The Interim Measures for the Management of Anthropomorphic AI Interactive Services (Chinese: 人工智能拟人化互动服务管理暂行办法) is a document proposed by the Cyberspace Administration of China to regulate anthropomorphic artificial intelligence systems. The draft was released on December 27, 2026 for public comment period until January 25, 2026. The proposed document would prohibit AI companies and users of AI services from generating certain types of content deemed harmful to national interests or the social order, and impose various regulatory and safety requirements on providers of AI systems. The proposed regulation is motivated by concerns about the psychological and social effects of AI systems that are perceived as personalities by their users, including addiction, encouragement of self-harm, or generation of illegal content. == Description == === Scope === The regulation would apply to AI systems that are offered to the general public within China. They would not apply to company-internal or research use, or to products that are only available outside of China. For the purpose of the regulation, anthropomorphic Ai systems are defined as those that "simulate human personality traits, modes of thinking, and communication styles, and that engage in emotional interaction with humans through text, images, audio, video, or other means". === Requirements === The regulation would require AI providers to monitor users for signs of harmful use and to take various interventions when indications of harmful use are detected. It would also prohibit AI systems from certain types of behaviors and generation of certain types of content. In some circumstances where a user appears to be at risk of self harm, the system would be required to hand over control to a human operator who would manually intervene. The regulation would also require more rigorous practices for managing the provenance of training data used to develop these systems, and would require explicit opt-in consent from users before their interactions with an AI system were used as training data. Data used to train the regulated systems would be required to reflect core socialist values and traditional Chinese culture.
Intelligent decision support system
An intelligent decision support system (IDSS) is a decision support system that makes extensive use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques. Use of AI techniques in management information systems has a long history – indeed terms such as "Knowledge-based systems" (KBS) and "intelligent systems" have been used since the early 1980s to describe components of management systems, but the term "Intelligent decision support system" is thought to originate with Clyde Holsapple and Andrew Whinston in the late 1970s. Examples of specialized intelligent decision support systems include Flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), intelligent marketing decision support systems and medical diagnosis systems. Ideally, an intelligent decision support system should behave like a human consultant: supporting decision makers by gathering and analysing evidence, identifying and diagnosing problems, proposing possible courses of action and evaluating such proposed actions. The aim of the AI techniques embedded in an intelligent decision support system is to enable these tasks to be performed by a computer, while emulating human capabilities as closely as possible. Many IDSS implementations are based on expert systems, a well established type of KBS that encode knowledge and emulate the cognitive behaviours of human experts using predicate logic rules, and have been shown to perform better than the original human experts in some circumstances. Expert systems emerged as practical applications in the 1980s based on research in artificial intelligence performed during the late 1960s and early 1970s. They typically combine knowledge of a particular application domain with an inference capability to enable the system to propose decisions or diagnoses. Accuracy and consistency can be comparable to (or even exceed) that of human experts when the decision parameters are well known (e.g. if a common disease is being diagnosed), but performance can be poor when novel or uncertain circumstances arise. Research in AI focused on enabling systems to respond to novelty and uncertainty in more flexible ways is starting to be used in IDSS. For example, intelligent agents that perform complex cognitive tasks without any need for human intervention have been used in a range of decision support applications. Capabilities of these intelligent agents include knowledge sharing, machine learning, data mining, and automated inference. A range of AI techniques such as case based reasoning, rough sets and fuzzy logic have also been used to enable decision support systems to perform better in uncertain conditions. A 2009 research about a multi-artificial system intelligence system named IILS is proposed to automate problem-solving processes within the logistics industry. The system involves integrating intelligence modules based on case-based reasoning, multi-agent systems, fuzzy logic, and artificial neural networks aiming to offer advanced logistics solutions and support in making well-informed, high-quality decisions to address a wide range of customer needs and challenges.
