Bioz is a search engine for life science experimentation. == History == Bioz was founded by Karin Lachmi and Daniel Levitt. Lachmi is a scientist who completed her postdoc in molecular and cellular biology at the Stanford University School of Medicine. During her lab work she found little available data regarding preferable lab tools, reagents and related products for experimentation. There are 50,000 vendors selling 300 million scientific products. She decided to start the company in order to provide researchers with adequate information for that purpose. Co-founder Daniel Levitt is an entrepreneur who sold his company WebAppoint to Microsoft in the year 2000. He also co-founded the company StemRad. At Bioz, Lachmi serves as the Chief Scientific Officer and Levitt serves as the chief executive officer. Bioz claims to have over a million researcher-users from 196 countries. Among the investors are Esther Dyson and the Stanford-StartX Fund. The company's advisory board includes Nobel Laureates in Chemistry Michael Levitt, Roger Kornberg, and Ada Yonath. == Technology == The company uses artificial intelligence, machine learning and natural language processing in order to extract experimentation data from scientific articles, such as the products that researchers used, the companies that supply the products, the protocol conditions that researchers selected, and the types of experiments and techniques. The algorithm ranks products based on how frequently they were used by researchers in their experiments, how recently a product was used, and the impact factor of the journal. The algorithm's output is a Bioz stars score for each product that was mentioned in an article. Bioz is a data-driven platform for product recommendations, which is contrary to platforms such as TripAdvisor and OpenTable that are based on user-generated reviews and ratings. The recommendations and scoring system that the company has developed are meant to assist researchers with the process of developing future medications and finding cures for diseases. They are guided towards products and techniques that were previously used by other researchers when planning and performing experiments. The company's revenue is based on selling SaaS subscriptions to researchers in biopharma companies. They also charge product suppliers for content syndication.
Dynamic epistemic logic
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a logical framework dealing with knowledge and information change. Typically, DEL focuses on situations involving multiple agents and studies how their knowledge changes when events occur. These events can change factual properties of the actual world (they are called ontic events): for example a red card is painted in blue. They can also bring about changes of knowledge without changing factual properties of the world (they are called epistemic events): for example, a card is revealed publicly (or privately) to be red. Originally, DEL focused on epistemic events. Only some of the basic ideas are present in this entry of the original DEL framework; more details about DEL in general can be found in the references. Due to the nature of its object of study and its abstract approach, DEL is related and has applications to numerous research areas, such as computer science (artificial intelligence), philosophy (formal epistemology), economics (game theory) and cognitive science. In computer science, DEL is for example very much related to multi-agent systems, which are systems where multiple intelligent agents interact and exchange information. As a combination of dynamic logic and epistemic logic, dynamic epistemic logic is a young field of research. It really started in 1989 with Plaza's logic of public announcement. Independently, Gerbrandy and Groeneveld proposed a system dealing moreover with private announcement and that was inspired by the work of Veltman. Another system was proposed by van Ditmarsch whose main inspiration was the Cluedo game. But the most influential and original system was the system proposed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki. This system can deal with all the types of situations studied in the works above and its underlying methodology is conceptually grounded. This entry will present some of its basic ideas. Formally, DEL extends ordinary epistemic logic by the inclusion of event models to describe actions, and a product update operator that defines how epistemic models are updated as the consequence of executing actions described through event models. Epistemic logic will first be recalled. Then, actions and events will enter into the picture and we will introduce the DEL framework. == Epistemic logic == Epistemic logic is a modal logic dealing with the notions of knowledge and belief. As a logic, it is concerned with understanding the process of reasoning about knowledge and belief: which principles relating the notions of knowledge and belief are intuitively plausible? Like epistemology, it stems from the Greek word ϵ π ι σ τ η μ η {\displaystyle \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \eta \mu \eta } or ‘episteme’ meaning knowledge. Epistemology is nevertheless more concerned with analyzing the very nature and scope of knowledge, addressing questions such as “What is the definition of knowledge?” or “How is knowledge acquired?”