Trying to pick the best AI humanizer? An AI humanizer is software that uses machine learning to help you get more done — it scales effortlessly from a single task to thousands. The best picks balance beginner-friendly simplicity with the depth power users need, and they ship updates often. Whether you are a beginner or a pro, the right AI humanizer slots into your workflow and pays for itself fast. This guide breaks down the top picks, their pros and cons, and who each one is best for.
Zynn
Zynn was a Chinese video-sharing social networking service owned by Kuaishou, a Beijing-based internet technology company established in 2011 by Su Hua and Cheng Yixiao. It was used to create and share short videos, and it pays its users for using the app and referring others. Zynn was launched on May 7, 2020. It became the most-downloaded app in the App Store in the same month. It has also been criticized for being a "pyramid scheme", and it has faced accusations of plagiarism and stealing content. Aside from Zynn in North America, Kuaishou is available under the name Kwai in Russia, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, America, India, and the Middle East. Kwai used to be available in Australia and the United States on the App Store, but was removed at an unknown date. Zynn was permanently shut down on the 20th of August, 2021. == History == In 2011, entrepreneur Su Hua co-founded Kuaishou with business partner Cheng Yixiao. Originally a GIF-making app, Kuaishou soon moved to short video content. Su Hua also serves as the current Kuaishou CEO. In December 2019, Chinese internet conglomerate Tencent invested $2 billion in Kuaishou, reportedly to compete with rival ByteDance. In December 2019, Kuaishou acquired an app developer called Owlii, which is the developer of Zynn. Zynn was developed to be a North American Market edition of Kuaishou. On May 7, 2020, the app was launched and it was downloaded over 2 million times in that month. On May 12, 2020, Kuaishou filed a lawsuit seeking compensation for "unfair competition", and accused Douyin, the sister app of TikTok, of "interfering" with search results on app stores. Zynn shut down on the 20th of August, 2021. == Features == Zynn allows its users to create, edit and share short videos of themselves. Its interface has been described as a "complete clone" of TikTok, its main competitor. The Zynn app was unique in the way that they paid users for using the platform. Each user earned $1 for signing up, and they could earn money for referring users to the platform. Watching videos resulted in earning "points", which could be redeemed for gift cards or be cashed out via PayPal.[1] == Criticisms and controversies == Multiple TikTok users had reported seeing their entire accounts plagiarized, with one account pretending to be Addison Rae. Despite being launched in May, many videos were posted in February. Zynn has employed "intermittent variable rewards" in its point system, which has been criticized as being the "same reinforcement strategy used to addict people to slot machines". Cash payouts for using the app have resulted in criticism and accusations of anti-competitive behavior. The app was taken down from the Google Play store on June 10. Zynn blamed it on an "isolated incident". Six days later, it was taken down from the App Store as well. US Senator Josh Hawley has criticized the platform, calling it "predatory" and "anti-competitive" in a letter to the Federal Trade Commission asking for an investigation into Zynn. He said "[Zynn] smacks of a textbook predatory-pricing scheme, one calculated to attain immediate market dominance for Zynn by driving competitors out of the market."
Parity benchmark
Parity problems are widely used as benchmark problems in genetic programming but inherited from the artificial neural network community. Parity is calculated by summing all the binary inputs and reporting if the sum is odd or even. This is considered difficult because: a very simple artificial neural network cannot solve it, and all inputs need to be considered and a change to any one of them changes the answer.
