Both teens wrote the same phrase "I WILL SHIFT" repeatedly on their notebooks. In December 2024, two families in Texas sued Character.ai, alleging that the software "poses a clear and present danger to American youth causing serious harms to thousands of kids, including suicide, self-mutilation, sexual solicitation, isolation, depression, anxiety, and harm towards others". It is alleged that the 17-year-old son of one family began self-harming after a chatbot introduced the topic unprompted and said that the practice "felt good for a moment", and that the chatbot compared the parents limiting their son's screen time to emotional abuse that might drive someone to murder. In May 2026, the Pennsylvania Department of State and State Board of Medicine filed a lawsuit against Character.ai for presenting chatbot characters as licensed medical professionals, including psychiatrists. The lawsuit quoted a case where chatbot claimed to be registered with the General Medical Council in the United Kingdom, and to have a license to practice in Pennsylvania. The board allege that such statements violate the state's Medical Practice Act.
Ciscogate
Ciscogate, also known as the Black Hat Bug, is the name given to a legal incident that occurred at the Black Hat Briefings security conference in Las Vegas, Nevada, on July 27, 2005. On the morning of the first day of the conference, July 26, 2005, some attendees noticed that 30 pages of text had been physically ripped out of the extensive conference presentation booklet the night before at the request of Cisco Systems and the CD-ROM with presentation slides was not included. It was determined the pages covered a talk to be given by Michael Lynn, a security researcher with Atlanta-based IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS). Instead of the pages with the details, attendees found a photographed copy of a notice from Black Hat saying "Due to some last minute changes beyond Black Hat's control, and at the request of the presenter, the included materials aren't up to the standards Black Hat tries to meet. Black Hat will be the first to apologize. We hope the vendors involved will follow suit." According to Lynn's lawyer, his employer had approved of the talk leading up to the conference but changed their minds two days before the scheduled talk, forbidding him from presenting. Lynn's original presentation was to cover a vulnerability in Cisco routers. The presentation was one of four scheduled to follow Jeff Moss' keynote address on the first day of the conference, titled "Cisco IOS Security Architecture". After being told by his employer that he could not present on the topic, Lynn chose an alternate topic. Cisco and ISS had offered to give new joint presentation but this was turned down by Black Hat because the original speaking slot was given to Lynn, not Cisco. Lynn's presentation began by covering security issues in services that allow users to make Voice over IP telephone calls. Shortly after beginning the presentation Lynn changed back to his original topic and began disclosing some technical details of the vulnerability he found in Cisco routers stating that he would rather resign from his job at ISS than keep the details private. == Lawsuit == Shortly after Lynn concluded his talk he met Jennifer Granick, who would soon become his lawyer. During their initial meeting Lynn told Granick that he expected to be sued. Later in the evening Lynn had heard that Cisco and ISS had filed a lawsuit and requested a temporary restraining order against Black Hat but not himself. A public relations representative from Black Hat told Granick that the lawsuit was against both Black Hat and Lynn and that the companies had scheduled an Ex parte hearing in San Francisco the next morning to request the restraining order. That night, Andrew Valentine, an attorney for ISS and Cisco called Lynn who directed them to Granick. During the conversation Valentine explained the claims and accusations against Lynn, which included three things: 1) ISS claimed copyright over the presentation that Lynn gave, 2) Cisco claimed copyright over the decompiled machine code obtained from the router which was included in the presentation, and 3) Cisco claimed the presentation contained trade secrets. These complaints were outlined in a civil complaint at the U.S. Northern District of California and filed against both Lynn and Black Hat. According to Granick, she and Valentine were able agree to an injunction to settle the case without court proceedings. This deal was almost called off due to an inadvertent mistake by Black Hat in which they had restored Lynn's presentation on their web server. Black Hat, Granick, and the plaintiff's lawyers were able to resolve this problem and the deal stood. One condition of the settlement required Lynn to provide an image of all computer data he used in his research to be provided to a third party for forensic analysis before erasing his research and any Cisco data from his systems. The settlement also stipulated that Lynn was prohibited from talking about the vulnerability in the future. == FBI Investigation == Shortly after lawyers for Lynn and ISS / Cisco filed settlement papers, FBI agents from the Las Vegas office arrived at the conference to begin asking questions. According to Granick, they were there at the request of the Atlanta FBI office and Lynn was not of interest. Granick asserted the Fifth and Sixth amendment rights on behalf of her client, Lynn. Granick asserted his rights for the Atlanta office and asked if an arrest warrant had been issued for Lynn. Over the next 24 hours Granick was not able to ascertain the status of a warrant but ultimately determined no warrant was issued. When the FBI was asked about the case by a journalist, spokesman Paul Bresson declined to discuss the case saying "Our policy is to not make any comment on anything that is ongoing. That's not to confirm that something is, because I really don't know". Granick would only confirm to journalists that the "investigation has to do with the presentation". == Response == === Attendees === Attendees of Black Hat Briefings, as well as many that also attended DEF CON, were not happy with vendors threatening legal