. In fact, epistemic logic grew out of epistemology in the Middle Ages thanks to the efforts of Burley and Ockham. The formal work, based on modal logic, that inaugurated contemporary research into epistemic logic dates back only to 1962 and is due to Hintikka. It then sparked in the 1960s discussions about the principles of knowledge and belief and many axioms for these notions were proposed and discussed. For example, the interaction axioms K p → B p {\displaystyle Kp\rightarrow Bp} and B p → K B p {\displaystyle Bp\rightarrow KBp} are often considered to be intuitive principles: if an agent Knows p {\displaystyle p} then (s)he also Believes p {\displaystyle p} , or if an agent Believes p {\displaystyle p} , then (s)he Knows that (s)he Believes p {\displaystyle p} . More recently, these kinds of philosophical theories were taken up by researchers in economics, artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science where reasoning about knowledge is a central topic. Due to the new setting in which epistemic logic was used, new perspectives and new features such as computability issues were then added to the research agenda of epistemic logic. === Syntax === In the sequel, A G T S = { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle AGTS=\{1,\ldots ,n\}} is a finite set whose elements are called agents and P R O P {\displaystyle PROP} is a set of propositional letters. The epistemic language is an extension of the basic multi-modal language of modal logic with a common knowledge operator C A {\displaystyle C_{A}} and a distributed knowledge operator D A {\displaystyle D_{A}} . Formally, the epistemic language L EL C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\textsf {EL}}^{C}} is defined inductively by the following grammar in BNF: L EL C : ϕ ::= p ∣ ¬ ϕ ∣ ( ϕ ∧ ϕ ) ∣ K j ϕ ∣ C A ϕ ∣ D A ϕ {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\textsf {EL}}^{C}:\phi ~~::=~~p~\mid ~\neg \phi ~\mid ~(\phi \land \phi )~\mid ~K_{j}\phi ~\mid ~C_{A}\phi ~\mid ~D_{A}\phi } where p ∈ P R O P {\displaystyle p\in PROP} , j ∈ A G T S {\displaystyle j\in {AGTS}} and A ⊆ A G T S {\displaystyle A\subseteq {AGTS}} . The basic epistemic language L E L {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{EL}} is the language L E L C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{EL}^{C}} without the common knowledge and distributed knowledge operators. The formula ⊥ {\displaystyle \bot } is an abbreviation for ¬ p ∧ p {\displaystyle \neg p\land p} (for a given p ∈ P R O P {\displaystyle p\in PROP} ), ⟨ K j ⟩ ϕ {\displaystyle \langle K_{j}\rangle \phi } is an abbreviation for ¬ K j ¬ ϕ {\displaystyle \neg K_{j}\neg \phi } , E A ϕ {\displaystyle E_{A}\phi } is an abbreviation for ⋀ j ∈ A K j ϕ {\displaystyle \bigwedge \limits _{j\in A}K_{j}\phi } and C ϕ {\displaystyle C\phi } an abbreviation for C A G T S ϕ {\displaystyle C_{AGTS}\phi } . Group notions: general, common and distributed knowledge. In a multi-agent setting there are three important epistemic concepts: general knowledge, distributed knowledge and common knowledge. The notion of common knowledge was first studied by Lewis in the context of conventions. It was then applied to distributed systems and to game theory, where it allows to express that the rationality of the players, the rules of the game and the set of players are commonly known. General knowledge. General knowledge of ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } means that everybody in the group of agents A G T S {\displaystyle {AGTS}} knows that ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } . Formally, this corresponds to the following formula: E ϕ := ⋀ j ∈ A G T S K j ϕ . {\displaystyle E\phi :={\underset {j\in {AGTS}}{\bigwedge }}K_{j}\phi .} Common knowledge. Common knowledge of ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } means that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } but also that everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } , that everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ {\displaystyle \phi } , and so on ad infinitum. Formally, this corresponds to the following formula C ϕ := E ϕ ∧ E E ϕ ∧ E E E ϕ ∧ … {\displaystyle C\phi :=E\phi \land EE\phi \land EEE\phi \land \ldots } As we do not allow infinite conjunction the notion of common knowledge will have to be introduced as a primitive in our language. Before defining the language with this new operator, we are going to give an example introduced by Lewis that illustrates the difference between the notions of general knowledge and common knowledge. Lewis wanted to know what kind of knowledge is needed so that the statement p {\displaystyle p} : “every driver must drive on the right” be a convention among a group of agents. In other words, he wanted to know what kind of knowledge is