Influence-for-hire or collective influence, refers to the economy that has emerged around buying and selling influence on social media platforms. == Overview == Companies that engage in the influence-for-hire industry range from content farms to high-end public relations agencies. Traditionally influence operations have largely been confined to public sector actors like intelligence agencies, in the influence-for-hire industry the groups conduction the operations are private with commerce being their primary consideration. However many of the clients in the influence-for-hire industry are countries or countries acting through proxies. They are often located in countries with less expensive digital labor. == History == In May 2021, Facebook took a Ukrainian influence-for-hire network offline. Facebook attributed the network to organizations and consultants linked to Ukrainian politicians including Andriy Derkach. During the COVID-19 pandemic state sponsored misinformation was spread through influence-for-hire networks. In August 2021, a report published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute implicated the Chinese government and the ruling Chinese Communist Party in campaigns of online manipulation conducted against Australia and Taiwan using influence-for-hire.
Neurocomputing (journal)
Neurocomputing is a peer-reviewed scientific journal covering research on artificial intelligence, machine learning, and neural computation. It was established in 1989 and is published by Elsevier. The editor-in-chief is Zidong Wang (Brunel University London). Independent scientometric studies noted that despite being one of the most productive journals in the field, it has kept its reputation across the years intact and plays an important role in leading the research in the area. The journal is abstracted and indexed in Scopus and Science Citation Index Expanded. According to the Journal Citation Reports, its 2023 impact factor is 5.5.
Air Force Network
Air Force Network (AFNet) is an Indian Air Force (IAF) owned, operated and managed digital information grid. The AFNet replaces the Indian Air Force's (IAF) old communication network set-up using the tropo-scatter technology of the 1950s making it a true net-centric combat force. The IAF project is part of the overall mission to network all three services; The Indian Army, The Indian Navy and The Indian Air Force. The former Defence Minister AK Antony inaugurated the IAF's the AFNET on 14 September 2010 dedicating it to the people of India, for their direct or indirect participation in the communication revolution. == Background == Armed Forces in India has been using troposcatters as primary means of military communications since the 1950s, thereby occupying huge and expensive 2G and 3G spectrums which otherwise could have been used for expanding and de-clogging the civilian wireless communication network. The rapid expansion of civilian mobile telephony leading to need for larger bandwidth for wireless communication and commercial need to operate the 3G network necessitated the Government of India to have the Indian Armed Forces vacate the spectrum occupied by them. Thus the government of India through Department of Telecommunication (DoT) started a project called "Network for Spectrum" to set up a fiber optics network for the exclusive use of Indian Armed Forces in exchange for spectrum being released by the Defence Forces. The aim of 'Network for Spectrum' being twofold - to facilitate the growth of national tele-density on the one hand, and ensuring modernization of defence communications with the state-of-the-art communication infrastructure, and to support net-centric military operations. The Department of Telecom and the Ministry of Defence signed the memorandum of understanding for vacating the spectrum and setting up dedicated network for the use of defence forces. In this MoU, DoT agreed to laying of 40,000 route kilometres of optical fibre cable connecting 219 Army stations, 33 Navy stations and 162 points for the Air Force. It further agreed to setting up an exclusive defence band and Defence Interest Zone along 100 km of the international border, where spectrum will be reserved only for use by the Armed Forces. The total cost of implementing "Network for Spectrum" project is estimated to be ₹ 10,000 crores. AFNet is Indian Air Force component of Digital Information Grid under "Network for Spectrum" project and the AFNet has been extended and connected to the Digital Information Grid Project under implementation for the Indian Navy and the Indian Army on 2015. == Project Origin == The Air Force Network (AFNet) had been developed by the Indian Air Force at a cost of ₹1,077 crore (US$235.53 million) in collaboration with HCL Technologies