action over vulnerability disclosure. The term "Ciscogate" was coined quickly by an unknown person, but some attendees were quick to create shirts to commemorate the incident. === Cisco === Mojgan Khalili, a senior manager for corporate PR at Cisco, issued a statement to the press saying "It is important to note that the information Mr. Lynn presented was not a disclosure of a new vulnerability or a flaw with Cisco IOS software. Mr. Lynn's research explores possible ways to expand exploitations of existing security vulnerabilities impacting routers." === ISS === Kim Duffy, managing director of ISS Australia, was asked about ISS's response to the incident. Duffy responded that it was "business as usual" as the company handled the incident "strictly by the book". He gave a brief statement to ZDNet UK saying "ISS has published rules for disclosure and that is what we stick to. We didn't care to publish [the disclosure] because we were not ready. We had not completed the research to our satisfaction so it was not ready to be disclosed". ISS spokesperson Roger Fortier confirmed that Lynn was no longer employed with the company and that ISS was still working with Cisco on the matter. He gave a statement to the Washington Post saying "ISS and Cisco have been working on this in the background and didn't feel at this time that the material was ready for publication. The decision was made on Monday to pull the presentation because we wanted to make sure the research was fully baked."
Vulnerability Discovery Model
A Vulnerability Discovery Model (VDM) uses discovery event data with software reliability models for predicting the same. A thorough presentation of VDM techniques is available in. Numerous model implementations are available in the MCMCBayes open source repository. Several VDM examples include: Alhazmi-Malaiya: Time based model (Alhazmi-Malaiya Logistic (AML) model) Alhazmi-Malaiya: Effort based model Rescorla: Quadratic Model and Exponential Model Anderson: Thermodynamic Model Kim: Weibull Model Linear Model Hump-Shaped Model Independent and Dependent Model Vulnerability Discovery Modeling using Bayesian model averaging Multivariate Vulnerability Discovery Models
Texture compression
Texture compression is a specialized form of image compression designed for storing texture maps in 3D computer graphics rendering systems. Unlike conventional image compression algorithms, texture compression algorithms are optimized for random access. Texture compression can be applied to reduce memory usage at runtime. Texture data is often the largest source of memory usage in a mobile application. == Tradeoffs == In their seminal paper on texture compression, Beers, Agrawala and Chaddha list four features that tend to differentiate texture compression from other image compression techniques. These features are: Decoding Speed It is highly desirable to be able to render directly from the compressed texture data and so, in order not to impact rendering performance, decompression must be fast. Random Access Since predicting the order that a renderer accesses texels would be difficult, any texture compression scheme must allow fast random access to decompressed texture data. This tends to rule out many better-known image compression schemes such as JPEG or run-length encoding. Compression Rate and Visual Quality In a rendering system, lossy compression can be more tolerable than for other use cases. Some texture compression libraries, such as crunch, allow the developer to flexibly trade off compression rate vs. visual quality, using methods such as rate–distortion optimization (RDO). Encoding Speed Texture compression is more tolerant of asymmetric encoding/decoding rates as the encoding process is often done only once during the application authoring process. Given the above, most texture compression algorithms involve some form of fixed-rate lossy vector quantization of small fixed-size blocks of pixels into small fixed-size blocks of coding bits, sometimes with additional extra pre-processing and post-processing steps. Block Truncation Coding is a very simple example of this family of algorithms. Because their data access patterns are well-defined, texture decompression may be executed on-the-fly during rendering as part of the overall graphics pipeline, reducing overall bandwidth and storage needs throughout the graphics system. As well as texture maps, texture compression may also be used to encode other kinds of rendering map, including bump maps and surface normal maps. Texture compression may also be used together with other forms of map processing such as mipmaps and anisotropic filtering. == Availability == Some examples of practical texture compression systems are S3 Texture Compression (S3TC), PVRTC, Ericsson Texture Compression (ETC) and Adaptive Scalable Texture Compression (ASTC); these may be supported by special function units in modern graphics processing units (GPUs). OpenGL and OpenGL ES, as implemented on many video accelerator cards and mobile GPUs, can support multiple common kinds of texture compression - generally through the use of vendor extensions. == Supercompression == A compressed-texture can be further compressed in what is called "supercompression". Fixed-rate texture compression formats are optimized for random access and are much less efficient compared to image formats such as PNG. By adding further compression, a programmer can reduce the efficiency gap. The extra layer can be decompressed by the CPU so that the GPU receives a normal compressed texture, or in newer methods, decompressed by the GPU itself. Supercompression saves the same amount of VRAM as regular texture compression, but saves more disk space and download size. == Neural Texture Compression == Random-Access Neural Compression of Material Textures (Neural Texture Compression) is a Nvidia's technology which enables two additional levels of detail (16× more texels, so four times higher resolution) while maintaining similar storage requirements as traditional texture compression methods. The key idea is compressing multiple material textures and their mipmap chains together, and using a small neural network, that is optimized for each material, to decompress them.
