An information element, sometimes informally referred to as a field, is an item in Q.931 and Q.2931 messages, IEEE 802.11 management frames, and cellular network messages sent between a base transceiver station and a mobile phone or similar piece of user equipment. An information element is often a type–length–value item, containing 1) a type (which corresponds to the label of a field), a length indicator, and a value, although any combination of one or more of those parts is possible. A single message may contain multiple information elements. The abbreviation IE is found in many technical specification documents from 3GPP. It is not uncommon for a single specification document to contain thousands of references to IEs.
Google Clips
Google Clips is a discontinued miniature clip-on camera device developed by Google. == History == It was announced on October 4, 2017 and went on sale on January 27, 2018. Google Clips automatically captured video clips (without audio) at moments its machine learning algorithms determined to be interesting or relevant. An indicator flashed when the camera was looking for scenes to capture. Google Clips' artificial intelligence (AI) could learn the faces of people to take photographs with certain people, and could automatically set lighting and framing. It had 16 GB of storage built-in storage and could record clips for up to 3 hours. This camera was originally priced at US$249 in the United States. It was withdrawn from sale on October 15, 2019, but supported until the end of December 2021. == Reception == The Independent wrote that Google Clips is "an impressive little device, but one that also has the potential to feel very creepy." According to The Verge's generally negative review, "it didn't capture anything special" over two weeks of testing.
System integrity
In telecommunications, the term system integrity has the following meanings: That condition of a system wherein its mandated operational and technical parameters are within the prescribed limits. The quality of an AIS when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system. The state that exists when there is complete assurance that under all conditions an IT system is based on the logical correctness and reliability of the operating system, the logical completeness of the hardware and software that implement the protection mechanisms, and data integrity.
Computers & Graphics
Computers & Graphics is a peer-reviewed scientific journal that covers computer graphics and related subjects such as data visualization, human-computer interaction, virtual reality, and augmented reality. It was established in 1975 and originally published by Pergamon Press. It is now published by Elsevier, which acquired Pergamon Press in 1991. From 2018 to 2022 Graphics and Visual Computing was an open access sister journal sharing the same editorial team and double-blind peer-review policies. It has since merged into GMOD, the International Journal of Graphical Models. == History == The journal was established in 1975 by founding editor-in-chief Robert Schiffman (University of Colorado, Boulder), as Computers & Graphics-UK. Schiffman, who co-organized the first SIGGRAPH conference in 1974, had the conference proceedings published as the first issue of the journal. He was succeeded in 1978 by Larry Feeser (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute). In 1983 José Luis Encarnação (Technische Hochschule Darmstadt) took over. Joaquim Jorge (University of Lisbon) has been Editor-in-Chief since 2007. == Replicability == The journal is working with the Graphics Replicability Stamp Initiative to promote replicable results in publication. == Abstracting and indexing == The journal is abstracted and indexed in: Current Contents/Engineering, Computing & Technology EBSCO databases Ei Compendex Inspec ProQuest databases Science Citation Index Expanded Scopus Chinese Computer Federation/Recommended List of International Conferences and Journals on CAD & Graphics and Multimedia. According to the Journal Citation Reports, the journal has a 2022 impact factor of 2.5.
