An and–or tree is a graphical representation of the reduction of problems (or goals) to conjunctions and disjunctions of subproblems (or subgoals). == Example == The and–or tree: represents the search space for solving the problem P, using the goal-reduction methods: P if Q and R P if S Q if T Q if U == Definitions == Given an initial problem P0 and set of problem solving methods of the form: P if P1 and … and Pn the associated and–or tree is a set of labelled nodes such that: The root of the tree is a node labelled by P0. For every node N labelled by a problem or sub-problem P and for every method of the form P if P1 and ... and Pn, there exists a set of children nodes N1, ..., Nn of the node N, such that each node Ni is labelled by Pi. The nodes are conjoined by an arc, to distinguish them from children of N that might be associated with other methods. A node N, labelled by a problem P, is a success node if there is a method of the form P if nothing (i.e., P is a "fact"). The node is a failure node if there is no method for solving P. If all of the children of a node N, conjoined by the same arc, are success nodes, then the node N is also a success node. Otherwise the node is a failure node. == Search strategies == An and–or tree specifies only the search space for solving a problem. Different search strategies for searching the space are possible. These include searching the tree depth-first, breadth-first, or best-first using some measure of desirability of solutions. The search strategy can be sequential, searching or generating one node at a time, or parallel, searching or generating several nodes in parallel. == Relationship with logic programming == The methods used for generating and–or trees are propositional logic programs (without variables). In the case of logic programs containing variables, the solutions of conjoint sub-problems must be compatible. Subject to this complication, sequential and parallel search strategies for and–or trees provide a computational model for executing logic programs. == Relationship with two-player games == And–or trees can also be used to represent the search spaces for two-person games. The root node of such a tree represents the problem of one of the players winning the game, starting from the initial state of the game. Given a node N, labelled by the problem P of the player winning the game from a particular state of play, there exists a single set of conjoint children nodes, corresponding to all of the opponents responding moves. For each of these children nodes, there exists a set of non-conjoint children nodes, corresponding to all of the player's defending moves. For solving game trees with proof-number search family of algorithms, game trees are to be mapped to and–or trees. MAX-nodes (i.e. maximizing player to move) are represented as OR nodes, MIN-nodes map to AND nodes. The mapping is possible, when the search is done with only a binary goal, which usually is "player to move wins the game".
DAvE (Infineon)
DAVE, or Digital Application Virtual Engineer, is a software development and code generation tool for microcontroller applications created in C/C++. == Versions == === Version 4 (beta) === The successor of the Eclipse-based development environment for C/C++ and/or graphical user interface (GUI) based development using application software (apps). It generates code for the latest XMC1xxx and XMC4xxx microcontrollers using ARM Cortex-M processors. DAVE software development kit (SDK) is a free integrated development environment to set up its own apps for DAVE. === Version 3 === Automatic code generation is based on the use of case-oriented, configurable, and tested software (SW) components, called DAVE Apps. They are comparable to executable and configurable application notes that can be downloaded from the web. The environment is based on Eclipse. Ordinary program development using C/C++ is also available. The targets for this development are XMC1xxx and XMC4xxx microcontrollers that use Cortex-M processors. === Previous versions === This version targets 32-bit microcontroller units (MCUs) (Infineon TriCore AUDO family), 16-bit MCUs (C166, XC166, XE166, and XC2000 family), and 8-bit MCUs (XC800 family) from Infineon. After the initial setup, the configuration wizard appears and gives an overview of the hardware peripherals, control units, and modules. The microcontroller application can be created by selecting the desired functions. At this step, module-specific functions must be selected for module initializing and control. Finally, the application source files will be generated by DAVE and embedded in a project in the selected development environment, where the code can still be modified or added to an extant project. == DAVE-related software == Infineon also developed additional software that can be used in conjunction with DAVE for specific microcontroller families or additional hardware: DAVE Bench for XC800 is a platform providing free development tools for Infineon's 8-bit microcontroller family, based on the Open Source Eclipse architecture. DAVE Drive is a GUI-based software tool that allows application developers to create embedded software for the control of brushless synchronous three-phase motors. == Alternative software == The Infineon MCUs are directly supported by several commercial products, depending on the selected MCU target. An embedded programming library for MATLAB exists. As a free alternative to DAVE, the developer can use the Keil Microcontroller Development Kit (MDK) Version 5. Code for the XMX1000 series up to 128 kB can be developed this way without purchasing a license from Keil.
