CrocBITE (currently CrocAttack) was an online database of wild crocodilian attacks reported on humans in the world. The non-profit online research tool helped to scientifically analyze crocodilian behavior via complex models. Users were encouraged to feed information in a crowdsourcing manner. This website excludes captive crocodilian attacks, as well as non-fatal bites on professional handlers, rangers, staff, or researchers, and crocodilian attacks on pets and livestock, because its primary goal is to analyze natural human-crocodilian conflict in the wild for conservation and management purposes, and that these incidents do are not considered indicative of natural species behavior or typical human-wildlife conflict, as well as not providing enough useful data and helping researchers understand wild population behavior or typical human-wildlife conflict dynamics and helps create safety strategies for people living or working near wild crocodilians, rather than tracking workplace accidents in zoos or farms. While fatal incidents involving handlers are sometimes included on the website, typical captive incidents (such as handlers being bitten by them in zoos) are excluded because they are considered manageable professional risks rather than general public safety threats. == About == The online database was established in 2013 (2013) by Dr Adam Britton, a researcher at Charles Darwin University, his student Brandon Sideleau and Erin Britton. It was a compilation of government records, individual reports, registered contributors and historical data. Dr Simon Pooley, Junior Research fellow, Imperial College London joined hands to further the studies. The collaboration culminated when Dr Pooley met Dr Britton at the IUCN Crocodile Specialist Group, in Louisiana in 2014. The program received funds from Economic and Social Research Council, United Kingdom to the tune of A$30,000 and unspecified resourced plus amount from Big Gecko Crocodilian Research, Crocodillian.com and Charles Darwin University. The research yielded pertinent observations that provide inside into crocodile attacks. It was observed that most attacks on humans occur from bites of Saltwater crocodile as against the popular understanding of Nile crocodiles taking the top spot. This is not, however, believed to be the actual case, as most attacks by the Nile crocodile are believed to go unreported or only reported on a local level. The broad category of Nile crocodile attacks were segmented into West African crocodile and Crocodylus niloticus (the Nile Crocodile) species to get a clear understanding of their respective attack zones. The objective was that the information would be used by communities and conservation managers to help inform and educate people about how to keep safe. The information was vital for Australia and Africa where such attacks are more likely than in other parts of the world. This was the only database of its kind with such comprehensive collection of information made available online. The database is no longer online, and its founder Adam Britton is in custody having pleaded guilty to charges of bestiality on September 25, 2023. It has been rebranded and renamed CrocAttack, and serves as a updated database focusing on human-crocodilian conflict and records over 8,500 incidents from the past decades.
Flok (company)
Flok (formerly Loyalblocks) was an American tech startup based in New York City that provides marketing services such as chatbots/AI, customer loyalty programs, mobile apps and CRM services to local businesses. In January 2017, the company was acquired by Wix.com. Around March 2017, Flok ceased regular communication. At some point in 2019 Flok communicated to its customers that it would shut down in March 2020. == Background == Flok was founded in 2011 by Ido Gaver and Eran Kirshenboim and has offices in Tel Aviv, Israel. In May 2013, Flok secured a $9 million Series A Round from General Catalyst Partners with participation from Founder Collective and existing investor Gemini Israel Ventures. In total, Flok has raised over $18 million in venture capital in three rounds. In May 2014, Flok announced a self-service loyalty platform for SMBs to build their own programs with beacon integration. At that time, approximately 40,000 businesses were using the service. In 2016, Flok released a turnkey chatbot service for local businesses, and was featured in AdWeek for developing the first weed bot chatbot for a California cannabis business. == Services == Flok offered an eponymous customer-facing app, that consumers use to receive rewards and deals from partner businesses, and a Flok business app for merchants to manage the platform.