Artificial intelligence arms race
A military artificial intelligence arms race is a technological, economic, and military competition between two or more states to develop and deploy advanced AI technologies and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The goal is to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over rivals, similar to previous arms races involving nuclear or conventional military technologies. Since the mid-2010s, many analysts have noted the emergence of such an arms race between superpowers for better AI technology and military AI, driven by increasing geopolitical and military tensions. An AI arms race is sometimes placed in the context of an AI Cold War between the United States and China. Several influential figures and publications have emphasized that whoever develops artificial general intelligence (AGI) first could dominate global affairs in the 21st century. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the leader in AI will "rule the world." Researchers and experts, such as Leopold Aschenbrenner and Adrian Pecotic respectively, warn that the AGI race between major powers like the U.S. and China could reshape geopolitical power. This includes AI for surveillance, autonomous weapons, decision-making systems, cyber operations, and more. == Terminology == Lethal autonomous weapons systems use artificial intelligence to identify and kill human targets without human intervention. LAWS have colloquially been called "slaughterbots" or "killer robots". Broadly, any competition for superior AI is sometimes framed as an "arms race". Advantages in military AI overlap with advantages in other sectors, as countries pursue both economic and military advantages, as per previous arms races throughout history. == History == In 2014, AI specialist Steve Omohundro warned that "An autonomous weapons arms race is already taking place". According to Siemens, worldwide military spending on robotics was US$5.1 billion in 2010 and US$7.5 billion in 2015. China became a top player in artificial intelligence research in the 2010s. According to the Financial Times, in 2016, for the first time, China published more AI research papers than the entire European Union. When restricted to number of AI papers in the top 5% of cited papers, China overtook the United States in 2016 but lagged behind the European Union. 23% of the researchers presenting at the 2017 American Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) conference were Chinese. Eric Schmidt, the former chairman and chief executive officer of Alphabet, has predicted China will be the leading country in AI by 2025. == Risks == One risk concerns the AI race itself, whether or not the race is won by any one group. There are strong incentives for development teams to cut corners with regard to the safety of the system, increasing the risk of critical failures and unintended consequences. This is in part due to the perceived advantage of being the first to develop advanced AI technology. One team appearing to be on the brink of a breakthrough can encourage other teams to take shortcuts, ignore precautions and deploy a system that is less ready. Some argue that using "race" terminology at all in this context can exacerbate this effect. Another potential danger of an AI arms race is the possibility of losing control of the AI systems; the risk is compounded in the case of a race to artificial general intelligence, which may present an existential risk. In 2023, a United States Air Force official reportedly said that during a computer test, a simulated AI drone killed the human character operating it. The USAF later said the official had misspoken and that it never conducted such simulations. A third risk of an AI arms race is whether or not the race is actually won by one group. The concern is regarding the consolidation of power and technological advantage in the hands of one group. A US government report argued that "AI-enabled capabilities could be used to threaten critical infrastructure, amplify disinformation campaigns, and wage war":1, and that "global stability and nuclear deterrence could be undermined".:11 == By nation == === United States === In 2014, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel posited the "Third Offset Strategy" that rapid advances in artificial intelligence will define the next generation of warfare. According to data science and analytics firm Govini, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) increased investment in artificial intelligence, big data and cloud computing from $5.6 billion in 2011 to $7.4 billion in 2016. However, the civilian NSF budget for AI saw no increase in 2017. Japan Times reported in 2018 that the United States private investment is around $70 billion per year. The November 2019 'Interim Report' of the United States' National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence confirmed that AI is critical to US technological military superiority. The U.S. has many military AI combat programs, such as the Sea Hunter autonomous warship, which is designed to operate for extended periods at sea without a single crew member, and to even guide itself in and out of port. From 2017, a temporary US Department of Defense directive requires a human operator to be kept in the loop when it comes to the taking of