GraphLab
Turi is a graph-based, high performance, distributed computation framework written in C++. The GraphLab project was started by Prof. Carlos Guestrin of Carnegie Mellon University in 2009. It is an open source project that uses the Apache License. While GraphLab was originally developed for machine learning tasks, it has also been developed for other data-mining tasks. == Motivation == As the amounts of collected data and computing power grow (multicore, GPUs, clusters, clouds), modern datasets no longer fit into one computing node. Efficient distributed parallel algorithms for handling large-scale data are required. The GraphLab framework is a parallel programming abstraction targeted for sparse iterative graph algorithms. GraphLab provides a programming interface, allowing deployment of distributed machine learning algorithms. The main design considerations behind the design of GraphLab are: Sparse data with local dependencies Iterative algorithms Potentially asynchronous execution == GraphLab toolkits == On top of GraphLab, several implemented libraries of algorithms: Topic modeling - contains applications like LDA, which can be used to cluster documents and extract topical representations. Graph analytics - contains applications like pagerank and triangle counting, which can be applied to general graphs to estimate community structure. Clustering - contains standard data clustering tools such as Kmeans Collaborative filtering - contains a collection of applications used to make predictions about users interests and factorize large matrices. Graphical models - contains tools for making joint predictions about collections of related random variables. Computer vision - contains a collection of tools for reasoning about images. == Turi == Turi (formerly called Dato and before that GraphLab Inc.) is a company that was founded by Prof. Carlos Guestrin from University of Washington in May 2013 to continue development support of the GraphLab open source project. Dato Inc. raised a $6.75M Series A from Madrona Venture Group and New Enterprise Associates (NEA). They raised a $18.5M Series B from Vulcan Capital and Opus Capital, with participation from Madrona and NEA. On August 5, 2016, Turi was acquired by Apple Inc. for $200,000,000.
Generalized canonical correlation
In statistics, the generalized canonical correlation analysis (gCCA), is a way of making sense of cross-correlation matrices between the sets of random variables when there are more than two sets. While a conventional CCA generalizes principal component analysis (PCA) to two sets of random variables, a gCCA generalizes PCA to more than two sets of random variables. The canonical variables represent those common factors that can be found by a large PCA of all of the transformed random variables after each set underwent its own PCA. == Applications == The Helmert-Wolf blocking (HWB) method of estimating linear regression parameters can find an optimal solution only if all cross-correlations between the data blocks are zero. They can always be made to vanish by introducing a new regression parameter for each common factor. The gCCA method can be used for finding those harmful common factors that create cross-correlation between the blocks. However, no optimal HWB solution exists if the random variables do not contain enough information on all of the new regression parameters.
Language-Theoretic Security
Language-theoretic security, or LangSec, is an approach to software security that focuses on input handling, complexity, and program design as strategies to improve the verifiability of computer programs. It was introduced in 2005 by Robert J. Hansen and Meredith L. Patterson at BlackHat and in 2011 by Len Sassaman and Patterson. It aims to create a formal description of which software is likely to have security vulnerabilities of particular classes, and why. It considers programs to have an inherent parser component, whether or not explicit, composed of that part of the program which operates on external input before that input is fully parsed. A central hypothesis of language-theoretic security is that vulnerabilities in software increase according to the computational power of the notional input-accepting automaton equivalent to this parser, using the definitions of automata theory. The lower bound on this computational power is the input language complexity of the program. The extent to which reducing this complexity is possible is a function of the specification of the communication protocol or file format the program takes as input. == Parsing as a security mechanism == The behaviour of a program is defined with reference to its expected input. Unexpected input being used by a program is a factor in numerous security bugs, including the so-called Android master key vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787), because accepting unexpected input renders the program's specification ambiguous. In that instance, the unexpected ambiguity came in the form of a ZIP file with duplicate filenames. If a program fully parses its input and only acts on input that unambiguously meets the specification, it follows that the program will avoid these types of vulnerabilities. This is an intentional inversion of the Postel principle. Accepting only unambiguous and valid input is a more formal requirement than