Open Mashup Alliance
The Open Mashup Alliance (OMA) is a non-profit consortium that promotes the adoption of mashup solutions in the enterprise through the evolution of enterprise mashup standards like EMML. The initial members of the OMA include some large technology companies such as Adobe Systems, Hewlett-Packard, and Intel and some major technology users such as Bank of America and Capgemini. According to Dion Hinchcliffe, "Ultimately, the OMA creates a standardized approach to enterprise mashups that creates an open and vibrant market for competing runtimes, mashups, and an array of important aftermarket services such as development/testing tools, management and administration appliances, governance frameworks, education, professional services, and so on." == Specification development == The initial focus of the OMA is developing EMML, which is a declarative mashup domain-specific language (DSL) aimed at creating enterprise mashups. The EMML language provides a comprehensive set of high-level mashup-domain vocabulary to consume and mash a variety of web data sources. EMML provides a uniform syntax to invoke heterogeneous service styles: REST, WSDL, RSS/ATOM, RDBMS, and POJO. EMML also provides the ability to mix and match diverse data formats: XML, JSON, JDBC, JavaObjects, and primitive types. The OMA website provides the EMML specification, the EMML schema, a reference runtime implementation capable of running EMML scripts, sample EMML mashup scripts, and technical documentation. The OMA is developing EMML under a Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives license. The eventual objective of the OMA is to submit the EMML specification and any other OMA specifications to a recognized industry standards body.
Digital Cinema Package
A Digital Cinema Package (DCP) is a collection of digital files used to store and convey digital cinema (DC) audio, image, and data streams. The term was popularized by Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC in its original recommendation for packaging DC contents. However, the industry tends to apply the term to the structure more formally known as the composition. A DCP is a container format for compositions, a hierarchical file structure that represents a title version. The DCP may carry a partial composition (e.g. not a complete set of files), a single complete composition, or multiple and complete compositions. The composition consists of a Composition Playlist (in XML format) that defines the playback sequence of a set of Track Files. Track Files carry the essence (audio, image, subtitles), which is wrapped using Material eXchange Format (MXF). Track Files must contain only one essence type. Two track files at a minimum must be present in every composition (see SMPTE ST429-2 D-Cinema Packaging – DCP Constraints, or Cinepedia): a track file carrying picture essence, and a track file carrying audio essence. The composition, consisting of a Composition Playlist (CPL) and associated track files, are distributed as a Digital Cinema Package (DCP). A composition is a complete representation of a title version, while the DCP need not carry a full composition. However, as already noted, it is commonplace in the industry to discuss the title in terms of a DCP, as that is the deliverable to the cinema. The Picture Track File essence is compressed using JPEG 2000 and the Audio Track File carries a 24-bit linear PCM uncompressed multichannel WAV file. Encryption may optionally be applied to the essence of a track file to protect it from unauthorized use. The encryption used is AES 128-bit in CBC mode. In practice, there are two versions of composition in use. The original version is called Interop DCP. In 