Voice inversion scrambling is an analog method of obscuring the content of a transmission. It is sometimes used in public service radio, automobile racing, cordless telephones and the Family Radio Service. Without a descrambler, the transmission makes the speaker "sound like Donald Duck". Despite the term, the technique operates on the passband of the information and so can be applied to any information being transmitted. == Forms and details == There are various forms of voice inversion which offer differing levels of security. Overall, voice inversion scrambling offers little true security as software and even hobbyist kits are available from kit makers for scrambling and descrambling. The cadence of the speech is not changed. It is often easy to guess what is happening in the conversation by listening for other audio cues like questions, short responses and other language cadences. In the simplest form of voice inversion, the frequency p {\displaystyle p} of each component is replaced with s − p {\displaystyle s-p} , where s {\displaystyle s} is the frequency of a carrier wave. This can be done by amplitude modulating the speech signal with the carrier, then applying a low-pass filter to select the lower sideband. This will make the low tones of the voice sound like high ones and vice versa. This process also occurs naturally if a radio receiver is tuned to a single sideband transmission but set to decode the wrong sideband. There are more advanced forms of voice inversion which are more complex and require more effort to descramble. One method is to use a random code to choose the carrier frequency and then change this code in real time. This is called Rolling Code voice inversion and one can often hear the "ticks" in the transmission which signal the changing of the inversion point. Another method is split band voice inversion. This is where the band is split and then each band is inverted separately. A rolling code can also be added to this method for variable split band inversion (VSB). Common carrier frequencies are: 2.632 kHz, 2.718 kHz, 2.868 kHz, 3.023 kHz, 3.107 kHz, 3.196 kHz, 3.333 kHz, 3.339 kHz, 3.496 kHz, 3.729 kHz and 4.096 kHz. Voice inversion offers no security at all and software is available to restore the original voice, which is why it is no longer used to protect conversations today. However, voice inversion is still found in low-end Chinese walkie talkies.
The AI Con
The AI Con: How to Fight Big Tech's Hype and Create the Future We Want is a 2025 non-fiction book by linguist Emily M. Bender and sociologist Alex Hanna. It argues that much of what is labeled "artificial intelligence" is a misleading term that obscures ordinary automation while concentrating power in a small number of technology firms. The book was published in May 2025 by Harper in the United States and Bodley Head in the United Kingdom. It was developed alongside the authors' long-running podcast Mystery AI Hype Theater 3000, which critiques exaggerated claims about AI. == Synopsis == The authors present AI as a marketing umbrella that encourages audiences to infer understanding and agency where none exist. They argue readers should treat such language skeptically and to separate specific automated tasks from broad claims of intelligence. The book describes a recurring hype cycle in which corporate narratives justify data and labor extraction, the replacement of human services with cheaper substitutes, and the diversion of attention from present harms to speculative futures. While acknowledging limited uses such as pattern recognition, the authors argue that contemporary systems are best understood as text and media generators shaped by training data and human labor, not as thinking or reasoning entities. A central theme is the social and environmental cost of scaling these systems, including increased energy and water use, the appropriation of creative work for training, and the outsourcing of ghost work to low-paid data workers worldwide. These costs are linked to workplace effects, with the authors arguing that automation rarely eliminates jobs outright and more often degrades them through surveillance, work intensification, and unpaid oversight. As alternatives to passive adoption, the authors propose concrete responses: asking precise questions about what is being automated and why, demanding transparency about data and evaluation, and practicing what they call strategic refusal when deployment conflicts with evidence or values. The book also develops a vocabulary for public debate, rejecting both boosterish and doomerish narratives as grounded in the same assumption that AI is a singular, autonomous force. The authors recommend reading strategies such as favoring trusted human sources over automated summaries and using humor to deflate inflated claims. They describe a link between language to policy and power, arguing that precise terminology can help policymakers and the public resist austerity-driven automation and demand accountability for errors and harms. == Reception == The Guardian praised the book's myth-busting approach and its analysis of how hype erodes cultural and civic life by normalizing synthetic media as a substitute for human judgment. Kirkus Reviews described it as a contrarian account that catalogs concrete risks while cutting through speculative predictions. An interview in Business Insider highlighted the authors' accessible frameworks, including their proposal to describe chatbots as conversation simulators and to evaluate systems in terms of values, labor, and evidence. Coverage in GeekWire emphasized the book's call for resistance through collective bargaining, stronger data rights, and a norm of rejecting deployments that fail basic standards of necessity and evaluation. Some reviews were more critical. A review in LLRX argued that the book's tone could be overly polemical and that it gave limited attention to potential benefits claimed for generative systems. Coverage in the Financial Times, focused on Bender's broader public scholarship, situated the book within her long-standing critique of anthropomorphic narratives about large language models and her advocacy for more democratic oversight of automated systems.