and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited. It will replace the Air Force's more than half-a-century-old telecom network. This project is part of the defence ministry's initiative to digitize the communication systems of the three armed forces under "Network for Spectrum" initiative to improve coordination among themselves and other Military and Strategic Institution. IAF was the first to complete this gigabyte digital information grid implemented under the AFNet project. AFNet will be connected and extended to a Unified Digital Grid encompassing all the legs of Indian Armed Forces. The then defence minister, A. K. Antony, inaugurated the AFNet, IAF's gigabyte digital information grid. The grid is aimed at improving the network-centric warfare capability of the Air Force. The event also saw the presence of other personalities including the then Minister of Communication & IT, A. Raja; the Marshal of the Air Force, Arjan Singh; the Chief of the Air Staff, the Chief of the Army Staff and other officials from the three services and members of the Industry. The event also featured a practice interception of a simulated aerial target by a MiG-29 which took off from an airbase in the Punjab sector using the AFNet capabilities. Further capabilities in line with network centric warfare were also demonstrated. This included sharing information, videos and pictures by operational assets and platforms like UAVs and AWACS to decision-makers who are several hundred kilometres apart. == Technology, Design & Structure == AFNet incorporates the latest traffic transportation technology in form of Internet Protocol (IP) packets over the network using Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS). A large Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) layer with stringent quality of service enforcement will facilitate robust, high quality voice, video and conferencing solutions. AFNet will prove to be an effective force multiplier for intelligence analysis, mission planning and control, post-mission feedback and related activities like maintenance, logistics and administration. A comprehensive design with multi-layer security precautions for “Defence in Depth” have been planned by incorporating encryption technologies, Intrusion Prevention Systems to ensure the resistance of the IT system against information manipulation and eavesdropping. The network is secured with a host of advanced state-of-the-art encryption technologies. It is designed for high reliability with redundancy built into the network design itself. The AFNet is also capable of transmitting video from unmanned surveillance aircraft (UAV), pictures from airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) to decision makers on the ground and providing intelligence inputs from remote areas. The AFNet is also expected to facilitate accelerated economic growth by providing radio frequency spectrum for telecommunication purposes. AFNET will be the largest Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS) network in the defence segment. == Demonstration == At the AFNet launch, the IAF showcased a practice interception of simulated enemy targets by a pair of Mig-29 fighter aircraft airborne from an advanced airbase in the Punjab sector using the gigabyte digital information grid. During the AFNet-assisted operations, the Indian fighter jets neutralised intruding targets in the western sector, which was played out live on the giant screens at the Air Force auditorium offering a glimpse of the harnessed potential of the system. The final orders for engaging the enemy targets were issued live by Antony, whose queries about how the operation went were responded to by the pilot as "excellent". Various other functionalities contributing towards Network Centric Warfare were also showcased. These consisted of facilitating video from Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), pictures from an AWACS aircraft to the decision-makers on ground sitting hundreds of kilometres away, providing intelligence inputs from far-flung areas at central locations seamlessly. This was possible mainly because of the robust networking platform provided by AFNet. == Integrated Air Command and Control System == Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) is an automated command and control system for air defence operated by the Indian Air Force. IACCS operations rides the AFNET backbone integrating all ground-based and airborne sensors, air defense weapon systems and command and control (C2) nodes. Subsequent integration with other services networks and civil radars will provide an integrated Air Situation Picture to operators to carry out AD role. The project was envisaged in 1995 following the Purulia arms drop case and