VoxForge is a free speech corpus and acoustic model repository for open source speech recognition engines. VoxForge was set up to collect transcribed speech to create a free GPL speech corpus in order to be uses with open source speech recognition engines. The speech audio files will be 'compiled' into acoustic models for use with open source speech recognition engines such as Julius, ISIP, and Sphinx and HTK (note: HTK has distribution restrictions). VoxForge has used LibriVox as a source of audio data since 2007.
Template matching
Template matching is a technique in digital image processing for finding small parts of an image which match a template image. It can be used for quality control in manufacturing, navigation of mobile robots, or edge detection in images. The main challenges in a template matching task are detection of occlusion, when a sought-after object is partly hidden in an image; detection of non-rigid transformations, when an object is distorted or imaged from different angles; sensitivity to illumination and background changes; background clutter; and scale changes. == Feature-based approach == The feature-based approach to template matching relies on the extraction of image features, such as shapes, textures, and colors, that match the target image or frame. This approach is usually achieved using neural networks and deep-learning classifiers such as VGG, AlexNet, and ResNet.Convolutional neural networks (CNNs), which many modern classifiers are based on, process an image by passing it through different hidden layers, producing a vector at each layer with classification information about the image. These vectors are extracted from the network and used as the features of the image. Feature extraction using deep neural networks, like CNNs, has proven extremely effective has become the standard in state-of-the-art template matching algorithms. This feature-based approach is often more robust than the template-based approach described below. As such, it has become the state-of-the-art method for template matching, as it can match templates with non-rigid and out-of-plane transformations, as well as high background clutter and illumination changes. == Template-based approach == For templates without strong features, or for when the bulk of a template image constitutes the matching image as a whole, a template-based approach may be effective. Since template-based matching may require sampling of a large number of data points, it is often desirable to reduce the number of sampling points by reducing the resolution of search and template images by the same factor before performing the operation on the resultant downsized images. This pre-processing method creates a multi-scale, or pyramid, representation of images, providing a reduced search window of data points within a search image so that the template does not have to be compared with every viable data point. Pyramid representations are a method of dimensionality reduction, a common aim of machine learning on data sets that suffer the curse of dimensionality. == Common challenges == In instances where the template may not provide a direct match, it may be useful to implement eigenspaces to create templates that detail the matching object under a number of different conditions, such as varying perspectives, illuminations, color contrasts, or object poses. For example, if an algorithm is looking for a face, its template eigenspaces may consist of images (i.e., templates) of faces in different positions to the camera, in different lighting conditions, or with different expressions (i.e., poses). It is also possible for a matching image to be obscured or occluded by an object. In these cases, it is unreasonable to provide a multitude of templates to cover each possible occlusion. For example, the search object may be a playing card, and in some of the search images, the card is obscured by the fingers of someone holding the card, or by another card on top of it, or by some other object in front of the camera. In cases where the object is malleable or poseable, motion becomes an additional problem, and problems involving both motion and occlusion become ambiguous. In these cases, one possible solution is to divide the template image into multiple sub-images and perform matching on each subdivision. == Deformable templates in computational anatomy == Template matching is a central tool in computational anatomy (CA). In this field, a deformable template model is used to model the space of human anatomies and their orbits under the group of diffeomorphisms, functions which smoothly deform an object. Template matching arises as an approach to finding the unknown diffeomorphism that acts on a template image to match the target image. Template matching algorithms in CA have come to be called large deformation diffeomorphic metric mappings (LDDMMs). Currently, there are LDDMM template matching algorithms for matching anatomical landmark points, curves, surfaces, volumes. == Template-based matching explained using cross correlation or sum of absolute differences == A basic method of template matching sometimes called "Linear Spatial Filtering" uses an image patch (i.e., the "template image" or "filter mask") tailored to a specific feature of search images to detect. This technique can be easily performed on grey images or edge images, where the additional variable of color is either not present or not relevant. Cross correlation techniques compare the similarities of the search and template images. Their outputs should be highest at places where the image structure matches the template structure, i.e., where large search image values get multiplied by large template image values. This method is normally implemented by first picking out a part of a search image to use as a template. Let S ( x , y ) {\displaystyle S(x,y)} represent the value of a search image pixel, where ( x , y ) {\displaystyle (x,y)} represents the coordinates of the pixel in the search image. For simplicity, assume pixel values are scalar, as in a greyscale image. Similarly, let T ( x t , y t ) {\textstyle T(x_{t},y_{t})} represent the value of a template pixel, where ( x t , y t ) {\textstyle (x_{t},y_{t})} represents the coordinates of the pixel in the template image. To apply the filter, simply move the center (or origin) of the