Resilience week
Resilience week is an annual symposium established to enable cross-disciplinary and role based discussions to advance strategies and research that engenders resilience in critical infrastructure systems and communities. Damaging storms, cyber attack and the interconnection of critical infrastructure systems can lead to cascading events that not only affect local but also across regions. However, many of these interdependencies are not easily recognized and obscure and complicate the mitigation of risk. The purpose of the symposia series is hence to facilitate best practice in managing critical infrastructure risks, by bringing together businesses, government and researchers. == Background == Originally organized in 2008 as a focus on the new research area of resilient control systems, including the disciplinary areas of control system, cyber-security, cognitive psychology and any number of critical infrastructure domains. Resilience has long been recognized as an area that requires not only the contributions of multiple disciplines or multidisciplinary participation, but interdisciplinary interaction where there is a common language and familiarity of the contributors to what other disciplines (and roles) contribute. The resulting interactions developed by Resilience Week and associated activities are intended to culture this sharing environment as a safe zone for inclusion; more importantly, an environment that lends to developing the new science and practice. As the attributes of resilience are complex, the contributions and topics for the event have included both the disciplinary and the project considerations, in keynotes, panels and research presentations. Keynotes have included senior leadership in the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the National Science Foundation, and other agencies in addition to National Academy and professional organization fellows and senior industry leaders. Project panels and research presentations include emergent topics in resilience to climate change, cyber attack, damaging storms and the energy assurance. Topics Areas of focus have included: Control Systems Cyber Systems Cognitive Systems Communications Systems Communities and Infrastructure Project Focus Areas have included: Dependencies and Interdependencies Cyber Resilience for Operating Technology Commercializing Research and Development Building Critical Infrastructure Resilience through Distributed Energy Resources Energy Equity and Community Resilience Proceedings are developed for each year of the event, documenting the diversity of the research and engagements within these topical areas. == Impacts for the future == Since its inception, the Resilience Week community has evolved from one that primarily included only university researchers to one that includes many government laboratories, universities and private industries in the US and internationally. This type of collaboration forms a feedback loop that informs the research with the current needs and hones best practices. The future of the event is to further advance discussions that advance investment, recognize priorities and expedite technologies and tools to proactively address our energy future, in light of the natural and manmade challenges, and rationalizing the complex relationships that exist in critical infrastructure.
Intrinsic dimension
In mathematics, the intrinsic dimension of a subset can be thought of as the minimal number of variables needed to represent the subset. The concept has widespread applications in geometry, dynamical systems, signal processing, statistics, and other fields. Due to its widespread applications and vague conceptualization, there are many different ways to define it rigorously. Consequently, the same set might have different intrinsic dimensions according to different definitions. The intrinsic dimension can be used as a lower bound of what dimension it is possible to compress a data set into through dimension reduction, but it can also be used as a measure of the complexity of the data set or signal. For a data set or signal of N variables, its intrinsic dimension M satisfies 0 ≤ M ≤ N, although estimators may yield higher values. == Exact dimension == === Differential === In differential geometry, given a differentiable manifold N and a submanifold M, the intrinsic dimension of M is its dimension. Suppose N has n dimensions and M has m dimensions, then that means around any point in M, there exists a local coordinate system ( x 1 , … , x m , x m + 1 , … , x n ) {\displaystyle (x_{1},\dots ,x_{m},x_{m+1},\dots ,x_{n})} of N, such that the manifold M is simply the subset of N defined by x m + 1 = 0 , … , x n = 0 {\displaystyle x_{m+1}=0,\dots ,x_{n}=0} . === Metric === Given a mere metric space, we can still define its intrinsic dimension. The most general case is the Hausdorff dimension, though for metric spaces occurring in practice, the box-counting dimension and the packing dimension often are identical to the Hausdorff dimension. Let X , d {\textstyle X,d} be a metric space and A ⊂ X {\textstyle A\subset X} be totally bounded. Define the covering number N ( A , ε ) = min { k : A ⊂ ⋃ i = 1 k B ( x i , ε ) } . {\displaystyle N(A,\varepsilon )=\min \left\{k:A\subset \bigcup _{i=1}^{k}B\left(x_{i},\varepsilon \right)\right\}.