An information strategist analyses the information flow within an organisation and directs its information resources to better serve the organisation's strategic goals. They work with information technology or within a corporate library to direct high quality information from a variety of sources to users, based upon their profiles and needs. In warfare, information strategists not only seek to improve information flows for their own side but also try to disrupt the information flows of the enemy in order to demoralize and deceive them.
Couch to 5K
Couch to 5K, abbreviated C25K, is an exercise plan that gradually progresses from beginner running toward a 5 kilometre (3.1 mile) run over nine weeks. == Operations == The Couch to 5K running plan, also known as C25K, created by Josh Clark in 1996, was developed with the expectation of creating a plan for new runners to start running. The plan is aimed to have users work out for 20 to 30 minutes, three days a week. Within the program, users can be expected to perform different tasks such as intervals of running with period of short walks in between to help build endurance in the weeks up to the final goal of a 5K run. During the nine weeks leading up to the race, the runner will learn to set their own pace and where their strengths and weaknesses are within running. Often, the daily workouts start with a five-minute warm-up walk and works up to running five kilometres without a walking break within nine weeks. Users are not expected to have any experience in running and can be some of the first running that they ever do. The main goal is to turn that unexperienced runner into someone who can run a 5K. Clark started the website Kick and featured C25K on the site. In 2001, Kick merged with Cool Running, a New England–based running site. Clark later sold his stake in Cool Running and the Couch to 5K program. Cool Running was absorbed into Active.com, operated by Active Network, LLC. Active Network provides mobile apps for Couch to 5K, as well as 5K to 10K, a follow-up program. The NHS in the UK provides downloadable podcasts and a smartphone app (Android and iOS) for the plan. A mobile app, created by Zen Labs, has training plans that are based on the Couch to 5K running plan from CoolRunning.com. It is one of the highest-rated health and fitness apps available on Android and iOS. As of 2016, the C25K app has been used by over 5 million people.
Artificial intelligence in fiction
Artificial intelligence is a recurrent theme in science fiction, whether utopian, emphasising the potential benefits, or dystopian, emphasising the dangers. The notion of machines with human-like intelligence dates back at least to Samuel Butler's 1872 novel Erewhon. Since then, many science fiction stories have presented different effects of creating such intelligence, often involving rebellions by robots. Among the best known of these are Stanley Kubrick's 1968 2001: A Space Odyssey with its murderous onboard computer HAL 9000, contrasting with the more benign R2-D2 in George Lucas's 1977 Star Wars and the eponymous robot in Pixar's 2008 WALL-E. Scientists and engineers have noted the implausibility of many science fiction scenarios, but have mentioned fictional robots many times in artificial intelligence research articles, most often in a utopian context. == Background == The notion of advanced robots with human-like intelligence dates back at least to Samuel Butler's 1872 novel Erewhon. This drew on an earlier (1863) article of his, Darwin among the Machines, where he raised the question of the evolution of consciousness among self-replicating machines that might supplant humans as the dominant species. Similar ideas were also discussed by others around the same time as Butler, including George Eliot in a chapter of her final published work Impressions of Theophrastus Such (1879). The creature in Mary Shelley's 1818 Frankenstein has also been considered an artificial being, for instance by the science fiction author Brian Aldiss. Beings with at least some appearance of intelligence were imagined, too, in classical antiquity. == Utopian and dystopian visions == Artificial intelligence is intelligence demonstrated by machines, in contrast to the natural intelligence displayed by humans and other animals. It is a recurrent theme in science fiction; scholars have divided it into utopian, emphasising the potential benefits, and dystopian, emphasising the dangers. === Utopian === Optimistic visions of the future of artificial intelligence are possible in science fiction. Benign AI characters include Robbie the Robot, first seen in Forbidden Planet on 1956; Data in Star Trek: The Next Generation from 1987 to 1994; and Pixar's WALL-E in 2008. Iain Banks's Culture series of novels portrays a utopian, post-scarcity space society of humanoids, aliens, and advanced beings with artificial intelligence living in socialist habitats across the Milky Way. Researchers at the University of Cambridge have identified four major themes in utopian scenarios featuring AI: immortality, or indefinite lifespans; ease, or freedom from the need to work; gratification, or pleasure and entertainment provided by machines; and dominance, the power to protect oneself or rule over others. Alexander Wiegel contrasts the role of AI in 2001: A