needed so that everybody feels safe to drive on the right. Suppose there are only two agents i {\displaystyle i} and j {\displaystyle j} . Then everybody knowing p {\displaystyle p} (formally E p {\displaystyle Ep} ) is not enough. Indeed, it might still be possible that the agent i {\displaystyle i} considers possible that the agent j {\displaystyle j} does not know p {\displaystyle p} (formally ¬ K i K j p {\displaystyle \neg K_{i}K_{j}p} ). In that case the agent i {\displaystyle i} will not feel safe to drive on the right because he might consider that the agent j {\displaystyle j} , not knowing p {\displaystyle p} , could drive on the left. To avoid this problem, we could then assume that everybody knows that everybody knows that p {\displaystyle p} (formally E E p {\displaystyle EEp} ). This is again not enough to ensure that everybody feels safe to drive on the right. Indeed, it might still be possible that agent i {\displaystyle i} considers possible that agent j {\displaystyle j} considers possible that agent i {\displaystyle i} does not know p {\displaystyle p} (formally ¬ K i K j K i p {\displaystyle \neg K_{i}K_{j}K_{i}p} ). In that case and from i {\displaystyle i} ’s point of view, j {\displaystyle j} considers possible that i {\displaystyle i} , not knowing p {\displaystyle p} , will drive on the left. So from i {\displaystyle i} ’s point of view, j {\displaystyle j} might drive on the left as well (by the same argument as abov
Workplace impact of artificial intelligence
The impact of artificial intelligence on workers includes both applications to improve worker safety and health, and potential hazards that must be controlled. One potential application is using AI to eliminate hazards by removing humans from hazardous situations that involve risk of stress, overwork, or musculoskeletal injuries. Predictive analytics may also be used to identify conditions that may lead to hazards such as fatigue, repetitive strain injuries, or toxic substance exposure, leading to earlier interventions. Another is to streamline workplace safety and health workflows through automating repetitive tasks, enhancing safety training programs through virtual reality, or detecting and reporting near misses. When used in the workplace, AI also presents the possibility of new hazards. These may arise from machine learning techniques leading to unpredictable behavior and inscrutability in their decision-making, or from cybersecurity and information privacy issues. Many hazards of AI are psychosocial due to its potential to cause changes in work organization. These include increased monitoring leading to micromanagement, algorithms unintentionally or intentionally mimicking undesirable human biases, and assigning blame for machine errors to the human operator instead. AI may also lead to physical hazards in the form of human–robot collisions, and ergonomic risks of control interfaces and human–machine interactions. Hazard controls include cybersecurity and information privacy measures, communication and transparency with workers about data usage, and limitations on collaborative robots. From a workplace safety and health perspective, only "weak" or "narrow" AI that is tailored to a specific task is relevant, as there are many examples that are currently in use or expected to come into use in the near future. Certain digital technologies are predicted to result in job losses. Starting in the 2020s, the adoption of modern robotics has led to net employment growth. However, many businesses anticipate that automation, or employing robots would result in job losses in the future. This is especially true for companies in Central and Eastern Europe. Other digital technologies, such as platforms or big data, are projected to have a more neutral impact on employment. A large number of tech workers have been laid off starting in 2023; many such job cuts have been attributed to artificial intelligence. == Health and safety applications == In order for any potential AI health and safety application to be adopted, it requires acceptance by both managers and workers. For example, worker acceptance may be diminished by concerns about information privacy, or from a lack of trust and acceptance of the new technology, which may arise from inadequate transparency or training. Alternatively, managers may emphasize increases in economic productivity rather than gains in worker safety and health when implementing AI-based systems. === Eliminating hazardous tasks === AI may increase the scope of work tasks where a worker can be removed from a situation that carries risk. In a sense, while traditional automation can replace the functions of a worker's body with a robot, AI effectively replaces the functions of their brain with a computer. Hazards that can be avoided include stress, overwork, musculoskeletal injuries, and boredom. This can expand the range of affected job sectors into white-collar and service sector jobs such as in medicine, finance, and information technology. === Analytics to reduce risk === Machine learning is used for people