was a part of IAF’s first Air Power Doctrinal manual issued in the 2000s, later revised in 2022. The first node in the western sectors had been operationalised by September 2010. The first five nodes located in the western and south western sectors were commissioned in 2011. The Air Force was preparing to seek clearance for five further nodes which would cover the rest of the nation including the island territories. Through the IACCS, IAF will connect all of its space, air and ground assets quickly, for total awareness of a region. This will offer connectivity for all the ground platforms and airborne platforms (including AEW&C), as a part of the network centricity of IAF. The IACCS also facilitates real-time transport of images, data and voice, amongst satellites, aircraft and ground stations. By 2018, five IACCS nodes had been established including Barnala (Punjab), Wadsar (Gujarat), Aya Nagar (Delhi), Jodhpur (Rajasthan) and Ambala (Haryana). Following this, under Phase-II, 4 additional nodes and 10 sub-nodes are to be set up. The major nodes will be established in the Eastern, Central, Southern and Andaman and Nicobar sectors. The second phase will cost ₹8,000 crore (equivalent to ₹110 billion or US$1.1 billion in 2023). IACCS successfully integrated all operating radars, including its own, the Army's, and civilian ones, in 2023. This enabled the autonomous firing response capability to take down incoming missiles, aircraft, and UAVs. The Akashteer system of the Indian Army is being integrated with the IACCS
Cryptographic bill of materials
Cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM—also cryptography bill of materials) is a structured inventory of all cryptographic assets present in a software, firmware, device, or system. It enumerates algorithms (and parameters such as key sizes and modes), cryptographic libraries or modules, digital certificates, keys and related material, and protocols in use, and maps their relationships to the components that implement or invoke them. CBOMs are used to improve security analysis, compliance, and cryptographic agility, and are increasingly referenced in guidance for post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) migration. == Definition and scope == A CBOM inventories cryptographic primitives and materials—such as encryption and signature algorithms (with specific variants and modes), key sizes, cryptographic libraries/modules, digital certificates (e.g., X.509), keys and other related cryptographic material, and security protocols (e.g., TLS, IPsec). It also documents dependencies (for example, an application uses an algorithm provided by a library; a protocol uses several algorithms) and can capture certificate lifecycles, cryptographic module certifications (e.g., FIPS 140‑3), and policy conformance metadata. In common practice, a CBOM may be embedded within an SBOM format (such as CycloneDX) or exported as a separate, linked artifact. === Typical CBOM fields === The exact schema varies by implementation, but common fields are summarized below (see CycloneDX CBOM guide and NIST SP 1800‑38B). == Relation to SBOM == A CBOM is complementary to, but distinct from, a software bill of materials (SBOM). Whereas an SBOM lists software components and their versions, a CBOM focuses specifically on the cryptography present and how it is configured and used. For example, an SBOM might enumerate inclusion of a library such as OpenSSL, while the CBOM would identify which algorithms and parameters that library enables (e.g., RSA‑2048, ECDH P‑256, AES‑GCM) and list relevant keys and certificates. The pairing enables both supply‑chain transparency and cryptographic transparency. == History == The term and practice emerged in the early–mid 2020s alongside software‑supply‑chain transparency and PQC planning. The OWASP CycloneDX standard introduced native CBOM support (v1.6 and later), modeling algorithms, keys, certificates, and protocols as first‑class “cryptographic assets” and providing dependency semantics (uses/implements) between software and cryptography. Open tooling from industry and researchers (e.g., IBM's CBOMkit and related generators/viewers) appeared to automate discovery and representation of cryptographic use in the CycloneDX CBOM schema. == Regulatory and policy context == In the United States, policy has emphasized cryptographic inventories as a prerequisite to PQC migration. The White House's National Security Memorandum 10 (2022) directed a government‑wide transition to quantum‑resistant cryptography; the Office of Management and Budget's M‑23‑02 (November 2022) operationalized this by requiring agencies to submit a prioritized inventory of cryptographic systems (with algorithm and key details) by 4 May 2023 and annually