} The metric entropy is H ( A , ε ) = log N ( A , ε ) {\textstyle H(A,\varepsilon )=\log N(A,\varepsilon )} (any log base). The upper and lower metric entropy dimensions are dim ¯ E A = lim sup ε ↓ 0 H ( A , ε ) log ( 1 / ε ) , dim _ E A = lim inf ε ↓ 0 H ( A , ε ) log ( 1 / ε ) . {\displaystyle {\overline {\dim }}_{E}A=\limsup _{\varepsilon \downarrow 0}{\frac {H(A,\varepsilon )}{\log(1/\varepsilon )}},\quad {\underline {\dim }}_{E}A=\liminf _{\varepsilon \downarrow 0}{\frac {H(A,\varepsilon )}{\log(1/\varepsilon )}}.} If they are equal, then dim E A {\textstyle \operatorname {dim} _{E}A} is that common value, called the metric entropy dimension. The entropy dimensions are usually used in information theory, and especially coding theory, since entropy is involved in its definition. === Topological === If X {\displaystyle X} is merely a topological space, then we can still define its intrinsic dimension, using the topological dimension or Lebesgue covering dimension. An open cover of a topological space X is a family of open sets Uα such that their union is the whole space, ∪ α {\displaystyle \cup _{\alpha }} Uα = X. The order or ply of an open cover A {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {A}}} = {Uα} is the smallest number m (if it exists) for which each point of the space belongs to at most m open sets in the cover: in other words Uα1 ∩ ⋅⋅⋅ ∩ Uαm+1 = ∅ {\displaystyle \emptyset } for α1, ..., αm+1 distinct. A refinement of an open cover A {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {A}}} = {Uα} is another open cover B {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {B}}} = {Vβ}, such that each Vβ is contained in some Uα. The covering dimension of a topological space X is defined to be the minimum value of n such that every finite open cover A {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {A}}} of X has an open refinement B {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {B}}} with order n + 1. The refinement B {\displaystyle {\mathfrak {B}}} can always be chosen to be finite. Thus, if n is finite, Vβ1 ∩ ⋅⋅⋅ ∩ Vβn+2 = ∅ {\displaystyle \emptyset } for β1, ..., βn+2 distinct. If no such minimal n exists, the space is said to have infinite covering dimension. == Introductory example == Let f ( x 1 , x 2 ) {\textstyle f(x_{1},x_{2})} be a two-variable function (or signal) which is of the form f ( x 1 , x 2 ) = g ( x 1 ) {\textstyle f(x_{1},x_{2})=g(x_{1})} for some one-variable function g which is not constant. This means that f varies, in accordance to g, with the first variable or along the first coordinate. On the other hand, f is constant with respect to the second variable or along the second coordinate. It is only necessary to know the value of one, namely the first, variable in order to determine the value of f. Hence, it is a two-variable function but its intrinsic dimension is one. A slightly more complicated example is f ( x 1 , x 2 ) = g ( x 1 + x 2 ) {\textstyle f(x_{1},x_{2})=g(x_{1}+x_{2})} . f is still intrinsic one-dimensional, which can be seen by making a variable transformation y 1 = x 1 + x 2 {\textstyle y_{1}=x_{1}+x_{2}} and y 2 = x 1 − x 2 {\textstyle y_{2}=x_{1}-x_{2}} which gives f ( y 1 + y 2 2 , y 1 − y 2 2 ) = g ( y 1 ) {\textstyle f\left({\frac {y_{1}+y_{2}}{2}},{\frac {y_{1}-y_{2}}{2}}\right)=g\left(y_{1}\right)} . Since the variation in f can be described by the single variable y1 its intrinsic dimension is one. For the case that f is constant, its intrinsic dimension is zero since no variable is needed to describe variation. For the general case, when the intrinsic dimension of the two-variable function f is neither zero or one, it is two. In the literature, functions which are of intrinsic dimension zero, one, or two are sometimes referred to as i0D, i1D or i2D, respectively. == Signal processing == In signal processing of multidimensional signals, the intrinsic dimension of the signal describes how many variables are needed to generate a good approximation of the signal. For an N-variable function f, the set of variables can be represented as an N-dimensional vector x: f = f ( x ) where x = ( x 1 , … , x N ) {\textstyle f=f\left(\mathbf {x} \right){\text{ where }}\mathbf {x} =\left(x_{1},\dots ,x_{N}\right)} . If for some M-variable function g and M × N matrix A it is the case that for all x; f ( x ) = g ( A x ) , {\textstyle f(\mathbf {x} )=g(\mathbf {Ax} ),} M is the smallest number for which the above relation between f and g can be found, then the intrinsic dimension of f is M. The intrinsic dimension is a characterization of f, it is not an unambiguous characterization of g nor of A. That is, if the above relation is satisfied for some f, g, and A, it