analytics to make predictions about worker behavior to assist management decision-making, such as hiring and performance assessment. These could also be used to improve worker health. The analytics may be based on inputs such as online activities, monitoring of communications, location tracking, and voice analysis and body language analysis of filmed interviews. For example, sentiment analysis may be used to spot fatigue to prevent overwork. Decision support systems have a similar ability to be used to, for example, prevent industrial disasters or make disaster response more efficient. For manual material handling workers, predictive analytics and artificial intelligence may be used to reduce musculoskeletal injury. Traditional guidelines are based on statistical averages and are geared towards anthropometrically typical humans. The analysis of large amounts of data from wearable sensors may allow real-time, personalized calculation of ergonomic risk and fatigue management, as well as better analysis of the risk associated with specific job roles. Wearable sensors may also enable earlier intervention against exposure to toxic substances than is possible with area or breathing zone testing on a periodic basis. Furthermore, the large data sets generated could improve workplace health surveillance, risk assessment, and research. === Streamlining safety and health workflows === AI has also been used to attempt to make the workplace safety and health workflow more efficient. One example is coding of workers' compensation claims, which are submitted in a prose narrative form and must manually be assigned standardized codes. AI is being investigated to perform this task faster, more cheaply, and with fewer errors. == Hazards == There are several broad aspects of AI that may give rise to specific hazards. The risks depend on implementation rather than the mere presence of AI. Systems using sub-symbolic AI such as machine learning may behave unpredictably and are more prone to inscrutability in their decision-making. This is especially true if a situation is encountered that was not part of the AI's training dataset, and is exacerbated in environments that are less structured. Undesired behavior may also arise from flaws in the system's perception (arising either from within the software or from sensor degradation), knowledge representation and reasoning, or from software bugs. They may arise from improper training, such as a user applying the same algorithm to two problems that do not have the same requirements. Machine learning applied during the design phase may have different implications than that applied at runtime. Systems using symbolic AI are less prone to unpredictable behavior. The use of AI also increases cybersecurity risks relative to platforms that do not use AI, and information privacy concerns about collected data may pose a hazard to workers. === Psychosocial === Psychosocial hazards are those that arise from the way work is designed, organized, and managed, or its economic and social contexts, rather than arising from a physical substance or object. They cause not only psychiatric and psychological outcomes such as occupational burnout, anxiety disorders, and depression, but they can also cause physical injury or illness such as cardiovascular disease or musculoskeletal injury. Many hazards of AI are psychosocial in nature due to its potential to cause changes in work organization, in terms of increasing complexity and interaction between different organizational factors. However, psychosocial risks are often overlooked by designers of advanced manufacturing systems. Einola and Khoreva explore how different organizational groups perceive and interact with AI technologies. Their research shows that successful AI integration depends on human ownership and contextual understanding. They caution against blind technological optimism and stress the importance of tailoring AI use to specific workplace ecosystems. This perspective reinforces the need for inclusive design and transparent implementation strategies. ==== Changes in work practices ==== Over-reliance on AI tools may lead to deskilling of some professions. When AI becomes a substitute for traditional peer collaboration and mentorship, there is a risk of diminishing opportunities for interpersonal skill development and team-based learning. Increased monitoring may lead to micromanagement and thus to stress and anxiety. A perception of surveillance may also lead to stress. Controls for these include consultation with worker groups, extensive testing, and attention to introduced bias. Wearable sensors, activity trackers, and augmented reality may also lead to stress from micromanagement, both for assembly line workers and gig workers. Gig workers also lack the legal protections and rights of formal workers. Newell & Marabelli argue that AI alters power dynamics and employee autonomy, requiring a more nuanced understanding of its social and organizational implications. There is also the risk of people being forced to work at a robot's pace, or to monitor robot performance at nonstandard hours. A 2025 preprint paper based on users' interactions with the AI chatbot Microsoft Copilot identified forty jobs that the author's claimed had high overlaps with the capabilities of AI. Some media outlets used this paper to report on jobs becoming obsolete. Cri