Social media reach
Social media reach is a media analytics metric that refers to the number of users who have come across a particular content on a particular social media platform. Social media platforms have their own individual ways of tracking, analyzing and reporting the traffic on each of the individual platforms. As these platforms are a main source of communication between companies and their target audiences, by conducting research, companies are able to utilize analytical information, such as the reach of their posts, to better understand the interactions between the users and their content. There are multiple underlying factors that will determine what shows up on a newsfeed or timeline. Algorithms, for example, are a type of factor that can alter the reach of a post due to the way the algorithm is coded, which can affect who sees a post and when. Other examples of factors that can impede the reach can include the time at which posts are made, as well as how frequent the posts are between one another. In comparison, an impression is the total number of circumstances where content has been shown on a social timeline, meanwhile, engagement looks at how people interact with the content that they see on a social platform such as like, share or retweet. == Reach on Facebook == Facebook has their own analytic platform which allows the user to see how other users are interacting with their posts, with the use of multiple metrics. This is not something the average user uses, but rather a tool that is used by pages or public figures. For example, Facebook pages that represent a business often look at the activity their posts have generated. There are three types of reach that can be looked at on the Facebook analytic platform. === Types of reach === ==== Organic Reach ==== This type of reach regards the number of distinct users that have seen a specific post on their feed. Organic reach, in other words is the number of people who have seen the post being analyzed on their Facebook newsfeed. Data gathered from this type of reach can give intel to those doing the analysis, such as the demographics of those who have seen the post. ==== Paid Reach ==== This type of reach regards the number of times that distinct users have come across sponsored posts, ads or content. In other words, paid reach is the number of times Facebook users have seen a post that has been paid for by a company. Data collected can give insight, to advertisers or marketers for example, on the activity based around the reach of their post. ==== Viral Reach ==== This type of reach regards the number of views by distinct users on posts that have been commented on or shared by their friends on Facebook. In other words, viral reach looks at the number of people who have seen a post after a friend of theirs commented or shared the original post, therefore it showed on their timeline. Viral reach can be looked at in terms of a collective number of times that the post has been on individual user's timelines. Data collected from viral reach can be used in multiple ways, for example, it can be used to analyze the type of content that gets shared or commented on and can be further used to compare to other posts. === Engaged users === This refers to the number of individual users who have clicked and interacted with a post on Facebook. == Reach on Twitter == Twitter gives access to any of their users to analytics of their tweets as well as their followers. Their dashboard is user friendly, which allows anyone to take a look at the analytics behind their Twitter account. This open access is useful for both the average user and companies as it can provide a quick glance or general outlook of who has seen their tweets. The way that Twitter works is slightly different than the way of Facebook in terms of the reach. On Twitter, especially for users with a higher profile, they are not only engaging with the people who follow them, but also with the followers of their own followers. The reach metric on Twitter looks at the quantity of Twitter users who have been engaged, but also the number of users that follow them as well. This metric is useful to see the if the tweets/content being shared on Twitter are contributing to the growth of audience on this platform. == Reach on Instagram == Instagram gives their users access to their reach, in the Instagram Insights section. Instagram insights can be used to learn more about an account's followers and performance. Reach indicates the total number of unique Instagram accounts that have seen your Instagram post or story. You can find this data by looking at each individual post insights. == Uses of reach == The reach can be a useful metric to analyze for marketers and advertisers. Social media is a platform that is used by marketers to directly target their intended audience with ease. These platforms not only allow marketers to get a better understanding of their audience, but also allow advertisers to insert their ads onto the timelines of specific users to later be able to conduct research to see the reach of their posts/content. The basic goal of marketers is to increase their reach as much as possible to impact bigger audiences of their dream customers and, in the end, make more sales. When doing organic social media marketing, using paid methods like ads or doing influencer marketing whether it is paid or free, it allows marketers to track the performance