template image over each point in the search image and calculate the sum of products, similar to a dot product, between the pixel values in the search and template images over the whole area spanned by the template. More formally, if ( 0 , 0 ) {\displaystyle (0,0)} is the center (or origin) of the template image, then the cross correlation T ⋆ S {\displaystyle T\star S} at each point ( x , y ) {\displaystyle (x,y)} in the search image can be computed as: ( T ⋆ S ) ( x , y ) = ∑ ( x t , y t ) ∈ T T ( x t , y t ) ⋅ S ( x t + x , y t + y ) {\displaystyle (T\star S)(x,y)=\sum _{(x_{t},y_{t})\in T}T(x_{t},y_{t})\cdot S(x_{t}+x,y_{t}+y)} For convenience, T {\displaystyle T} denotes both the pixel values of the template image as well as its domain, the bounds of the template. Note that all possible positions of the template with respect to the search image are considered. Since cross correlation values are greatest when the values of the search and template pixels align, the best matching position ( x m , y m ) {\displaystyle (x_{m},y_{m})} corresponds to the maximum value of T ⋆ S {\displaystyle T\star S} over S {\displaystyle S} . Another way to handle translation problems on images using template matching is to compare the intensities of the pixels, using the sum of absolute differences (SAD) measure. To formulate this, let I S ( x s , y s ) {\displaystyle I_{S}(x_{s},y_{s})} and I T ( x t , y t ) {\displaystyle I_{T}(x_{t},y_{t})} denote the light intensity of pixels in the search and template images with coordinates ( x s , y s ) {\displaystyle (x_{s},y_{s})} and ( x t , y t ) {\displaystyle (x_{t},y_{t})} , respectively. Then by moving the center (or origin) of the template to a point ( x , y ) {\displaystyle (x,y)} in the search image, as before, the sum of absolute differences between the template and search pixel intensities at that point is: S A D ( x , y ) = ∑ ( x t , y t ) ∈ T | I T ( x t , y t ) − I S ( x t + x , y t + y ) | {\displaystyle SAD(x,y)=\sum _{(x_{t},y_{t})\in T}\left\vert I_{T}(x_{t},y_{t})-I_{S}(x_{t}+x,y_{t}+y)\right\vert } With this measure, the lowest SAD gives the best position for the template, rather than the greatest as with cross correlation. SAD tends to be relatively simple to implement and understand, but it also tends to be relatively slow to execute. A simple C++ implementation of SAD template matching is given below. == Implementation == In this simple implementation, it is assumed that the above described method is applied on grey images: This is why Grey is used as pixel intensity. The final position in this implementation gives the top left location for where the template image best matches the search image. One way to perform template matching on color images is to decompose the pixels into their color components and measure the quality of match between the color template and search image using the sum of the SAD computed for each color separately. == Speeding up the process == In the past, this type of spatial filtering was normally only used in dedicated hardware solutions because of the computational complexity of the operation, however we can lessen this complexity b
Lior Ron (business executive)
Lior Ron (born March 16, 1977) is an Israeli businessman. He is the founder, chairman and former CEO of logistics technology company Uber Freight, co-founder of self-driving truck company Otto, and COO of self-driving technology company Waabi. == Early life and education == Ron grew up in Israel near Haifa. He attended the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, where he earned a bachelor's degree in computer science in 1997. He then joined Israeli Army Intelligence, where he served until 2004. After the Army, he earned a master's degree in computer science at Technion, incorporating artificial intelligence as he developed a biomedical device to assist patients suffering with Parkinson's disease. He then moved to California and earned an MBA from The Stanford Graduate School of Business. His undergraduate work and master's thesis were centered around AI when it was still in its early stages. == Career == === Google === In 2007, Ron joined Google as the Product Lead for Google Maps. He then worked at Motorola Mobility after it was acquired by Google, and in Google's robotics research effort. === Otto === In 2016, Ron left Google to found Otto, a company that makes self-driving kits to retrofit big rig trucks. Quoted in Wired, Ron said he left Google because he “felt an obligation to bring this technology to society sooner rather than later.” Otto launched in May 2016, and was acquired by Uber in late July of the same year. The Uber partnership allowed Ron and Otto the opportunity to develop a freight marketplace for truck drivers. === Uber Freight === On May 18, 2017, Ron and Uber launched Uber Freight, a unit of Uber initially designed as an app connecting long-haul truck drivers with companies in need of cargo shipping, with Ron as CEO. In August 2018, Uber Freight launched a new digital platform focused on shippers, to help them find the right driver for their needs. In 2021, Uber Freight acquired Transplace for $2.25 billion, expanding its services to include managed transportation, logistics software, and consulting. With Ron as CEO, Uber Freight has evolved into a full-scale logistics technology company for shippers and drivers, as Ron introduced more advanced generative AI capabilities to Uber Freight's software and Insights AI logistics platform. In September 2024, the company announced it manages nearly $20 billion in freight, and serves one in three Fortune 500 companies. In May 2025, the company launched the transportation industry's first large-scale AI-powered logistics network, with its large language model embedded directly into its transportation management system. === Waabi === On August 12, 2025, it was reported that Ron had been named chief operating officer of Waabi, a company developing autonomous driving technology using artificial intelligence. He remains as chairman of Uber Freight, with Rebecca Tinucci taking over as CEO. == Controversy == Ron co-founded Otto with Anthony Levandowski, who faces a lawsuit brought in 2017 from Google's parent company Alphabet that alleges Levandowski stole trade secrets while working for Alphabet's self-driving car division before he and Ron co-founded Otto.