must also be satisfied for the same f and g′ and A′ given by g ′ ( y ) = g ( B y ) {\textstyle g'\left(\mathbf {y} \right)=g\left(\mathbf {By} \right)} and A ′ = B − 1 A {\textstyle \mathbf {A'} =\mathbf {B} ^{-1}\mathbf {A} } where B is a non-singular M × M matrix, since f ( x ) = g ′ ( A ′ x ) = g ( B A ′ x ) = g ( A x ) {\textstyle f\left(\mathbf {x} \right)=g'\left(\mathbf {A'x} \right)=g\left(\mathbf {BA'x} \right)=g\left(\mathbf {Ax} \right)} . == The Fourier transform of signals of low intrinsic dimension == An N variable function which has intrinsic dimension M < N has a characteristic Fourier transform. Intuitively, since this type of function is constant along one or several dimensions its Fourier transform must appear like an impulse (the Fourier transform of a constant) along the same dimension in the frequency domain. === A simple example === Let f be a two-variable function which is i1D. This means that there exists a normalized vector n ∈ R 2 {\textstyle \mathbf {n} \in \mathbb {R} ^{2}} and a one-variable function g such that f ( x ) = g ( n T x ) {\textstyle f(\mathbf {x} )=g(\mathbf {n} ^{\operatorname {T} }\mathbf {x} )} for all x ∈ R 2 {\textstyle \mathbf {x} \in \mathbb {R} ^{2}} . If F is the Fourier transform of f (both are two-variable functions) it must be the case that F ( u ) = G ( n T u ) ⋅ δ ( m T u ) {\textstyle F\left(\mathbf {u} \right)=G\left(\mathbf {n} ^{\mathrm {T} }\mathbf {u} \right)\cdot \delta \left(\mathbf {m} ^{\mathrm {T} }\mathbf {u} \right)} . Here G is the Fourier transform of g (both are one-variable functions), δ is the Dirac impulse function and m is a normalized vector in R 2 {\textstyle \mathbb {R} ^{2}} perpendicular to n. This means that F vanishes everywhere except on a line which passes through the origin of the frequency domain and is parallel to m. Along this line F varies according to G. === The general case === Let f be an N-variable function which has intrinsic dimension M, that is, there exists an M-variable function g and M × N matrix A such that f ( x ) = g ( A x ) ∀ x {\textstyle f(\mathbf {x} )=g(\mathbf {Ax} )\quad \forall \mathbf {x} } . Its Fourier transform F can then be described as follows: F vanishes everywhere except for a subspace of dimension M The subspace M is spanned by the rows of the matrix A In the subspace, F varies according to G the Fourier transform of g == Generalizations == The type of intrinsic dimension described above assume
Insider threat
An insider threat is a perceived threat to an organization that comes from people within the organization, such as employees, former employees, contractors or business associates, who have inside information concerning the organization's security practices, data and computer systems. The threat may involve fraud, the theft of confidential or commercially valuable information, the theft of intellectual property, or the sabotage of computer systems. == Overview == Insiders may have accounts giving them legitimate access to computer systems, with this access originally having been given to them to serve in the performance of their duties; these permissions could be abused to harm the organization. Insiders are often familiar with the organization's data and intellectual property as well as the methods that are in place to protect them. This makes it easier for the insider to circumvent any security controls of which they are aware. Physical proximity to data means that the insider does not need to hack into the organizational network through the outer perimeter by traversing firewalls; rather they are in the building already, often with direct access to the organization's internal network. Insider threats are harder to defend against than attacks from outsiders, since the insider already has legitimate access to the organization's information and assets. An insider may attempt to steal property or information for personal gain or to benefit another organization or country. The threat to the organization could also be through malicious software left running on its computer systems by former employees, a so-called logic bomb. == Research == Insider threat is an active area of research in academia and government. The CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie-Mellon University maintains the CERT Insider Threat Center, which includes a database of more than 850 cases of insider threats, including instances of fraud, theft and sabotage; the database is used for research and analysis. CERT's Insider Threat Team also maintains an informational blog to help organizations and businesses defend themselves against insider crime. The Threat Lab and Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (DOD PERSEREC) has also recently emerged as a national resource within the United States of America. The Threat Lab hosts an annual conference, the SBS Summit. They also maintain a website that contains resources from this conference. Complimenting these efforts, a companion podcast was created, Voices from the SBS