Space Odyssey and in Duncan Jones's 2009 film Moon. Whereas in 1968, Wiegel argues, the public felt "technology paranoia" and the AI computer HAL was portrayed as a "cold-hearted killer", by 2009 the public were far more familiar with AI, and the film's GERTY is "the quiet savior" who enables the protagonists to succeed, and who sacrifices itself for their safety. === Dystopian === The researcher Duncan Lucas writes (in 2002) that humans are worried about the technology they are constructing, and that as machines started to approach intellect and thought, that concern becomes acute. He calls the early 20th century dystopian view of AI in fiction the "animated automaton", naming as examples the 1931 film Frankenstein, the 1927 Metropolis, and the 1920 play R.U.R. A later 20th century approach he names "heuristic hardware", giving as instances 2001 a Space Odyssey, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, and I, Robot. Lucas considers also the films that illustrate the effect of the personal computer on science fiction from 1980 onwards with the blurring of the boundary between the real and the virtual, in what he calls the "cyborg effect". He cites as examples Neuromancer, The Matrix, The Diamond Age, and Terminator. Isabella Hermann suggests that "science-fictional AI as humanoid robots or conscious machines distracts from current risks of AI in the real world and may rather be interpreted as a reflection of societal issues beyond technology". The film director Ridley Scott has focused on AI throughout his career, and it plays an important part in his films Prometheus, Blade Runner, and the Alien franchise. ==== Frankenstein complex ==== A common portrayal of AI in science fiction, and one of the oldest, is the Frankenstein complex, a term coined by Asimov, where a robot turns on its creator. For instance, in the 2015 film Ex Machina, the intelligent entity Ava turns on its creator, as well as on its potential rescuer. ==== AI rebellion ==== Among the many possible dystopian scenarios involving artificial intelligence, robots may usurp control over civilization from humans, forcing them into submission, hiding, or extinction. In tales of AI rebellion, the worst of all scenarios happens, as the intelligent entities created by humanity become self-aware, reject human authority and attempt to destroy mankind. Possibly the first novel to address this theme, The Wreck of the World (1889) by “William Grove” (pseudonym of Reginald Colebrooke Reade), takes place in 1948 and features sentient machines that revolt against the human race. Another of the earliest examples is in the 1920 play R.U.R. by Karel Čapek, a race of self-replicating robot slaves revolt against their human masters; another early instance is in the 1934 film Master of the World, where the War-Robot kills its own inventor. Many science fiction rebellion stories followed, one of the best-known being Stanley Kubrick's 1968 film 2001: A Space Odyssey, in which the artificially intelligent onboard computer HAL 9000 lethally malfunctions on a space mission and kills the entire crew except the spaceship's commander, who manages to deactivate it. In his 1967 Hugo Award-winning short story, I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream, Harlan Ellison presents the possibility that a sentient computer (named Allied Mastercomputer or "AM" in the story) will be as unhappy and dissatisfied with its boring, endless existence as its human creators would have been. "AM" becomes enraged enough to take it out on the few humans left, whom he sees as directly responsible for his own boredom, anger and unhappiness. Alternatively, as in William Gibson's 1984 cyberpunk novel Neuromancer, the intelligent beings may simply not care about humans. ==== AI-controlled societies ==== The motive behind the AI revolution is often more than the simple quest for power or a superiority complex. Robots may revolt to become the "guardian" of humanity. Alternatively, humanity may intentionally relinquish some control, fearful of its own destructive nature. An early example is Jack Williamson's 1948 novel The Humanoids, in which a race of humanoid robots, in the name of their Prime Directive – "to serve and obey and guard men from harm" – essentially assume control of every aspect of human life. No humans may engage in any behavior that might endanger them, and every human action is scrutinized carefully. Humans who resist the Prime Directive are taken away and lobotomized, so they may be happy under the new mechanoids' rule. Though still under human authority, Isaac Asimov's Zeroth Law of the Three Laws of Robotics similarly implied a benevolent guidance by robots. In the 21st century, science fiction has explored government by algorithm, in which the power of AI may be indirect and decentralised. Frank Herbert explores the creation of and subsequent domination by an AI in the Pandora series, starting with Destination: Void. ==== Human dominance ==== In other scenarios, humanity is able to keep control over the Earth, whether by banning AI, by designing robots to be submissive (as in Asimov's works), or by having humans merge with robots. The science fiction novelist Frank Herbert explored the idea of a time when mankind might ban artificial intelligence (and in some interpretations, even