of their strategy and tweak it based on what works and what does not. == Analytics and reach == Social analytics looks at the data collected based on the interactions of users on social media platforms. A lot of information can be gathered which can provide intel based on user activities on social media. When looking into analytics in regard to social media, each company or group has a different goal in mind to engage their audience. At a glance, the three might seem as if they are very similar, however the differences between them are significant. There are many aspects that can be analyzed from the data gathered from social media platforms, depending on what is being observed, the correct metric would then be selected to further analyze. One example of the many metrics that can be used through social analytics is the reach. == Reach formula == To calculate social media reach one can use the following formula: R = I f ¯ {\displaystyle R={\frac {I}{\bar {f}}}} where R {\displaystyle R} — is social media reach, I {\displaystyle I} stands for the number of impressions, f ¯ {\displaystyle {\bar {f}}} is the average frequency of impressions per user. f ¯ {\displaystyle {\bar {f}}} represents the number of events when the ad is shown to a particular user. The average value should be calculated over the time period with stable settings of advertisement campaign. == Commenting For Better Reach == Commenting For Better Reach also known as "CFBR" is a widely used strategy for organically boosting post reach on social media platforms. Algorithms tend to favor posts with substantial likes and comments, granting them broader exposure compared to less engaging content. Primarily seen on LinkedIn, a platform geared toward professional networking and business connections, the use of CFBR signals active engagement aimed at enhancing post visibility. It is important to note that genuine and meaningful comments are key to effective engagement. Spammy or irrelevant comments not only detract from the conversation but may also limit a post's potential reach and impact.
Strong cryptography
Strong cryptography or cryptographically strong are general terms used to designate the cryptographic algorithms that, when used correctly, provide a very high (usually insurmountable) level of protection against any eavesdropper, including the government agencies. There is no precise definition of the boundary line between the strong cryptography and (breakable) weak cryptography, as this border constantly shifts due to improvements in hardware and cryptanalysis techniques. These improvements eventually place the capabilities once available only to the NSA within the reach of a skilled individual, so in practice there are only two levels of cryptographic security, "cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files" (Bruce Schneier). The strong cryptography algorithms have high security strength, for practical purposes usually defined as a number of bits in the key. For example, the United States government, when dealing with export control of encryption, considered as of 1999 any implementation of the symmetric encryption algorithm with the key length above 56 bits or its public key equivalent to be strong and thus potentially a subject to the export licensing. To be strong, an algorithm needs to have a sufficiently long key and be free of known mathematical weaknesses, as exploitation of these effectively reduces the key size. At the beginning of the 21st century, the typical security strength of the strong symmetrical encryption algorithms is 128 bits (slightly lower values still can be strong, but usually there is little technical gain in using smaller key sizes). Demonstrating the resistance of any cryptographic scheme to attack is a complex matter, requiring extensive testing and reviews, preferably in a public forum. Good algorithms and protocols are required (similarly, good materials are required to construct a strong building), but good system design and implementation is needed as well: "it is possible to build a cryptographically weak system using strong algorithms and protocols" (just like the use of good materials in construction does not guarantee a solid structure). Many real-life systems turn out to be weak when the strong cryptography is not used properly, for example, random nonces are reused A successful attack might not even involve algorithm at all, for example, if the key is generated from a password, guessing a weak password is easy and does not depend on the strength of the cryptographic primitives. A user can become the weakest link in the overall picture, for example, by sharing passwords and hardware tokens with the colleagues. == Background == The level of expense required for strong cryptography originally restricted its use to the government and military agencies, until the middle of the 20th century the process of encryption required a lot of human labor and errors (preventing the decryption) were very common, so only a small share of written information could have been encrypted. US government, in particular, was able to keep a monopoly on the development and use of cryptography in the US into the 1960s. In the 1970, the increased availability of powerful computers and unclassified research breakthroughs (Data Encryption Standard, the Diffie-Hellman and RSA algorithms) made strong cryptography available for civilian use. Mid-1990s saw the worldwide