Summit. In 2022, the Threat Lab created an interdisciplinary journal, Counter Insider Threat Research and Practice (CITRAP) which publishes research on insider threat detection. === Findings === In the 2022 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), Verizon found that 82% of breaches involved the human element, noting that employees continue to play a leading role in cybersecurity incidents and breaches. According to the UK Information Commissioners Office, 90% of all breaches reported to them in 2019 were the result of mistakes made by end users. This was up from 61% and 87% over the previous two years. A 2018 whitepaper reported that 53% of companies surveyed had confirmed insider attacks against their organization in the previous 12 months, with 27% saying insider attacks have become more frequent. A report published in July 2012 on the insider threat in the U.S. financial sector gives some statistics on insider threat incidents: 80% of the malicious acts were committed at work during working hours; 81% of the perpetrators planned their actions beforehand; 33% of the perpetrators were described as "difficult" and 17% as being "disgruntled". The insider was identified in 74% of cases. Financial gain was a motive in 81% of cases, revenge in 23% of cases, and 27% of the people carrying out malicious acts were in financial difficulties at the time. The US Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center published a report that describes approaches for detecting insider threats. Earlier it published ten case studies of insider attacks by information technology professionals. Cybersecurity experts believe that 38% of negligent insiders are victims of a phishing attack, whereby they receive an email that appears to come from a legitimate source such as a company. These emails normally contain malware in the form of hyperlinks. == Typologies and ontologies == Multiple classification systems and ontologies have been proposed to classify insider threats. Traditional models of insider threat identify three broad categories: Malicious insiders, which are people who take advantage of their access to inflict harm on an organization; Negligent insiders, which are people who make errors and disregard policies, which place their organizations at risk; and Infiltrators, who are external actors that obtain legitimate access credentials without authorization. == Criticisms == Insider threat research has been criticized. Critics have argued that insider threat is a poorly defined concept. Forensically investigating insider data theft is notoriously difficult, and requires novel techniques such as stochastic forensics. Data supporting insider threat is generally proprietary (i.e., encrypted data). Theoretical/conceptual models of insider threat are often based on loose interpretations of research in the behavioral and social sciences, using "deductive principles and intuitions of subject matter expert." Adopting sociotechnical approaches, researchers have also argued for the need to consider insider threat from the perspective of social systems. Jordan Schoenherr said that "surveillance requires an understanding of how sanctioning systems are framed, how employees will respond to surveillance, what workplace norms are deemed relevant, and what ‘deviance’ means, e.g., deviation for a justified organization norm or failure to conform to an organizational norm that conflicts with general social values." By treating all employees as potential insider threats, organizations might create conditions that lead to insider threats. == Sector-specific concerns == === Healthcare === The healthcare industry faces particularly acute insider threat risks due to the large number of workforce members who require access to sensitive patient records for legitimate clinical purposes. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has identified unauthorized access by insiders, including workforce snooping on patient records and theft of protected health information for identity fraud, as a persistent enforcement concern. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule addresses insider threats through several administrative safeguards, including workforce security procedures requiring covered entities to implement policies for authorizing and supervising workforce members who work with electronic protected health information, as well as termination procedures to revoke access when employment ends (45 CFR 164.308(a)(3)). The rule also requires audit controls to record and examine information system activity (45 CFR 164.312(b)), enabling detection of unauthorized access by insiders. The December 2024 Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to overhaul the HIPAA Security Rule would strengthen insider threat defenses by mandating role-based access controls, requiring notification of relevant workforce members within 24 hours of any changes to access privileges, and requiring regular review of audit logs to detect anomalous access patterns.