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Generalized nondeterministic finite automaton
In the theory of computation, a generalized nondeterministic finite automaton (GNFA), also known as an expression automaton or a generalized nondeterministic finite state machine, is a variation of a nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) where each transition is labeled with any regular expression. The GNFA reads blocks of symbols from the input which constitute a string as defined by the regular expression on the transition. There are several differences between a standard finite state machine and a generalized nondeterministic finite state machine. A GNFA must have only one start state and one accept state, and these cannot be the same state, whereas an NFA or DFA both may have several accept states, and the start state can be an accept state. A GNFA must have only one transition between any two states, whereas a NFA or DFA both allow for numerous transitions between states. In a GNFA, a state has a single transition to every state in the machine, although often it is a convention to ignore the transitions that are labelled with the empty set when drawing generalized nondeterministic finite state machines. == Formal definition == A GNFA can be defined as a 5-tuple, (S, Σ, T, s, a), consisting of a finite set of states (S); a finite set called the alphabet (Σ); a transition function (T : (S ∖ {\displaystyle \setminus } {a}) × (S ∖ {\displaystyle \setminus } {s}) → R); a start state (s ∈ S); an accept state (a ∈ S); where R is the collection of all regular expressions over the alphabet Σ. The transition function takes as its argument a pair of two states and outputs a regular expression (the label of the transition). This differs from other finite state machines, which take as input a single state and an input from the alphabet (or the empty string in the case of nondeterministic finite state machines) and outputs the next state (or the set of possible states in the case of nondeterministic finite state machines). A DFA or NFA can easily be converted into a GNFA and then the GNFA can be easily converted into a regular expression by repeatedly collapsing parts of it to single edges until S = {s, a}. Similarly, GNFAs can be reduced to NFAs by changing regular expression operators into new edges until each edge is labelled with a regular expression matching a single string of length at most 1. NFAs, in turn, can be reduced to DFAs using the powerset construction. This shows that GNFAs recognize the same set of formal languages as DFAs and NFAs.
Adversarial machine learning
Adversarial machine learning is the study of the attacks on machine learning algorithms, and of the defenses against such attacks. Machine learning techniques are mostly designed to work on specific problem sets, under the assumption that the training and test data are generated from the same statistical distribution (IID). However, this assumption is often violated in practical high-stake applications, where users may intentionally supply fabricated data that violates the statistical assumption. Most common attacks in adversarial machine learning include evasion attacks, data poisoning attacks, Byzantine attacks and model extraction. == History == At the MIT Spam Conference in January 2004, John Graham-Cumming showed that a machine-learning spam filter could be used to defeat another machine-learning spam filter by automatically learning which words to add to a spam email to get the email classified as not spam. In 2004, Nilesh Dalvi and others noted that linear classifiers used in spam filters could be defeated by simple "evasion attacks" as spammers inserted "good words" into their spam emails. (Around 2007, some spammers added random noise to fuzz words within "image spam" in order to defeat OCR-based filters.) In 2006, Marco Barreno and others published "Can Machine Learning Be Secure?", outlining a broad taxonomy of attacks. As late as 2013 many researchers continued to hope that non-linear classifiers (such as support vector machines and neural networks) might be robust to adversaries, until Battista Biggio and others demonstrated the first gradient-based attacks on such machine-learning models (2012–2013). In 2012, deep neural networks began to dominate computer vision problems; starting in 2014, Christian Szegedy and others demonstrated that deep neural networks could be fooled by adversaries, again using a gradient-based attack to craft adversarial perturbations. Further work would show that adversarial attacks are harder to produce in uncontrolled environments, due to the different environmental constraints that cancel out the effect of noise. For example, any small rotation or slight illumination on an adversarial image can destroy the adversariality. In addition, researchers such as Google Brain's Nick Frosst point out that it is much easier to make self-driving cars miss stop signs by physically removing the sign itself, rather than creating adversarial examples. Frosst also believes that the adversarial machine learning community incorrectly assumes models trained on a certain data distribution will also perform well on a completely different data distribution. He suggests that a new approach to machine learning should be explored, and is currently working on a unique neural network that has characteristics more similar to human perception than state-of-the-art approaches. While adversarial machine learning continues to be heavily rooted in academia, large tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, and IBM have begun curating documentation and open source code bases to allow others to concretely assess the robustness of machine learning models and minimize the risk of adversarial attacks. === Examples === Examples include attacks in spam