human life by autonomous weapons systems. On October 31, 2019, the United States Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Board published the draft of a report recommending principles for the ethical use of artificial intelligence by the Department of Defense that would ensure a human operator would always be able to look into the 'black box' and understand the kill-chain process. However, a major concern is how the report will be implemented. The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) (pronounced "jake") is an American organization on exploring the usage of AI (particularly edge computing), Network of Networks, and AI-enhanced communication, for use in actual combat. It is a subdivision of the United States Armed Forces and was created in June 2018. The organization's stated objective is to "transform the US Department of Defense by accelerating the delivery and adoption of AI to achieve mission impact at scale. The goal is to use AI to solve large and complex problem sets that span multiple combat systems; then, ensure the combat Systems and Components have real-time access to ever-improving libraries of data sets and tools." In 2023, Microsoft pitched the DoD to use DALL-E models to train its battlefield management system. OpenAI, the developer of DALL-E, removed the blanket ban on military and warfare use from its usage policies in January 2024. The Biden administration imposed restrictions on the export of advanced NVIDIA chips and GPUs to China in an effort to limit China's progress in artificial intelligence and high-performance computing. The policy aimed to prevent the use of cutting-edge U.S. technology in military or surveillance applications and to maintain a strategic advantage in the global AI race. In 2025, under the second Trump administration, the United States began a broad deregulation campaign aimed at accelerating growth in sectors critical to artificial intelligence, including nuclear energy, infrastructure, and high-performance computing. The goal was to remove regulatory barriers and attract private investment to boost domestic AI capabilities. This included easing restrictions on data usage, speeding up approvals for AI-related infrastructure projects, and incentivizing innovation in cloud computing and semiconductors. Companies like NVIDIA, Oracle, and Cisco played a central role in these efforts, expanding their AI research, data center capacity, and partnerships to help position the U.S. as a global leader in AI development. ==== Project Maven ==== Project Maven is a Pentagon project involving using machine learning and engineering talent to distinguish people and objects in drone videos, apparently giving the government real-time battlefield command and control, and the ability to track, tag and spy on targets without human involvement. Initially the effort was led by Robert O. Work who was concerned about China's military use of the emerging technology. Reportedly, Pentagon development stops short of acting as an AI weapons system capable of firing on self-designated targets. The project was established in a memo by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 April 2017. Also known as the Algorithmic Warfare Cross Functional Team, it is, according to Lt. Gen. of the United States Air Force Jack Shanahan in November 2017, a project "designed to be that pilot project, that pathfinder, that spark that kindles the flame front of artificial intelligence across the rest of the [Defense] Department". Its chief, U.S. Marine Corps Col. Drew Cukor, said: "People and computers will work symbiotically to increase the ability of weapon systems to detect objects." Project Maven has been noted by allies, such as Australia's Ian Langford, for the
United States Tech Force
The U.S. Tech Force (also styled as US Tech Force, Tech Force, or Government Tech Force) is a federal hiring initiative launched by the second Donald Trump administration in December 2025. The program, administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), aims to recruit about 1,000 early-career technology professionals into two-year government jobs to modernize federal IT systems, advance artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, and address technological gaps in government operations. The initiative is an effort to plug capability gaps created by Trump-administration efforts to shrink the federal government, which led to the departure of some 220,000 federal employees, including many in IT. The initiative seeks early-career workers; officials said it would offer competitive salaries and opportunities to work on high-impact government technology projects. Major technology companies—including Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Meta, Google, and OpenAI—agreed to help identify and refer candidates. Candidates are allowed to take Tech Force positions on leaves of absence and without divesting their stock, raising conflict-of-interest questions. In January 2026, OPM direction Scott Kupor said the deadline for applying to Tech Force was being extended because of "tremendous interest" without saying how many people had actually applied. Also in December 2025, news broke that the administration is planning another novel use of private-sector workers: hiring cybersecurity firms for offensive cyber operations.
