TU (formerly TU Me) is a digital platform developed by Telefónica and operated through its subsidiary Telefónica Innovación Digital. Initially launched in 2012 as a messaging app under the name TU Me, the brand was later revived in 2024 to designate a new suite of digital products focused on privacy, cybersecurity, and digital identity. == TU Me (2012–2014) == TU Me was a free mobile application released by Telefónica in May 2012. It allowed users to make voice calls, send texts, share photos and locations, and store conversation history in the cloud. The app was available for iOS and Android platforms, positioned as an alternative to services like WhatsApp and Viber. Despite early interest, TU Me was discontinued a few years later and removed from major app stores. Telefónica did not continue development of this version beyond its initial release cycle. == TU (2024–present) == In January 2024, Telefónica relaunched the brand TU through its technology subsidiary Telefónica Innovación Digital. Unlike its predecessor, the new TU is not a messaging app but a digital product platform offering solutions in cybersecurity, identity management, and cryptographic technology. The project includes a range of services built with technologies such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, and post-quantum cryptography. It operates independently from Movistar and targets both individual users and businesses. Notable products include: Latch: a digital access control system for securing user accounts. VerifAI: an AI-based tool for detecting manipulated media (images, audio, video). Metashield: software to identify and remove hidden metadata in documents. Wallet: a digital wallet for managing crypto-assets. Quantum Drop: encrypted file transfer system using post-quantum technology. Quantum Encryption: a security tool for IoT and private networks. Gallery: a blockchain-based digital art marketplace.
Security type system
In computer science, a type system can be described as a syntactic framework which contains a set of rules that are used to assign a type property (int, boolean, char etc.) to various components of a computer program, such as variables or functions. A security type system works in a similar way, only with a main focus on the security of the computer program, through information flow control. Thus, the various components of the program are assigned security types, or labels. The aim of a such system is to ultimately be able to verify that a given program conforms to the type system rules and satisfies non-interference. Security type systems is one of many security techniques used in the field of language-based security, and is tightly connected to information flow and information flow policies. In simple terms, a security type system can be used to detect if there exists any kind of violation of confidentiality or integrity in a program, i.e. the programmer wants to detect if the program is in line with the information flow policy or not. == A simple information flow policy == Suppose there are two users, A and B. In a program, the following security classes (SC) are introduced: SC = {∅, {A}, {B}, {A,B}}, where ∅ is the empty set. The information flow policy should define the direction that information is allowed to flow, which is dependent on whether the policy allows read or write operations. This example considers read operations (confidentiality). The following flows are allowed: → = {({A}, {A}), ({B}, {B}), ({A,B}, {A,B}), ({A,B}, {A}), ({A,B}, {B}), ({A}, ∅), ({B}, ∅), ({A,B}, ∅)} This can also be described as a superset (⊇). In words: information is allowed to flow towards stricter levels of confidentiality. The combination operator (⊕) can express how security classes can perform read operations with respect to other security classes. For example: {A} ⊕ {A,B} = {A} — the only security class that can read from both {A} and {A,B} is {A}. {A} ⊕ {B} = ∅ — neither {A} nor {B} are allowed to read from both {A} and {B}. This can also be described as an intersection (∩) between security classes. An information flow policy can be illustrated as a Hasse diagram. The policy should also be a lattice, that is, it has a greatest lower-bound and least upper-bound (there always exists a combination between security classes). In the case of integrity, information will flow in the opposite direction, thus the policy will be inverted. == Information flow policy in security type systems == Once the policy is in place, the software developer can apply the security classes to the program components. Use of a security type system is usually combined with a compiler that can perform the verification of the information flow according to the type system rules. For the sake of simplicity, a