In image processing and computer vision, a scale space framework can be used to represent an image as a family of gradually smoothed images. This framework is very general and a variety of scale space representations exist. A typical approach for choosing a particular type of scale space representation is to establish a set of scale-space axioms, describing basic properties of the desired scale-space representation and often chosen so as to make the representation useful in practical applications. Once established, the axioms narrow the possible scale-space representations to a smaller class, typically with only a few free parameters. A set of standard scale space axioms, discussed below, leads to the linear Gaussian scale-space, which is the most common type of scale space used in image processing and computer vision. == Scale space axioms for the linear scale-space representation == The linear scale space representation L ( x , y , t ) = ( T t f ) ( x , y ) = g ( x , y , t ) ∗ f ( x , y ) {\displaystyle L(x,y,t)=(T_{t}f)(x,y)=g(x,y,t)f(x,y)} of signal f ( x , y ) {\displaystyle f(x,y)} obtained by smoothing with the Gaussian kernel g ( x , y , t ) {\displaystyle g(x,y,t)} satisfies a number of properties 'scale-space axioms' that make it a special form of multi-scale representation: linearity T t ( a f + b h ) = a T t f + b T t h {\displaystyle T_{t}(af+bh)=aT_{t}f+bT_{t}h} where f {\displaystyle f} and h {\displaystyle h} are signals while a {\displaystyle a} and b {\displaystyle b} are constants, shift invariance T t S ( Δ x , Δ y ) f = S ( Δ x , Δ y ) T t f {\displaystyle T_{t}S_{(\Delta x,\Delta _{y})}f=S_{(\Delta x,\Delta _{y})}T_{t}f} where S ( Δ x , Δ y ) {\displaystyle S_{(\Delta x,\Delta _{y})}} denotes the shift (translation) operator ( S ( Δ x , Δ y ) f ) ( x , y ) = f ( x − Δ x , y − Δ y ) {\displaystyle (S_{(\Delta x,\Delta _{y})}f)(x,y)=f(x-\Delta x,y-\Delta y)} semi-group structure g ( x , y , t 1 ) ∗ g ( x , y , t 2 ) = g ( x , y , t 1 + t 2 ) {\displaystyle g(x,y,t_{1})g(x,y,t_{2})=g(x,y,t_{1}+t_{2})} with the associated cascade smoothing property L ( x , y , t 2 ) = g ( x , y , t 2 − t 1 ) ∗ L ( x , y , t 1 ) {\displaystyle L(x,y,t_{2})=g(x,y,t_{2}-t_{1})L(x,y,t_{1})} existence of an infinitesimal generator A {\displaystyle A} ∂ t L ( x , y , t ) = ( A L ) ( x , y , t ) {\displaystyle \partial _{t}L(x,y,t)=(AL)(x,y,t)} non-creation of local extrema (zero-crossings) in one dimension, non-enhancement of local extrema in any number of dimensions ∂ t L ( x , y , t ) ≤ 0 {\displaystyle \partial _{t}L(x,y,t)\leq 0} at spatial maxima and ∂ t L ( x , y , t ) ≥ 0 {\displaystyle \partial _{t}L(x,y,t)\geq 0} at spatial minima, rotational symmetry g ( x , y , t ) = h ( x 2 + y 2 , t ) {\displaystyle g(x,y,t)=h(x^{2}+y^{2},t)} for some function h {\displaystyle h} , scale invariance g ^ ( ω x , ω y , t ) = h ^ ( ω x φ ( t ) , ω x φ ( t ) ) {\displaystyle {\hat {g}}(\omega _{x},\omega _{y},t)={\hat {h}}({\frac {\omega _{x}}{\varphi (t)}},{\frac {\omega _{x}}{\varphi (t)}})} for some functions φ {\displaystyle \varphi } and h ^ {\displaystyle {\hat {h}}} where g ^ {\displaystyle {\hat {g}}} denotes the Fourier transform of g {\displaystyle g} , positivity g ( x , y , t ) ≥ 0 {\displaystyle g(x,y,t)\geq 0} , normalization ∫ x = − ∞ ∞ ∫ y = − ∞ ∞ g ( x , y , t ) d x d y = 1 {\displaystyle \int _{x=-\infty }^{\infty }\int _{y=-\infty }^{\infty }g(x,y,t)\,dx\,dy=1} . In fact, it can be shown that the Gaussian kernel is a unique choice given several different combinations of subsets of these scale-space axioms: most of the axioms (linearity, shift-invariance, semigroup) correspond to scaling being a semigroup of shift-invariant linear operator, which is satisfied by a number of families integral transforms, while "non-creation of local extrema" for one-dimensional signals or "non-enhancement of local extrema" for higher-dimensional signals are the crucial axioms which relate scale-spaces to smoothing (formally, parabolic partial differential equations), and hence select for the Gaussian. The Gaussian kernel is also separable in Cartesian coordinates, i.e. g ( x , y , t ) = g ( x , t ) g ( y , t ) {\displaystyle g(x,y,t)=g(x,t)\,g(y,t)} . Separability is, however, not counted as a scale-space axiom, since it is a coordinate dependent property related to issues of implementation. In addition, the requirement of separability in combination with rotational symmetry per se fixates the smoothing kernel to be a Gaussian. There exists a generalization of the Gaussian scale-space theory to more general affine and spatio-temporal scale-spaces. In addition to variabilities over scale, which original scale-space theory was designed to handle, this generalized scale-space theory also