List of artificial intelligence journals
This is a list of notable peer-reviewed academic journals that publish research in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), including areas such as machine learning, computer vision, natural language processing, robotics, and intelligent systems. == General artificial intelligence == Artificial Intelligence (journal) – Elsevier Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) – AI Access Foundation Knowledge-Based Systems – Elsevier == Machine learning == Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery – Springer Machine Learning (journal) – Springer Journal of Machine Learning Research – Microtome Pattern Recognition (journal) – Elsevier Neural Networks (journal) – Elsevier Neural Computation (journal) – MIT Press Neurocomputing (journal) - Elsevier == Deep learning and neural computation == IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation – IEEE IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems – IEEE Nature Machine Intelligence – Springer Nature == Computer vision == International Journal of Computer Vision – Springer IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence – IEEE Machine Vision and Applications – Springer == Natural language processing == Computational Linguistics (journal) – MIT Press Natural Language Processing Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics – ACL == Robotics and intelligent systems == IEEE Transactions on Robotics – IEEE Autonomous Robots – Springer Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems – Springer == Interdisciplinary and ethics in AI == AI & Society – Springer Artificial Life – MIT Press Philosophy & Technology – Springer Minds and Machines – Springer
AI-complete
In the field of artificial intelligence (AI), tasks that are hypothesized to require artificial general intelligence to solve are informally known as AI-complete or AI-hard. Calling a problem AI-complete reflects the belief that it cannot be solved by a simple specific algorithm. Prior to 2013, problems supposed to be AI-complete included computer vision, natural language understanding, and dealing with unexpected circumstances while solving any real-world problem. AI-complete tasks were notably considered useful for distinguishing humans from automated agents, as CAPTCHAs aim to do. == History == The term was coined by Fanya Montalvo by analogy with NP-complete and NP-hard in complexity theory, which formally describes the most famous class of difficult problems. Early uses of the term are in Erik Mueller's 1987 PhD dissertation and in Eric Raymond's 1991 Jargon File. Expert systems, that were popular in the 1980s, were able to solve very simple and/or restricted versions of AI-complete problems, but never in their full generality. When AI researchers attempted to "scale up" their systems to handle more complicated, real-world situations, the programs tended to become excessively brittle without commonsense knowledge or a rudimentary understanding of the situation: they would fail as unexpected circumstances outside of its original problem context would begin to appear. When human beings are dealing with new situations in the world, they are helped by their awareness of the general context: they know what the things around them are, why they are there, what they are likely to do and so on. They can recognize unusual situations and adjust accordingly. Expert systems lacked this adaptability and were brittle when facing new situations. DeepMind published a work in May 2022 in which they trained a single model to do several things at the same time. The model, named Gato, can "play Atari, caption images, chat, stack blocks with a real robot arm and much more, deciding based on its context whether to output text, joint torques, button presses, or other tokens." Similarly, some tasks once considered to be AI-complete, like machine translation, are among the capabilities of large language models. == AI-complete problems == AI-complete problems have been hypothesized to include: AI peer review (composite natural language understanding, automated reasoning, automated theorem proving, formalized logic expert system) Bongard problems Computer vision (and subproblems such as object recognition) Natural language understanding (and subproblems such as text mining, machine translation, and word-sense disambiguation) Autonomous driving Dealing with unexpected circumstances while solving any real world problem, whether navigation, planning, or even the kind of reasoning done by expert systems. == Formalization == Computational complexity theory deals with the relative computational difficulty of computable functions. By definition, it does not cover problems whose solution is unknown or has not been characterized formally. Since many AI problems have no formalization yet, conventional complexity theory does not enable a formal definition of AI-completeness. == Research == Roman Yampolskiy suggests that a problem C {\displaystyle C} is AI-Complete if it has two properties: It is in the set of AI problems (Human Oracle-solvable). Any AI problem can be converted into C {\displaystyle C} by some polynomial time algorithm. On the other hand, a problem H {\displaystyle H} is AI-Hard if and only if there is an AI-Complete problem C {\displaystyle C} that is polynomial time Turing-reducible to H {\displaystyle H} . This also gives as a consequence the existence of AI-Easy problems, that are solvable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine with an oracle for some problem. Yampolskiy has also hypothesized that the Turing Test is a defining feature of AI-completeness. Groppe and Jain classify problems which require artificial general intelligence to reach human-level machine performance as AI-complete, while only restricted versions of AI-complete problems can be solved by the current AI systems. For Šekrst, getting a polynomial solution to AI-complete problems would not necessarily be equal to solving the issue of artificial general intelligence, while emphasizing the lack of computational complexity research being the limiting factor towards achieving artificial general intelligence. For Kwee-Bintoro and Velez, solving AI-complete problems would have strong repercussions on society.
