Resolution enhancement technology

Resolution enhancement technology

Resolution enhancement technology (RET) is a form of image processing technology used to manipulate dot characteristics popular among laser printer and inkjet printer manufacturers. Closely related RET techniques are also used in VLSI photolithography manufacturing technology, in particular in relation to 90 nanometre technology. Resolution refers to the sharpness of image detail, smoothness of curved lines, and the faithful reproduction of an image. In both cases, RET uses pre-compensation of the image in order to try to mitigate the effects of the printing process. Among the major issues in RET in VLSI technology are the fundamental properties of a wave: amplitude, phase, and direction.

Stop Motion Studio

Stop Motion Studio is a stop motion animation software developed by Cateater LLC. It is available as both an app for iOS and Android and as a software for Windows and Mac. Two versions of the software exist, the standard Stop Motion Studio for free, and the paid Stop Motion Studio Pro, which contains extra, more advanced features. The software is commonly used in brickfilming.

Computer Law & Security Review

The Computer Law & Security Review is an international peer-reviewed journal published by Elsevier. It has been published six times a year since 1985 and is indexed in Scopus and SSCI. It is accessible to a wide range of professional legal and IT practitioners, businesses, academics, researchers, libraries and organisations in both the public and private sectors. The journal regularly covers: CLSR Briefing with special emphasis on UK/US developments European Union update National news from 10 European jurisdictions Pacific rim news column Refereed practitioner and academic papers on topics such as Web 2.0, IT security, Identity management, ID cards, RFID, interference with privacy, Internet law, telecoms regulation, online broadcasting, intellectual property, software law, e-commerce, outsourcing, data protection and freedom of information and many other topics. The Journal's Correspondent Panel includes more than 40 specialists in IT law and security. Each issue contains articles, case law analysis and current news on information and communications technology. Special Features High quality peer reviewed papers from internationally renowned practitioner and academic experts Latest developments reported in situ by more than 20 leading law firms from around the world Highly experienced and respected editor and correspondents panel Online access to all 23 volumes of CLSR with embedded web links to primary sources Contact details of all authors A pool of expertise that can collectively identify the key topics that need to be examined.

Halloween Problem

In computing, the Halloween Problem refers to a phenomenon in databases in which an update operation causes a change in the physical location of a row, potentially allowing the row to be visited again later in the same update operation. This could even cause an infinite loop in some cases where updates continually place the updated record ahead of the scan performing the update operation. The potential for this database error was first discovered by Don Chamberlin, Pat Selinger, and Morton Astrahan in the mid-1970s, on Halloween day, while working on query optimization. They wrote a SQL query supposed to give a ten percent raise to every employee who earned less than $25,000. This query would run successfully, with no errors, but when finished all the employees in the database earned at least $25,000, because it kept giving them a raise until they reached that level. The expectation was that the query would iterate over each of the employee records with a salary less than $25,000 precisely once. In fact, because even updated records were visible to the query execution engine and so continued to match the query's criteria, salary records were matching multiple times and each time being given a 10% raise until they were all greater than $25,000. Contrary to what some believe, the name is not descriptive of the nature of the problem but rather was given due to the day it was discovered on. As recounted by Don Chamberlin: Pat and Morton discovered this problem on Halloween... I remember they came into my office and said, "Chamberlin, look at this. We have to make sure that when the optimizer is making a plan for processing an update, it doesn't use an index that is based on the field that is being updated. How are we going to do that?" It happened to be on a Friday, and we said, "Listen, we are not going to be able to solve this problem this afternoon. Let's just give it a name. We'll call it the Halloween Problem and we'll work on it next week." And it turns out it has been called that ever since.