thereafter, and tasked CISA/NSA/NIST to develop automated discovery and inventory strategies. A 2024 Office of the National Cyber Director report reiterated that a “comprehensive cryptographic inventory” is the baseline for PQC planning and must be maintained iteratively with both automated and manual discovery. NIST's NCCoE practice guide (SP 1800‑38B, preliminary draft) provides concrete methods for cryptographic discovery and documentation across enterprises, aligning with CBOM‑style representations. CISA later published a strategy to migrate federal agencies to automated cryptography discovery and inventory tools to support continuous reporting. Separately, NSA, CISA, and NIST issued joint guidance encouraging all organisations to prepare cryptographic inventories and roadmaps for PQC, beyond government environments. == Role in quantum readiness and cryptographic agility == Because large‑scale quantum computing threatens widely used public‑key algorithms (e.g., RSA, ECC), organisations are planning multi‑year transitions to post-quantum cryptography. CBOMs enable that planning by identifying where quantum‑vulnerable algorithms appear, prioritising high‑impact systems, and tracking replacements over time. A machine‑readable CBOM also supports cryptographic agility and incident response: if an algorithm, library, or certificate lifecycle becomes non‑compliant or vulnerable, the CBOM indicates which products and systems are affected and where mitigations must be applied first. == Standards and tooling == CycloneDX (OWASP): Native CBOM modelling (v1.6+) for algorithms, certificates, keys/related material, and protocols, with dependency semantics and examples. The project publishes a CBOM guide and use‑case profiles (e.g., certificate and algorithm inventories). NIST NCCoE SP 1800‑38 series: Practice guides for PQC migration include enterprise cryptographic discovery methods that produce CBOM‑like inventories and integrate multiple discovery tools. Government automation initiatives: Following M‑23‑02, CISA issued a strategy to migrate to automated cryptography discovery and inventory tools to support agency reporting and continuous inventory management. Open‑source and vendor tools: IBM's CBOMkit and related components generate, analyse, and visualise CBOMs; the IBM CBOM specification work was upstreamed into CycloneDX 1.6. === Data model and interchange (example) === CycloneDX provides machine‑readable encodings (JSON/XML) for CBOM content. The example below (subset) shows an application depending on a crypto library that provides the AES‑256‑GCM algorithm, and the application also depends on a leaf X.509 certificate. See the CycloneDX CBOM guide, JSON reference, and the “Implementation details” use‑case for the semantics of `dependsOn` and `provides`. == Relationship to cybersecurity supply chain initiatives == CBOMs complement SBOM‑focused supply‑chain transparency introduced by U.S. Executive Order 14028 and NTIA/NIST SBOM work. SBOMs document software components; CBOMs add detail on embedded cryptography to support risk management, policy compliance (e.g., disallowing deprecated algorithms), and PQC transition planning.
ISO 15765-2
ISO 15765-2, or ISO-TP (Transport Layer), is an international standard for sending data packets over a CAN bus. The protocol allows for the transport of messages that exceed the eight byte maximum payload of CAN frames. ISO-TP segments longer messages into multiple frames, adding metadata (CAN-TP Header) that allows the interpretation of individual frames and reassembly into a complete message packet by the recipient. It can carry up to 232-1 (4294967295) bytes of payload per message packet starting from the 2016 version. Prior versions were limited to a maximum payload size of 4095 bytes. In the OSI model, ISO-TP covers the layer 3 (network layer) and 4 (transport layer). The most common application for ISO-TP is the transfer of diagnostic messages with OBD-II equipped vehicles using KWP2000 and UDS, but is used broadly in other application-specific CAN implementations where one might need to send messages longer than what the CAN protocol physical layer allows (eight bytes for CAN, 64 bytes for CAN FD, and 2048 bytes for CAN-XL). ISO-TP can be operated with its own addressing as so-called Extended Addressing or without address using only the CAN ID (so-called Normal Addressing). Extended addressing uses the first data byte of each frame as an additional element of the address, reducing the application payload by one byte. For clarity the protocol description below is based on Normal Addressing with eight byte CAN frames. In total, six types of addressing are allowed by the ISO 15765-2 Protocol. ISO-TP prepends one or more metadata bytes to the payload data in the