AI nationalism
AI nationalism is the idea that nations should develop and control their own artificial intelligence technologies to advance their own interests and ensure technological sovereignty. This concept is gaining traction globally, leading countries to implement new laws, form strategic alliances, and invest significantly in domestic AI capabilities. == Global trends and national strategies == In 2018, British technology investor Ian Hogarth published an influential essay titled AI Nationalism. He argued that as AI gains more power and its economic and military significance expands, governments will take measures to bolster their own domestic AI industries, and predicted that the advancement of machine learning systems would lead to what he termed "AI nationalism." He anticipated that this rise in AI would accelerate a global arms race, resulting in more closed economies, restrictions on foreign acquisitions, and limitations on the movement of talent. Hogarth predicted that AI policy would become a central focus of government agendas. He also criticized Britain’s approach to AI strategy, citing the sale of London-based DeepMind—one of the leading AI laboratories, acquired by Google for a relatively modest £400 million in 2014—as a significant misstep. AI nationalism is chiefly reflected in the escalating rhetoric of an artificial intelligence arms race, portraying AI development as a zero-sum game where the winner gains significant economic, political, and military advantages. This mindset, as highlighted in a 2017 Pentagon report, warns that sharing AI technology could erode technological supremacy and enhance rivals' capabilities. The winner-takes-all mentality of AI nationalism poses risks including unsafe AI development, increased geopolitical tension, and potential military aggression (such as cyberattacks or targeting AI professionals). Several countries, including Canada, France, and India, have formulated national strategies to advance their positions in AI. In the United States, a leading player in the global AI arena, trade policies have been enacted to restrict China's access to critical microchips, reflecting a strategic effort to maintain a technological edge. The United States’ National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) frames AI development as a critical aspect of a broader technology competition crucial for national success. It emphasizes the need to outpace China in AI to maintain strategic advantage, reflecting AI nationalism by linking geopolitical power directly to advancements in AI. France has seen notable governmental support for local AI startups, particularly those specializing in language technologies that cater to French and other non-English languages. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is investing billions in AI research and development. The country has actively collaborated with major technology firms such as Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft to establish itself as a prominent AI hub. == Historical and cultural context == AI nationalism is seen as deeply connected to historical racism and imperialism. It is viewed not merely as a technological competition but as a contest over racial and civilizational superiority. Historically, technological achievements were often used to justify colonialism and racial hierarchies, with Western societies perceiving their advancements as evidence of superiority. In the context of AI, this historical context continues to shape views on intelligence and development. Some argue that AI nationalism reinforces the idea of fundamental civilizational divides, especially between the Western world and China. This perspective often frames China's progress in AI as a direct challenge to Western values, presenting the AI competition as a struggle over values. AI nationalism is said to draw from long-standing anti-Asian stereotypes, such as the "Yellow Peril," which portray Asian nations as threats to Western civilization. This viewpoint links Asian technological advances with dehumanization and artificiality, reflecting persistent anxieties about China's growing role in the global tech landscape. == Implications == AI nationalism is seen as a component of a broader trend towards the fragmentation of the internet, where digital services are increasingly influenced by local regulations and national interests. This shift is creating a new technological landscape in which the impact of artificial intelligence on individuals' lives can vary significantly depending on their geographic location. J. Paul Goode argues that AI nationalism may exacerbate existing societal divisions by promoting the development of systems that embed cultural biases, thereby privileging certain groups while disadvantaging others.