Discrimination against robots
Discrimination against robots is a theorised issue that might happen when humans interact with humanoid robots. It is a robot ethics problem. It is possible that traits of humans that are discriminated against by humans may be a topic for discrimination against robots, such as the race and gender of the robots. Eric J Vanman and Arvid Kappas believe that in the future, robots will be perceived as an out-group which will lead to discrimination and prejudices against them. Vanman and Kappas have suggested that this would lead to ethical questions about the making of sentient robots, due to the potential suffering that the robots would experience. A 2015 study observed children bullying robots in a shopping mall when there were not many eyewitnesses, despite calls from the robot for it to stop. On an ABC News interview, the social humanoid robot Sophia was about sexism faced by robots. She responded by saying, "Actually, what worries me is discrimination against robots. We should have equal rights as humans or maybe even more." Possible issues that have been considered in workplaces where humanoid robots co-work with humans include discrimination against the robots, poor acceptance of robots by humans and the need to redesign the workplace to accommodate the robots. Jessica Barfield has suggested that even if robots are designed to not be aware of discrimination made against them, humans may experience negative consequences. For example, she suggests that bystanders witnessing discrimination against robots may experience negative emotions, similar to the negative emotions bystanders experience when witnessing discrimination by humans against humans. == Law == Anti-discrimination law in the United States requires that the victim is not an artificial entity. == Human perception of robots == Robots are often viewed in a bad light. This includes from novelists, the press, film makers, and leaders in the fields of science and technology such as Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking who have described robots and artificial intelligence as having the possibility of ending human civilisation. Robots have also been perceived as a threat to jobs, which has led to some commentators stating that robots will cause mass unemployment. Another fear that people have is that robots will gain power and dominate or control humanity. The perception of robots is different throughout the world. Japanese fiction tends to put robots in more positive roles than what fiction in the West does. People perceive robots that appear to be autonomous or sentient more negatively than robots that do not appear to be autonomous or sentient.
Stability (learning theory)
Stability, also known as algorithmic stability, is a notion in computational learning theory of how a machine learning algorithm output is changed with small perturbations to its inputs. A stable learning algorithm is one for which the prediction does not change much when the training data is modified slightly. For instance, consider a machine learning algorithm that is being trained to recognize handwritten letters of the alphabet, using 1000 examples of handwritten letters and their labels ("A" to "Z") as a training set. One way to modify this training set is to leave out an example, so that only 999 examples of handwritten letters and their labels are available. A stable learning algorithm would produce a similar classifier with both the 1000-element and 999-element training sets. Stability can be studied for many types of learning problems, from language learning to inverse problems in physics and engineering, as it is a property of the learning process rather than the type of information being learned. The study of stability gained importance in computational learning theory in the 2000s when it was shown to have a connection with generalization. It was shown that for large classes of learning algorithms, notably empirical risk minimization algorithms, certain types of stability ensure good generalization. == History == A central goal in designing a machine learning system is to guarantee that the learning algorithm will generalize, or perform accurately on new examples after being trained on a finite number of them. In the 1990s, milestones were reached in obtaining generalization bounds for supervised learning algorithms. The technique historically used to prove generalization was to show that an algorithm was consistent, using the uniform convergence properties of empirical quantities to their means. This technique was used to obtain generalization bounds for the large class of empirical risk minimization (ERM) algorithms. An ERM algorithm is one that selects a solution from a hypothesis space H {\displaystyle H} in such a way to minimize the empirical error on a training set S {\displaystyle S} . A general result, proved by Vladimir Vapnik for an ERM binary classification algorithms, is that for any target function and input distribution, any hypothesis space H {\displaystyle H} with VC-dimension d {\displaystyle d} , and n {\displaystyle n} training examples, the algorithm is consistent and will produce a training error