Physical information security

Physical information security is the intersection or common ground between physical security and information security. It primarily concerns the protection of tangible information-related assets such as computer systems and storage media against physical, real-world threats such as unauthorized physical access, theft, fire and flood. It typically involves physical controls such as protective barriers and locks, uninterruptible power supplies, and shredders. Information security controls in the physical domain complement those in the logical domain (such as encryption), and procedural or administrative controls (such as information security awareness and compliance with policies and laws). == Background == Asset are inherently valuable and yet vulnerable to a wide variety of threats, both malicious (e.g. theft, arson) and accidental/natural (e.g. lost property, bush fire). If threats materialize and exploit those vulnerabilities causing incidents, there are likely to be adverse impacts on the organizations or individuals who legitimately own and utilize the assets, varying from trivial to devastating in effect. Security controls are intended to reduce the probability or frequency of occurrence and/or the severity of the impacts arising from incidents, thus protecting the value of the assets. Physical security involves the use of controls such as smoke detectors, fire alarms and extinguishers, along with related laws, regulations, policies and procedures concerning their use. Barriers such as fences, walls and doors are obvious physical security controls, designed to deter or prevent unauthorized physical access to a controlled area, such as a home or office. The moats and battlements of Mediaeval castles are classic examples of physical access controls, as are bank vaults and safes. Information security controls protect the value of information assets, particularly the information itself (i.e. the intangible information content, data, intellectual property, knowledge etc.) but also computer and telecommunications equipment, storage media (including papers and digital media), cables and other tangible information-related assets (such as computer power supplies). The corporate mantra "Our people are our greatest assets" is literally true in the sense that so-called knowledge workers qualify as extremely valuable, perhaps irreplaceable information assets. Health and safety measures and even medical practice could therefore also be classed as physical information security controls since they protect humans against injuries, diseases and death. This perspective exemplifies the ubiquity and value of information. Modern human society is heavily reliant on information, and information has importance and value at a deeper, more fundamental level. In principle, the subcellular biochemical mechanisms that maintain the accuracy of DNA replication could even be classed as vital information security controls, given that genes are 'the information of life'. Malicious actors who may benefit from physical access to information assets include computer crackers, corporate spies, and fraudsters. The value of information assets is self-evident in the case of, say, stolen laptops or servers that can be sold-on for cash, but the information content is often far more valuable, for example encryption keys or passwords (used to gain access to further systems and information), trade secrets and other intellectual property (inherently valuable or valuable because of the commercial advantages they confer), and credit card numbers (used to commit identity fraud and further theft). Furthermore, the loss, theft or damage of computer systems, plus power interruptions, mechanical/electronic failures and other physical incidents prevent them being used, typically causing disruption and consequential costs or losses. Unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, and even the coercive threat of such disclosure, can be damaging as we saw in the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack at the end of 2014 and in numerous privacy breach incidents. Even in the absence of evidence that disclosed personal information has actually been exploited, the very fact that it is no longer secured and under the control of its rightful owners is itself a potentially harmful privacy impact. Substantial fines, adverse publicity/reputational damage and other noncompliance penalties and impacts that flow from serious privacy breaches are best avoided, regardless of cause! == Examples of physical attacks to obtain information == There are several ways to obtain information through physical attacks or exploitations. A few examples are described below. === Dumpster diving === Dumpster diving is the practice of searching through trash in the hope of obtaining something valuable such as information carelessly discarded on paper, computer disks or other hardware. === Overt access === Sometimes attackers will simply go into a building and take the information they need. Frequently when using this strategy, an attacker will masquerade as someone who belongs in the situation. They may pose as a copy room employee, remove a document from someone's desk, copy the document, replace the original, and leave with the copied document. Individuals pretending to building maintenance may gain access to otherwise restricted spaces. They might walk right out of the building with a trash bag containing sensitive documents, carrying portable devices or storage media that were left out on desks, or perhaps just having memorized a password on a sticky note stuck to someone's computer screen or called out to a colleague across an open office. == Examples of Physical Information Security Controls == Shredding paper documents prior to their disposal can prevent unintended information leakage. Digital data can be encrypted or securely wiped. Offices may require visitors to present valid identification cards or valid access keys. Office workers may be required to obey "clear desk" policies, protecting documents and other storage media (including portable IT devices) by tidying them away out of sight (for example in locked drawers, filing cabinets, safes or a Bank vault). Workers may be required to memorize their passwords or use a password manager instead of writing passwords on paper. Computers are vulnerable to outages caused by power cuts, accidental disconnection, flat batteries, brown-outs, surges, spikes, electrical interference and electronic failures. Physical information security controls to address the associated risks include: fuses, no-break battery-backed power supplies, electrical generators, redundant power sources and cabling, "Do not remove" warning signs on plugs, surge protectors, power quality monitoring, spare batteries, professional design and installation of power circuits plus regular inspections/tests and preventive maintenance.