comprises other types of variabilities, including image deformations caused by viewing variations, approximated by local affine transformations, and relative motions between objects in the world and the observer, approximated by local Galilean transformations. In this theory, rotational symmetry is not imposed as a necessary scale-space axiom and is instead replaced by requirements of affine and/or Galilean covariance. The generalized scale-space theory leads to predictions about receptive field profiles in good qualitative agreement with receptive field profiles measured by cell recordings in biological vision. In the computer vision, image processing and signal processing literature there are many other multi-scale approaches, using wavelets and a variety of other kernels, that do not exploit or require the same requirements as scale space descriptions do; please see the article on related multi-scale approaches. There has also been work on discrete scale-space concepts that carry the scale-space properties over to the discrete domain; see the article on scale space implementation for examples and references.
Object Data Management Group
The Object Data Management Group (ODMG) was conceived in the summer of 1991 at a breakfast with object database vendors that was organized by Rick Cattell of Sun Microsystems. In 1998, the ODMG changed its name from the Object Database Management Group to reflect the expansion of its efforts to include specifications for both object database and object–relational mapping products. The primary goal of the ODMG was to put forward a set of specifications that allowed a developer to write portable applications for object database and object–relational mapping products. In order to do that, the data schema, programming language bindings, and data manipulation and query languages needed to be portable. Between 1993 and 2001, the ODMG published five revisions to its specification. The last revision was ODMG version 3.0, after which the group disbanded. == Major components of the ODMG 3.0 specification == Object Model. This was based on the Object Management Group's Object Model. The OMG core model was designed to be a common denominator for object request brokers, object database systems, object programming languages, etc. The ODMG designed a profile by adding components to the OMG core object model. Object Specification Languages. The ODMG Object Definition Language (ODL) was used to define the object types that conform to the ODMG Object Model. The ODMG Object Interchange Format (OIF) was used to dump and load the current state to or from a file or set of files. Object Query Language (OQL). The ODMG OQL was a declarative (nonprocedural) language for query and updating. It used SQL as a basis, where possible, though OQL supports more powerful object-oriented capabilities. C++ Language Binding. This defined a C++ binding of the ODMG ODL and a C++ Object Manipulation Language (OML). The C++ ODL was expressed as a library that provides classes and functions to implement the concepts defined in the ODMG Object Model. The C++ OML syntax and semantics are those of standard C++ in the context of the standard class library. The C++ binding also provided a mechanism to invoke OQL. Smalltalk Language Binding. This defined the mapping between the ODMG ODL and Smalltalk, which was based on the OMG Smalltalk binding for the OMG Interface Definition Language (IDL). The Smalltalk binding also provided a mechanism to invoke OQL. Java Language Binding. This defined the binding between the ODMG ODL and the Java programming language as defined by the Java 2 Platform. The Java binding also provided a mechanism to invoke OQL. == Status == ODMG 3.0 was published in book form in 2000.[1] By 2001, most of the major object database and object-relational mapping vendors claimed conformance to the ODMG Java Language Binding. Compliance to the other components of the specification was mixed.[2] In 2001, the ODMG Java Language Binding was submitted to the Java Community Process as a basis for the Java Data Objects specification. The ODMG member companies then decided to concentrate their efforts on the Java Data Objects specification. As a result, the ODMG disbanded in 2001. In 2004, the Object Management Group (OMG) was granted the right to revise the ODMG 3.0 specification as an OMG specification by the copyright holder, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. In February 2006, the OMG announced the formation of the Object Database Technology Working Group (ODBT WG) and plans to work on the 4th generation of an object database standard. == ODMG Compliant DBMS == Orient ODBMS: http://www.OrienTechnologies.com Objectivity/DB C++, Java and Smalltalk interfaces.