very simple computer program, together with the information flow policy as described in the previous section, can be used as a demonstration. The simple program is given in the following pseudocode: if y{A} = 1 then x{A,B} := 0 else x{A,B} := 1 Here, an equality check is made on a variable y that is assigned the security class {A}. A variable x with a lower security class ({A,B}) is influenced by this check. This means that information is leaking from class {A} to class {A,B}, which is a violation of the confidentiality policy. This leak should be detected by the security type system. === Example === Designing a security type system requires a function (also known as a security environment) that creates a mapping from variables to security types, or classes. This function can be called Γ, such that Γ(x) = τ, where x is a variable and τ is the security class, or type. Security classes are assigned (also called "judgement") to program components, using the following notation: Types are assigned to read operations by: Γ ⊢ e : τ. Types are assigned to write operations by: Γ ⊢ S : τ cmd. Constants can be assigned any type. The following bottom-up notation can be used to decompose the program: assumption1 ... assumptionn/conclusion. Once the program is decomposed into trivial judgements, by which the type can easily be determined, the types for the less trivial parts of the program can be derived. Each "numerator" is considered in isolation, looking at the type of each statement to see if an allowed type can be derived for the "denominator", based on the defined type system "rules". ==== Rules ==== The main part of the security type system is the rules. They say how the program should be decomposed and how type verification should be performed. This toy program consists of a conditional test and two possible variable assignments. Rules for these two events are defined as follows: Applying this to the simple program introduced above yields: The type system detects the policy violation in line 2, where a read operation of security class {A} is performed, followed by two write operations of a less strict security class {A,B}. In more formalized terms, {A} ⋢ {A,B}, {A,B} (from the rule of the conditional test). Thus, the program is classified as "not typeable". === Soundness === The soundness of a security type system can be informally defined as: If program P is well typed, P satisfies non-interference. Volpano, Smith and Irvine were the first to prove soundness of a security type system for a deterministic imperative programming language with a standard (non-instrumented) semantics using the notion of non-interference.
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Noisy channel model
The noisy channel model is a framework used in spell checkers, question answering, speech recognition, and machine translation. In this model, the goal is to find the intended word given a word where the letters have been scrambled in some manner. == In spell-checking == See Chapter B of. Given an alphabet Σ {\displaystyle \Sigma } , let Σ ∗ {\displaystyle \Sigma ^{}} be the set of all finite strings over Σ {\displaystyle \Sigma } . Let the dictionary D {\displaystyle D} of valid words be some subset of Σ ∗ {\displaystyle \Sigma ^{}} , i.e., D ⊆ Σ ∗ {\displaystyle D\subseteq \Sigma ^{}} . The noisy channel is the matrix Γ w s = Pr ( s | w ) {\displaystyle \Gamma _{ws}=\Pr(s|w)} , where w ∈ D {\displaystyle w\in D} is the intended word and s ∈ Σ ∗ {\displaystyle s\in \Sigma ^{}} is the scrambled word that was actually received. The goal of the noisy channel model is to find the intended word given the scrambled word that was received. The decision function σ : Σ ∗ → D {\displaystyle \sigma :\Sigma ^{}\to D} is a function that, given a scrambled word, returns the intended word. Methods of constructing a decision function include the maximum likelihood rule, the maximum a posteriori rule, and the minimum distance rule. In some cases, it may be better to accept the scrambled word as the intended word rather than attempt to find an intended word in the dictionary. For example, the word schönfinkeling may not be in the dictionary, but might in fact be the intended word. === Example === Consider the English alphabet Σ = { a , b , c , . . . , y , z , A , B , . . . , Z , . . . } {\displaystyle \Sigma =\{a,b,c,...,y,z,A,B,...,Z,...