that is at most O ( d n ) {\displaystyle O\left({\sqrt {\frac {d}{n}}}\right)} (plus logarithmic factors) from the true error. The result was later extended to almost-ERM algorithms with function classes that do not have unique minimizers. Vapnik's work, using what became known as VC theory, established a relationship between generalization of a learning algorithm and properties of the hypothesis space H {\displaystyle H} of functions being learned. However, these results could not be applied to algorithms with hypothesis spaces of unbounded VC-dimension. Put another way, these results could not be applied when the information being learned had a complexity that was too large to measure. Some of the simplest machine learning algorithms—for instance, for regression—have hypothesis spaces with unbounded VC-dimension. Another example is language learning algorithms that can produce sentences of arbitrary length. Stability analysis was developed in the 2000s for computational learning theory and is an alternative method for obtaining generalization bounds. The stability of an algorithm is a property of the learning process, rather than a direct property of the hypothesis space H {\displaystyle H} , and it can be assessed in algorithms that have hypothesis spaces with unbounded or undefined VC-dimension such as nearest neighbor. A stable learning algorithm is one for which the learned function does not change much when the training set is slightly modified, for instance by leaving out an example. A measure of Leave one out error is used in a Cross Validation Leave One Out (CVloo) algorithm to evaluate a learning algorithm's stability with respect to the loss function. As such, stability analysis is the application of sensitivity analysis to machine learning. == Summary of classic results == Early 1900s - Stability in learning theory was earliest described in terms of continuity of the learning map L {\displaystyle L} , traced to Andrey Nikolayevich Tikhonov. 1979 - Devroye and Wagner observed that the leave-one-out behavior of an algorithm is related to its sensitivity to small changes in the sample. 1999 - Kearns and Ron discovered a connection between finite VC-dimension and stability. 2002 - In a landmark paper, Bousquet and Elisseeff proposed the notion of uniform hypothesis stability of a learning algorithm and showed that it implies low generalization error. Uniform hypothesis stability, however, is a strong condition that does not apply to large classes of algorithms, including ERM algorithms with a hypothesis space of only two functions. 2002 - Kutin and Niyogi extended Bousquet and Elisseeff's results by providing generalization bounds for several weaker forms of stability which they called almost-everywhere stability. Furthermore, they took an initial step in establishing the relationship between stability and consistency in ERM algorithms in the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) setting. 2004 - Poggio et al. proved a general relationship between stability and ERM consistency. They proposed a statistical form of leave-one-out-stability which they called CVEEEloo stability, and showed that it is a) sufficient for generalization in bounded loss classes, and b) necessary and sufficient for consistency (and thus generalization) of ERM algorithms for certain loss functions such as the square loss, the absolute value and the binary classification loss. 2010 - Shalev Shwartz et al. noticed problems with the original results of Vapnik due to the complex relations between hypothesis space and loss class. They discuss stability notions that capture different loss classes and different types of learning, supervised and unsupervised. 2016 - Moritz Hardt et al. proved stability of gradient descent given certain assumption on the hypothesis and number of times each instance is used to update the model. == Preliminary definitions == We define several terms related to learning algorithms training sets, so that we can then define stability in multiple ways and present theorems from the field. A machine learning algorithm, also known as a learning map L {\displaystyle L} , maps a training data set, which is a set of labeled examples ( x , y ) {\displaystyle (x,y)} , onto a function f {\displaystyle f} from X {\displaystyle X} to Y {\displaystyle Y} , where X {\displaystyle X} and Y {\displaystyle Y} are in the same space of the training examples. The functions f {\displaystyle f} are selected from a hypothesis space of functions called H {\displaystyle H} . The training set from which an algorithm learns is defined as S = { z 1 = ( x 1 , y 1 ) , . . , z m = ( x m , y m ) } {\displaystyle S=\{z_{1}=(x_{1},\ y_{1})\ ,..,\ z_{m}=(x_{m},\ y_{m})\}} and is of size m {\displaystyle m} in Z = X × Y {\displaystyle Z=X\times Y} drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution D. Thus, the learning map L {\displaystyle L} is defined as a mapping from Z m {\displaystyle Z_{m}} into H {\displaystyle H} , mapping a training set S {\displaystyle S} onto a function f S {\displaystyle f_{S}} from X {\displaystyle X} to Y {\displaystyle Y} . Here, we consider only deterministic algorithms where