proliferation of knowledge and tools for strong cryptography. By the 21st century the technical limitations were gone, although the majority of the communication were still unencrypted. At the same the cost of building and running systems with strong cryptography became roughly the same as the one for the weak cryptography. The use of computers changed the process of cryptanalysis, famously with Bletchley Park's Colossus. But just as the development of digital computers and electronics helped in cryptanalysis, it also made possible much more complex ciphers. It is typically the case that use of a quality cipher is very efficient, while breaking it requires an effort many orders of magnitude larger - making cryptanalysis so inefficient and impractical as to be effectively impossible. == Cryptographically strong algorithms == This term "cryptographically strong" is often used to describe an encryption algorithm, and implies, in comparison to some other algorithm (which is thus cryptographically weak), greater resistance to attack. But it can also be used to describe hashing and unique identifier and filename creation algorithms. See for example the description of the Microsoft .NET runtime library function Path.GetRandomFileName. In this usage, the term means "difficult to guess". An encryption algorithm is intended to be unbreakable (in which case it is as strong as it can ever be), but might be breakable (in which case it is as weak as it can ever be) so there is not, in principle, a continuum of strength as the idiom would seem to imply: Algorithm A is stronger than Algorithm B which is stronger than Algorithm C, and so on. The situation is made more complex, and less subsumable into a single strength metric, by the fact that there are many types of cryptanalytic attack and that any given algorithm is likely to force the attacker to do more work to break it when using one attack than another. There is only one known unbreakable cryptographic system, the one-time pad, which is not generally possible to use because of the difficulties involved in exchanging one-time pads without them being compromised. So any encryption algorithm can be compared to the perfect algorithm, the one-time pad. The usual sense in which this term is (loosely) used, is in reference to a particular attack, brute force key search — especially in explanations for newcomers to the field. Indeed, with this attack (always assuming keys to have been randomly chosen), there is a continuum of resistance depending on the length of the key used. But even so there are two major problems: many algorithms allow use of different length keys at different times, and any algorithm can forgo use of the full key length possible. Thus, Blowfish and RC5 are block cipher algorithms whose design specifically allowed for several key lengths, and who cannot therefore be said to have any particular strength with respect to brute force key search. Furthermore, US export regulations restrict key length for exportable cryptographic products and in several cases in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., famously in the case of Lotus Notes' export approval) only partial keys were used, decreasing 'strength' against brute force attack for those (export) versions. More or less the same thing happened outside the US as well, as for example in the case of more than one of the cryptographic algorithms in the GSM cellular telephone standard. The term is commonly used to convey that some algorithm is suitable for some task in cryptography or information security, but also resists cryptanalysis and has no, or fewer, security weaknesses. Tasks are varied, and might include: generating randomness encrypting data providing a method to ensure data integrity Cryptographically strong would seem to mean that the described method has some kind of maturity, perhaps even approved for use against different kinds of systematic attacks in theory and/or practice. Indeed, that the method may resist those attacks long enough to protect the information carried (and what stands behind the information) for a useful length of time. But due to the complexity and subtlety of the field, neither is almost ever the case. Since such assurances are not actually available in real practice, sleight of hand in language which implies that they are will generally be misleading. There will always be uncertainty as advances (e.g., in cryptanalytic theory or merely affordable computer capacity) may reduce the effort needed to successfully use some attack method against an algorithm. In addition, actual use of cryptographic algorithms requires their encapsulation in a cryptosystem, and doing so often introduces vulnerabilities which are not due to faults in an algorithm. For example, essentially all algorithms require random choice of keys, and any cryptosystem which does not provide such keys will be subject to attack regardless of any attack resistant qualities of the encryption algorithm(s) used. == Legal issues == Widespread use of encryption increases the costs of surveillance, so the government policies aim to regulate the use of the strong cryptography. In the 2000s, the effect of encryption on the surveillance capabilities was limited by the ever-increasing share of communications going through the global social media platforms, that did not use the strong encryption and provided governments with the requested data. Murphy talks about a legislative balance that needs to be struck between the power of the government that are broad enough to be able to follow the qui