Double descent
Double descent in statistics and machine learning is the phenomenon where a model's error rate on the test set initially decreases with the number of parameters, then peaks, then decreases again. This phenomenon has been considered surprising, as it contradicts assumptions about overfitting in classical machine learning. The increase usually occurs near the interpolation threshold, where the number of parameters is the same as the number of training data points (the model is just large enough to fit the training data). Or, more precisely, it is the maximum number of samples on which the model/training procedure achieves approximately on average 0 training error. == History == Early observations of what would later be called double descent in specific models date back to 1989. The term "double descent" was coined by Belkin et. al. in 2019, when the phenomenon gained popularity as a broader concept exhibited by many models. The latter development was prompted by a perceived contradiction between the conventional wisdom that too many parameters in the model result in a significant overfitting error (an extrapolation of the bias–variance tradeoff), and the empirical observations in the 2010s that some modern machine learning techniques tend to perform better with larger models. == Theoretical models == Double descent occurs in linear regression with isotropic Gaussian covariates and isotropic Gaussian noise. A model of double descent at the thermodynamic limit has been analyzed using the replica trick, and the result has been confirmed numerically. A number of works have suggested that double descent can be explained using the concept of effective dimension: While a network may have a large number of parameters, in practice only a subset of those parameters are relevant for generalization performance, as measured by the local Hessian curvature. This explanation is formalized through PAC-Bayes compression-based generalization bounds, which show that less complex models are expected to generalize better under a Solomonoff prior.
AsoSoft text corpus
The AsoSoft text corpus is the first large-scale Kurdish text corpus, collected and processed by the AsoSoft research and development group. It contains 458,000 documents (188 million tokens) that are collected from sources such as websites, news agencies, books, and magazines. The corpus is partially tagged by topic, so it can be used for topic identification tasks. Also, it is applicable for extracting language model and computational lexicon information. Part of the corpus (75 million tokens) is available online for non-commercial use. The corpus uses the TEI format.
Artificial consciousness
Artificial consciousness, also known as machine consciousness, synthetic consciousness, or digital consciousness, is consciousness hypothesized to be possible for artificial intelligence. It is also the corresponding field of study, which draws insights from philosophy of mind, philosophy of artificial intelligence, cognitive science and neuroscience. The term "sentience" can be used when specifically designating ethical considerations stemming from a form of phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness, or the ability to feel qualia). Since sentience involves the ability to experience ethically positive or negative (i.e., valenced) mental states, it may justify welfare concerns and legal protection, as with non-human animals. Some scholars believe that consciousness is generated by the interoperation of various parts of the brain; these mechanisms are labeled the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Some further believe that constructing a system (e.g., a computer system) that can emulate this NCC interoperation would result in a system that is conscious. Some scholars reject the possibility of non-biological conscious beings. == Philosophical views == As there are many hypothesized types of consciousness, there are many potential implementations of artificial consciousness. In the philosophical literature, perhaps the most common taxonomy of consciousness is into "access" and "phenomenal" variants. Access consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that can be apprehended, while phenomenal consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that seemingly cannot be apprehended, instead being characterized qualitatively in terms of "raw feels", "what it is like" or qualia. === Plausibility debate === Type-identity theorists and other skeptics hold the view that consciousness can be realized only in particular physical systems because consciousness has properties that necessarily depend on physical constitution. In his 2001 article "Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility," Giorgio Buttazzo says that a common objection to artificial consciousness is that, "Working in a fully automated mode, they [the computers] cannot exhibit creativity, unreprogrammation (which means can 'no longer be reprogrammed', from rethinking), emotions, or free will. A computer, like a washing machine, is a slave operated by its components." For other theorists (e.g., functionalists), who define mental states in terms of causal roles, any system that can instantiate the same pattern of causal roles, regardless of physical constitution, will instantiate the same mental states, including consciousness. ==== Thought experiments ==== David Chalmers proposed two thought experiments intending to demonstrate that "functionally isomorphic" systems (those with the same "fine-grained functional organization", i.e., the same information processing) will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences, regardless of whether they are based on biological neurons or digital hardware. The "fading qualia" is a reductio ad absurdum thought experiment. It involves replacing, one by one, the