2009, a specification was published by SMPTE (SMPTE ST 429-2 Digital Cinema Packaging – DCP Constraints) for what is commonly referred to as SMPTE DCP. SMPTE DCP is similar but not backwards compatible with Interop DCP, resulting in an uphill effort to transition the industry from Interop DCP to SMPTE DCP. SMPTE DCP requires significant constraints to ensure success in the field, as shown by ISDCF. While legacy support for Interop DCP is necessary for commercial products, new productions are encouraged to be distributed in SMPTE DCP. == Technical specifications == The DCP root folder (in the storage medium) contains a number of files, some used to store the image and audio contents, and some other used to organize and manage the whole playlist. === Picture MXF files === Picture contents may be stored in one or more reels corresponding to one or more MXF files. Each reel contains pictures as MPEG-2 or JPEG 2000 essence, depending on the adopted codec. MPEG-2 is no longer compliant with the DCI specification. JPEG 2000 is the only accepted compression format. Supported frame rates are: SMPTE (JPEG 2000) 24, 25, 30, 48, 50, and 60 fps @ 2K 24, 25, and 30 fps @ 4K 24 and 48 fps @ 2K stereoscopic MXF Interop (JPEG 2000) – Deprecated 24 and 48 fps @ 2K (MXF Interop can be encoded at 25 frame/s but support is not guaranteed) 24 fps @ 4K 24 fps @ 2K stereoscopic MXF Interop (MPEG-2) – Deprecated 23.976 and 24 fps @ 1920 × 1080 Maximum frame sizes are 2048 × 1080 for 2K DC, and 4096 × 2160 for 4K DC. Common formats are: SMPTE (JPEG 2000) Flat (1998 × 1080 or 3996 × 2160), = 1.85:1 aspect ratio Scope (2048 × 858 or 4096 × 1716), ~2.39:1 aspect ratio HDTV (1920 × 1080 or 3840 × 2160), 16:9 aspect ratio (~1.78:1) (although not specifically defined in the DCI specification, this resolution is DCI compliant per section 8.4.3.2). Full (2048 × 1080 or 4096 × 2160) (~1.9:1 aspect ratio, official name by DCI is Full Container. Not widely accepted in cinemas.) MXF Interop (MPEG-2) – Deprecated Full Frame (1920 × 1080) 12 bits per component precision (36 bits total per pixel) XYZ' colorspace; the prime mark indicates gamma encoding (gamma=2.6) Maximum bit rate is 250 Mbit/s (1.3 MBytes per frame at 24 frame per second) === Sound MXF files === Sound contents are also stored in reels corresponding to picture reels in number and duration. In case of multilingual features, separate reels are required to convey different languages. Each file contains linear PCM essence. Sampling rate is 48,000 or 96,000 samples per second Sample precision of 24 bits Linear mapping (no companding) Up to 16 independent channels === Asset map file === List of all files included in the DCP, in XML format. === Composition playlist file === Defines the playback order during presentation. The order is saved in XML format in this file; each picture and sound reel is identified by its UUID. In the following example, a reel is composed by picture and sound: === Packing list file or package key list (PKL) === All files in the composition are hashed and their hash is stored here, in XML format. This file is generally used during ingestion in a digital cinema server to verify if data have been corrupted or tampered with in some way. For example, an MXF picture reel is identified by the following
General-Purpose Serial Interface
General-Purpose Serial Interface, also known as GPSI, 7-wire interface, or 7WS, is a 7 wire communications interface. It is used as an interface between Ethernet MAC and PHY blocks. Data is received and transmitted using separate data paths (TXD, RXD) and separate data clocks (TXCLK, RXCLK). Other signals consist of transmit enable (TXEN), receive carrier sense (CRS), and collision (COL).