\}} . Some subset D ⊆ Σ ∗ {\displaystyle D\subseteq \Sigma ^{}} makes up the dictionary of valid English words. There are several mistakes that may occur while typing, including: Missing letters, e.g., leter instead of letter Accidental letter additions, e.g., misstake instead of mistake Swapping letters, e.g., recieved instead of received Replacing letters, e.g., fimite instead of finite To construct the noisy channel matrix Γ {\displaystyle \Gamma } , we must consider the probability of each mistake, given the intended word ( Pr ( s | w ) {\displaystyle \Pr(s|w)} for all w ∈ D {\displaystyle w\in D} and s ∈ Σ ∗ {\displaystyle s\in \Sigma ^{}} ). These probabilities may be gathered, for example, by considering the Damerau–Levenshtein distance between s {\displaystyle s} and w {\displaystyle w} or by comparing the draft of an essay with one that has been manually edited for spelling. == In machine translation == One naturally wonders if the problem of translation could conceivably be treated as a problem in cryptography. When I look at an article in Russian, I say: 'This is really written in English, but it has been coded in some strange symbols. I will now proceed to decode. See chapter 1, and chapter 25 of. Suppose we want to translate a foreign language to English, we could model P ( E | F ) {\displaystyle P(E|F)} directly: the probability that we have English sentence E given foreign sentence F, then we pick the most likely one E ^ = arg max E P ( E | F ) {\displaystyle {\hat {E}}=\arg \max _{E}P(E|F)} . However, by Bayes law, we have the equivalent equation: E ^ = argmax E ∈ English P ( F ∣ E ) ⏞ translation model P ( E ) ⏞ language model {\displaystyle {\hat {E}}={\underset {E\in {\text{ English }}}{\operatorname {argmax} }}\overbrace {P(F\mid E)} ^{\text{translation model }}\overbrace {P(E)} ^{\text{language model}}} The benefit of the noisy-channel model is in terms of data: If collecting a parallel corpus is costly, then we would have only a small parallel corpus, so we can only train a moderately good English-to-foreign translation model, and a moderately good foreign-to-English translation model. However, we can collect a large corpus in the foreign language only, and a large corpus in the English language only, to train two good language models. Combining these four models, we immediately get a good English-to-foreign translator and a good foreign-to-English translator. The cost of noisy-channel model is that using Bayesian inference is more costly than using a translation model directly. Instead of reading out the most likely translation by arg max E P ( E | F ) {\displaystyle \arg \max _{E}P(E|F)} , it would have to read out predictions by both the translation model and the language model, multiply them, and search for the highest number. == In speech recognition == Speech recognition can be thought of as translating from a sound-language to a text-language. Consequently, we have T ^ = argmax T ∈ Text P ( S ∣ T ) ⏞ speech model P ( T ) ⏞ language model {\displaystyle {\hat {T}}={\underset {T\in {\text{ Text }}}{\operatorname {argmax} }}\overbrace {P(S\mid T)} ^{\text{speech model }}\overbrace {P(T)} ^{\text{language model}}} where P ( S | T ) {\displaystyle P(S|T)} is the probability that a speech sound S is produced if the speaker is intending to say text T. Intuitively, this equation states that the most likely text is a text that's both a likely text in the language, and produces the speech sound with high probability. The utility of the noisy-channel model is not in capacity. Theoretically, any noisy-channel model can be replicated by a direct P ( T | S ) {\displaystyle P(T|S)} model. However, the noisy-channel model factors the model into two parts which are appropriate for the situation, and consequently it is generally more well-behaved. When a human speaks, it does not produce the sound directly, but first produces the text it wants to speak in the language centers of the brain, then the text is translated into sound by the motor cortex, vocal cords, and other parts of the body. The noisy-channel model matches this model of the human, and so it is appropriate. This is justified in the practical success of noisy-channel model in speech recognition. === Example === Consider the sound-language sentence (written in IPA for English) S = aɪ wʊd laɪk wʌn tuː. There are three possible texts T 1 , T 2 , T 3 {\displaystyle T_{1},T_{2},T_{3}} : T 1 = {\displaystyle T_{1}=} I would like one to. T 2 = {\displaystyle T_{2}=} I would like one too. T 3 = {\displaystyle T_{3}=} I would like one two. that are equally likely, in the sense that P ( S | T 1 ) = P ( S | T 2 ) = P ( S | T 3 ) {\displaystyle P(S|T_{1})=P(S|T_{2})=P(S|T_{3})} . With a good English language model, we would have P ( T 2 ) > P ( T 1 ) > P ( T 3 ) {\displaystyle P(T_{2})>P(T_{1})>P(T_{3})} , since the second sentence is grammatical, the first is not quite, but close to a grammatical one (such as "I would like one to [go]."), while the third one is far from grammatical. Consequently, the noisy-channel model would output T 2 {\displaystyle T_{2}} as the best transcription.