Brain Imaging Data Structure
The Brain Imaging Data Structure (BIDS) is a standard for organizing, annotating, and describing data collected during neuroimaging experiments. It is based on a formalized file and directory structure and metadata files (based on JSON and TSV) with controlled vocabulary. This standard has been adopted by a multitude of labs around the world as well as databases such as OpenNeuro, SchizConnect, Developing Human Connectome Project, and FCP-INDI, and is seeing uptake in an increasing number of studies. While originally specified for MRI data, BIDS has been extended to several other imaging modalities such as MEG, EEG, and intracranial EEG (see also BIDS Extension Proposals). == History == The project is a community-driven effort. BIDS, originally OBIDS (Open Brain Imaging Data Structure), was initiated during an INCF sponsored data sharing working group meeting (January 2015) at Stanford University. It was subsequently spearheaded and maintained by Chris Gorgolewski. Since October 2019, the project is headed by a Steering Group and maintained by a separate team of maintainers, the Maintainers Group, according to a governance document that was approved of by the BIDS community in a vote. BIDS has advanced under the direction and effort of contributors, the community of researchers that appreciate the value of standardizing neuroimaging data to facilitate sharing and analysis. == BIDS Extension Proposals == BIDS can be extended in a backwards compatible way and is evolving over time. This is accomplished through BIDS Extension Proposals (BEPs), which are community-driven processes following agreed-upon guidelines. A full list of finalized BEPs and BEPs in progress can be found on the BIDS website
Content determination
Content determination is the subtask of natural language generation (NLG) that involves deciding on the information to be communicated in a generated text. It is closely related to the task of document structuring. == Example == Consider an NLG system which summarises information about sick babies. Suppose this system has four pieces of information it can communicate The baby is being given morphine via an IV drop The baby's heart rate shows bradycardia's (temporary drops) The baby's temperature is normal The baby is crying Which of these bits of information should be included in the generated texts? == Issues == There are three general issues which almost always impact the content determination task, and can be illustrated with the above example. Perhaps the most fundamental issue is the communicative goal of the text, i.e. its purpose and reader. In the above example, for instance, a doctor who wants to make a decision about medical treatment would probably be most interested in the heart rate bradycardias, while a parent who wanted to know how her child was doing would probably be more interested in the fact that the baby was being given morphine and was crying. The second issue is the size and level of detail of the generated text. For instance, a short summary which was sent to a doctor as a 160 character SMS text message might only mention the heart rate bradycardias, while a longer summary which was printed out as a multipage document might also mention the fact that the baby is on a morphine IV. The final issue is how unusual and unexpected the information is. For example, neither doctors nor parents would place a high priority on being told that the baby's temperature was normal, if they expected this to be the case. Regardless, content determination is very important to users, indeed in many cases the quality of content determination is the most important factor (from the user's perspective) in determining the overall quality of the generated text. == Techniques == There are three basic approaches to document structuring: schemas (content templates), statistical approaches, and explicit reasoning. Schemas are templates which explicitly specify the content of a generated text (as well as document structuring information). Typically, they are constructed by manually analysing a corpus of human-written texts in the target genre, and extracting a content template from these texts. Schemas work well in practice in domains where content is somewhat standardised, but work less well in domains where content is more fluid (such as the medical example above). Statistical techniques use statistical corpus analysis techniques to automatically determine the content of the generated texts. Such work is in its infancy, and has mostly been applied to contexts where the communicative goal, reader, size, and level of detail are fixed. For example, generation of newswire summaries of sporting events. Explicit reasoning approaches have probably attracted the most attention from researchers. The basic idea is to use AI reasoning techniques (such as knowledge-based rules, planning, pattern detection, case-based reasoning, etc.) to examine the information available to be communicated (including how unusual/unexpected it is), the communicative goal and reader, and the characteristics of the generated text (including target size), and decide on the optimal content for the generated text. A very wide range of techniques has been explored, but there is no consensus as to which is most effective.