Protocol engineering

Protocol engineering is the application of systematic methods to the development of communication protocols. It uses many of the principles of software engineering, but it is specific to the development of distributed systems. == History == When the first experimental and commercial computer networks were developed in the 1970s, the concept of protocols was not yet well developed. These were the first distributed systems. In the context of the newly adopted layered protocol architecture (see OSI model), the definition of the protocol of a specific layer should be such that any entity implementing that specification in one computer would be compatible with any other computer containing an entity implementing the same specification, and their interactions should be such that the desired communication service would be obtained. On the other hand, the protocol specification should be abstract enough to allow different choices for the implementation on different computers. It was recognized that a precise specification of the expected service provided by the given layer was important. It is important for the verification of the protocol, which should demonstrate that the communication service is provided if both protocol entities implement the protocol specification correctly. This principle was later followed during the standardization of the OSI protocol stack, in particular for the transport layer. It was also recognized that some kind of formalized protocol specification would be useful for the verification of the protocol and for developing implementations, as well as test cases for checking the conformance of an implementation against the specification. While initially mainly finite-state machine were used as (simplified) models of a protocol entity, in the 1980s three formal specification languages were standardized, two by ISO and one by ITU. The latter, called SDL, was later used in industry and has been merged with UML state machines. == Principles == The following are the most important principles for the development of protocols: Layered architecture: A protocol layer at the level n consists of two (or more) entities that have a service interface through which the service of the layer is provided to the users of the protocol, and which uses the service provided by a local entity of level (n-1). The service specification of a layer describes, in an abstract and global view, the behavior of the layer as visible at the service interfaces of the layer. The protocol specification defines the requirements that should be satisfied by each entity implementation. Protocol verification consists of showing that two (or more) entities satisfying the protocol specification will provide at their service interfaces the specified service of that layer. The (verified) protocol specification is used mainly for the following two activities: The development of an entity implementation. Note that the abstract properties of the service interface are defined by the service specification (and also used by the protocol specification), but the detailed nature of the interface can be chosen during the implementation process, separately for each entity. Test suite development for conformance testing. Protocol conformance testing checks that a given entity implementation conforms to the protocol specification. The conformance test cases are developed based on the protocol specification and are applicable to all entity implementations. Therefore standard conformance test suites have been developed for certain protocol standards. == Methods and tools == Tools for the activities of protocol verification, entity implementation and test suite development can be developed when the protocol specification is written in a formalized language which can be understood by the tool. As mentioned, formal specification languages have been proposed for protocol specification, and the first methods and tools where based on finite-state machine models. Reachability analysis was proposed to understand all possible behaviors of a distributed system, which is essential for protocol verification. This was later complemented with model checking. However, finite-state descriptions are not powerful enough to describe constraints between message parameters and the local variables in the entities. Such constraints can be described by the standardized formal specification languages mentioned above, for which powerful tools have been developed. It is in the field of protocol engineering that model-based development was used very early. These methods and tools have later been used for software engineering as well as hardware design, especially for distributed and real-time systems. On the other hand, many methods and tools developed in the more general context of software engineering can also be used of the development of protocols, for instance model checking for protocol verification, and agile methods for entity implementations. == Constructive methods for protocol design == Most protocols are designed by human intuition and discussions during the standardization process. However, some methods have been proposed for using constructive methods possibly supported by tools to automatically derive protocols that satisfy certain properties. The following are a few examples: Semi-automatic protocol synthesis: The user defines all message sending actions of the entities, and the tool derives all necessary reception actions (even if several messages are in transit). Synchronizing protocol: The state transitions of one protocol entity are given by the user, and the method derives the behavior of the other entity such that it remains in states that correspond to the former entity. Protocol derived from service specification: The service specification is given by the user and the method derives a suitable protocol for all entities. Protocol for control applications: The specification of one entity (called the plant - which must be controlled) is given, and the method derives a specification of the other entity such that certain fail states of the plant are never reached and certain given properties of the plant's service interactions are satisfied. This is a case of supervisory control. == Books == Ming T. Liu, Protocol Engineering, Advances in Computers, Volume 29, 1989, Pages 79–195. G.J. Holzmann, Design and Validation of Computer Protocols, Prentice Hall, 1991. H. König, Protocol Engineering, Springer, 2012. M. Popovic, Communication Protocol Engineering, CRC Press, 2nd Ed. 2018. P. Venkataram, S.S. Manvi, B.S. Babu, Communication Protocol Engineering, 2014.