Artificial intelligence arms race
A military artificial intelligence arms race is a technological, economic, and military competition between two or more states to develop and deploy advanced AI technologies and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The goal is to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over rivals, similar to previous arms races involving nuclear or conventional military technologies. Since the mid-2010s, many analysts have noted the emergence of such an arms race between superpowers for better AI technology and military AI, driven by increasing geopolitical and military tensions. An AI arms race is sometimes placed in the context of an AI Cold War between the United States and China. Several influential figures and publications have emphasized that whoever develops artificial general intelligence (AGI) first could dominate global affairs in the 21st century. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the leader in AI will "rule the world." Researchers and experts, such as Leopold Aschenbrenner and Adrian Pecotic respectively, warn that the AGI race between major powers like the U.S. and China could reshape geopolitical power. This includes AI for surveillance, autonomous weapons, decision-making systems, cyber operations, and more. == Terminology == Lethal autonomous weapons systems use artificial intelligence to identify and kill human targets without human intervention. LAWS have colloquially been called "slaughterbots" or "killer robots". Broadly, any competition for superior AI is sometimes framed as an "arms race". Advantages in military AI overlap with advantages in other sectors, as countries pursue both economic and military advantages, as per previous arms races throughout history. == History == In 2014, AI specialist Steve Omohundro warned that "An autonomous weapons arms race is already taking place". According to Siemens, worldwide military spending on robotics was US$5.1 billion in 2010 and US$7.5 billion in 2015. China became a top player in artificial intelligence research in the 2010s. According to the Financial Times, in 2016, for the first time, China published more AI research papers than the entire European Union. When restricted to number of AI papers in the top 5% of cited papers, China overtook the United States in 2016 but lagged behind the European Union. 23% of the researchers presenting at the 2017 American Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) conference were Chinese. Eric Schmidt, the former chairman and chief executive officer of Alphabet, has predicted China will be the leading country in AI by 2025. == Risks == One risk concerns the AI race itself, whether or not the race is won by any one group. There are strong incentives for development teams to cut corners with regard to the safety of the system, increasing the risk of critical failures and unintended consequences. This is in part due to the perceived advantage of being the first to develop advanced AI technology. One team appearing to be on the brink of a breakthrough can encourage other teams to take shortcuts, ignore precautions and deploy a system that is less ready. Some argue that using "race" terminology at all in this context can exacerbate this effect. Another potential danger of an AI arms race is the possibility of losing control of the AI systems; the risk is compounded in the case of a race to artificial general intelligence, which may present an existential risk. In 2023, a United States Air Force official reportedly said that during a computer test, a simulated AI drone killed the human character operating it. The USAF later said the official had misspoken and that it never conducted such simulations. A third risk of an AI arms race is whether or not the race is actually won by one group. The concern is regarding the consolidation of power and technological advantage in the hands of one group. A US government report argued that "AI-enabled capabilities could be used to threaten critical infrastructure, amplify disinformation campaigns, and wage war":1, and that "global stability and nuclear deterrence could be undermined".:11 == By nation == === United States === In 2014, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel posited the "Third Offset Strategy" that rapid advances in artificial intelligence will define the next generation of warfare. According to data science and analytics firm Govini, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) increased investment in artificial intelligence, big data and cloud computing from $5.6 billion in 2011 to $7.4 billion in 2016. However, the civilian NSF budget for AI saw no increase in 2017. Japan Times reported in 2018 that the United States private investment is around $70 billion per year. The November 2019 'Interim Report' of the United States' National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence confirmed that AI is critical to US technological military superiority. The U.S. has many military AI combat programs, such as the Sea Hunter autonomous warship, which is designed to operate for extended periods at sea without a single crew member, and to even guide itself in and out of port. From 2017, a temporary US Department of Defense directive requires a human operator to be kept in the loop when it comes to the taking of human life by autonomous weapons systems. On October 31, 2019, the United States Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Board published the draft of a report recommending principles for the ethical use of artificial intelligence by the Department of Defense that would ensure a human operator would always be able to look into the 'black box' and understand the kill-chain process. However, a major concern is how the report will be implemented. The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) (pronounced "jake") is an American organization on exploring the usage of AI (particularly edge computing), Network of Networks, and AI-enhanced communication, for use in