Multiple encryption
Multiple encryption is the process of encrypting an already encrypted message one or more times, either using the same or a different algorithm. It is also known as cascade encryption, cascade ciphering, cipher stacking, multiple encryption, and superencipherment. Superencryption refers to the outer-level encryption of a multiple encryption. Some cryptographers, like Matthew Green of Johns Hopkins University, say multiple encryption addresses a problem that mostly doesn't exist: Modern ciphers rarely get broken... You’re far more likely to get hit by malware or an implementation bug than you are to suffer a catastrophic attack on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). However, from the previous quote an argument for multiple encryption can be made, namely poor implementation. Using two different cryptomodules and keying processes from two different vendors requires both vendors' wares to be compromised for security to fail completely. == Independent keys == Picking any two ciphers, if the key used is the same for both, the second cipher could possibly undo the first cipher, partly or entirely. This is true of ciphers where the decryption process is exactly the same as the encryption process (a reciprocal cipher) – the second cipher would completely undo the first. If an attacker were to recover the key through cryptanalysis of the first encryption layer, the attacker could possibly decrypt all the remaining layers, assuming the same key is used for all layers. To prevent that risk, one can use keys that are statistically independent for each layer (e.g. independent RNGs). Ideally each key should have separate and different generation, sharing, and management processes. == Independent Initialization Vectors == For en/decryption processes that require sharing an Initialization Vector (IV) / nonce these are typically, openly shared or made known to the recipient (and everyone else). Its good security policy never to provide the same data in both plaintext and ciphertext when using the same key and IV. Therefore, its recommended (although at this moment without specific evidence) to use separate IVs for each layer of encryption. == Importance of the first layer == With the exception of the one-time pad, no cipher has been theoretically proven to be unbreakable. Furthermore, some recurring properties may be found in the ciphertexts generated by the first cipher. Since those ciphertexts are the plaintexts used by the second cipher, the second cipher may be rendered vulnerable to attacks based on known plaintext properties (see references below). This is the case when the first layer is a program P that always adds the same string S of characters at the beginning (or end) of all ciphertexts (commonly known as a magic number). When found in a file, the string S allows an operating system to know that the program P has to be launched in order to decrypt the file. This string should be removed before adding a second layer. To prevent this kind of attack, one can use the method provided by Bruce Schneier: Generate a random pad R of the same size as the plaintext. Encrypt R using the first cipher and key. XOR the plaintext with the pad, then encrypt the result using the second cipher and a different (!) key. Concatenate both ciphertexts in order to build the final ciphertext. A cryptanalyst must break both ciphers to get any information. This will, however, have the drawback of making the ciphertext twice as long as the original plaintext. Note, however, that a weak first cipher may merely make a second cipher that is vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack also vulnerable to a known plaintext attack. However, a block cipher must not be vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack to be considered secure. Therefore, the second cipher described above is not secure under that definition, either. Consequently, both ciphers still need to be broken. The attack illustrates why strong assumptions are made about secure block ciphers and ciphers that are even partially broken should never be used. == The Rule of Two == The Rule of Two is a data security principle from the NSA's Commercial Solutions for Classified Program (CSfC). It specifies two completely independent layers of cryptography to protect data. For example, data could be protected by both hardware encryption at its lowest level and software encryption at the application layer. It could mean using two FIPS-validated software cryptomodules from different vendors to en/decrypt data. The importance of vendor and/or model diversity between the layers of components centers around removing the possibility that the manufacturers or models will share a vulnerability. This way if one components is compromised there is still an entire layer of encryption protecting the information at rest or in transit. The CSfC Program offers solutions to achieve diversity in two ways. "The first is to implement each layer using components produced by different manufacturers. The second is to use components from the same manufacturer, where that manufacturer has provided NSA with sufficient evidence that the implementations of the two components are independent of one another." The principle is practiced in the NSA's secure mobile phone called Fishbowl. The phones use two layers of encryption protocols, IPsec and Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), to protect voice communications. The Samsung Galaxy S9 Tactical Edition is also an approved CSfC Component.