Double descent
Double descent in statistics and machine learning is the phenomenon where a model's error rate on the test set initially decreases with the number of parameters, then peaks, then decreases again. This phenomenon has been considered surprising, as it contradicts assumptions about overfitting in classical machine learning. The increase usually occurs near the interpolation threshold, where the number of parameters is the same as the number of training data points (the model is just large enough to fit the training data). Or, more precisely, it is the maximum number of samples on which the model/training procedure achieves approximately on average 0 training error. == History == Early observations of what would later be called double descent in specific models date back to 1989. The term "double descent" was coined by Belkin et. al. in 2019, when the phenomenon gained popularity as a broader concept exhibited by many models. The latter development was prompted by a perceived contradiction between the conventional wisdom that too many parameters in the model result in a significant overfitting error (an extrapolation of the bias–variance tradeoff), and the empirical observations in the 2010s that some modern machine learning techniques tend to perform better with larger models. == Theoretical models == Double descent occurs in linear regression with isotropic Gaussian covariates and isotropic Gaussian noise. A model of double descent at the thermodynamic limit has been analyzed using the replica trick, and the result has been confirmed numerically. A number of works have suggested that double descent can be explained using the concept of effective dimension: While a network may have a large number of parameters, in practice only a subset of those parameters are relevant for generalization performance, as measured by the local Hessian curvature. This explanation is formalized through PAC-Bayes compression-based generalization bounds, which show that less complex models are expected to generalize better under a Solomonoff prior.
Spotify Kids
Spotify Kids is a Swedish kid-friendly Music streaming service developed by Spotify. It offers curated content for children, including music, audiobooks, lullabies, and bedtime stories, while providing their parents with parental controls. The service is only available to subscribers to Spotify's Premium Family subscription plan. == Function == Spotify Kids is a Swedish Kid-friendly Music Streaming Service that allows children to browse Spotify with parental controls. Using the app, parents can view their children's listening history, block specific songs, and share playlists with their children. The app also includes sing-along songs, playlists designed for young children, and curated audiobooks, lullabies, and bedtime stories. Access is included in Spotify's Premium Family subscription plan, and is exclusive to subscribers to the plan. Users can configure the app for a specific age group upon first launch. The playlists on Spotify Kids are curated by groups including Discovery Kids, Nickelodeon, Universal Pictures, and The Walt Disney Company. All content on the Spotify Kids app is curated by editors. As of March 2021, there were roughly 8,000 songs available on the platform. The design of the Spotify Kids app is colorful, and user interface varies depending on the age group for which the app is configured. Spotify Kids is designed to comply with consent and data collection regulations for apps used by children. TechCrunch explains that it is "designed on a grand scale to drive subscriptions to Spotify's top-tier $14.99-per-month Premium Family Plan." == Release == After being beta tested in Ireland in October 2019, it was released as a beta across the United Kingdom on February 11, 2020. It was later released in Sweden, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. On March 31, 2021, it was made available in France, Canada, and the United States.