eight byte CAN frame, reducing the payload to seven or fewer bytes per frame. The metadata is called the Protocol Control Information, or PCI. The PCI is one, two or three bytes. The initial field is four bits indicating the frame type, and implicitly describing the PCI length. ISO 15765-2 is a part of ISO 15765 (headlined Road vehicles — Diagnostic communication over Controller Area Network (DoCAN)), which has the following parts: ISO 15765-1 Part 1: General information and use case definition ISO 15765-2 Part 2: Transport protocol and network layer services ISO 15765-3 Part 3: Implementation of unified diagnostic services (UDS on CAN) – replaced by ISO 14229-3 Road vehicles — Unified diagnostic services ISO 15765-4 Part 4: Requirements for emissions-related systems == List of protocol control information (PCI) field types == The ISO-TP defines four frame types: A message of seven bytes or less is sent in a single frame, with the initial byte containing the type (0) and payload length (1-7 bytes). With the 0 in the type field, this can also pass as a simpler protocol with a length-data format and is often misinterpreted as such. A message longer than 7 bytes requires segmenting the message packet over multiple frames. A segmented transfer starts with a First Frame. The PCI is two bytes in this case, with the first 4 bit field the type (type 1) and the following 12 bits the message length (excluding the type and length bytes). The recipient confirms the transfer with a flow control frame. The flow control frame has three PCI bytes specifying the interval between subsequent frames and how many consecutive frames may be sent (Block Size). For CAN FD, the ISO 15765-2 protocol has been extended for Single and First frame, to allow larger size values, but still backwards compatible with traditional ISO 15765. See CAN FD. The initial byte contains the type (type = 3) in the first four bits, and a flag in the next four bits indicating if the transfer is allowed (0 = Continue To Send, 1 = Wait, 2 = Overflow/abort). The next byte is the block size, the count of frames that may be sent before waiting for the next flow control frame. A value of zero allows the remaining frames to be sent without flow control or delay. The third byte is the minimum Separation Time (STmin), the minimum delay time between frames. STmin values up to 127 (0x7F) specify the minimum number of milliseconds to delay between frames, while values in the range 241 (0xF1) to 249 (0xF9) specify delays increasing from 100 to 900 microseconds. Note that the Separation Time is defined as the minimum time between the end of one frame to the beginning of the next. Robust implementations should be prepared to accept frames from a sender that misinterprets this as the frame repetition rate i.e. from start-of-frame to start-of-frame. Even careful implementations may fail to account for the minor effect of bit-stuffing in the physical layer. The sender transmits the rest of the message using Consecutive Frames. Each Consecutive Frame has a one byte PCI, with a four bit type (type = 2) followed by a 4-bit sequence number. The sequence number starts at 1 and increments with each frame sent (1, 2,..., F, 0, 1,...), with which lost or discarded frames can be detected. Each consecutive frame starts at 0, initially for the first set of data in the first frame will be considered as 0th data. So the first set of CF(Consecutive frames) start from 0x1. There afterwards when it reaches 0x2F, will be started from 0x20 (e.g. 0x21, 0x22, 0x23...0x2F, 0x20, 0x21...). The 12-bit length field (as indicated in the First Frame) allows up to 4095 bytes of user data in a segmented message, but in practice the typical application-specific limit is considerably lower because of receive buffer or hardware limitations. == Timing parameters == Timing parameters, such as P1 and P2 timers, have to be mentioned. == Standards == ISO 15765-2:2016 Road vehicles -- Diagnostic communication over Controller Area Network (DoCAN) -- Part 2: Transport protocol and network layer services
Client-side persistent data
Client-side persistent data or CSPD is a term used in computing for storing data required by web applications to complete internet tasks on the client-side as needed rather than exclusively on the server. As a framework it is one solution to the needs of Occasionally connected computing or OCC. A major challenge for HTTP as a stateless protocol has been asynchronous tasks. The AJAX pattern using XMLHttpRequest was first introduced by Microsoft in the context of the Outlook e-mail product. The first CSPD were the 'cookies' introduced by the Netscape Navigator. ActiveX components which have entries in the Windows registry can also be viewed as a form of client-side persistence.