input validation or sanitization, and narrows the number of possible but unanticipated program states that can be induced in an application via user input. Conversely, failure to do this is associated with security vulnerabilities. Input sanitization in particular is held to be an inadequate approach to avoiding malicious input because it inherently ignores context-sensitive properties of the input; it can therefore result in paradoxical effects, such as sanitization code activating otherwise inert cross-site scripting payloads in browsers. === Parser differentials === If the language of accepted program input is sufficiently simple, it is possible to verify that two implementations parse the same input language consistently. This is advantageous because it shows no parser differential exists between the two implementations. The requisite level of simplicity is theoretically that for which there is a solution to the equivalence problem. If the two parsers involved in CVE-2013-4787 were equivalent - that is, if they rendered the same output state given the same input state - the vulnerability could not have existed. One strategy for doing this is to publish machine-readable specifications of a format or protocol, and then use a parser generator to generate the parser code. An example of a parser generator built for this purpose is DaeDaLus. The combination of Lex with any of GNU Bison, ANTLR, or Yacc also accomplishes this. However, many parser generators allow the mixing of general purpose code with the parsing definitions, which weakens the guarantees provided by parsing. === Analysis of injection attacks === Injection attacks are generally the result of differences between the serializer (or "unparser") and the corresponding parser at a layer boundary in a system; therefore, they are a special case of parser differentials. In a SQL injection attack, for example, an attacker is able to cause the application with which they are interacting to serialize a SQL query that has different semantics than intended. In the simplest case where the payload ends a string and adds new code, the payload has crossed the code-data boundary in SQL. In language-theoretic security, this is treated as a bug in the serializer of the SQL query, which should instead be written in a way that constrains its possible outputs to those within the scope of the intended query. === Parser combinators === If a parser generator is not used, it is still possible to avoid implementation bugs by using parser combinator such as Nom to implement the parser code. This has the drawback of relying on a programmer correctly translating the specification into the language of the parser generator library, though this task is still less error-prone than hand-coding a parser. == Input format complexity == Complexity in computer programs is associated with security vulnerabilities. Within the domain of language-theoretic security, complexity is described with reference to the computational power of the abstract machine necessary to implement the program, or more particularly, to implement the parser for its input language. This complexity describes whether it is possible to show that there is no unintended or undesired functionality in the program which might be exploitable by an attacker. To be bounded in complexity, the program's input must be well-defined both in terms of form and of semantics. === Weird machines === A weird machine is a model of computation in a program that exists in parallel with, but is distinct from, the intended abstract model of computation in that program. Some classes of weird machine arise from the multi-layered nature of computer programs, or the context in which the programs run; others result from the unanticipated functionality a program has due to its complexity or to software bugs. The more complex the computation model of a program, the more likely it is to implement a weird machine. Depending on context, the weird machine may or may not be concretely useful for an attacker. Since the space of weird machines in the context of some program is the universe of all possible states that are not within the program's intended states, many exploited states including remote code execution and injection attacks belong to the domain of weird machines. A reduction in weird machines is therefore a likely correlate with reduced program vulnerability. === SafeDocs project === SafeDocs is a DARPA project undertaken in 2018 to take existing file formats, create safer subsets of them, and develop programming tools to work for the safer formats. The initial test case for this was PDF. The purpose of creating safer subsets in this case is to lower the minimum bound on parser complexity so that it becomes possible to create tools that will generate correct, normative parsers for them. == Relation to programming languages == The analytic framework of language-theoretic security assumes programs to be virtual machines that execute their input. A document that is read by an application is in this sense a form of machine code, in a generalization of the data as code idea, following the automata theory description of parsers. === Type-safe programming languages === Parsing input and serializing output are operations that consume one data type and emit another. A programming language can therefore check that