filtering, where spam messages are obfuscated through the misspelling of "bad" words or the insertion of "good" words; attacks in computer security, such as obfuscating malware code within network packets or modifying the characteristics of a network flow to mislead intrusion detection; attacks in biometric recognition where fake biometric traits may be exploited to impersonate a legitimate user; or to compromise users' template galleries that adapt to updated traits over time. Researchers showed that by changing only one-pixel it was possible to fool deep learning algorithms. Others 3-D printed a toy turtle with a texture engineered to make Google's object detection AI classify it as a rifle regardless of the angle from which the turtle was viewed. Creating the turtle required only low-cost commercially available 3-D printing technology. A machine-tweaked image of a dog was shown to look like a cat to both computers and humans. A 2019 study reported that humans can guess how machines will classify adversarial images. Researchers discovered methods for perturbing the appearance of a stop sign such that an autonomous vehicle classified it as a merge or speed limit sign. A data poisoning filter called Nightshade was released in 2023 by researchers at the University of Chicago. It was created for use by visual artists to put on their artwork to corrupt the data set of text-to-image models, which usually scrape their data from the internet without the consent of the image creator. McAfee attacked Tesla's former Mobileye system, fooling it into driving 50 mph over the speed limit, simply by adding a two-inch strip of black tape to a speed limit sign. Adversarial patterns on glasses or clothing designed to deceive facial-recognition systems or license-plate readers, have led to a niche industry of "stealth streetwear". An adversarial attack on a neural network can allow an attacker to inject algorithms into the target system. Researchers can also create adversarial audio inputs to disguise commands to intelligent assistants in benign-seeming audio; a parallel literature explores human perception of such stimuli. Clustering algorithms are used in security applications. Malware and computer virus analysis aims to identify malware families, and to generate specific detection signatures. In the context of malware detection, researchers have proposed methods for adversarial malware generation that automatically craft binaries to evade learning-based detectors while preserving malicious functionality. Optimization-based attacks such as GAMMA use genetic algorithms to inject benign content (for example, padding or new PE sections) into Windows executables, framing evasion as a constrained optimization problem that balances misclassification success with the size of the injected payload and showing transferability to commercial antivirus products. Complementary work uses generative adversarial networks (GANs) to learn feature-space perturbations that cause malware to be classified as benign; Mal-LSGAN, for instance, replaces the standard GAN loss with a least-squares objective and modified activation functions to improve training stability and produce adversarial malware examples that substantially reduce true positive rates across multiple detectors. == Challenges in applying machine learning to security == Researchers have observed that the constraints under which machine-learning techniques function in the security domain are different from those of common benchmark domains. Security data may change over time, include mislabeled samples, or reflect adversarial behavior, which complicates evaluation and reproducibility. === Data collection issues === Security datasets vary across formats, including binaries, network traces, and log files. Studies have reported that the process of converting these sources into features can introduce bias or inconsistencies. In addition, time-based leakage can occur when related malware samples are not properly separated across training and testing splits, which may lead to overly optimistic results. === Labeling and ground truth challenges === Malware labels are often unstable because different antivirus engines may classify the same sample in conflicting ways. Ceschin et al. note that families may be renamed or reorganized over time, causing further discrepancies in ground truth and reducing the reliability of benchmarks. === Concept drift === Because malware creators continuously adapt their techniques, the statistical properties of malicious samples also change. This form of concept drift has been widely documented and may reduce model performance unless systems are updated regularly or incorporate mechanisms for incremental learning. === Feature robustness === Researchers differentiate between features that can be easily manipulated and those that are more resistant to modification. For example, simple static attributes, such as header fields, may be altered by attackers, while structural features, such as control-flow graphs, are generally more stable but computationally expensive to extract. === Class imbalance === In realistic deployment environments, the proportion of malicious samples can be extremely low, ranging from 0.01% to 2% of total data. This unbalanced distribution causes models to develop a bias towards the majority class, achieving high accuracy but failing to identify malicious samples. Prior approaches to this problem have included both data-level solutions and sequence-specific models. Methods like n-gram and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks can model sequential data, but their performance has been shown to decline significantly when malware samples are realistically proportioned in the training set, demonstrating the limitations in
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