actual combat. It is a subdivision of the United States Armed Forces and was created in June 2018. The organization's stated objective is to "transform the US Department of Defense by accelerating the delivery and adoption of AI to achieve mission impact at scale. The goal is to use AI to solve large and complex problem sets that span multiple combat systems; then, ensure the combat Systems and Components have real-time access to ever-improving libraries of data sets and tools." In 2023, Microsoft pitched the DoD to use DALL-E models to train its battlefield management system. OpenAI, the developer of DALL-E, removed the blanket ban on military and warfare use from its usage policies in January 2024. The Biden administration imposed restrictions on the export of advanced NVIDIA chips and GPUs to China in an effort to limit China's progress in artificial intelligence and high-performance computing. The policy aimed to prevent the use of cutting-edge U.S. technology in military or surveillance applications and to maintain a strategic advantage in the global AI race. In 2025, under the second Trump administration, the United States began a broad deregulation campaign aimed at accelerating growth in sectors critical to artificial intelligence, including nuclear energy, infrastructure, and high-performance computing. The goal was to remove regulatory barriers and attract private investment to boost domestic AI capabilities. This included easing restrictions on data usage, speeding up approvals for AI-related infrastructure projects, and incentivizing innovation in cloud computing and semiconductors. Companies like NVIDIA, Oracle, and Cisco played a central role in these efforts, expanding their AI research, data center capacity, and partnerships to help position the U.S. as a global leader in AI development. ==== Project Maven ==== Project Maven is a Pentagon project involving using machine learning and engineering talent to distinguish people and objects in drone videos, apparently giving the government real-time battlefield command and control, and the ability to track, tag and spy on targets without human involvement. Initially the effort was led by Robert O. Work who was concerned about China's military use of the emerging technology. Reportedly, Pentagon development stops short of acting as an AI weapons system capable of firing on self-designated targets. The project was established in a memo by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 April 2017. Also known as the Algorithmic Warfare Cross Functional Team, it is, according to Lt. Gen. of the United States Air Force Jack Shanahan in November 2017, a project "designed to be that pilot project, that pathfinder, that spark that kindles the flame front of artificial intelligence across the rest of the [Defense] Department". Its chief, U.S. Marine Corps Col. Drew Cukor, said: "People and computers will work symbiotically to increase the ability of weapon systems to detect objects." Project Maven has been noted by allies, such as Australia's Ian Langford, for the
Algorithmic amplification
Algorithmic amplification is the process by which automated ranking and recommendation systems on digital platforms increase the visibility of certain content beyond its initial audience. Major platforms including Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter) use such systems to determine what appears in users' feeds and search results. The term is used in research on social media and digital media regulation to describe how platform design choices influence the distribution of online information. Unlike chronological feeds, algorithmic systems evaluate content using signals such as engagement rates, viewing duration, and predicted relevance to individual users. Content that performs strongly on these metrics may be promoted to progressively larger audiences through feeds, search rankings, or autoplay systems. The process is distinct from content moderation, which involves removing, labelling, or restricting content under platform rules, although the two can interact in practice. The concept is closely connected to the attention economy. Research has linked algorithmic amplification to the spread of misinformation and the circulation of political content, as well as to effects on young users' mental health. The scale and direction of those effects remain debated, in part because independent researchers have limited access to the internal workings of platform recommendation systems. Governments in the European Union, United Kingdom, United States, and China have pursued differing regulatory approaches to recommendation algorithms. The EU's Digital Services Act and the UK's Online Safety Act 2023 impose obligations on large platforms related to recommendation system transparency and risk, while China became the first country to enact binding legislation specifically targeting such systems. Internal documents and whistleblower testimony reported by the BBC in 2026 described how competitive pressure between Meta and TikTok led to trade-offs between engagement and user safety in the design of their recommendation systems. == Terminology == The term algorithmic amplification is used in media studies, platform governance scholarship and regulatory literature to describe how automated systems influence the distribution of content beyond what organic user sharing alone would produce. It is distinct from viral spread, which refers primarily to user-driven sharing behaviour, and from algorithmic bias, which describes systematic errors or unfairness in algorithmic outputs. The related term algorithmic curation is used for the broader process of selecting and ordering content, of which amplification is one possible outcome. The phrase also appears in regulatory and legislative discussion of recommendation systems. The European Union's Digital Services Act (DSA) identifies recommendation systems as a potential source of systemic risk, and the term appears frequently in academic and policy commentary