data is correctly parsed and contains the expected structure by checking data types, and correct serializing (or unparsing) can be implemented as operations on the data types that are relevant to the program's output. This approach can be used to show that the recognizer and unparser patterns have been implemented. It is also possible to implement type checking across a distributed system to enforce parsing and unparsing of the expected structures and to verify that the assumptions made in designing the compositional properties of a distributed system have been followed. === Memory-safe programming languages === In the general case, spatial memory correctness is undecidable. If any proof of spatial memory correctness is to be made, it is therefore necessary to bound the complexity of the code. Interpreted languages such as Java and Python effectively accomplish this via runtime bounds checking, and frameworks for runtime bounds checking also exist for C. The effect of these strategies for spatial memory correctness are to create a halt state in place of a spatial memory correctness violation; therefore, it can be shown that the program will not violate spatial memory correctness, but in exchange, it cannot be shown in the general case that programs will not have runtime bounds checking exceptions. Some programming languages, such as Rust, accomplish this using borrow checking. The borrow checker acts to assure spatial memory correctness by compile-time reference counting. Code for which spatial memory correctness cannot be shown to not be violated therefore does not compile, inherently limiting the complexity of the spatial memory correctness of the program to what is decidable. Thi
Learning classifier system
Learning classifier systems, or LCS, are a paradigm of rule-based machine learning methods that combine a discovery component (e.g. typically a genetic algorithm in evolutionary computation) with a learning component (performing either supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or unsupervised learning). Learning classifier systems seek to identify a set of context-dependent rules that collectively store and apply knowledge in a piecewise manner in order to make predictions (e.g. behavior modeling, classification, data mining, regression, function approximation, or game strategy). This approach allows complex solution spaces to be broken up into smaller, simpler parts for the reinforcement learning that is inside artificial intelligence research. The founding concepts behind learning classifier systems came from attempts to model complex adaptive systems, using rule-based agents to form an artificial cognitive system (i.e. artificial intelligence). == Methodology == The architecture and components of a given learning classifier system can be quite variable. It is useful to think of an LCS as a machine consisting of several interacting components. Components may be added or removed, or existing components modified/exchanged to suit the demands of a given problem domain (like algorithmic building blocks) or to make the algorithm flexible enough to function in many different problem domains. As a result, the LCS paradigm can be flexibly applied to many problem domains that call for machine learning. The major divisions among LCS implementations are as follows: (1) Michigan-style architecture vs. Pittsburgh-style architecture, (2) reinforcement learning vs. supervised learning, (3) incremental learning vs. batch learning, (4) online learning vs. offline learning, (5) strength-based fitness vs. accuracy-based fitness, and (6) complete action mapping vs best action mapping. These divisions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, XCS, the best known and best studied LCS algorithm, is Michigan-style, was designed for reinforcement learning but can also perform supervised learning, applies incremental learning that can be either online or offline, applies accuracy-based fitness, and seeks to generate a complete action mapping. === Elements of a generic LCS algorithm === Keeping in mind that LCS is a paradigm for genetic-based machine learning rather than a specific method, the following outlines key elements of a generic, modern (i.e. post-XCS) LCS algorithm. For simplicity let us focus on Michigan-style architecture with supervised learning. See the illustrations on the right laying out the sequential steps involved in this type of generic LCS. ==== Environment ==== The environment is the source of data upon which an LCS learns. It can be an offline, finite training dataset (characteristic of a data mining, classification, or regression problem), or an online sequential stream of live training instances. Each training instance is assumed to include some number of features (also referred to as attributes, or independent variables), and a single endpoint of interest (also referred to as the class, action, phenotype, prediction, or dependent variable). Part of LCS learning can involve feature selection, therefore not all of the features in the training data need to be informative. The set of feature values of an instance is commonly referred to as the state. For simplicity let's assume an example problem domain with Boolean/binary features and a Boolean/binary class. For Michigan-style systems, one instance from the environment is trained on each learning