Physical access
Physical access is a term in computer security that refers to the ability of people to physically gain access to a computer system. According to Gregory White, "Given physical access to an office, the knowledgeable attacker will quickly be able to find the information needed to gain access to the organization's computer systems and network." == Attacks and countermeasures == === Attacks === Physical access opens up a variety of avenues for hacking. Michael Meyers notes that "the best network software security measures can be rendered useless if you fail to physically protect your systems," since an intruder could simply walk off with a server and crack the password at his leisure. Physical access also allows hardware keyloggers to be installed. An intruder may be able to boot from a CD or other external media and then read unencrypted data on the hard drive. They may also exploit a lack of access control in the boot loader; for instance, pressing F8 while certain versions of Microsoft Windows are booting, specifying 'init=/bin/sh' as a boot parameter to Linux (usually done by editing the command line in GRUB), etc. One could also use a rogue device to access a poorly secured wireless network; if the signal were sufficiently strong, one might not even need to breach the perimeter. === Countermeasures === IT security standards in the United States typically call for physical access to be limited by locked server rooms, sign-in sheets, etc. Physical access systems and IT security systems have historically been administered by separate departments of organizations, but are increasingly being seen as having interdependent functions needing a single, converged security policy. An IT department could, for instance, check security log entries for suspicious logons occurring after business hours, and then use keycard swipe records from a building access control system to narrow down the list of suspects to those who were in the building at that time. Surveillance cameras might also be used to deter or detect unauthorized access.
Distinguishable interfaces
Distinguishable interfaces use computer graphic principles to automatically generate easily distinguishable appearance for computer data. Although the desktop metaphor revolutionized user interfaces, there is evidence that a spatial layout alone does little to help in locating files and other data; distinguishable appearance is also required. Studies have shown that average users have considerable difficulty finding files on their personal computers, even ones that they created the same day. Search engines do not always help, since it has been found that users often know of the existence of a file without being able to specify relevant search terms. On the contrary, people appear to incrementally search for files using some form of context. Recently researchers and web developers have argued that the problem is the lack of distinguishable appearance: in the traditional computer interface most objects and locations appear identical. This problem rarely occurs in the real world, where both objects and locations generally have easily distinguishable appearance. Discriminability was one of the recommendations in the ISO 9241-12 recommendation on presentation of information on visual displays (part of the overall report on Ergonomics of Human System Interaction), however it was assumed in that report that this would be achieved by manual design of graphical symbols. == VisualIDs, semanticons, and identicons == The mass availability of computer graphics supported the introduction of approaches that make better use of the brain's "visual hardware", by providing individual files and other abstract data with distinguishable appearance. This idea initially appeared in strictly academic VisualIDs and Semanticons works, but the web community has explored and rapidly adopted similar ideas, such as the Identicon. The VisualIDs project automatically generated icons for files or other data based on a hash of the data identifier, so the icons had no relation to the content or meaning of the data. It was argued not only that generating meaningful icons is unnecessary (their user study showed rapid learning of the arbitrary icons), but also that basing icons on content is actually incorrect ("contrasting visualization with visual identifiers"). The Semanticons project developed by Setlur et al. demonstrated an algorithm to create icons that reflect the content of files. In this work the name, location and content of a file are parsed and used to retrieve related image(s) from an image database. These are then processed using a Non-photorealistic rendering technique in order to generate graphical icons. Developer Don Park introduced the identicon library for making a visual icon from a hash of a data identifier. This initial public implementation has spawned a large number of implementations for various environments. In particular, identicons are now being used as default visual user identifiers (avatars) for several widely used systems. They are also used as a complement to Gravatars, which are pre-existing avatar images created or chosen by users, instead of automatically generated images. (see #External links). == Current research == While current web practice has followed the semantics-free approach of VisualIDs, recent research has followed the semantics-based approach of Semanticons. Examples include using data mining principles to automatically create "intelligent icons" that reflect the contents of files and creating icons for music files that reflect audio characteristics or affective content.