Commitment ordering

Commitment ordering (CO) is a class of interoperable serializability techniques in concurrency control of databases, transaction processing, and related applications. It allows optimistic (non-blocking) implementations. With the proliferation of multi-core processors, CO has also been increasingly utilized in concurrent programming, transactional memory, and software transactional memory (STM) to achieve serializability optimistically. CO is also the name of the resulting transaction schedule (history) property, defined in 1988 with the name dynamic atomicity. In a CO compliant schedule, the chronological order of commitment events of transactions is compatible with the precedence order of the respective transactions. CO is a broad special case of conflict serializability and effective means (reliable, high-performance, distributed, and scalable) to achieve global serializability (modular serializability) across any collection of database systems that possibly use different concurrency control mechanisms (CO also makes each system serializability compliant, if not already). Each not-CO-compliant database system is augmented with a CO component (the commitment order coordinator—COCO) which orders the commitment events for CO compliance, with neither data-access nor any other transaction operation interference. As such, CO provides a low overhead, general solution for global serializability (and distributed serializability), instrumental for global concurrency control (and distributed concurrency control) of multi-database systems and other transactional objects, possibly highly distributed (e.g., within cloud computing, grid computing, and networks of smartphones). An atomic commitment protocol (ACP; of any type) is a fundamental part of the solution, utilized to break global cycles in the conflict (precedence, serializability) graph. CO is the most general property (a necessary condition) that guarantees global serializability, if the database systems involved do not share concurrency control information beyond atomic commitment protocol (unmodified) messages and have no knowledge of whether transactions are global or local (the database systems are autonomous). Thus CO (with its variants) is the only general technique that does not require the typically costly distribution of local concurrency control information (e.g., local precedence relations, locks, timestamps, or tickets). It generalizes the popular strong strict two-phase locking (SS2PL) property, which in conjunction with the two-phase commit protocol (2PC), is the de facto standard to achieve global serializability across (SS2PL based) database systems. As a result, CO compliant database systems (with any different concurrency control types) can transparently join such SS2PL based solutions for global serializability. In addition, locking based global deadlocks are resolved automatically in a CO based multi-database environment, a vital side-benefit (including the special case of a completely SS2PL based environment; a previously unnoticed fact for SS2PL). Furthermore, strict commitment ordering (SCO; Raz 1991c), the intersection of Strictness and CO, provides better performance (shorter average transaction completion time and resulting in better transaction throughput) than SS2PL whenever read-write conflicts are present (identical blocking behavior for write-read and write-write conflicts; comparable locking overhead). The advantage of SCO is especially during lock contention. Strictness allows both SS2PL and SCO to use the same effective database recovery mechanisms. Two major generalizing variants of CO exist, extended CO (ECO; Raz 1993a) and multi-version CO (MVCO; Raz 1993b). They also provide global serializability without local concurrency control information distribution, can be combined with any relevant concurrency control, and allow optimistic (non-blocking) implementations. Both use additional information for relaxing CO constraints and achieving better concurrency and performance. Vote ordering (VO or Generalized CO (GCO); Raz 2009) is a container schedule set (property) and technique for CO and all its variants. Local VO is necessary for guaranteeing global serializability if the atomic commitment protocol (ACP) participants do not share concurrency control information (have the generalized autonomy property). CO and its variants inter-operate transparently, guaranteeing global serializability and automatic global deadlock resolution