cycle (i.e. incremental learning). Pittsburgh-style systems perform batch learning, where rule sets are evaluated in each iteration over much or all of the training data. ==== Rule/classifier/population ==== A rule is a context dependent relationship between state values and some prediction. Rules typically take the form of an {IF:THEN} expression, (e.g. {IF 'condition' THEN 'action'}, or as a more specific example, {IF 'red' AND 'octagon' THEN 'stop-sign'}). A critical concept in LCS and rule-based machine learning alike, is that an individual rule is not in itself a model, since the rule is only applicable when its condition is satisfied. Think of a rule as a "local-model" of the solution space. Rules can be represented in many different ways to handle different data types (e.g. binary, discrete-valued, ordinal, continuous-valued). Given binary data LCS traditionally applies a ternary rule representation (i.e. rules can include either a 0, 1, or '#' for each feature in the data). The 'don't care' symbol (i.e. '#') serves as a wild card within a rule's condition allowing rules, and the system as a whole to generalize relationships between features and the target endpoint to be predicted. Consider the following rule (#1###0 ~ 1) (i.e. condition ~ action). This rule can be interpreted as: IF the second feature = 1 AND the sixth feature = 0 THEN the class prediction = 1. We would say that the second and sixth features were specified in this rule, while the others were generalized. This rule, and the corresponding prediction are only applicable to an instance when the condition of the rule is satisfied by the instance. This is more commonly referred to as matching. In Michigan-style LCS, each rule has its own fitness, as well as a number of other rule-parameters associated with it that can describe the number of copies of that rule that exist (i.e. the numerosity), the age of the rule, its accuracy, or the accuracy of its reward predictions, and other descriptive or experiential statistics. A rule along with its parameters is often referred to as a classifier. In Michigan-style systems, classifiers are contained within a population [P] that has a user defined maximum number of classifiers. Unlike most stochastic search algorithms (e.g. evolutionary algorithms), LCS populations start out empty (i.e. there is no need to randomly initialize a rule population). Classifiers will instead be initially introduced to the population with a covering mechanism. In any LCS, the trained model is a set of rules/classifiers, rather than any single rule/classifier. In Michigan-style LCS, the entire trained (and optionally, compacted) classifier population forms the prediction model. ==== Matching ==== One of the most critical and often time-consuming elements of an LCS is the matching process. The first step in an LCS learning cycle takes a single training instance from the environment and passes it to [P] where matching takes place. In step two, every rule in [P] is now compared to the training instance to see which rules match (i.e. are contextually relevant to the current instance). In step three, any matching rules are moved to a match set [M]. A rule matches a training instance if all feature values specified in the rule condition are equivalent to the corresponding feature value in the training instance. For example, assuming the training instance is (001001 ~ 0), these rules would match: (###0## ~ 0), (00###1 ~ 0), (#01001 ~ 1), but these rules would not (1##### ~ 0), (000##1 ~ 0), (#0#1#0 ~ 1). Notice that in matching, the endpoint/action specified by the rule is not taken into consideration. As a result, the match set may contain classifiers that propose conflicting actions. In the fourth step, since we are performing supervised learning, [M] is divided into a correct set [C] and an incorrect set [I]. A matching rule goes into the correct set if it proposes the correct action (based on the known action of the training instance), otherwise it goes into [I]. In reinforcement learning LCS, an action set [A] would be formed here instead, since the correct action is not known. ==== Covering ==== At this point in the learning cycle, if no classifiers made it into either [M] or [C] (as would be the case when the population starts off empty), the covering mechanism is applied (fifth step). Covering is a form of online smart population initialization. Covering randomly generates a rule that matches the current training instance (and in the case of supervised learning, that rule is also generated with the correct action. Assuming the training instance is (001001 ~ 0), covering might generate any of the following rules: (#0#0## ~ 0), (001001 ~ 0), (#010## ~ 0). Covering not only ensures that each learning cycle there is at least one correct, matching rule in [C], but that any rule initialized into the population will match at least one training instance. This prevents LCS from exploring the search space of rules that do not match any training instances. ==== Parameter updates/credit assignment/learning ==== In the sixth step, the rule parameters of any rule in [M] are updated to reflect the new experience gained from the current training instance. Depending on the LCS algorithm, a number of updates can take place at this step. For supervised learning, we can simply update the accuracy/error of a