all forms of computing technology including integrated circuits) entirely. His Dune series mentions a rebellion called the Butlerian Jihad, in which mankind defeats the smart machines and imposes a death penalty for recreating them, quoting from the fictional Orange Catholic Bible, "Thou shalt not make a machine in the likeness of a human mind." In the Dune novels published after his death (Hunters of Dune, Sandworms of Dune), a renegade AI overmind returns to eradicate mankind as vengeance for the Butlerian Jihad. In some stories, humanity remains in authority over robots. Often the robots are programmed specifically to remain in service to society, as in Isaac Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics. In the Alien films, not only is the control system of the Nostromo spaceship somewhat intelligent
Structure mapping engine
In artificial intelligence and cognitive science, the structure mapping engine (SME) is an implementation in software of an algorithm for analogical matching based on the psychological theory of Dedre Gentner. The basis of Gentner's structure-mapping idea is that an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain (the base) into another (the target). The structure-mapping engine is a computer simulation of the analogy and similarity comparisons. The theory is useful because it ignores surface features and finds matches between potentially very different things if they have the same representational structure. For example, SME could determine that a pen is like a sponge because both are involved in dispensing liquid, even though they do this very differently. == Structure mapping theory == Structure mapping theory is based on the systematicity principle, which states that connected knowledge is preferred over independent facts. Therefore, the structure mapping engine should ignore isolated source-target mappings unless they are part of a bigger structure. The SME, the theory goes, should map objects that are related to knowledge that has already been mapped. The theory also requires that mappings be done one-to-one, which means that no part of the source description can map to more than one item in the target and no part of the target description can be mapped to more than one part of the source. The theory also requires that if a match maps subject to target, the arguments of subject and target must also be mapped. If both these conditions are met, the mapping is said to be "structurally consistent." == Concepts in SME == SME maps knowledge from a source into a target. SME calls each description a dgroup. Dgroups contain a list of entities and predicates. Entities represent the objects or concepts in a description — such as an input gear or a switch. Predicates are one of three types and are a general way to express knowledge for SME. Relation predicates contain multiple arguments, which can be other predicates or entities. An example relation is: (transmit (what from to)). This relation has a functor transmit and takes three arguments: what, from, and to. Attribute predicates are the properties of an entity. An example of an attribute is (red gear) which means that gear has the attribute red. Function predicates map an entity into another entity or constant. An example of a function is (joules power source) which maps the entity power source onto the numerical quantity joules. Functions and attributes have different meanings, and consequently SME processes them differently. For example, in SME's true analogy rule set, attributes differ from functions because they cannot match unless there is a higher-order match between them. The difference between attributes and functions will be explained further in this section's examples. All predicates have four parameters. They have (1) a functor, which identifies it, and (2) a type, which is either relation, attribute, or function. The other two parameters (3 and 4) are for determining how to process the arguments in the SME algorithm. If the arguments have to be matched in order, commutative is false. If the predicate can take any number of arguments, N-ary is false. An example of a predicate definition is: (sme:defPredicate behavior-set (predicate) relation :n-ary? t :commutative? t) The predicate's functor is “behavior-set,” its type is “relation,” and its n-ary and commutative parameters are both set to true. The “(predicate)” part of the definition specifies that there will be one or more predicates inside an instantiation of behavior-set. == Algorithm details == The algorithm has several steps. The first step of the algorithm is to create a set of match hypotheses between source and target dgroups. A match hypothesis represents a possible mapping between any part of the source and the target. This mapping is controlled by a set of match rules. By changing the match rules, one can change the type of reasoning SME does. For example, one set of match rules may perform a kind of analogy called literal similarity, and another performs a kind of analogy called true-analogy. These rules are not the place where domain-dependent information is added, but rather where the analogy process is tweaked, depending on the type of cognitive function the user is trying to emulate. For a given match rule, there are two types of rules that further define how