Locally recoverable code
Locally recoverable codes are a family of error correction codes that were introduced first by D. S. Papailiopoulos and A. G. Dimakis and have been widely studied in information theory due to their applications related to distributive and cloud storage systems. An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} LRC is an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code such that there is a function f i {\displaystyle f_{i}} that takes as input i {\displaystyle i} and a set of r {\displaystyle r} other coordinates of a codeword c = ( c 1 , … , c n ) ∈ C {\displaystyle c=(c_{1},\ldots ,c_{n})\in C} different from c i {\displaystyle c_{i}} , and outputs c i {\displaystyle c_{i}} . == Overview == Erasure-correcting codes, or simply erasure codes, for distributed and cloud storage systems, are becoming more and more popular as a result of the present spike in demand for cloud computing and storage services. This has inspired researchers in the fields of information and coding theory to investigate new facets of codes that are specifically suited for use with storage systems. It is well-known that LRC is a code that needs only a limited set of other symbols to be accessed in order to restore every symbol in a codeword. This idea is very important for distributed and cloud storage systems since the most common error case is when one storage node fails (erasure). The main objective is to recover as much data as possible from the fewest additional storage nodes in order to restore the node. Hence, Locally Recoverable Codes are crucial for such systems. The following definition of the LRC follows from the description above: an [ n , k , r ] {\displaystyle [n,k,r]} -Locally Recoverable Code (LRC) of length n {\displaystyle n} is a code that produces an n {\displaystyle n} -symbol codeword from k {\displaystyle k} information symbols, and for any symbol of the codeword, there exist at most r {\displaystyle r} other symbols such that the value of the symbol can be recovered from them. The locality parameter satisfies 1 ≤ r ≤ k {\displaystyle 1\leq r\leq k} because the entire codeword can be found by accessing k {\displaystyle k} symbols other than the erased symbol. Furthermore, Locally Recoverable Codes, having the minimum distance d {\displaystyle d} , can recover d − 1 {\displaystyle d-1} erasures. == Definition == Let C {\displaystyle C} be a [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code. For i ∈ { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}} , let us denote by r i {\displaystyle r_{i}} the minimum number of other coordinates we have to look at to recover an erasure in coordinate i {\displaystyle i} . The number r i {\displaystyle r_{i}} is said to be the locality of the i {\displaystyle i} -th coordinate of the code. The locality of the code is defined as An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} locally recoverable code (LRC) is an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code C ∈ F q n {\displaystyle C\in \mathbb {F} _{q}^{n}} with locality r {\displaystyle r} . Let C {\displaystyle C} be an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} -locally recoverable code. Then an erased component can be recovered linearly, i.e. for every i ∈ { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}} , the space of linear equations of the code contains elements of the form x i = f ( x i 1 , … , x i r ) {\displaystyle x_{i}=f(x_{i_{1}},\ldots ,x_{i_{r}})} , where i j ≠ i {\displaystyle i_{j}\neq i} . == Optimal locally recoverable codes == Theorem Let n = ( r + 1 ) s {\displaystyle n=(r+1)s} and let C {\displaystyle C} be an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} -locally recoverable code having s {\displaystyle s} disjoint locality sets of size r + 1 {\displaystyle r+1} . Then An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} -LRC C {\displaystyle C} is said to be optimal if the minimum distance of C {\displaystyle C} satisfies == Tamo–Barg codes == Let f ∈ F q [ x ] {\displaystyle f\in \mathbb {F} _{q}[x]} be a polynomial and let ℓ {\displaystyle \ell } be a positive integer. Then f {\displaystyle f} is said to be ( r {\displaystyle r} , ℓ {\displaystyle \ell } )-good if • f {\displaystyle f} has degree r + 1 {\displaystyle r+1} , • there exist distinct subsets A 1 , … , A ℓ {\displaystyle A_{1},\ldots ,A_{\ell }} of F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} such that – for any i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} , f ( A i ) = { t i } {\displaystyle f(A_{i})=\{t_{i}\}} for some t i ∈ F q {\displaystyle t_{i}\in \mathbb {F} _{q}} , i.e., f {\displaystyle f} is constant on A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} , – # A i = r + 1 {\displaystyle \#A_{i}=r+1} , – A i ∩ A j = ∅ {\displaystyle