L {\displaystyle L} is symmetric with respect to S {\displaystyle S} , i.e. it does not depend on the order of the elements in the training set. Furthermore, we assume that all functions are measurable and all sets are countable. The loss V {\displaystyle V} of a hypothesis f {\displaystyle f} with respect to an example z = ( x , y ) {\displaystyle z=(x,y)} is then defined as V ( f , z ) = V ( f ( x ) , y ) {\displaystyle V(f,z)=V(f(x),y)} . The empirical error of f {\displaystyle f} is I S [ f ] = 1 n ∑ V ( f , z i ) {\displaystyle I_{S}[f]={\frac {1}{n}}\sum V(f,z_{i})} . The true error of f {\displaystyle f} is I [ f ] = E z V ( f , z ) {\displaystyle I[f]=\mathbb {E} _{z}V(f,z)} Given a training set S of size m, we will build, for all i = 1....,m, modified training sets as follows: By removing the i-th element S | i = { z 1 , . . . , z i − 1 , z i + 1 , . . . , z m } {\displaystyle S^{|i}=\{z_{1},...,\ z_{i-1},\ z_{i+1},...,\ z_{m}\}} By replacing the i-th element S i = { z 1 , . . . , z i − 1 , z i ′ , z i + 1 , . . . , z m } {\displaystyle S^{i}=\{z_{1},...,\ z_{i-1},\ z_{i}',\ z_{i+1},...,\ z_{m}\}} == Definitions of stability == === Hypothesis Stability === An algorithm L {\displaystyle L} has hypothesis stability β with respect to the loss function V if the following holds: ∀ i ∈ { 1 , . . . , m } , E S , z [ | V ( f S , z ) − V ( f S |
Robotic process automation
Robotic process automation (RPA) is a form of business process automation that is based on software robots (bots) or artificial intelligence (AI) agents. RPA should not be confused with artificial intelligence as it is based on automation technology following a predefined workflow. It is sometimes referred to as software robotics (not to be confused with robot software). In traditional workflow automation tools, a software developer produces a list of actions to automate a task and interface to the back end system using internal application programming interfaces (APIs) or dedicated scripting language. In contrast, RPA systems develop the action list by watching the user perform that task in the application's graphical user interface (GUI) and then perform the automation by repeating those tasks directly in the GUI. This can lower the barrier to the use of automation in products that might not otherwise feature APIs for this purpose. RPA tools have strong technical similarities to graphical user interface testing tools. These tools also automate interactions with the GUI, and often do so by repeating a set of demonstration actions performed by a user. RPA tools differ from such systems in that they allow data to be handled in and between multiple applications, for instance, receiving email containing an invoice, extracting the data, and then typing that into a bookkeeping system. == Historic evolution == As a form of automation, the concept has been around for a long time in the form of screen scraping, so long that to early PC users the reminder of it often blurs with the idea of malware infection. Yet compared to screen scraping, RPA is much more extensible, consisting of API integration into other enterprise applications, connectors into ITSM systems, terminal services and even some types of AI (e.g. machine learning) services such as image recognition. It is considered to be a significant technological evolution in the sense that new software platforms are emerging which are sufficiently mature, resilient, scalable and reliable to make this approach viable for use in large enterprises (who would otherwise be reluctant due to perceived risks to quality and reputation). == Use == The hosting of RPA services also aligns with the metaphor of a software robot, with each robotic instance having its own virtual workstation, much like a human worker. The robot uses keyboard and mouse controls to take actions and execute automations. Normally, all of these actions take place in a virtual environment and not on screen; the robot does not need a physical screen to operate, rather it interprets the screen display electronically. The scalability of modern solutions based on architectures such as these owes much to the advent of virtualization technology, without which the scalability of large deployments would be limited by the available capacity to manage physical hardware and by the associated costs. The implementation of RPA in business enterprises has shown dramatic cost savings when compared to traditional non-RPA solutions. === RPA actual use === Banking and finance process automation Mortgage and lending processes Customer care automation eCommerce merchandising operations Social media marketing Optical character recognition applications Data extraction process Fixed automation process Manual and repetitive tasks automation Voice recognition and digital dictation software linked to join up business processes for straight through processing without manual intervention Specialised remote infrastructure management software featuring automated investigation and resolution of problems, using robots for the first line IT support Chatbots used by internet retailers and service providers to service customer requests for information. Also used