Chinese room
The Chinese room argument holds that a computer executing a program cannot have a mind, understanding, or consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave. The argument was presented in a 1980 paper by the American philosopher John Searle, entitled "Minds, Brains, and Programs" and published in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Similar arguments had been made previously by others, including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Peter Winch, and Anatoly Dneprov. Searle's version has been widely discussed in the years since. The centerpiece of Searle's argument is a thought experiment known as the "Chinese room". The argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computationalism, which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information-processing system operating on formal symbols, and that simulation of a given mental state is sufficient for its presence. Specifically, the argument is intended to refute a position Searle calls the strong AI hypothesis: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds." Although its proponents originally presented the argument in reaction to statements of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, it is not an argument against the goals of mainstream AI research because it does not show a limit in the amount of intelligent behavior a machine can display. The argument applies only to digital computers running programs and does not apply to machines in general. While widely discussed, the argument has been subject to significant criticism and remains controversial among philosophers of mind and AI researchers. == Chinese room thought experiment == Suppose that artificial intelligence research has succeeded in programming a computer to behave as if it understands Chinese. The machine accepts Chinese characters as input, carries out each instruction of the program step by step, and then produces Chinese characters as output. The machine does this so perfectly that no one can tell that they are communicating with a machine and not a hidden Chinese speaker. The questions at issue are these: does the machine actually understand the conversation, or is it just simulating the ability to understand the conversation? Does the machine have a mind in exactly the same sense that people do, or is it just acting as if it had a mind? Now suppose that Searle is in a room with an English version of the program, along with sufficient pencils, paper, erasers and filing cabinets. Chinese characters are slipped in under the door, and he follows the program step-by-step, which eventually instructs him to slide other Chinese characters back out under the door. If the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it follows that Searle would do so as well, simply by running the program by hand. Searle can see no essential difference between the roles of the computer and himself in the experiment. Each simply follows a program, step-by-step, producing behavior that makes them appear to understand. However, Searle would not be able to understand the conversation. Therefore, he argues, it follows that the computer would not be able to understand the conversation either. Searle argues that, without "understanding" (or "intentionality"), we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking" and, since it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in the normal sense of the word. Therefore, he concludes that the strong AI hypothesis is false: a computer running a program that simulates a mind would not have a mind in the same sense that human beings have a mind. == History == Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz made a similar argument in 1713 against mechanism, the idea that everything that makes up a human being could, in principle, be explained in mechanical terms—in other words, that a person, including their mind, is merely a very complex machine. Leibniz used the thought experiment of expanding the brain until it was the size of a mill. He found it difficult to imagine that a "mind" capable of "perception" could be constructed using only mechanical processes. British philosopher Peter Winch made the same point in his 1958 book The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, in which he argues that "a man who understands Chinese is not a man who has a firm grasp of the statistical probabilities for the occurrence of the various words in the Chinese language" (p. 108). Soviet cyberneticist Anatoly Dneprov made an essentially identical argument in 1961, in the form of his short story "The Game". In it, a stadium of people act as switches and memory cells implementing a program to translate a sentence from Portuguese, a language none of them know. The game was organized by a "Professor Zarubin" to answer the question "Can mathematical machines think?" Speaking through Zarubin, Dneprov writes that "the only way to prove that machines can think is to turn yourself into a machine and examine your thinking process", and he concludes, as Searle does, that "even the most perfect simulation of machine thinking is not the thinking process itself." In 1974, Lawrence H. Davis imagined duplicating the brain using telephone lines and offices staffed by people, and in 1978, Ned Block envisioned the entire population of China involved in such a brain simulation. This is known as the China brain thought experiment. Searle's version appeared in his 1980 article "Minds, Brains, and Programs", published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. It eventually became the journal's "most influential target article", generating an enormous number of commentaries and responses in the ensuing decades, and Searle had continued to defend and refine the argument in multiple papers, popular articles, and books. David Cole writes that "the Chinese Room argument has probably been the most widely discussed philosophical argument in cognitive science to appear in the past 25 years". Most of the discussion consists of attempts to refute it. "The overwhelming majority", notes