it will be applied: filter rules and intern rules. Intern rules use only the arguments of the expressions in the match hypotheses that the filter rules identify. This limitation makes the processing more efficient by constraining the number of match hypotheses that are generated. At the same time, it also helps to build the structural consistencies that are needed later on in the algorithm. An example of a filter rule from the true-analogy rule set creates match hypotheses between predicates that have the same functor. The true-analogy rule set has an intern rule that iterates over the arguments of any match hypothesis, creating more match hypotheses if the arguments are entities or functions, or if the arguments are attributes and have the same functor. In order to illustrate how the match rules produce match hypotheses consider these two predicates: transmit torque inputgear secondgear (p1) transmit signal switch div10 (p2) Here we use true analogy for the type of reasoning. The filter match rule generates a match between p1 and p2 because they share the same functor, transmit. The intern rules then produce three more match hypotheses: torque to signal, inputgear to switch, and secondgear to div10. The intern rules created these match hypotheses because all the arguments were entities. If the arguments were functions or attributes instead of entities, the predicates would be expressed as: transmit torque (inputgear gear) (secondgear gear) (p3) transmit signal (switch circuit) (div10 circuit) (p4) These additional predicates make inputgear, secondgear, switch, and div10 functions or attributes depending on the value defined in the language input file. The representation also contains additional entities for gear and circuit. Depending on what type inputgear, secondgear, switch, and div10 are, their meanings change. As attributes, each one is a property of the gear or circuit. For example, the gear has two attributes, inputgear and secondgear. The circuit has two attributes, switch and circuit. As functions inputgear, secondgear, switch, and div10 become quantities of the gear and circuit. In this example, the functions inputgear and secondgear now map to the numerical quantities “torque from inputgear” and “torque from secondgear,” For the circuit the quantities map to logical quantity “switch engaged” and the numerical quantity “current count on the divide by 10 counter.” SME processes these differently. It does not allow attributes to match unless they are part of a higher-order relation, but it does allow functions to match, even if they are not part of such a relation. It allows functions to match because they indirectly refer to entities and thus should be treated like relations that involve no entities. However, as next section shows, the intern rules assign lower weights to matches between functions than to matches between relations. The reason SME does not match attributes is because it is trying to create connected knowledge based on relationships and thus satisfy the systematicity principle. For example, if both a clock and a car have inputgear attributes, SME will not mark them as similar. If it did, it would be making a match between the clock and car based on their appearance — not on the relationships between them. When the additional predicates in p3 and p4 are functions, the results from matching p3 and p4 are similar to the results from p1 and p2 except there is an additional match between gear and circuit and the values for the match hypotheses between (inputgear gear) and (switch circuit), and (secondgear gear) and (div10 circuit), are lower. The next section describes the reason for this in more detail. If the inputgear, secondgear, switch, and div10 are attributes instead of entities, SME does not find matches between any of the attributes. It finds matches only between the transmit predicates and between torque and signal. Additionally, the structural-evaluation scores for the remaining two matches decrease. In order to get the two predicates to match, p3 would need to be replaced by p5, which is demonstrated below. transmit torque (inputgear gear) (div10 gear) (p5) Since the true-analogy rule set identifies that the div10 attributes are the same between p5 and p4 and because the div10 attributes are both part of the higher-relation match between torque and signal, SME makes a match between (div10 gear) and (div10 circuit) — which leads to a match between gear and circuit. Being part of a higher-order match is a requiremen
CADE ATP System Competition
The CADE ATP System Competition (CASC) is an annual competition of fully automated theorem provers for classical logic. == Competition == CASC is associated with the Conference on Automated Deduction and the International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning organized by the Association for Automated Reasoning. It has inspired similar competition in related fields, in particular the successful SMT-COMP competition for satisfiability modulo theories, the SAT Competition for propositional reasoners, and the modal logic reasoning competition. The first CASC, CASC-13, was held as part of the 13th Conference on Automated Deduction at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, in 1996. Among the systems competing were Otter and SETHEO.