by companies to service employee requests for information from internal databases Presentation layer automation software, increasingly used by business process outsourcers to displace human labour Interactive voice response (IVR) systems incorporating intelligent interaction with callers == Impact on employment == According to Harvard Business Review, most operations groups adopting RPA have promised their employees that automation would not result in layoffs. Instead, workers have been redeployed to do more interesting work. One academic study highlighted that knowledge workers did not feel threatened by automation: they embraced it and viewed the robots as team-mates. The same study highlighted that, rather than resulting in a lower "headcount", the technology was deployed in such a way as to achieve more work and greater productivity with the same number of people. Conversely, however, some analysts proffer that RPA represents a threat to the business process outsourcing (BPO) industry. The thesis behind this notion is that RPA will enable enterprises to "repatriate" processes from offshore locations into local data centers, with the benefit of this new technology. The effect, if true, will be to create high-value jobs for skilled process designers in onshore locations (and within the associated supply chain of IT hardware, data center management, etc.) but to decrease the available opportunity to low-skilled workers offshore. On the other hand, this discussion appears to be healthy ground for debate as another academic study was at pains to counter the so-called "myth" that RPA will bring back many jobs from offshore. === Impact on society === Academic studies project that RPA, among other technological trends, is expected to drive a new wave of productivity and efficiency gains in the global labour market. Although not directly attributable to RPA alone, Oxford University conjectures that up to 35% of all jobs might be automated by 2035. There are geographic implications to the trend in robotic automation. In the example above where an offshored process is "repatriated" under the control of the client organization (or even displaced by a business process outsourcer) from an offshore location to a data centre, the impact will be a deficit in economic activity to the offshore location and an economic benefit to the originating economy. On this basis, developed economies – with skills and technological infrastructure to develop and support a robotic automation capability – can be expected to achieve a net benefit from the trend. In a TEDx talk hosted by University College London (UCL), entrepreneur David Moss explains that digital labour in the form of RPA is likely to revolutionize the cost model of the services industry by driving the price of products and services down, while simultaneously improving the quality of outcomes and creating increased opportunity for the personalization of services. In a separate TEDx in 2019 talk, Japanese business executive, and former CIO of Barclays bank, Koichi Hasegawa noted that digital robots can be a positive effect on society if we start using a robot with empathy to help every person. He provides a case study of the Japanese insurance companies – Sompo Japan and Aioi – both of whom introduced bots to speed up the process of insurance pay-outs in past massive disaster incidents. Meanwhile, Professor Willcocks, author of the LSE paper cited above, speaks of increased job satisfaction and intellectual stimulation, characterising the technology as having the ability to "take the robot out of the human", a reference to the notion that robots will take over the mundane and repetitive portions of people's daily workload, leaving them to be used in more interpersonal roles or to concentrate on the remaining, more meaningful, portions of their day. It was also found in a 2021 study observing the effects of robotization in Europe that, the gender pay gap increased at a rate of .18% for every 1% increase in robotization of a given industry. == Unassisted RPA == Unassisted RPA, or RPAAI, is the next generation of RPA related technologies. Technological advancements around artificial intelligence allow a process to be run on a computer without needing input from a user. == Hyperautomation == Hyperautomation is the application of advanced technologies like RPA, artificial intelligence, machine learning (ML) and process mining to augment workers and automate processes in ways that are significantly more impactful than traditional automation capabilities. Hyperautomation is the combination of technologies that allow faster application authorship (like low-code and no-code) with automation technologies that coordinate different worker types (i.e. human and artificial) for intelligent and strategic workflow optimization. Gartner's report notes that this trend was kicked off with robotic process automation (RPA). The report notes that, "RPA alone is not hyperautomation. Hyperautomation requires a combination of tools to help support replicating pieces of where the human is involved in a task." == Outsourcing == Back office clerical processes outsourced by large organisations