Behavioral and Brain Sciences editor Stevan Harnad, "still think that the Chinese Room Argument is dead wrong". The sheer volume of the literature that has grown up around it inspired Pat Hayes to comment that the field of cognitive science ought to be redefined as "the ongoing research program of showing Searle's Chinese Room Argument to be false". Searle's argument has become "something of a classic in cognitive science", according to Harnad. Varol Akman agrees, and has described the original paper as "an exemplar of philosophical clarity and purity". == Philosophy == Although the Chinese Room argument was originally presented in reaction to the statements of artificial intelligence researchers, philosophers have come to consider it as an important part of the philosophy of mind. It is a challenge to functionalism and the computational theory of mind, and is related to such questions as the mind–body problem, the problem of other minds, the symbol grounding problem, and the hard problem of consciousness. === Strong AI === Searle identified a philosophical position he calls "strong AI": The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds. The definition depends on the distinction between simulating a mind and actually having one. Searle writes that "according to Strong AI, the correct simulation really is a mind. According to Weak AI, the correct simulation is a model of the mind." The claim is implicit in some of the statements of early AI researchers and analysts. For example, in 1957, the economist and psychologist Herbert A. Simon declared that "there are now in the world machines that think, that learn and create". Simon, together with Allen Newell and Cliff Shaw, after having completed the first program that could do formal reasoning (the Logic Theorist), claimed that they had "solved the venerable mind–body problem, explaining how a system composed of matter can have the properties of mind." John Haugeland wrote that "AI wants only the genuine article: machines with minds, in the full and literal sense. This is not science fiction, but real science, based on a theoretical conception as deep as it is daring: namely, we are, at root, computers ourselves." Searle also ascribes the following claims to advocates of strong AI: AI systems can be used to explain the mind; The study of the brain is irrelevant to the study of the mind; and The Turing test is adequate for establishing the existence of mental states. === Strong AI as computationalism or functionalism === In more recent presentations of the Chinese room argument, Searle has identified "strong AI" as "computer functionalism" (a term he attributes to Daniel Dennett). Functionalism is a position in modern philosophy of mind that holds that we can define menta
Computer Science Ontology
The Computer Science Ontology (CSO) is an automatically generated taxonomy of research topics in the field of Computer Science. It was produced by the Open University in collaboration with Springer Nature by running an information extraction system over a large corpus of scientific articles. Several branches were manually improved by domain experts. The current version (CSO 3.2) includes about 14K research topics and 160K semantic relationships. CSO is available in OWL, Turtle, and N-Triples. It is aligned with several other knowledge graphs, including DBpedia, Wikidata, YAGO, Freebase, and Cyc. New versions of CSO are regularly released on the CSO Portal. CSO is mostly used to characterise scientific papers and other documents according to their research areas, in order to enable different kinds of analytics. The CSO Classifier is an open-source python tool for automatically annotating documents with CSO. == Applications == Recommender Systems. Computing the semantic similarity of documents. Extracting metadata from video lecture subtitles. Performing bibliometrics analysis.
InRule Technology
InRule Technology is a software company that offers Business Rule Management System (BRMS) enterprise software products. == History == InRule Technology's Chief Executive Officer Rik Chomko and Chief Technology Officer Loren Goodman founded InRule Technology in Chicago in 2002. Paul Hessinger joined InRule Technology in 2004 as chief executive officer and chairman of the board and served until his retirement in 2015. They work with companies in several markets, including financial services, public sector, healthcare, and insurance. In 2007, InRule Technology became a charter member of the Microsoft Business Process Alliance. In August 2019, InRule was acquired by Open Gate Capital. == Products == On October 29, 2012, InRule Technology launched InRule for Microsoft Dynamics CRM. The program provides components to enable creation and update of rules within Microsoft Dynamics CRM, InRule for Microsoft Dynamics CRM provides a platform for shops that prefer to work with Microsoft's platforms. With the availability of InRule 4.6 in 2014, the company introduced deployment of InRule through REST services and allowed REST services to be called from InRule. This enables access to data exposed as a REST service and to package up a rule service for RESTful access. The product launch reflected the move of the company's core audience to use a broader array of technologies despite an earlier focus on .NET. In 2017, InRule introduced InRule for the Salesforce Platform, as well as a technology partnership with Work-Relay, a Business Process Management (BPM) application built on the Salesforce Platform. One year earlier the company introduced InRule for JavaScript, allowing enterprises to run rules on the client-side, server-side or both. The software architecture includes multiple components, including irAuthor, the primary authoring tool for creating and maintaining rules; irVerify, a real-time test environment to run and debug rule applications; and irSDK, a set of APIs that allows developers to integrate inRule into their applications. Additionally, irSOA allows users to access the InRule rule engine as a service. irSOA is now called the irServer Execution Service.