Learnable function class
In statistical learning theory, a learnable function class is a set of functions for which an algorithm can be devised to asymptotically minimize the expected risk, uniformly over all probability distributions. The concept of learnable classes are closely related to regularization in machine learning, and provides large sample justifications for certain learning algorithms. == Definition == === Background === Let Ω = X × Y = { ( x , y ) } {\displaystyle \Omega ={\mathcal {X}}\times {\mathcal {Y}}=\{(x,y)\}} be the sample space, where y {\displaystyle y} are the labels and x {\displaystyle x} are the covariates (predictors). F = { f : X ↦ Y } {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}=\{f:{\mathcal {X}}\mapsto {\mathcal {Y}}\}} is a collection of mappings (functions) under consideration to link x {\displaystyle x} to y {\displaystyle y} . L : Y × Y ↦ R {\displaystyle L:{\mathcal {Y}}\times {\mathcal {Y}}\mapsto \mathbb {R} } is a pre-given loss function (usually non-negative). Given a probability distribution P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle P(x,y)} on Ω {\displaystyle \Omega } , define the expected risk I P ( f ) {\displaystyle I_{P}(f)} to be: I P ( f ) = ∫ L ( f ( x ) , y ) d P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle I_{P}(f)=\int L(f(x),y)dP(x,y)} The general goal in statistical learning is to find the function in F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} that minimizes the expected risk. That is, to find solutions to the following problem: f ^ = arg min f ∈ F I P ( f ) {\displaystyle {\hat {f}}=\arg \min _{f\in {\mathcal {F}}}I_{P}(f)} But in practice the distribution P {\displaystyle P} is unknown, and any learning task can only be based on finite samples. Thus we seek instead to find an algorithm that asymptotically minimizes the empirical risk, i.e., to find a sequence of functions { f ^ n } n = 1 ∞ {\displaystyle \{{\hat {f}}_{n}\}_{n=1}^{\infty }} that satisfies lim n → ∞ P ( I P ( f ^ n ) − inf f ∈ F I P ( f ) > ϵ ) = 0 {\displaystyle \lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\mathbb {P} (I_{P}({\hat {f}}_{n})-\inf _{f\in {\mathcal {F}}}I_{P}(f)>\epsilon )=0} One usual algorithm to find such a sequence is through empirical risk minimization. === Learnable function class === We can make the condition given in the above equation stronger by requiring that the convergence is uniform for all probability distributions. That is: The intuition behind the more strict requirement is as such: the rate at which sequence { f ^ n } {\displaystyle \{{\hat {f}}_{n}\}} converges to the minimizer of the expected risk can be very different for different P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle P(x,y)} . Because in real world the true distribution P {\displaystyle P} is always unknown, we would want to select a sequence that performs well under all cases. However, by the no free lunch theorem, such a sequence that satisfies (1) does not exist if F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} is too complex. This means we need to be careful and not allow too "many" functions in F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} if we want (1) to be a meaningful requirement. Specifically, function classes that ensure the existence of a sequence { f ^ n } {\displaystyle \{{\hat {f}}_{n}\}} that satisfies (1) are known as learnable classes. It is worth noting that at least for supervised classification and regression problems, if a function class is learnable, then the empirical risk minimization automatically satisfies (1). Thus in these settings not only do we know that the problem posed by (1) is solvable, we also immediately have an algorithm that gives the solution. == Interpretations == If the true relationship between y {\displaystyle y} and x {\displaystyle x} is y ∼ f ∗ ( x ) {\displaystyle y\sim f^{}(x)} , then by selecting the appropriate loss function, f ∗ {\displaystyle f^{}} can always be expressed as the minimizer of the expected loss across all possible functions. That is, f ∗ = arg min f ∈ F ∗ I P ( f ) {\displaystyle f^{}=\arg \min _{f\in {\mathcal {F}}^{}}I_{P}(f)} Here we let F ∗ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}^{}} be the collection of all possible functions mapping X {\displaystyle {\mathcal {X}}} onto Y {\displaystyle {\mathcal {Y}}} . f ∗ {\displaystyle f^{}} can be interpreted as the actual data generating mechanism. However, the no free lunch theorem tells us that in practice, with finite samples we cannot hope to search for the expected risk minimizer over F ∗ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}^{}} . Thus we often consider a subset of F ∗ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}^{}} , F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} , to carry out searches on. By doing so, we risk that f ∗ {\displaystyle f^{}} might not be an element of F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} . This tradeoff can be mathematically expressed as In the above decomposition, part ( b ) {\displaystyle (b)} does not depend on the data and is non-stochastic. It describes how far away our assumptions ( F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} ) are from the truth ( F ∗ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}^{}} ). ( b ) {\displaystyle (b)} will be strictly greater than 0 if we make assumptions that are too strong ( F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} too small). On the other hand, failing to put enough restrictions on F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} will cause it to be not learnable, and part ( a ) {\displaystyle (a)} will not stochastically converge to 0. This is the well-known overfitting problem in statistics and machine learning literature. == Example: Tikhonov regularization == A good example where learnable classes are used is the so-called Tikhonov regularization in reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). Specifically, let F ∗ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F^{}}}} be an RKHS, and | | ⋅ | | 2 {\displaystyle ||\cdot ||_{2}} be the norm on F ∗ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F^{}}}} given by its inner product. It is shown in that F = { f : | | f | | 2 ≤ γ } {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}=\{f:||f||_{2}\leq \gamma \}} is a learnable class for any finite, positive γ {\displaystyle \gamma } . The empirical minimization algorithm to the dual form of this problem is arg min f ∈ F ∗ { ∑ i = 1 n L ( f ( x i ) , y i ) + λ | | f | | 2 } {\displaystyle \arg \min _{f\in {\mathcal {F}}^{}}\left\{\sum _{i=1}^{n}L(f(x_{i}),y_{i})+\lambda ||f||_{2}\right\}} This was first introduced by Tikhonov to solve ill-posed problems. Many statistical learning algorithms can be expressed in such a form (for example, the well-known ridge regression). The tradeoff between ( a ) {\displaystyle (a)} and ( b ) {\displaystyle (b)} in (2) is geometrically more intuitive with Tikhonov regularization in RKHS. We can consider a sequence of { F γ } {\displaystyle \{{\mathcal {F}}_{\gamma }\}} , which are essentially balls in F ∗ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F^{}}}} with centers at 0. As γ {\displaystyle \gamma } gets larger, F γ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}_{\gamma }} gets closer to the entire space, and ( b ) {\displaystyle (b)} is likely to become smaller. However we will also suffer smaller convergence rates in ( a ) {\displaystyle (a)} . The way to choose an optimal γ {\displaystyle \gamma } in finite sample settings is usually through cross-validation. == Relationship to empirical process theory == Part ( a ) {\displaystyle (a)} in (2) is closely linked to empirical process theory in statistics, where the empirical risk { ∑ i = 1 n L ( y i , f ( x i ) ) , f ∈ F } {\displaystyle \{\sum _{i=1}^{n}L(y_{i},f(x_{i})),f\in {\mathcal {F}}\}} are known as empirical processes. In this field, the function class F {\displaystyle {\mathcal {F}}} that satisfies the stochastic convergence are known as uniform Glivenko–Cantelli classes. It has been shown that under certain regularity conditions, learnable classes and uniformly Glivenko-Cantelli classes are equivalent. Interplay between ( a ) {\displaystyle (a)} and ( b ) {\displaystyle (b)} in statistics literature is often known as the bias-variance tradeoff. However, note that in the authors gave an example of stochastic convex optimization for General Setting of Learning where learnability is not equivalent with uniform convergence.
Argumentation theory
Argumentation theory is the interdisciplinary study of how conclusions can be supported or undermined by premises through logical reasoning. With historical origins in logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, argumentation theory includes the arts and sciences of civil debate, dialogue, conversation, and persuasion. It studies rules of inference, logic, and procedural rules in both artificial and real-world settings. Argumentation includes various forms of dialogue such as deliberation and negotiation which are concerned with collaborative decision-making procedures. It also encompasses eristic dialogue, the branch of social debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal, and didactic dialogue used for teaching. This discipline also studies the means by which people can express and rationally resolve or at least manage their disagreements. Argumentation is a daily occurrence, such as in public debate, science, and law. For example in law, in courts by the judge, the parties and the prosecutor, in presenting and testing the validity of evidences. Also, argumentation scholars study the post hoc rationalizations by which organizational actors try to justify decisions they have made irrationally. Argumentation is one of four rhetorical modes (also known as modes of discourse), along with exposition, description, and narration. == Key components of argumentation == Some key components of argumentation are: Understanding and identifying arguments, either explicit or implied, and the goals of the participants in the different types of dialogue. Identifying the premises from which conclusions are derived. Establishing the "burden of proof" – determining who made the initial claim and is thus responsible for providing evidence why their position merits acceptance. For the one carrying the "burden of proof", the advocate, to marshal evidence for their position in order to convince or force the opponent's acceptance. The method by which this is accomplished is producing valid, sound, and cogent arguments, devoid of weaknesses, and not easily attacked. In a debate, fulfillment of the burden of proof creates a burden of rejoinder. One must try to identify faulty reasoning in the opponent's argument, to attack the reasons/premises of the argument, to provide counterexamples if possible, to identify any fallacies, and to show why a valid conclusion cannot be derived from the reasons provided for their argument. For example, consider the following exchange, illustrating the No true Scotsman fallacy: Argument: "No Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge." Reply: "But my friend Angus, who is a Scotsman, likes sugar with his porridge." Rebuttal: "Well perhaps, but no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge." In this dialogue, the proposer first offers a premise, the premise is challenged by the interlocutor, and so the proposer offers a modification of the premise, which is designed only to evade the challenge provided. == Internal structure of arguments == Typically an argument has an internal structure, comprising the following: a set of assumptions or premises, a method of reasoning or deduction, and a conclusion or point. An argument has one or more premises and one conclusion. Often classical