A_{i}\cap A_{j}=\varnothing } for any i ≠ j {\displaystyle i\neq j} . We say that { A 1 , … , A ℓ {\displaystyle A_{1},\ldots ,A_{\ell }} } is a splitting covering for f {\displaystyle f} . === Tamo–Barg construction === The Tamo–Barg construction utilizes good polynomials. • Suppose that a ( r , ℓ ) {\displaystyle (r,\ell )} -good polynomial f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} over F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} is given with splitting covering i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} . • Let s ≤ ℓ − 1 {\displaystyle s\leq \ell -1} be a positive integer. • Consider the following F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} -vector space of polynomials V = { ∑ i = 0 s g i ( x ) f ( x ) i : deg ( g i ( x ) ) ≤ deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 } . {\displaystyle V=\left\{\sum _{i=0}^{s}g_{i}(x)f(x)^{i}:\deg(g_{i}(x))\leq \deg(f(x))-2\right\}.} • Let T = ⋃ i = 1 ℓ A i {\textstyle T=\bigcup _{i=1}^{\ell }A_{i}} . • The code { ev T ( g ) : g ∈ V } {\displaystyle \{\operatorname {ev} _{T}(g):g\in V\}} is an ( ( r + 1 ) ℓ , ( s + 1 ) r , d , r ) {\displaystyle ((r+1)\ell ,(s+1)r,d,r)} -optimal locally coverable code, where ev T {\displaystyle \operatorname {ev} _{T}} denotes evaluation of g {\displaystyle g} at all points in the set T {\displaystyle T} . === Parameters of Tamo–Barg codes === • Length. The length is the number of evaluation points. Because the sets A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} are disjoint for i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} , the length of the code is | T | = ( r + 1 ) ℓ {\displaystyle |T|=(r+1)\ell } . • Dimension. The dimension of the code is ( s + 1 ) r {\displaystyle (s+1)r} , for s {\displaystyle s} ≤ ℓ − 1 {\displaystyle \ell -1} , as each g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} has degree at most deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2} , covering a vector space of dimension deg ( f ( x ) ) − 1 = r {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-1=r} , and by the construction of V {\displaystyle V} , there are s + 1 {\displaystyle s+1} distinct g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} . • Distance. The distance is given by the fact that V ⊆ F q [ x ] ≤ k {\displaystyle V\subseteq \mathbb {F} _{q}[x]_{\leq k}} , where k = r + 1 − 2 + s ( r + 1 ) {\displaystyle k=r+1-2+s(r+1)} , and the obtained code is the Reed-Solomon code of degree at most k {\displaystyle k} , so the minimum distance equals ( r + 1 ) ℓ − ( ( r + 1 ) − 2 + s ( r + 1 ) ) {\displaystyle (r+1)\ell -((r+1)-2+s(r+1))} . • Locality. After the erasure of the single component, the evaluation at a i ∈ A i {\displaystyle a_{i}\in A_{i}} , where | A i | = r + 1 {\displaystyle |A_{i}|=r+1} , is unknown, but the evaluations for all other a ∈ A i {\displaystyle a\in A_{i}} are known, so at most r {\displaystyle r} evaluations are needed to uniquely determine the erased component, which gives us the locality of r {\displaystyle r} . To see this, g {\displaystyle g} restricted to A j {\displaystyle A_{j}} can be described by a polynomial h {\displaystyle h} of degree at most deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 = r + 1 − 2 = r − 1 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2=r+1-2=r-1} thanks to the form of the elements in V {\displaystyle V} (i.e., thanks to the fact that f {\displaystyle f} is constant on A j {\displaystyle A_{j}} , and the g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} 's have degree at most deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2} ). On the other hand | A j ∖ { a j } | = r {\displaystyle |A_{j}\backslash \{a_{j}\}|=r} , and r {\displaystyle r} evaluations uniquely determine a polynomial of degree r − 1 {\displaystyle r-1} . Therefore h {\displaystyle h} can be constructed and evaluated at a j {\displaystyle a_{j}} to recover g ( a j ) {\displaystyle g(a_{j})} . === Example of Tamo–Barg construction === We will use x 5 ∈ F 41 [ x ] {\displaystyle x^{5}\in \mathbb {F} _{41}[x]} to construct [ 15 , 8 , 6 , 4 ] {\displaystyle [15,8,6,4]} -LRC. Notice that the degree of this polynomial is 5, and it is constant on A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} for i ∈ { 1 , … , 8 } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,8\}} , where A 1 = { 1 , 10 , 16 , 18 , 37 } {\displaystyle A_{1}=\{1,10,16,18,37\}} , A 2 = 2 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{2}=2A_{1}} , A 3 = 3 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{3}=3A_{1}} , A 4 = 4 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{4}=4A_{1}} , A 5 = 5 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{5}=5A_{1}} , A 6 = 6 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{6}=6A_{1}}