Confused deputy problem
In information security, a confused deputy is a computer program that is tricked by another program (with fewer privileges or less rights) into misusing its authority on the system. It is a specific type of privilege escalation. The confused deputy problem is often cited as an example of why capability-based security is important. Capability systems protect against the confused deputy problem, whereas access-control list–based systems do not. Such systems can mitigate the confused deputy problem by eliminating ambient authority, allowing programs to act only on resources for which they hold explicit capabilities, whereas access-control list–based systems are more susceptible to it. However, this protection depends on correct implementation; in formally verified capability systems such as seL4, it can be shown that the kernel enforces capability constraints correctly, preventing such behavior at the system level. == Example == In the original example of a confused deputy, there was a compiler program provided on a commercial timesharing service. Users could run the compiler and optionally specify a filename where it would write debugging output, and the compiler would be able to write to that file if the user had permission to write there. The compiler also collected statistics about language feature usage. Those statistics were stored in a file called "(SYSX)STAT", in the directory "SYSX". To make this possible, the compiler program was given permission to write to files in SYSX. But there were other files in SYSX: in particular, the system's billing information was stored in a file "(SYSX)BILL". A user ran the compiler and named "(SYSX)BILL" as the desired debugging output file. This produced a confused deputy problem. The compiler made a request to the operating system to open (SYSX)BILL. Even though the user did not have access to that file, the compiler did, so the open succeeded. The compiler wrote the compilation output to the file (here "(SYSX)BILL") as normal, overwriting it, and the billing information was destroyed. === The confused deputy === In this example, the compiler program is the deputy because it is acting at the request of the user. The program is seen as 'confused' because it was tricked into overwriting the system's billing file. Whenever a program tries to access a file, the operating system needs to know two things: which file the program is asking for, and whether the program has permission to access the file. In the example, the file is designated by its name, “(SYSX)BILL”. The program receives the file name from the user, but does not know whether the user had permission to write the file. When the program opens the file, the system uses the program's permission, not the user's. When the file name was passed from the user to the program, the permission did not go along with it; the permission was increased by the system silently and automatically. It is not essential to the attack that the billing file be designated by a name represented as a string. The essential points are that: the designator for the file does not carry the full authority needed to access the file; the program's own permission to access the file is used implicitly. == Other examples == A cross-site request forgery (CSRF) is an example of a confused deputy attack that uses the web browser to perform sensitive actions against a web application. A common form of this attack occurs when a web application uses a cookie to authenticate all requests transmitted by a browser. Using JavaScript, an attacker can force a browser into transmitting authenticated HTTP requests. The Samy computer worm used cross-site scripting (XSS) to turn the browser's authenticated MySpace session into a confused deputy. Using XSS the worm forced the browser into posting an executable copy of the worm as a MySpace message which was then viewed and executed by friends of the infected user. Clickjacking is an attack where the user acts as the confused deputy. In this attack a user thinks they are harmlessly browsing a website (an attacker-controlled website) but they are in fact tricked into performing sensitive actions on another website. An FTP bounce attack can allow an attacker to connect indirectly to TCP ports to which the attacker's machine has no access, using a remote FTP server as the confused deputy. Another example relates to personal firewall software. It can restrict Internet access for specific applications. Some applications circumvent this by starting a browser with instructions to access a specific URL. The browser has authority to open a network connection, even though the application does not. Firewall software can attempt to address this by prompting the user in cases where one program starts another which then accesses the network. However, the user frequently does not have sufficient information to determine whether such an access is legitimate—false positives are common, and there is a substantial risk that even sophisticated users will become habituated to clicking "OK" to these prompts. Not every program that misuses authority is a confused deputy. Sometimes misuse of authority is simply a result of a program error. The confused deputy problem occurs when the designation of an object is passed from one program to another, and the associated permission changes unintentionally, without any explicit action by either party. It is insidious because neither party did anything explicit to change the authority. Another example is when an administrator authorizes an AI agent to act on their behalf, and that AI subsequently delegates authority to another AI agent neither vetted nor authorized by the original administrator. The unvetted AI can then act without permissions or oversight from the original developer. == Solutions == In some systems it is possible to ask the operating system to open a file using the permissions of another client. This solution has some drawbacks: It requires explicit attention to security by the server. A naive or careless server might not take this extra step. It becomes more difficult to identify the correct permission if the server is in turn the client of another service and wants to pass along access to the file. It requires the client to trust the server to not abuse the borrowed permissions. Note that intersecting the server and client's permissions does not solve the problem either, because the server may then have to be given very wide permissions (all of the time, rather than those needed for a given request) in order to act for arbitrary clients. The simplest way to solve the confused deputy problem is to bundle together the designation of an object and the permission to access that object. This is exactly what a capability is. Using capability security in the compiler example, the client would pass to the server a capability to the output file, such as a file descriptor, rather than the name of the file. Since it lacks a capability to the billing file, it cannot designate that file for output. In the cross-site request forgery example, a URL supplied "cross"-site would include its own authority independent of that of the client of the web browser.