together in a mixed, heterogeneous environment with different variants. == Overview == The Commitment ordering (CO; Raz 1990, 1992, 1994, 2009) schedule property has been referred to also as Dynamic atomicity (since 1988), commit ordering, commit order serializability, and strong recoverability (since 1991). The latter is a misleading name since CO is incomparable with recoverability, and the term "strong" implies a special case. This means that a substantial recoverability property does not necessarily have the CO property and vice versa. In 2009 CO has been characterized as a major concurrency control method, together with the previously known (since the 1980s) three major methods: Locking, Time-stamp ordering, and Serialization graph testing, and as an enabler for the interoperability of systems using different concurrency control mechanisms. In a federated database system or any other more loosely defined multidatabase system, which are typically distributed in a communication network, transactions span multiple and possibly Distributed databases. Enforcing global serializability in such system is problematic. Even if every local schedule of a single database is still serializable, the global schedule of a whole system is not necessarily serializable. The massive communication exchanges of conflict information needed between databases to reach conflict serializability would lead to unacceptable performance, primarily due to computer and communication latency. The problem of achieving global serializability effectively had been characterized as open until the public disclosure of CO in 1991 by its inventor Yoav Raz (Raz 1991a; see also Global serializability). Enforcing CO is an effective way to enforce conflict serializability globally in a distributed system since enforcing CO locally in each database (or other transactional objects) also enforces it globally. Each database may use any, possibly different, type of concurrency control mechanism. With a local mechanism that already provides conflict serializability, enforcing CO locally does not cause any other aborts, since enforcing CO locally does not affect the data access scheduling strategy of the mechanism (this scheduling determines the serializability related aborts; such a mechanism typically does not consider the commitment events or their order). The CO solution requires no communication overhead since it uses (unmodified) atomic commitment protocol messages only, already needed by each distributed transaction to reach atomicity. An atomic commitment protocol plays a central role in the distributed CO algorithm, which enforces CO globally by breaking global cycles (cycles that span two or more databases) in the global conflict graph. CO, its special cases, and its generalizations are interoperable and achieve global serializability while transparently being utilized together in a single heterogeneous distributed environment comprising objects with possibly different concurrency control mechanisms. As such, Commitment ordering, including its special cases, and together with its generalizations (see CO variants below), provides a general, high performance, fully distributed solution (no central processing component or central data structure are needed) for guaranteeing global serializability in heterogeneous environments of multidatabase systems and other multiple transactional objects (objects with states accessed and modified only by transactions; e.g., in the framework of transactional processes, and within Cloud computing and Grid computing). The CO solution scales up with network size and the number of databases without any negative impact on performance (assuming the statistics of a single distributed transaction, e.g., the average number of databases involved with a single transaction, are unchanged). With the proliferation of Multi-core processors, Optimistic CO (OCO) has also been increasingly utilized to achieve serializability in software transactional memory, and numerous STM articles and patents utilizing "commit order" have already been published (e.g., Zhang et al. 2006). == The commitment ordering solution for global serializability == === General characterization of CO === Commitment ordering (CO) is a special case of conflict serializability. CO can be enforced with non-blocking mechanisms (each transaction can complete its task without having its data-access blocked, which allows optimistic concurrency control; however, commitment could be blo