Nabil Ali
Nabil Ali Mohammed Abd AL Azeez (Arabic:نبيل علي) (3 January 1938 – 27 January 2016) was an Egyptian scientist, writer, and intellectual who worked in the field of natural language processing and computational linguistics. Ali is considered a pioneer of Arabic language computing, making significant innovations in early computational linguistics. == Education and career == Ali earned a bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering in 1960, and a master's degree in 1967. In 1971, he earned a PhD in Aeronautics. From 1961 to 1972 Ali worked as an engineering officer in the Egyptian Air Force, specializing in maintenance and training. In 1972, he shifted focus to computing, and from 1972 to 1977 he worked as a computer manager at Egyptair. While in this position, Ali introduced the first automated reservation system for airlines in the Arab world. He later held various computing positions in Egypt, Kuwait, Europe, Canada and the US. Ali started working for Sakhr Software, an Arabic language technology company, in 1983. From 1985 to 1999, he was vice president of Sakhr's council for Research and Development. As a director of the Multilingual Advanced Systems Foundation and project manager at the Egyptian National Company for Scientific and Technical Information, Ali did extensive research on information culture and artificial intelligence relating to the Arabic language. Over the course of his career, Ali developed more than 20 educational programs relating to computational linguistics. He developed the first Arabic lexical database and the first knowledge base for Arabic poetry, as well as many other pieces of Arabic language software. == Awards == 1994: General Book Authority Award for Best Book (in the field of future studies). 2003: General Book Authority Award for Best Culture Book (in the field of "Challenges of the Information Age"). 2007: General Book Authority "Innovation in Information Technology" Award. 2012: King Faisal International Award, with Professor Ali Helmy Mousa, in the field of computer processing of the Arabic Language. == Works == Arabic Language and Computer (Research study), Dar Localization, 1988. Al Arab and the Information Age, Knowledge World Series No. 184, April 1994. Arab Culture and the Information Age: A Vision for the Future of Arab Culture Discourse, World of Knowledge Series, No. 265 January 2001. The Digital Gap: an Arab Vision for a Knowledge Society (in partnership with Dr. Nadia Hegazy), World of Knowledge Series, No. 318 August 2005. The Arab Mind and the Knowledge Society: Manifestations of the Crisis and Suggestions for Solutions, Part 1, The World of Knowledge Series, No. 369, November 2009. The Arab Mind and the Knowledge Society: Manifestations of the Crisis and Suggestions for Solutions, Part 2, The World of Knowledge Series, No. 370, December 2009. == Tribute == On 3 January 2020, Google Doodle celebrated Nabil Ali Mohamed's 82nd Birthday.
Catie Cuan
Catie Cuan is an artist, entrepeuneur, and innovator in the field of robotic art and human-robot interaction, where she specializes in choreorobotics, an emerging field at the intersection of choreographic dance and robotics. Catie Cuan is currently one of the academic researchers pioneering the field of choreorobotics and currently holds a post-doctoral fellowship at Stanford University. == Career == Catie Cuan earned a bachelor's degree from the University of California, Berkeley. She graduated with a Ph.D. from the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Stanford University, focusing in robotics. Her most cited publication is about how to improve robotic expressive systems using tools from dance theory, such as the Laban/Bartenieff Movement Analysis. In her most recent research projects, she explores a predictive model of imitation learning for robots moving around humans, a project that advances the field of social robotics. Cuan credits her work in robotics to the experience with her father when he had a stroke and was surrounded by many medical machines, which made her think about how people might feel empowered and hopeful rather than afraid. As a ballet dancer and choreographer, she has performed with the Metropolitan Opera Ballet and the Lyric Opera of Chicago. In 2020, she was the dancer and choreographer of the show Output, which was part of a collaboration with ThoughtWorks Arts and the Pratt Institute. In the production, she danced with an ABB IRB 6700 industrial robot. In 2022, she was named as an IF/THEN ambassador for the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The same year, she was appointed Futurist-in-Residence at the Smithsonian Arts and Industries Building, where she performed at the closing ceremonies of the FUTURES exhibit on July 6, 2022. Cuan has also contributed to product designs, working with IDEO and Dutch interior design firm moooi on their Piro project, which launched a dancing scent diffuser robot during Milan Design Week in June 2022. She is a TED speaker with talks about how to teach robots to dance, and what is coming up for dancing robots in the AI era.
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