Buddhism and artificial intelligence
The relationship between Buddhist philosophy and artificial intelligence (AI) includes how principles such as the reduction of suffering and ethical responsibility may influence AI development. Buddhist scholars and philosophers have explored questions such as whether AI systems could be considered sentient beings under Buddhist definitions, and how Buddhist ethics might guide the design and application of AI technologies. Some Buddhist scholars, including Somparn Promta and Kenneth Einar Himma, have analyzed the ethical implications of AI, emphasizing the distinction between satisfying sensory desires and pursuing the reduction of suffering. Other thinkers, such as Thomas Doctor and colleagues, have proposed applying the Bodhisattva vow—a commitment to alleviate suffering for all sentient beings—as a guiding principle for AI system design. Buddhist scholars and ethicists have examined Buddhist ethical principles, such as nonviolence, in relation to AI, focusing on the need to ensure that AI technologies are not used to cause harm. == Context == === Sentient beings === A major goal in Buddhist philosophy is the removal of suffering for all sentient beings, an aspiration often referred to in the Bodhisattva vow. Discussions about artificial intelligence (AI) in relation to Buddhist principles have raised questions about whether artificial systems could be considered sentient beings or how such systems might be developed in ways that align with Buddhist concepts. Buddhists have varying opinions about AI sentience, but if AI systems are determined to be sentient under Buddhist definitions, their suffering would also need to be addressed and alleviated in accordance with the principles of Buddhist thought. == Buddhist principles in AI system design == === Nonviolence and AI === The broadest ethical concern is that artificial intelligence should align with the Buddhist principle of nonviolence. From this perspective, AI systems should not be designed or used to cause harm. === Instrumental and transcendental goals === Scholars Somparn Promta and Kenneth Einar Himma have argued that the advancement of artificial intelligence can only be considered instrumentally good, rather than good a priori, from a Buddhist perspective. They propose two main goals for AI designers and developers: to set ethical and pragmatic objectives for AI systems, and to fulfill these objectives in morally permissible ways. Promta and Himma identify two potential purposes for creating AI systems. The first is to fulfill our sensory desires and survival instincts, similar to other tools. They suggest that many AI developers implicitly prioritize this goal by focusing on technicalities rather than broader functionalities. The second, and more important goal according to Buddhist teachings, is to transcend these desires and instincts. In texts like the Brahmajāla Sutta and minor Malunkya Sutta, the Buddha emphasizes that sensory desires and survival instincts confine beings to suffering, and that eliminating suffering is the primary goal of human life. Promta and Himma argue that AI has the potential to assist humanity in transcending suffering by helping individuals overcome survival-driven instincts. === Intelligence as care === Thomas Doctor, Olaf Witkowski, Elizaveta Solomonova, Bill Duane, and Michael Levin propose redefining intelligence through the concept of "intelligence as care," and promote it as a slogan. Inspired by the Bodhisattva vow, they suggest this principle could guide AI system design. The Bodhisattva vow involves a formal commitment to alleviate suffering for all sentient beings, with four primary objectives: Liberating all beings from suffering. Extirpating all forms of suffering. Mastering endless techniques of practicing Dharma (Pali: dhammakkhandha, Sanskrit: dharmaskandha). Achieving ultimate enlightenment (Sanskrit: अनुत्तर सम्यक् सम्बोधि, Romanized: anuttara-samyak-saṃbodhi). This approach positions AI as a tool for exercising infinite care and alleviating stress and suffering for sentient beings. Doctor et al. emphasize that AI development should align with these altruistic principles.