DABUS
DABUS (Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience) is an artificial intelligence (AI) system created by Stephen Thaler. It reportedly conceived of two novel products — a food container constructed using fractal geometry, which enables rapid reheating, and a flashing beacon for attracting attention in an emergency. The filing of patent applications designating DABUS as inventor has led to decisions by patent offices and courts on whether a patent can be granted for an invention reportedly made by an AI system. == History in different jurisdictions == === Australia === On 17 September 2019, Thaler filed an application to patent a "Food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention," naming DABUS as the inventor. On 21 September 2020, IP Australia found that section 15(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) is inconsistent with an artificial intelligence machine being treated as an inventor, and Thaler's application had lapsed. Thaler sought judicial review, and on 30 July 2021, the Federal Court set aside IP Australia's decision and ordered IP Australia to reconsider the application. On 13 April 2022, the Full Court of the Federal Court set aside that decision, holding that only a natural person can be an inventor for the purposes of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth), and that such an inventor must be identified for any person to be entitled to a grant of a patent. On 11 November 2022, Thaler was refused special leave to appeal to the High Court. === European Patent Office === On 17 October 2018 and 7 November 2018, Thaler filed two European patent applications with the European Patent Office. The first claimed invention was a "Food Container" and the second was "Devices and Methods for Attracting Enhanced Attention." On 27 January 2020, the EPO rejected the applications on the grounds that the application listed an AI system named DABUS, and not a human, as the inventor, based on Article 81 and Rule 19(1) of the European Patent Convention (EPC). On 21 December 2021, the Board of Appeal of the EPO dismissed Thaler's appeal from the EPO's primary decision. The Board of Appeal confirmed that "under the EPC the designated inventor has to be a person with legal capacity. This is not merely an assumption on which the EPC was drafted. It is the ordinary meaning of the term inventor." === United Kingdom === Similar applications were filed by Thaler to the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office on 17 October and 7 November 2018. The Office asked Thaler to file statements of inventorship and of right of grant to a patent (Patent Form 7) in respect of each invention within 16 months of the filing date. Thaler filed those forms naming DABUS as the inventor and explaining in some detail why he believed that machines should be regarded as inventors in the circumstances. His application was rejected on the grounds that: (1) naming a machine as inventor did not meet the requirements of the Patents Act 1977; and (2) the IPO was not satisfied as to the manner in which Thaler had acquired rights that would otherwise vest in the inventor. Thaler was not satisfied with the decision and asked for a hearing before an official known as the "hearing officer". By a decision dated 4 December 2019 the hearing officer rejected Thaler's appeal. Thaler appealed against the hearing officer's decision to the Patents Court (a specialist court within the Chancery Division of the High Court of England and Wales that determines patent disputes). On 21 September 2020, Mr Justice Marcus Smith upheld the decision of the hearing officer. On 21 September 2021, Thaler's further appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by Arnold LJ and Laing LJ (Birss LJ dissenting). On 20 December 2023, the UK Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal by Thaler. In its judgment, the court held that an "inventor" under the Patents Act 1977 must be a natural person. === United States === The patent applications on the inventions were refused by the USPTO, which held that only natural persons can be named as inventors in a patent application. Thaler first fought this result by filing a complaint under the Administrative Procedure Act alleging that the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law; unsupported by substantial evidence, and in excess of Defendants’ statutory authority." A month later on August 19, 2019, Thaler filed a petition with the USPTO as allowed in 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 stating that DABUS should be the inventor. The judge and Thaler agreed in this case that Thaler himself is unable to receive the patent on behalf of DABUS. In their August 5, 2022, Thaler decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that only a natural person could be an inventor, which means that the AI that invents any other type of invention is not addressed by the "who" mentioned in the legislation. === New Zealand === On January 31, 2022, the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) decided that a patent application (776029) filed by Stephen Thaler was void, on the basis that no inventor was identified on the patent application. IPONZ determined that DABUS could not be "an actual devisor of the invention" as required by the Patents Act 2013, and that this must be a natural person as held by the previous patent offices above. The High Court of New Zealand confirmed the decision in 2023. === South Africa === On 24 June 2021, the South African Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) accepted Dr Thaler's Patent Cooperation Treaty, for a patent in respect of inventions generated by DABUS. In July 2021, the CIPC released a notice of issuance for the patent. It is the first patent granted for an AI invention. === Switzerland === On June 26, 2025, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court ruled that artificial intelligence systems such as DABUS cannot be listed as inventors in patent applications. The court upheld the existing practice of the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property (IPI), which requires that only natural persons can be recognized as inventors under Swiss patent law. The case concerned a patent application, which sought to designate DABUS as the sole inventor of a food container designed with a fractal geometry to enhance heat distribution. The IPI had rejected the application, arguing that both the absence of a human inventor and the attribution of inventorship to an AI system were inadmissible. While the court dismissed Thaler's main request, it accepted a subsidiary request: if a human applicant recognizes and files a patent based on an AI-generated invention, that person may be considered the inventor. As a result, the application may proceed with Thaler listed as the inventor. The decision (B-2532/2024) can still be appealed to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.