on the regulation. In the United States, proposals including the Filter Bubble Transparency Act and the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) have used it to frame requirements around recommendation system transparency. In the United Kingdom, the House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee used the term in a 2025 report on how recommendation algorithms contributed to the spread of misinformation during the 2024 Southport riots. A Joint Declaration on AI and Freedom of Expression adopted in October 2025 by four international freedom of expression mandate holders, including the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, stated that recommender systems and other AI-powered curation tools exert "a large hidden influence and gatekeeper role" over what information people access and consume. == Background == Early internet platforms typically displayed content in reverse-chronological order or through keyword-based search systems. Although the term is most often applied to social media, the underlying logic predates social media itself. A 2021 overview traced the origins of modern recommendation systems to the early 1990s, when they were first used experimentally for personal email and information filtering. The 1992 Tapestry mail system and the 1994 GroupLens news filtering system were early milestones before recommendation systems spread into e-commerce and other online services. As user bases and content volumes grew during the 2000s, major platforms including Google, YouTube, and Facebook developed machine-learning systems to personalise content delivery and prioritise material predicted to generate engagement. Facebook introduced its News Feed in 2006, which gradually shifted from chronological presentation towards algorithmically ranked content. YouTube altered its recommendation system in 2012 to prioritise watch time rather than clicks, a change the platform said was prompted by concerns that click-based metrics encouraged misleading thumbnails and low-quality videos. TikTok, launched internationally in 2018, adopted a model in which its primary content surface, the For You feed, is driven almost entirely by algorithmic recommendation rather than by a user's social graph. An internal document obtained by The New York Times in 2021 showed that the platform's algorithm optimised for retention and time spent, using signals such as watch duration, replays, likes, and comments to score and rank videos. Algorithmic recommendation also became central to platforms outside social media. Spotify's personalised features, including Discover Weekly, Release Radar, and Home recommendations, use behavioural signals and inferred "taste profiles" to surface tracks and artists beyond a listener's existing library. An ethnographic study of music curators at streaming platforms described this blend of algorithmic and human editorial selection as an "algo-torial" model of gatekeeping. Amazon adopted item-based collaborative filtering for product recommendations in 1998, and its recommendation engine has been described as one of the earliest large-scale deployments of recommendation technology in e-commerce. The same dynamics operate on adult content platforms. Law professor Amy Adler has argued that from 2007 onwards the pornography industry migrated to algorithm-driven streaming platforms, most of which are controlled by a single near-monopoly company, Aylo (formerly MindGeek). These platforms use algorithmic search engines, suggestions, rigid categorisation of content, and AI-driven search term optimisation in ways that produce the same distorting effects found on mainstream speech platforms, including filter bubbles, feedback loops, and the tendency of algorithmic recommendations to alter individual preferences. == Mechanisms == Recommendation systems commonly combine collaborative filtering, which predicts a user's preferences from the behaviour of similar users, with machine-learning models that predict which content a user is likely to engage with from their prior activity. In a common two-stage design, a platform first generates a set of candidate items from a large content pool and then ranks them using a scoring model with objectives such as predicted engagement or user satisfaction. Small changes in ranking criteria can shift exposure at scale, particularly when applied repeatedly across multiple browsing sessions. These systems typically rely on signals including engagement rates, viewing duration, click-through rates, and network relationships between users. Modern recommendation pipelines continuously update predictions as new behavioural data arrives, allowing platforms to adjust rankings in near real time. Users' revealed preferences, expressed through behaviour such as clicks and viewing time, do not always align with their stated preferences, expressed through explicit feedback such as surveys or content controls. Popularity signals can create feedback dynamics in which early engagement increases the likelihood that content will be shown to additional users. Experimental research on online cultural markets has demonstrated how such feedback processes can produce unequal visibility outcomes even when initial differences in content quality are small. == Beneficial and public-interest uses == Recommendation systems can help users navigate large volumes of content by surfacing material predicted to match their interests or needs, which can improve discoverability on platforms with large content libraries. In public health communication, platforms can help health authorities distribute timely information at scale, though the same recommendation systems also risk amplifying misinformation alongside official guidance. Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci has argued that the shift from independent blogs to large centralised platforms transferred gatekeeping power from traditional media to corporate algorithms. In the case of the Egyptian uprising of 2011, she noted that ordinary users