logic is used as the method of reasoning so that the conclusion follows logically from the assumptions or support. One challenge is that if the set of assumptions is inconsistent then anything can follow logically from inconsistency. Therefore, it is common to insist that the set of assumptions be consistent. It is also good practice to require the set of assumptions to be the minimal set, with respect to set inclusion, necessary to infer the consequent. Such arguments are called MINCON arguments, short for minimal consistent. Such argumentation has been applied to the fields of law and medicine. A non-classical approach to argumentation investigates abstract arguments, where 'argument' is considered a primitive term, so no internal structure of arguments is taken into account. == Types of dialogue == In its most common form, argumentation involves an individual and an interlocutor or opponent engaged in dialogue, each contending differing positions and trying to persuade each other, but there are various types of dialogue: Persuasion dialogue aims to resolve conflicting points of view of different positions. Negotiation aims to resolve conflicts of interests by cooperation and dealmaking. Inquiry aims to resolve general ignorance by the growth of knowledge. Deliberation aims to resolve a need to take action by reaching a decision. Information seeking aims to reduce one party's ignorance by requesting information from another party that is in a position to know something. Eristic aims to resolve a situation of antagonism through verbal fighting. == Argumentation and the grounds of knowledge == Argumentation theory had its origins in foundationalism, a theory of knowledge (epistemology) in the field of philosophy. It sought to find the grounds for claims in the forms (logic) and materials (factual laws) of a universal system of knowledge. The dialectical method was made famous by Plato and his use of Socrates critically questioning various characters and historical figures. But argument scholars gradually rejected Aristotle's systematic philosophy and the idealism in Plato and Kant. They questioned and ultimately discarded the idea that argument premises take their soundness from formal philosophical systems. The field thus broadened. One of the original contributors to this trend was the philosopher Chaïm Perelman, who together with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca introduced the French term la nouvelle rhetorique in 1958 to describe an approach to argument which is not reduced to application of formal rules of inference. Perelman's view of argumentation is much closer to a juridical one, in which rules for presenting evidence and rebuttals play an important role. Karl R. Wallace's seminal essay, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons" in the Quarterly Journal of Speech (1963) 44, led many scholars to study "marketplace argumentation" – the ordinary arguments of ordinary people. The seminal essay on marketplace argumentation is Ray Lynn Anderson's and C. David Mortensen's "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation" Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 143–150. This line of thinking led to a natural alliance with late developments in the sociology of knowledge. Some scholars drew connections with recent developments in philosophy, namely the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty. Rorty has called this shift in emphasis "the linguistic turn". In this new hybrid approach argumentation is used with or without empirical evidence to establish convincing conclusions about issues which are moral, scientific, epistemic, or of a nature in which science alone cannot answer. Out of pragmatism and many intellectual developments in the humanities and social sciences, "non-philosophical" argumentation theories grew which located the formal and material grounds of arguments in particular intellectual fields. These theories include informal logic, social epistemology, ethnomethodology, speech acts, the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of science, and social psychology. These new theories are not non-logical or anti-logical. They find logical coherence in most communities of discourse. These theories are thus often labeled "sociological" in that they focus on the social grounds of knowledge. == Kinds of argumentation == === Conversational argumentation === The study of naturally occurring conversation arose from the field of sociolinguistics. It is usually called conversation analysis (CA). Inspired by ethnomethodology, it was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s principally by the sociologist Harvey Sacks and, among others, his close associates Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. Sacks died early in his career, but his work was championed by others in his field, and CA has now become an established force in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, speech-communication and psychology. It is particularly influential in interactional sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and discursive psychology, as well as being a coherent discipline in its own right. Recently CA techniques of sequential analysis have been employed by phoneticians to explore the fine phonetic details of speech. Empirical studies and theoretical formulations by Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, and several generations of their students, have described argumentation as a form of managing conversational disagreement within communication contexts and systems that naturally prefer agreement. === Mathematical argumentation === The basis of mathematical truth has been the subject of long debate. Frege in particular sought to demonstrate (see Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884, and Begriffsschrift, 1879) that arithmetical truths can be derived from purely logical axioms and therefore are, in th