neurons of a brain with a functionally identical component, for example based on a silicon chip. Chalmers makes the hypothesis, knowing it in advance to be absurd, that "the qualia fade or disappear" when neurons are replaced one-by-one with identical silicon equivalents. Since the original neurons and their silicon counterparts are functionally identical, the brain's information processing should remain unchanged, and the subject's behaviour and introspective reports would stay exactly the same. Chalmers argues that this leads to an absurd conclusion: the subject would continue to report normal conscious experiences even as their actual qualia fade away. He concludes that the subject's qualia actually don't fade, and that the resulting robotic brain, once every neuron is replaced, would remain just as sentient as the original biological brain. Similarly, the "dancing qualia" thought experiment is another reductio ad absurdum argument. It supposes that two functionally isomorphic systems could have different perceptions (for instance, seeing the same object in different colors, like red and blue). It involves a switch that alternates between a chunk of brain that causes the perception of red, and a functionally isomorphic silicon chip, that causes the perception of blue. Since both perform the same function within the brain, the subject would not notice any change during the switch. Chalmers argues that this would be highly implausible if the qualia were truly switching between red and blue, hence the contradiction. Therefore, he concludes that the equivalent digital system would not only experience qualia, but it would perceive the same qualia as the biological system (e.g., seeing the same color). Greg Egan's short story Learning To Be Me (mentioned in §In fiction), illustrates how undetectable duplication of the brain and its functionality could be from a first-person perspective. Critics object that Chalmers' proposal begs the question in assuming that all mental properties and external connections are already sufficiently captured by abstract causal organization. Van Heuveln et al. argue that the dancing qualia argument contains an equivocation fallacy, conflating a "change in experience" between two systems with an "experience of change" within a single system. Mogensen argues that the fading qualia argument can be resisted by appealing to vagueness at the boundaries of consciousness and the holistic structure of conscious neural activity, which suggests consciousness may require specific biological substrates rather than being substrate-independent. Anil Seth argues that the complexity of brain neurons intrinsically matters in addition to their function and that it is not possible to replace any part of the brain with a perfect silicon equivalent. He points out that some of biological neurons exhibit activity aimed at cleaning up metabolic waste products, and writes that a perfect silicon replacement would require a silicon-based metabolism, but silicon is not suitable for creating such artificial metabolism. ==== In large language models ==== In 2022, Google engineer Blake Lemoine made a viral claim that Google's LaMDA chatbot was sentient. Lemoine supplied as evidence the chatbot's humanlike answers to many of his questions; however, the chatbot's behavior was judged by the scientific community as likely a consequence of mimicry, rather than machine sentience. Lemoine's claim was widely derided for being ridiculous. Moreover, attributing consciousness based solely on the basis of LLM outputs or the immersive experience created by an algorithm is considered a fallacy. However, while philosopher Nick Bostrom states that LaMDA is unlikely to be conscious, he additionally poses the question of "what grounds would a person have for being sure about it?" One would have to have access to unpublished information about LaMDA's architecture, and also would have to understand how consciousness works, and then figure out how to map the philosophy onto the machine: "(In the absence of these steps), it seems like one should be maybe a little bit uncertain. [...] there could well be other systems now, or in the relatively near future, that would start to satisfy the criteria." David Chalmers argued in 2023 that LLMs today display impressive conversational and general intelligence abilities, but are likely not conscious yet, as they lack some features that may be necessary, such as recurrent processing, a global workspace, and unified agency. Nonetheless, he considers that non-biological systems can be conscious, and suggested that future, extended models (LLM+s) incorporating these elements might eventually meet the criteria for consciousness, raising both profound scientific questions and significant ethical challenges. However, the view that consciousness can exist without biological phenomena is controversial and some reject it. Kristina Šekrst cautions that anthropomorphic terms such as "hallucination" can obscure important ontological differences between artificial and human cognition. While LLMs may produce human-like outputs, she argues that it does not justify ascribing mental states or consciousness to them. Instead, she advocates for an epistemological framework (such as reliabilism) that recognizes the distinct nature of AI knowledge production. She suggests that apparent understanding in LLMs may be a sophisticated form of AI hallucination. She also questions what would happen if an LLM were trained without any mention of consciousness. === Testing === Sentience is an inherently first-person phenomenon. Because of that, and due to the lack of an empirical definition of sentience, directly measuring it may be impossible. Although systems may display numerous behaviors correlated with sentience, determining whether a system is sentient is known as the hard pr